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
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1543

SUPPLEMENTARY

DESPATCHES, CORRESPONDENCE, AND MEMORANDA

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

ARTHUR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

EDITED BY HIS SON,

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

VOLUME THE SIXTH,

INCLUDING

EXPEDITION TO DENMARK—PLANS FOR CONQUEST OF MEXICO—
EXPEDITIONS TO PORTUGAL IN 1808 & 1809—
AND THE FIRST ADVANCE OF THE BRITISH ARMY INTO SPAIN.

[JULY, 1807 TO DECEMBER, 1810.]

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LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

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1844

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AND CHARING CROSS.

PREFACE.

THIS volume is divided into Chapters, comprising distinct subjects.

The first refers to the expedition to Denmark in 1807.

The second contains details of proposed plans for the conquest of Mexico, of Manilla, and of the Spanish Provinces in South America, in 1806-7-8.

The third relates to the British campaign in Portugal in 1808.

The fourth consists of documents connected with the Peninsular war, which are published as furnishing additional materials for the history of a period hitherto imperfectly understood.

SUPPLEMENTARY DESPATCHES.

CHAPTER I.—DENMARK.*

To Lord Hawkesbury. [1.]

On board the *Prometheus*, in the Cattegat,
5th Aug., 1807.

MY DEAR LORD,

I see some vessels standing out from the Sound, and I write a few lines to let you know where we are, which I hope to have an opportunity of sending home by one of them. We passed the fleet from the Nore on Sunday; it was well on to the northward, and I think that by this time it is off the Skaw, and will be able to come down the Cattegat with the wind which now blows. I have not seen or heard of any of the other detachments, and I imagine they must all be behind the Nore fleet. But the wind has been very favourable for the passage of all since we sailed, excepting yesterday, when it was calm for a few hours; and I think that we may expect the whole in a day or two. The weather has been delightful.

I expect to be at Elsineur this night or to-morrow morning.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lord Hawkesbury. [2.]

On board the *Prometheus*, off Elsineur,
7th Aug., 1807.

MY DEAR LORD,

I arrived here on Wednesday night, and the troops from the Nore came in this morning. We have no accounts yet of the other divisions.

I was on shore this day; all quiet yet, but the militia of this town are embodied, and there are more of them than I expected to find; I went into three or four houses, in each of which I

* Sir Arthur Wellesley was appointed in July, 1807, to command "the Reserve of the Army" proceeding to Copenhagen.

saw military clothing and accoutrements in readiness and belonging to the inhabitants. The people of the town appear inclined to supply the armament with provisions, &c.

I do not hear that the Crown Prince is come over from Holstein.

Lord Cathcart not yet arrived.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Will you let the Duke of Richmond know that you have heard from me, as I have not time to write to him?

[3.] *To Lord Hawkesbury.*

On board the *Goliah*, off Elsineur,
14th Aug., 1807.

MY DEAR LORD,

Since I wrote to you last our prospects here have changed in some degree. The Crown Prince arrived at Copenhagen on Monday, and we are informed that since his arrival the preparations for defence have been unremitting, both in the town and on the island. Mr. Taylor came away, I believe, on Tuesday night, and Lord Cathcart arrived here on Wednesday morning. He has been occupied in endeavours to obtain information which will enable him to decide on his plan of operations; and it has been calm or the wind has been contrary ever since his arrival.

From the accounts which the engineer has received, and the knowledge he has obtained from an examination of the plans of Copenhagen, he appears to be of opinion that the place is so strong that it cannot be taken excepting by a regular siege; and he appears to think that we have not the means to enable us to carry on the operations which would be necessary for the reduction of the place. It is also imagined that the enemy's numbers are greater and their description better than had been at first supposed; and upon the whole I think that the opinion of Lord Cathcart and the engineer officers is, that all he can do is to bombard the place, and set fire to or otherwise destroy the shipping. His intention therefore is to land as soon as he can move from hence, to invest Copenhagen with the British troops on the island of Zealand, and the Germans on the island of Amag, and to proceed afterwards as he may find it

to be practicable. From all that I have heard, however, of the state of our equipments for a siege, of the strength of the place, of the enemy's numbers, of the state of the country, and of our own wants, I am apprehensive that if we don't frighten the Danes out of Copenhagen by investing it completely, and by the appearance of an intention to attack it, our operations will be confined to the seizure of the Crown battery, and other posts which will best enable us to injure the fleet by the fire of mortars. I acknowledge that I am much disappointed; and I fear that you and your friends will be so likewise; but I am convinced that Lord Cathcart will omit nothing which can afford a hope of bringing things to a more fortunate conclusion.

I expect that the Germans under Lord Rosslyn will arrive in the Bay of Kioge this afternoon. This wind will answer for their passage from Rügen; and we shall certainly sail from hence as soon as the wind will allow us, and we shall land to the northward of Copenhagen.

The troops from Hull are not yet arrived.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

It was reported here yesterday, and I think in some degree confirmed last night, that the Crown Prince had taken the King from Copenhagen, and carried him into Holstein. This looks like a determination to defend the place to extremities; but if His Royal Highness does not return to it, I suspect that it will be but badly defended.

To Lord Hawkesbury. [4.]

MY DEAR LORD, Bronshage, in Zealand, 21st Aug., 1807.

We sailed from Elsineur roads on the 15th, and anchored off Veldbeck, the point at which the disembarkation was to take place; and at daylight on the morning of the 16th I landed with the light troops, and the whole army followed in the course of that day. We moved forward in the evening in three columns to a position between Lingbye and the sea, and on the next morning we marched again in three columns, and took up the position which we now occupy, by which we have completely invested Copenhagen on the side of the island of Zealand.

Since the 17th the time has been taken up principally in landing and bringing up the artillery, and in securing the position which we have taken. The enemy have manifested a considerable jealousy of our left, and have kept up a heavy fire upon it from the Crown battery and some gunboats; but they have done us little mischief, and a battery will be finished in the course of this day at the extremity of our left, which will threaten the former and keep the latter within the harbour. Since the 17th the weather has been so calm that the fleet has scarcely been able to get under weigh, so that our armed craft have not been able to render all the assistance which they otherwise would; and this state of the weather has not prevented the operations of the Danish row-boats.

I saw Lord Rosslyn's fleet still in the Bay of Kioge on the night before last from the top of the palace of Fridericborg, and I am in hopes that they will have been able to get under weigh by the aid of the breeze which we had yesterday evening. Lord Cathcart will have informed Lord Castlereagh that he now intends to land the Germans as well as the British troops upon Zealand, and to occupy Amag after he will have established his communication with that island, if he should find the measure to be necessary.

I cannot pretend to give you any opinion of the strength of this place, for we are not sufficiently near it to enable me to see it. I believe that the number of regular troops within the place is very small indeed, but the Burgher militia are numerous. The artillery are very good; but I think that we have reason to believe that the quantity of stores, particularly powder, in the place is very insufficient. My troops and the Hanoverian cavalry have been successful in intercepting some convoys, and a German corps under General Decken have taken the depôt, foundry, &c., at Fridericborg.

In respect to our prospect of success in our object, I am not able to form an opinion. We ought certainly to occupy Amag, or we shall not produce the distress for provisions in the town which is likely to cause the capitulation without resorting to a bombardment; and I conceive that there can be no risk in extending ourselves to that island, considering the small body of regular troops which are in Copenhagen, and that we shall have a secure communication between the troops on our right and those which will be in Amag.

We have it in our power to place ourselves much nearer the town than we are at present; and I think it probable that an advance to this position, the occupation of Amag, and the storming of the Crown battery, will produce an effect upon the minds of the inhabitants which will lead to a capitulation without obliging us to resort to bombardment. But if that should not have the wished-for effect, I can hardly believe that in their situation they can hold out against the injuries which we have it in our power to do them.

We are very unpopular in the country, and derive but little resource or assistance from it, and that little is procured with difficulty. The inhabitants have fled from their villages in many places; and in none have we yet succeeded in prevailing upon them to cut or bring in their harvest. But I am in hopes that I shall be able to prevail upon them in this part of the country, and that the others will follow their example.

The troops are in high health and spirits. They have behaved very well in all the little affairs which they have had, and tolerably well in other respects.

I promised to write to Lord Castlereagh, but I have not time at present, and must beg you to communicate this letter to him.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM. [5.]

23rd Aug., 1807.

It appears that the force assembled at Roeskilde consists of about 2400 regular infantry, with cavalry amounting to between 400 and 600 men, and from 12 to 16 pieces of artillery. Besides these troops, the peasantry have been collected in such numbers as to make the total force amount to 4000 men, which, it is believed, may be still further increased. It is known that some officers have joined this corps from Holstein, and there is every reason to believe that an effort will be made to complete it in its equipments and its discipline, and they have begun to fortify themselves at Roeskilde. There can be no doubt of the necessity of making an early effort to disperse this corps: the question is, what the amount and description of the force ought to be, and what its plan of operations?

Considering the present amount of the force in regular troops; the numbers of which the whole corps consists, and the chance that it will be increased; that its position is already in some degree fortified; that we cannot get intelligence how or where; and that all we know is, that it would be most advisable to make more than one attack; it appears advisable not to employ upon this service a smaller corps than the British reserve, aided by as large a body of dragoons as can be spared from the operations of the siege of Copenhagen. The troops ought to be divided into two corps. One, consisting of the great body of the infantry with * squadrons of cavalry, ought to march by the high road from Fridericborg to Roeskilde. They should leave their positions in this neighbourhood as soon as it should be dark, assemble behind Fridericborg, and they would arrive in the neighbourhood of Roeskilde about day-break.

The other corps should consist of five companies of the 43rd, of the 2nd battalion 95th regiment, and * squadrons of cavalry. The line of operation for this corps should be upon the flank and rear of the enemy, while the principal corps should attack him in front. This may be carried into execution, either by a march to the northward and the passage of the Roeskilde Fiord into Jægersprus, or by a march to the southward and turning the enemy's left flank. In respect to the first, I have to observe that, by the adoption of it, the success of the expedition, as far as it will depend upon the operations of this corps, will be exposed to the chances which must always attend the operations of troops which depend upon the passage of broad rivers, and embarkation and disembarkation of horses in boats. But this is not the only objection which exists in my mind to this plan of operations. When this corps will have crossed the Roeskilde Fiord it will be in the peninsula of Jægersprus, the greatest breadth of which may be about ten miles. It is not very probable that the enemy would retire to that quarter. On the other hand, we will suppose that he stands the attack at Roeskilde: the march from the point of the peninsula to Roeskilde is as long as that from Fridericborg; both corps would start nearly at the same time, but the smaller one must have disembarked in Jægersprus at least on the preceding morning, if not on the preceding night, so that it would be exposed to the

* Blank in manuscript.

attack of the enemy during twelve, if not during twenty-four, hours before the corps would march from Copenhagen.

But the great objection of all to this plan is, that if it should be successful, it will oblige the enemy to draw off in the direction in which we should not wish to see him go. Our object should be to press him upon his right flank, and oblige him to retire into Jægersprus; or, if he should be able to pass on to the westward, into the narrow countries in the N.W. of Zealand. Upon the whole, therefore, I should recommend that the operations of the smaller of these corps should be directed to the southward, and to turn the enemy by his right. In respect to the road which it must take, I suspect that it must march by the high road as far as Roeskilde Rooe, if not as far as Flyng. From the map, it appears that the Brente runs through a marsh, which is probably impassable; the plan of operations for both corps should be, therefore, to assemble at Flyng, the cavalry being on the left of the road. If that should not be approved of, the infantry of the smaller corps might march, at an earlier hour in the evening, by Rodwill Bronsbye Verter, to Vallensbeck, where it might be joined by the cavalry and proceed by Thuie or Dauridge; or possibly even in a more southerly direction, to force the enemy towards the Fiord or the Peninsula.

There ought to be cannon with both these divisions. There is a brigade already with the reserve, and it would be desirable to have two more 6-pounders and two howitzers, in order to be able to detach a sufficient quantity with the left division.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut.-Gen. Lord Cathcart. [6.]

MY LORD, Kormenah, 27th Aug., 1807. 5 P.M.

I marched from Bronshage yesterday with the troops which your Lordship placed under my command, in two columns: the right, consisting of two squadrons of Reden's hussars, half a brigade of Hanoverian horse artillery, a brigade of British artillery, the 2nd battalion 52nd, the 1st battalion 92nd, 5 companies of the 43rd, and 5 companies of the 95th, went to Roeskilde Rooe; and the left, consisting of 6 squadrons of Hanoverian hussars, half a brigade of Hanoverian horse artillery, the 6th battalion of the Legion, 5 companies of the 43rd,

and 5 companies of the 2nd battalion 95th regiment, under the command of Major-General Linsingen, went to Cagstrup. Both columns marched again this morning: the left by a long détour through the woods to the southward, with an intention to turn the enemy's position at Kirkerup and prevent his retreat to the southward; and the right by the road of Roeskilde and Swagerslov, to attack it in front. The enemy, however, broke up from hence yesterday in the evening, and directed his march, with the principal body of his troops, upon Kioge; and it appears that the landwehr have separated, and some have gone towards Ringstæd, and others, it is said, towards Holbek.

As in the relative positions of General Castenskiold and myself, the rear of the army making the siege of Copenhagen is exposed to him, and as I could not make any attempt upon him to-morrow, as General Linsingen's column is unable to make another long march, I have thought it best to move forthwith to Roeskilde Rooe with the infantry of my column, and to send Colonel Reden, with his hussars, to Vallensbeck. By this position we shall effectually protect the rear of the army; and General Linsingen, who is in this neighbourhood, will move to Roeskilde to-morrow, and will be able to undertake anything against the enemy the next day.

I hope that your Lordship will approve of these movements; and I beg you to let me know whether you wish me to follow General Castenskiold to the southward, if I should find that he moves in that direction.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[7.] *To Lord Hawkesbury.*

MY DEAR LORD, Roeskilde Rooe, 28th Aug., 1807.

Lord Rosslyn landed at Kioge, and joined the army before Copenhagen, on the 22nd and 23rd, and on that day we found that the battery which had been constructed on the extremity of our left had not been so effectual a protection against the fire of the gun-boats as had been expected. In fact, in an engagement between our gun craft and battery on our left on one side, and the Crown battery and the enemy's gun-boats on the other, on the 23rd, the enemy had the best of it, and our boats were

obliged to draw off. Lord Cathcart therefore determined to move on his centre and right; and on the morning of the 24th the whole line, with the exception of the extremity of the left, moved forward and established themselves without opposition in a line, at the distance of about 1700 yards from the town; and my riflemen in the centre of the guards on the right were pushed considerably more forward into the suburbs. On the 25th Lord Rosslyn took up my position on the lines, as I was destined to destroy the collection of Danish troops and peasants which had been making in the neighbourhood of Roeskilde; and on the 25th, in the afternoon, there was some appearance of an intention in the enemy to make a sortie to drive in the riflemen and light infantry of the guards which occupied the faubourgs in front of our line. I went down and assisted Lord Rosslyn, and we soon drove in the enemy entirely, and have established ourselves within 700 yards of the town, on the bank of the reservoirs of water for the supply of Copenhagen. The left made a forward movement at the same time, with the exception of its flank; so that on the morning of the 26th, when I marched, the army was securely established in a position within 700 yards of the works of the town. Lord Cathcart intended to establish mortar batteries at that distance, and then to summon the town. Since my departure I hear that he has given them twenty-four hours to consider of his propositions; and I learn that our battery upon the left has been more successful against the enemy's craft; that one vessel has blown up, and two have been sunk; and that on the right, where the enemy had brought gun craft, between Amag and the island of Zealand, a battery which has been constructed for the protection of the right flank has been equally successful. Unless the enemy should consent to our terms, I conclude that Lord Cathcart will commence the bombardment to-morrow morning. I acknowledge that I should prefer an establishment upon Amag, as a more certain mode of forcing a capitulation than a bombardment. In fact, the Danes are fighting only for their credit; it would be disgraceful not to bear a bombardment; but no city with a population of 70,000 or 80,000 inhabitants can be expected to hold out when cut off from all supplies of provisions. Besides, I think that it behoves us to do as little mischief to the town as possible, and to adopt any mode of reducing it, rather than bombardment. However, I am aware that no man can judge of the propriety of any par-

ticular plan of operations so well as the person who conducts them, and knows every thing; and therefore I conclude that there are some strong reasons against the occupation of Amag, of which I am not aware: one of these is certainly the necessity of sending a detachment to disperse the collection of troops making near Roeskilde, upon which service I am now employed with my own corps, and a part of the cavalry under General Linsingen. I made a good forced march upon them yesterday, but they avoided me, and are gone down to Kioge, and I propose to try again to-morrow. But the country is so much against us, that I can get no information excepting from our own patrols, and this deficiency of intelligence may protract the defeat or dispersion of the corps. The troops continue very healthy, and behave tolerably well; they have done very well in the little affair which we have had before Copenhagen. Pray communicate this letter to Lord Castlereagh.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[8.] *To Lieut.-Gen. Lord Cathcart.*

MY LORD, Kioge, 29th Aug., 1807. Half-past 10 P.M.

In my letter of this evening* I omitted to say anything to you about the prisoners. I now intend to send them to the army to-morrow, unless I should receive your Lordship's orders not to do so. The officers are very desirous to be allowed to go about the country on their parole; and, if your Lordship should have no objection, I think I can make an arrangement with the General which shall relieve them from the inconvenience of confinement, at the same time that we shall not suffer from the indulgence which we may extend to them. However, I shall send them to the army, unless I should receive your Lordship's permission to give them their parole.

Our loss has been very small; we have lost no English officer, and but few men of the 92nd and 95th. Some of the officers of hussars have been wounded, and a few of the men. I have not yet got the returns of killed and wounded. The rout of the enemy appears complete.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. iv., p. 2.

I propose to-morrow to extend my outposts to Ringstæd, and I shall take up, with the infantry, a position which shall be centrical to Ringstæd, Kioge, and Roeskilde, rather nearest to the latter. By this disposition I hope to keep up the terror of our success; I shall be in the way to succour this place if an attempt should be made upon it, and I shall be able to feed upon Roeskilde. The Amptman, I must observe, however, has not supplied the bread he promised on the 27th, much less that for the last requisition.

We have prisoners coming in every moment.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut.-Gen. Lord Cathcart. [9.]

MY LORD, Kioge, 30th Aug., 1807. 12 at noon.

I have the honour to inform you that 1500 prisoners, in charge of two companies of the 43rd and a detachment of dragoons, will march off forthwith towards Copenhagen, and they will arrive at head-quarters to-morrow. In respect to the officers, I have made an arrangement with Major-General Oxholm, of which I enclose a copy; and they will attend your Lordship's orders to-morrow at head-quarters.

The guns and arms are either destroyed or removed into the King's ships; the powder has all been removed; and I propose to march this day to take up a position, with my cavalry under Colonel Reden, towards the peninsula of Jægersprus; my infantry at Kishe Honlöe, Sœrlöre, and Orsted, and Terslov, and General Linsingen at Ringstæd, with his cavalry spreading towards this place.

I send with the prisoners some waggons, which I wish to have returned loaded with bread.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Kioge, 30th Aug., 1807.

It is agreed between Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., and Major-General Oxholm, that the officers in the service of His Danish Majesty, a list of whose names is annexed

to this agreement, shall attend the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the British army before Copenhagen at Hellerup to-morrow morning, the 31st of August, with the exception of Lieutenant Wedel Jarlsberg, who is wounded, and unable to travel, and who therefore has the permission of Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley to remain at Kioge till the orders of the Commander-in-Chief will be received.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
P. L. OXHOLM.

Major-Gen. Oxholm to Major-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Kioge, 2nd Aug., 1807.

Penetrated with gratitude for your human and generous conduct towards me and all the officers prisoners, I beg leave here in writing to repeat what my words were unable to express when you left Kioge. I have been at head-quarters, and received there from Lord Cathcart an equal noble treatment: my officers were permitted to go home on their parole; the soldiers were sent on bord the ships; I could not obtain any indulgence for them, but have no right to complain, well convinced that, could it have been granted, it would have been done. It is a great pitty that political views should counteract the private feelings of the individuals, but, as soldiers, our lot is to obey.

I enclose a letter to Lord Cathcart, which I request the favour of you to forward with your next despatches, having the honour to be, with the greatest respect, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

P. L. OXHOLM.*

[10.] *To Lieut.-Gen. Lord Cathcart.*

MY LORD, Bræsenborg, 31st Aug., 1807.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 30th, and I am much flattered by the notice which your Lordship has been pleased to take of the little service which we have been enabled to perform.

I made no report to your Lordship respecting General Linsingen's pursuit, for it produced only a few more prisoners. I do not believe that any entire column got away, excepting that of cavalry, which he could not have been able to overtake. The débande is general, and I hear that the people are returning to their homes in all parts of the country. I have not heard where General Castenskiold or his cavalry are. It is supposed in this

* Printed from the original letter written by Major-Gen. Oxholm.

neighbourhood that our success will have a great effect in Copenhagen, for much was expected from this army, and I have no doubt but that the magazine of gunpowder was intended for the fort.

I am not yet quite clear of uneasiness about subsistence, although I have better hopes of a supply from Roeskilde than I had: the fact is that there is but little wheat flour in the country. I have not seen my commissary since the 28th, and, what is worse, he has removed from Roeskilde the young German officer acting as commissary who I had desired should remain there.

I am sorry to hear that General Baird is wounded, but I hope that his wound will not be attended by any bad consequences.

I enclose a letter which the Countess of Holstein, who lives in this neighbourhood, has requested to have sent into the fort. May I request your Lordship to have it sent by the first opportunity?

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

I did not make any arrangement respecting the prisoners, excepting one which provided for their going to head-quarters to receive your orders.

To the Countess of Holstein. [11.]

1st Sept., 1807.

Upon my march from Kioge towards this part of the country, I heard with the greatest concern that a detachment of British troops which had pursued the enemy on the side of Valoe Slot Bye had committed excesses in the convent, from which your Royal Highness and your servants had suffered.

I cannot sufficiently express my concern at the occurrence of this event, respecting which I find that your servants had already had some communication with the officers of the regiment to which the men belong who have been guilty of these excesses. The zealous desire of these officers to remove the disgrace which these offences have brought upon their regiment has anticipated my wishes, and they last night sent me all the articles which had been taken from your Highness's servants, of which they gave the officers a list.

I now send those articles, and entreat your Highness to pardon

these excesses in consideration of the ignorance of the soldiers that your Highness resided at Valoe Slot Bye, and of the circumstances by which they were produced. Those soldiers were engaged in the pursuit of a defeated enemy, who made some attempt to rally, and fired from the houses and buildings in your Highness's neighbourhood.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[12.] *To Lieut.-Gen. Lord Cathcart.*

MY LORD, Brædenborg, 2nd Sept., 1807.

I have the honour to enclose a detailed report of the operations of the corps under the command of Major-General Linsingen on the 29th August, which I received last night.

I hear nothing of the enemy, excepting that the people are returning to their homes daily. I think it would be advisable to issue a proclamation calling upon them to remain peaceably at home, and promising that they shall not be molested on account of having borne arms.

If your Lordship could have this proclamation printed, I think I could have it circulated.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Since writing the above I have received the enclosed report from General Linsingen of this morning. I have written to the General to approve of his advance, but I much fear that he will be too late to take General Castenskiold. I am sufficiently near to Ringstæd to support General Linsingen if he should find the force at Wordingborg too strong for him; and in the mean time I propose to order forward Reden's dragoons to Ringstæd as soon as they will come in from the patrols on which they have been sent this day towards Holbek and Jægersprus.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Major-Gen. Baron Linsingen to Major-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Ringstæd, 2nd Sept., 1807, morning, 6 o'clock.

I beg to inform you of the following intelligence I have received late this night during the reconnaissance I have made towards Nestved. The enemy has evacuated the same, and General Castenskiold has been amongst those that fled, with 130 dragoons of Zealand. He has gone towards Wor-

dingborg, where he is expected to embark to-day for Laaland. The landsturm is supposed to have been disbanded, and the force in and near Wordingborg may be about 2000 men. I am the more persuaded of the accuracy of this account as it has been told to us by so different people and in so different places having no connexion one with each other. Cornet von Wisch, of the 1st light dragoons, has brought out of Nestved 3 cannons, made 4 prisoners, besides 50 guns. More guns, &c., &c., magazines of oats and bread are still remaining in the barracks there. I shall break up immediately with the greater part of my cavalry and half the horse artillery, and advance towards Wordingborg to attack the troops remaining there, and endeavour to make General Castenskiold prisoner, if possible. Colonel Honstedt will remain with all the infantry, some cavalry, and half the artillery at this place, and keep the same outposts I had; being likewise ordered to report to you as soon as possible all intelligence he may be able to receive.

It seems to me that the force in the south of Zealand once destroyed, the others that may perhaps remain in and near Corsoer and Callundborg may easily be put an end to.

I hope you will not disapprove of the plan I have made to advance with my cavalry immediately, as I think no time ought to be lost at so favourable an opportunity; and if you remain in the position you occupy at present, and Colonel Honstedt at Ringsted with some cavalry, besides his infantry, the aim you proposed yourself will be completely answered. In the mean while I have to observe that my patrols, though they have been very far to their right, could never meet with any picquet or patrols of Colonel Reden's light dragoons. A communication with them would be very desirable.

I have, &c.,

LINSINGEN, Major-General.

To Lord Hawkesbury. [13.]

MY DEAR LORD, Brøsenborg, 3rd Sept., 1807.

I marched on the morning after I wrote to you last, and defeated the Danish army at Kioge. I don't believe they have now a man in Zealand, excepting the cavalry and a few infantry at Wordingborg, endeavouring to escape to the island of Falster, and my cavalry are gone after them. Not a man would have made his retreat if —— —— had carried into execution his part of the plan; but, as it is, they have been sufficiently beat to prevent their assembling again. I cannot tell you how the siege is going on; from what I have heard, however, I believe that the mortar batteries were prepared only yesterday. . . . We had possession of the ground for them on the 25th at night, and their mortar batteries were not prepared to open till the 2nd September in the morning! Although the success at Kioge must have some effect upon the garrison of Copenhagen, I con-

ceive that it will still be necessary to occupy Amag, and I have proposed a plan to Lord Cathcart for that purpose, which I am willing to carry into execution myself now that I have nothing more to do in this part of the country, or to aid any other officer to carry it into execution, if he should think it necessary to employ another.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[14.] *To Lieut.-Gen. Lord Cathcart.*

MY LORD, Bræsenborg, 4th Sept., 1807.

I have the honour to enclose a report which I have just received from General Linsingen. It will occur to your Lordship upon reading this report to suggest to the Admiral to watch the passages between the islands of Falster and Moen and Zealand.

I likewise enclose the copy of my answer to General Linsingen upon his plan of going to Corsoer. I hope that this letter will reach the General before he will arrive there; but if it should not, and he should be too far engaged to be able to withdraw with honour, I am prepared to come to his assistance.

In case he should obtain possession of Corsoer, and there should be none of His Majesty's ships off the port, I request to have your Lordship's instructions, as soon as may be convenient to you, what we shall do with the vessels which he will find there.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Major-Gen. Baron Linsingen to Major-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Wordingborg, 3rd Sept., 1807.

I have to acquaint you that, in consequence of what I had the honour to state to you in my report of yesterday, I left Ringstæd with the greater part of my cavalry, 2 guns, and a detachment of 100 riflemen of the 95th, at 8 o'clock yesterday morning. Having put my infantry on waggons, assembled during the night for that purpose, nothing prevented me to move the column with the utmost speed towards Wordingborg. I halted at Nestved, where I had sent an officer so early as to have provisions and forage ready for the troops; and after the men were refreshed and the horses fed (which took me about an hour), I continued my march

to Wordingborg, where I arrived at 7 o'clock in the evening, finding confirmed, to my greatest disappointment, the accounts received already by the patrols that had been sent forward, that General Castenskiold had embarked with his last cavalry about *two hours* previous to my arrival here. The failure of this expedition I can attribute to no other circumstance than that of the Danish officers lately taken prisoners in the engagement at Kioge, and dismissed on their parole, travelling in all directions over the country in front of our outposts, who, no doubt, give the earliest information of any movement of our troops to the enemy, as their passports from head-quarters, signed by the Military Secretary, enable them to go wherever they may choose. I have met them at Nestved and here, and am sorry to say the indiscretion of their behaviour, by creeping amongst our men and by ascertaining the situation and strength of our picquets, has compelled me to confine them to their rooms.

General Castenskiold's troops have partly embarked at this place for Falster, and the General himself, with the remainder of his corps, has gone by Kallehave Ferry to the Moen Island. Both these islands are occupied by the enemy, and I am about to inform myself by what means an English force might be sent over in case such measures may be thought proper to adopt. The breadth of the water between this and Falster is one mile and a quarter Danish, and that between Kallehave and Moen not more than one quarter of a Danish mile. The arms and ammunition that have been found on searching the town are not worth while to be sent off, and I have therefore thought proper to destroy the same.

Such magazines of hay and oats as were in this place I am going to send off to the magazine established for my troops at Ringstæd, to the increase of which I have also sent a supply of 60,000 pounds of oats, 60,000 pounds of hay, 10,000 pounds of straw, and 10,000 pounds of bread, upon a written requisition from the magistrate at Nestved, for which Colonel Honstedt, commanding at Ringstæd, will give the necessary receipts on the delivery.

I have discovered this morning ten or twelve vessels of about 200 or 250 tons burthen in the offing, and as they were still within reach of cannon-shot I endeavoured to force them to return, yet the wind being much in their favour they made off as fast as possible without being injured by the fire of my artillery.

Having come to the farthest point on this side of the country, I flatter myself you will approve the plan I am now about to follow up, whose object is to examine and scour the right flank of your position, and to advance as far as Corsoer, where I have reason to suppose the last retreating parties of the enemy have gone to, and where I hope to find, on all events, military stores, ammunition, and arms, the Danish troops in Holstein having at all times been supplied with such from that place and from Callundborg. I shall therefore march instantly back to Nestved, halt there for the night, and continue to-morrow morning my march to Corsoer, where I shall wait for your further orders.

I have, &c.,

LINSINGEN, Major-General.

——— *Tönnejen to Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley.*

SIR, Schullarysholm, 4th Sept., 1807.

It is an obligation to me to thank you most sincerely and of my heart for the protection you have given me in these days your troops have laid in my neighbourhood. I can never forget it; I shall still remember it; and I beg you most humbly that you never will withdraw me this protection so long your troops are staying here; it will still be a comfort to me and family in letting us live in rest and security.

I cannot finish this without giving the best testimony to that people you have given me to guard. They have always behaved them as people belonging to a great and generous nation.

Most humbly,

TÖNNEJEN.

[15.] *To Major-General Baron Linsingen.*

DEAR SIR, Brœsenborg, 5th Sept., 1807.

I sent Lord Cathcart a copy of the letter which I wrote to you yesterday, and he approves of the directions which it contains: he has, however, taken no notice of what I referred to him respecting the ships in Corsoer, and therefore I think it proper to give you the following directions in case you should have got possession of Corsoer. My opinion is that the Crown Prince is not in want of vessels to convey his troops from Holstein or from Funen to Zealand, neither is there any want of vessels to convey troops from the islands to the southward to this island. The destruction of the vessels therefore would answer no purpose of the expedition, and would only tend to the distress and ruin of some private individual.

I recommend that, if you should not be able to communicate with any officer of the British navy, you should satisfy yourself with taking a hostage if you can get one, or, if you cannot, some security that the vessels you will find in Corsoer shall not be used in the conveyance of troops or military stores, or in any other manner against the English as long as they will remain in Zealand, or as the war will last between the King of England and the King of Denmark.

You will, however, understand that nothing in these directions is to prevent you from destroying effectually all ships or vessels of war, or that belong to the government.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Countess of Holstein to Major-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Lethrabourg, ce 5 Sept., 1807.

En assurant Mons. le Chevalier de Wellesley mes compliments, je prends la liberté de lui envoyer quelques fruits, pleignant seulement qu'ils ne soyent pas meilleures.

Un Lieutenant Bila des dragons vint dans ce moment demander après le Chevalier et Général pour lui demander la liberté de quelques prisonniers ; ne le trouvant pas ici, il m'a chargée de suppléer pour ces malheureux au lieu de lui, et je joins à ce billet les noms des personnes ; espérant du caractère noble et bienveillant du Chevalier Wellesley que je ne prierai pas sans succès. Avec l'égard le plus distingué, je me signe

S. C. E., COMTESSE DE HOLSTEIN.

J'enverrai d'abord pour apprendre s'il est possible où les paysans se trouvent ; et dès que j'en serai instruite, j'aurai le plaisir d'en informer Mons. le Chevalier.

Je vous suis infiniment reconnaissant pour ce que vous tâchez de faire pour aider les paysans, et je serai toujours, avec l'égard le plus distingué, Mons. le Chevalier,

Votre obéissante servante,

S. C. E., COMTESSE DE HOLSTEIN.

To Lieut.-Gen. Lord Cathcart. [16.]

MY LORD, Bræsenborg, 6th Sept., 1807.

I had the honour of receiving your letter of the 4th last night, and I enclose the copy of one which I immediately wrote to General Linsingen. I have not heard the result of his expedition to Corsoer.

I can hardly believe that the Danish officers have behaved so ill as General Linsingen supposes. In fact, General Castenskiold had too much the start of him, and there was ample time to get away without the assistance of information of our movements from the Danish officers.

I was always of opinion that it was desirable to give these officers their parole, as it was very clear that they would not again try the experiment of opposing our troops with the landwehr, and I deemed it desirable not to make the hostilities here more inconvenient to individuals than could possibly be avoided. But I did not give them any parole excepting that they should appear at head-quarters to receive your Lordship's orders on a certain day.

I don't doubt their impatience in England; but I don't think they ever form in England an accurate estimate of the difficulties attending any military enterprise which they undertake.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Major-Gen. Baron Linsingen to Major-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Corsoer, 6th Sept., 1807.

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 4th and 5th instant, in answer to which I have the honour to inform you that I arrived at Nestved on the evening of the 3rd instant, and having collected the few arms that remained in the town, and the cavalry stores that still had been left in the cavalry barracks in that place, and destroyed several new gun carriages, the cannons of which could not be found, I felt myself so seriously indisposed next morning that I was obliged to postpone for one day my intended expedition to Corsoer. The troops therefore halted at Nestved the 4th instant, and having sent a detachment of cavalry to reconnoitre Corsoer in the evening of that day, I arrived here yesterday at noon, when the officer commanding the fort surrendered himself a prisoner of war with 22 invalides. The officer has been set at liberty upon his parole, having signed a paper, which I have the honour to enclose for your information. The invalides, being old and infirm, without arms, have promised not to leave this place, and have likewise been dismissed upon their parole. With regard to this officer and men I shall await your further orders. We have already found in the fort 2 colours, 12 large guns of cast iron, that had been buried, and several smaller ones, the carriages of which I shall order to be destroyed; a number of bullets and other military stores, to ascertain the quantity of which we are busily employed at this moment. The cannons, if possible, will be forwarded by water to Sir A. Dixon, commanding His Majesty's naval force in the Great Belt. The same applies to the bullets, &c., &c.

I have ordered a telegraph, communicating with Funen, carefully to be taken down by the Danish officer who had the superintendence of it, and the same is likewise to be delivered to the naval commander.

As I have reason to suppose that some more stores are buried here, I propose staying till all has been removed or destroyed. To-morrow morning I shall send a detachment to make an attempt upon Callundborg, and everything will be executed in that quarter agreeable to your directions.

But a few ships are to be found in this harbour, and these belong to individuals. Sir A. Dixon has ordered them to remain in port.

Never any naval force belonging to the King of Denmark has been stationed off this harbour. The King's packet for the communication from Jutland to Zealand was the only vessel belonging to the Danish government, and this is now in the harbour of Nyeborg in Funen.

The intermediate telegraph in the Island Sproe has been taken down by

the British navy, and a naval hospital has been erected in that island. This telegraph corresponded with that of Nyeborg in Funen.

You will now allow me to observe, that with regard to the expedition to this place, I was (before I intended to undertake it) perfectly aware of a fort existing at Corsoer; yet I had received such information that insured me the possession of the town and the fort without apprehending a determined resistance from the enemy. This being the case, and knowing the aim you had in view, to disarm (if possible) the whole country, I thought no time should be lost to go to work to execute your wishes. This only could induce me to march to this place, having no other design in my plans than the general good and the security of the army before Copenhagen.

As soon as the inventory of stores found at this place will have been drawn up, I shall not fail to transmit the same to your head-quarters, together with the two colours, &c., &c.

During our stay at Nestved a hussar of the 2nd regiment shot himself without any apparent reason; he had long been of a melancholy turn, and has been buried by the magistrate of that place.

Having been informed by the inhabitants of Wordingborg that eleven horses belonging to Zealand dragoons were still at grass near Baarsse Amt Præstoe, I have seized them, and they will be sent to your head-quarters as soon as possible.

I have, &c.,

LINSINGEN, Major-General.

P.S. Any commands of yours will reach me the 8th instant at Soröe, on my return to Ringstæd.

This moment has been reported to me that some naval stores belonging to the Post Vonvatter, agent of the King's packets, have been found: they will be delivered to His Majesty's navy.

C. v. L.

To Lord Hawkesbury. [17.]

MY DEAR LORD, Head quarters near Copenhagen, 8th Sept., 1807.

Lord Cathcart sent for me the day before yesterday from my detachment in the country, and in the course of that night I settled with the Danish commissioners the capitulation of the town and citadel of Copenhagen, which, of course, will be sent to England by this opportunity. I have only to observe upon this instrument that it contains the absolute and unconditional cession of the fleet and naval stores, and gives us the possession of those military points which are necessary in order to enable us to equip and carry away the vessels. This was all that we wanted; and in every thing else I did all in my power to conciliate the Danes.

They certainly are much irritated against us, so much so that

the Danish officers who settled the capitulation apprehended a riot among the sailors and the Burgher militia on account of the cession of the fleet; and the officers of the navy in particular were likely to be much irritated. On this account, and because we command it completely from the citadel and dockyard, I did not ask for the Crown battery; and indeed I must add that we have no claim to this work, not having, I believe, fired one shot into it from the moment we approached the place.

I might have carried our terms higher; and in contemplation of a notion hinted in a letter from Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart, of keeping possession of Zealand, I might have gone so far as to demand the cession of the town entirely. But I have to observe that we are not aware what was the inducement to agree to any capitulation; I suspect it was want of powder, and, if it were so, they must have agreed to any terms; but if their only inducement was, as they said, the damage which they had received, and the greater damage they might receive, from the bombardment, terms which went to place us in their town, or to disgrace their burghers or their marine, particularly their officers, might have been rejected. Then I was to consider the state of the siege, their means of defence, and your call from England for the troops, none of which afforded inducements to press heavier terms upon them.

As to Lord Castlereagh's hint to Lord Cathcart, more as a point for deliberation than any thing else, it is quite out of the question. In the first year it would be necessary to have in Copenhagen a garrison of 10,000 men, and twice that number in the country. Those numbers might be diminished afterwards in proportion as we should conciliate the Danes to us and our government, and as we should bring the native population forward in our defence. But it could not be much diminished, and the naval blockade would be to be kept up necessarily until the Crown Prince and the powers of Europe should have consented to our possessing the island.

I have gone thus far into the consideration of the terms of the capitulation, which I must add are highly satisfactory to the army, not in order to justify them, for I am convinced that you and your friends will approve of them, but in order to show you that I took the whole subject into consideration; and I have only now to add that the Admiral and Lord Cathcart authorised us to take the fleet on the terms on which we first offered to hold it.

I am going this morning to join my corps in the country in order to draw it in gradually. I shall ask Lord Cathcart's leave to go to England immediately, and I hope to see you soon after you will receive this letter.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION *for the Town and Citadel of Copenhagen, agreed upon between* MAJOR-GENERAL THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, K.B.; SIR HOME POPHAM, Knight of Malta, and Captain of the Fleet; *and* LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GEORGE MURRAY, Deputy Quartermaster-General of the British Forces; *being thereto duly authorized by* JAMES GAMBIER, ESQ., Admiral of the Blue, and Commander-in-Chief of His Britannic Majesty's Ships and Vessels in the Baltic Sea; *and by* LIEUTENANT-GENERAL THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD CATHCART, Knight of the Thistle, Commander-in-Chief of His Britannic Majesty's Forces in Zealand and the North of the Continent of Europe, *on the one part; and by* MAJOR-GENERAL WALTERSTORFF, Knight of the Order of Dannebrog, Chamberlain to the King, and Colonel of the North Zealand Regiment of Infantry; REAR-ADMIRAL LUTKEN; *and* I. H. KERCHOFF, Aide-de-Camp to His Danish Majesty, *being duly authorized by* HIS EXCELLENCY MAJOR-GENERAL PEYMAN, Knight of the Order of Dannebrog, and Commander-in-Chief of His Danish Majesty's Forces in the Island of Zealand, *on the other part.*

ART. I.—When the capitulation shall have been signed and ratified, the troops of His Britannic Majesty are to be put in possession of the citadel.

ART. II.—A guard of His Britannic Majesty's troops shall likewise be placed in the dockyards.

ART. III.—The ships and vessels of war of every description, with all the naval stores belonging to His Danish Majesty, shall be delivered into the charge of such persons as shall be appointed by the Commanders-in-Chief of His Britannic Majesty's forces; and they are to be put in immediate possession of the dockyards, and all the buildings and storehouses belonging thereto.

ART. IV.—The store-ships and transports in the service of His Britannic Majesty are to be allowed, if necessary, to come into the harbour for the purpose of embarking such stores and troops as they have brought into this island.

ART. V.—As soon as the ships shall have been removed from the dockyard, or within six weeks from the date of this capitulation, or sooner if possible, the troops of His Britannic Majesty shall deliver up the citadel to the troops of His Danish Majesty, in the state in which it shall be found when they occupy it. His Britannic Majesty's troops shall likewise within the before-mentioned time, or sooner if possible, be embarked from the island of Zealand.

ART. VI.—From the date of this capitulation hostilities shall cease throughout the island of Zealand.

ART. VII.—No person whatsoever shall be molested; and all property, public or private, with the exception of the ships and vessels of war, and the naval stores before mentioned, belonging to His Danish Majesty, shall be respected; and all civil and military officers in the service of His Danish Majesty shall continue in the full exercise of their authority throughout the island of Zealand; and everything shall be done which can tend to produce union and harmony between the two nations.

ART. VIII.—All prisoners taken on both sides shall be unconditionally restored, and those officers who are prisoners on parole shall be released from its effect.

ART. IX.—Any English property that may have been sequestered in consequence of the existing hostilities, shall be restored to the owners.

This capitulation shall be ratified by the respective Commanders-in-Chief, and the ratifications shall be exchanged before twelve o'clock at noon this day.

Done at Copenhagen this 7th day of September, 1807.

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
HOME POPHAM.
GEORGE MURRAY.

Ratifié par moi,
(Signée) PEYMAN.

[18.] *To Lieut.-Gen. Lord Cathcart.*

MY LORD, Brøsenborg, 14th Sept., 1807.

There is every appearance at present of perfect tranquillity in the country. I hear from Copenhagen that the work in the dockyards is advancing with rapidity, and there is reasonable ground for a belief that it will be brought to a conclusion far within the space of time allotted for it in the capitulation. Under these circumstances I am induced to lay before your Lordship the situation in which I stand in respect to my office. When I left England Mr. Long undertook to carry through the business which remained unfinished in the House of Commons, and I acknowledge that I was very uncertain and very indifferent whether I should continue to hold the office. I find, however, that I am still in it, and your Lordship will readily believe that there is much to do in Ireland. The *long nights* are approaching fast, and if I am to have any concern in the government of that country, it is desirable that I should be there. If, therefore, your Lordship should think that you can give any officer leave of absence, or that you can spare me in consequence of the state of tranquillity of the country, or the general

situation of our affairs in Zealand, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will allow me to return home. But if you should think that I can be of the smallest use in any way in bringing matters to the termination which you wish, I should be sorry to go, and I am ready of course and willing to stay as long as a man will remain.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Countess of Holstein to Major-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

MONSIEUR, Lethrabourg, ce 14 Sept., 1807.

Pardonnez que je vous importune encore une fois avec une lettre; c'est pour vous demander un passeport pour cinq hommes de Holstein qui ont travaillé sur la Comtée, et que nous avons été obligé de congédier. Ils désirent de passer dans leur contrée, et craignent de ne pas oser traverser la ligne des troupes Anglaises et le Belt sans un papier de sûreté. J'ose dont vous demander un tel, Monsieur le Chevalier, s'il est nécessaire; et je joins les noms des hommes, et celui de la contrée dans laquelle ils veulent aller.

Comme le Chevalier est amateur de chasse, j'ai dit au chasseur qu'il doit être prêt d'en arranger quand vous le désirerez. Si vous voulez tirer des chevreuils, je vous prierai de m'en avertir un jour d'avance. J'aurais beaucoup désirée de pouvoir vous livrer quelque gibier pour votre table, mais notre vieux chasseur a été si effrayé depuis qu'on l'a pillé que je n'ai pu le faire sortir, d'autant plus comme il y a tous les jours des *chasseurs de Terslov et de la contrée* qui parcourent les champs et les bois, et tirent ce qu'ils vont trouver. Je sais que le Chevalier et Général leur a défendu de chasser, mais encore il ne parait pas que cela a aidé.

Ayez la bonté d'accepter ce peu de fruit, avec l'assurance que je suis, avec le plus parfait égard,

Monsieur le Chevalier,

Votre obéissante servante,

S. C. E. DE HOLSTEIN.

To Lieut.-Gen. Lord Cathcart. [19.]

MY LORD, Brœsenborg, 30th Sept., 1807.

I am concerned to have to report to your Lordship the conduct of Lieutenant ——— of the ——, who is the assistant commissary attached to the reserve of the army. He left me on the 28th to go to Roeskilde to issue bread to the troops there, with orders to return to Roeskilde Rooe that night: those orders he did not obey.

I then left orders for him at Roeskilde Rooe to remain there till he should hear from me again, and afterwards I ordered him on to Cagstrup with all the bread and spirits he had. I have reason to believe that he received those orders, for I heard yesterday at Roeskilde that an English commissary had gone to Cagstrup. But having sent there for him, and having had a patrol out looking for him all day, I have not been able to find him, and I have reason to believe that he has got with him a quantity of bread which had been prepared for my corps at Roeskilde.

I have to mention that Lieutenant ——— is entirely incapable of performing the duty of commissary.

I am concerned likewise to report the conduct of Lieutenant ———, of the Legion, attached to the reserve as commissary. He had orders to go to Roeskilde and remain there, solely for the purpose of urging the Amptman to supply the bread required for him, and to receive and forward what should be supplied. He has disobeyed the orders he received, has quitted Roeskilde since the 29th August, and nobody knows where he is gone.

I have, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

[20.] *To Lieut.-Gen. Lord Cathcart.*

My dear Lord, No. 11, Harley Street, London, 1st Oct., 1807.

I arrived in England on Monday, and went over to Lord Castlereagh at Lord Hertford's the next morning. He showed me the private letters which he had lately written to you, and communicated to me the purport of the instructions which he had sent you, and you will judge that I did not deliver the despatch with the conditional delivery of which you entrusted me. I conclude, and I have told the Ministers, that you will remain in your position at Copenhagen as long as the capitulation will allow you, and they expect, and, indeed, are now equally desirous with yourself, that that instrument should be faithfully carried into execution. They have a wish, however, to continue to occupy Zealand as a screw upon the Crown Prince which might induce him to make peace, or in order to prevent the French from claiming to occupy our position when we shall leave it, if the war should continue. It is intended to

try to prevail upon the Crown Prince to allow us to remain where we are, and also to get you to try Peyman, by urging upon him the misery and loss which the country will suffer by a fresh invasion if we should attack it again, or the inconvenience to which the Crown Prince will be exposed by the claims of the French to occupy Zealand if we should withdraw before peace is made between the Danes and us. I acknowledge, however, that I am not very sanguine in my hopes of success from this last negotiation, and it will remain to be seen whether it would be possible or proper to attack Zealand again. There is certainly nothing in the treaty to prevent it: the question is as to the means of effecting it. If the evacuation is to be made with a view to a re-occupation of Zealand, I would recommend to you to throw the cavalry and a great proportion of the artillery, with some of the infantry, across to Moen, and bring back and reland the whole again in a day or two. However, I think government feel very little anxiety to continue in the occupation of Zealand, excepting to keep the French out; and if they thought they were secure of that, I believe they would prefer to see Zealand again in the hands of the Danes.

The whole question of the permanent occupation is much altered since the Emperor of Russia has expressed a wish that we should continue to occupy Zealand; but the Ministers have not become more anxious (indeed, they have become less anxious) to retain the possession, since they have found that it could be retained with greater facility.

I think that at present it appears to be intended to leave to you the decision whether, when you will embark, you will land again.

There is nothing new: the country is delighted with your conquests.

Will you be so kind as to show this letter to the Admiral? Mr. Merry leaves town in the morning, and will go to Copenhagen in the *Prometheus*.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[21.] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

My dear Lord, No. 11, Harley Street, 1st Oct., 1807.

You will have heard from Lord Hawkesbury and Canning that they propose to send Mr. Merry to the Baltic, with a view to his going to the Crown Prince eventually, and I believe that they do not think it necessary that I should return. However, if they should alter their opinion, or if I can be of any use to government in any way, I am ready when and where they please.

You will see by Mr. Pierrepoint's despatch that the King of Sweden is ready to give the men required from him, or, if it should be thought desirable to evacuate Zealand entirely, he is not likely to feel any very great disappointment on the occasion.

I conclude that you will send directions to Lord Cathcart about the negotiation with Peyman. I doubt its success much, but it is just possible that Peyman may consent to allow us to hold our ground with a view to keep the French out, or to avoid the execution of our threat to invade Zealand again. If he won't allow us to keep our ground, will you carry your threat into execution, and in what manner? At all events, if he won't allow us to hold our ground, it is desirable that the following measures should be adopted: First, let the 20,000 Swedes be prepared to move into Zealand; secondly, let arrangements be made to receive in Scania the Hanoverian Legion, cavalry, artillery, and infantry; thirdly, let the captured ships be sent home manned by as many of our infantry as may be necessary for navigating them, and let the remainder of the infantry and artillery be embarked in transports ready either to be re-landed or to come away, according to your determination whether you will occupy Zealand or not; fourthly, let the blockade of the Belt be kept up till peace will be concluded with the Danes. According to this plan, you will seize Zealand from Scania when you please; but the inconveniences attending it are that the militia will be called out and armed, and the preparations for your reception will be more formidable than they would be according to another.

My idea of this is, that the cavalry and a considerable portion of the artillery and part of the infantry should be moved to the Island of Moen for the evacuation; that the rest of the

infantry, &c., should be embarked in the ships; that on the following day the whole should return into Zealand, and then that the British troops should be withdrawn and come home only in proportion as they should be relieved by the Swedes.

According to this plan, the return of the captured ships would depend upon the arrival of the Swedes, excepting that number of them which would be navigated by the volunteer seamen. I should prefer the last plan because it is to be carried into execution at an earlier period, and would more certainly succeed.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut.-Gen. Lord Cathcart. [22.]

MY DEAR LORD, London, 8th Oct., 1807.

At last it has, I think, been finally settled that Zealand is to be evacuated, and the intention now is to aid the King of Sweden with a force for the protection of his dominions and with money; and to give him a subsidy, in order to enable him to reconcile his subjects to the alliance. I think that all this will answer better than to keep Zealand, and it is possible that there will be no war between Danes and Swedes, which is all that we can now require.

I am just setting out for Ireland.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

There is in contemplation a plan for occupying the island Hwen, which may answer. However, upon that point I imagine that you will be left to decide.

To Lord Hawkesbury. [23.]

MY DEAR LORD, Dublin Castle, 9th Dec., 1807.

I enclose you the military statement which I promised you yesterday.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDA CONCERNING THE SIEGE OF COPENHAGEN, 1807.

Outfit.

Early in April orders were given to provide transports for cavalry and infantry with the utmost expedition, and by every possible exertion; but most of the eligible ships having already sailed for their summer voyages, the difficulty of procuring the requisite tonnage was very great. At the same time arrangements were made for assembling on the coast, and holding in readiness for service, a force amounting to 7712 cavalry and 20,000 infantry, with an adequate proportion of field artillery and battering ordnance for ordinary service, with ammunition, stores of all sorts, and a complete staff, to become efficient when called upon for foreign service.

As soon as sufficient tonnage was procured, a division of this force, amounting to from 8000 to 9000 men, was sent to Swedish Pomerania; the preparation of transports for the remaining force being still in progress, but not complete.

In the middle of July the intelligence of the treaty of Tilsit was received.

In nine days from the consideration of that subject, arrangements were completed for sending a force to the Sound.

Rendezvous.

By the 9th of August the King's ships, with land forces to the amount of near 16,000 men, with a large proportion of artillery, horses, and ordnance, for a siege, together with a supply of provisions and forage, were assembled in the Sound, and a squadron was distributed in the Cattegat, the Belt, and the Baltic, to observe the vessels destined for the island of Zealand.

Within ten days from that time the troops from Pomerania and the remaining troops from Britain joined the army, making up a force of from 24,000 to 25,000 men.

Description of the Place.

Copenhagen is situated on an angle of Zealand. The passage between that angle and the island of Amag forms the arsenal and harbour.

The defences to seaward consisted of blockships sunk and converted into batteries to enfilade the passage by which Lord

Nelson approached: of regular works full of ordnance of the heaviest nature and in complete order, on the island of Amag, to protect the harbour and to flank the left of the line of defence; of the Three Crown battery, which is a shoal on which a parapet and rampart is formed, and on which formidable batteries of heavy ordnance are mounted.

The interior of this battery is a basin; the gorge has a slight profile open to the citadel, fraised with palisades let into stone, and protected by booms under water, to prevent the approach of boats and other vessels.

The citadel has a low battery of large mortars and 36-pounders to co-operate with the Three Crown battery in protecting the entrance to the harbour, and with that battery forming advanced flanks to a formidable work on the arsenal, which enfilades the whole course of the entrance of the harbour.

Under protection of these works the gunboats and praams carrying the heaviest natures of ordnance could safely advance to fire beyond the range of the land works, but with a secure retreat within them in case of an attack from the sea.

The defences by land consist of the citadel, a complete work, in perfect repair, with a double ditch of great depth, and outworks, some of which were revetted, fully supplied with ordnance, ammunition and stores, and many of the guns on traversing platforms.

From the citadel on the east, to the western side of the promontory of Zealand, the defences consist of a rampart and *deep wet ditch*, with some outworks, a glacis, and covered way.

The same sort of defence is resumed on the island of Amag, the works on which are still stronger.

On the side of Zealand, exclusive of the citadel, are three gates. Between the approaches to the eastern and western gates are three large and deep inundations.

The ramparts were provided with sufficient ordnance to protect the angles, to enfilade the roads, and to give a cross-fire in every direction. They had abundance of ordnance and stores to reinforce the batteries on every part of the line, and they were in no want of men or horses to remove and mount them.

Strength of the Garrison.

About the 12th of August (when the Crown Prince of Den-

mark left Copenhagen) the garrison was understood to consist of near 5000 regular troops, viz.:

200 Horse Guards.
300 Foot ditto.
600 the King's regiment.
1200 a regiment of foot.
1500 artillery.
1000 marines.

4800.

Together with a corps of burghers or volunteers, trained to arms, amounting to 5000 men, exclusive of seamen.

To this were added detachments of cavalry, militia, and foresters armed with rifles, and good marksmen, drawn in from the country, whose number could not be exactly ascertained.

In addition to this force, the services of every inhabitant were in requisition, and most of them provided with arms.

The militia on the island is very numerous, as all the inhabitants are liable to serve when called upon.

A proportion of these were formed into regiments and officered, partly by old officers, and partly by gentlemen who live upon their estates.

There is likewise a power of compelling the peasants to get on horseback, with such arms as they can procure, to watch and report the movements of an enemy.

Project of Operation.

His Majesty's Ministers having declared the failure of their negotiation, the forces were to proceed according to their instructions to enforce the surrender of the fleet.

Reinforcements from Holstein or from Mecklenburg could not at that season be expected to pass the blockading squadron, and it was supposed that the land forces, composed as they were, might undertake to invest the place on the island of Zealand, notwithstanding the extent of its line of defence, and likewise to form a corps of observation to cover itself from the mass of inhabitants, militia and regulars, in sundry detachments, besides the garrison of Cronborg.

It was proposed, *first*, to try the effect of investing the place, and of presenting the army and navy before it in a menacing

attitude, also of cutting off, as much as possible, water and provisions; *secondly*, if the first experiment failed, to proceed to bombardment; and *lastly*, to push forward the approaches and storm the place.

The troops landed on the 16th, and the place was invested early the following morning.

The enemy having been deceived as to the intended place of landing, no resistance was made, either to the debarkation or advance of the troops; but a vigorous attack was made in the afternoon by gunboats and by a sortie, a species of combat frequently renewed during the siege.

The extent of the lines from right to left considerably exceeded three miles. The distance of the place where the ordnance, horses, and stores were landed, was upwards of two miles from the nearest part of the lines, and near six to their extremity.

It required several days to land horses and carriages, after the debarkation of the cavalry, before the ordnance and stores could be prepared for distribution; and it was not till the end of the first week that the field artillery was in sufficient order to protect the advance of the army and the construction of batteries.

It being then understood that the place would not capitulate until there was a military reason to justify its surrender, every exertion was made to prepare the batteries for this purpose, and it was determined to make the attack as vigorous and general as possible, in order that if a capitulation was to be obtained by that mode of attack, the necessity of surrendering might appear the more early and the more obviously.

The enemy having neglected to burn the suburbs, level the fences, and cut down the trees during the first days, he was prevented from doing it afterwards, by which means our troops were protected from the loss they would otherwise have sustained, for the enemy did not fail to throw shells and fire shot in every direction from every part of their line; but, excepting in a few instances, they could not see the effect of their fire.

Orders were given to admit flags of truce at any of our posts, and to cease firing during the time that any Danish officer was allowed to remain within the lines: consequently it was in the power of the enemy to put a stop to the attack whenever he pleased.

Every preparation was in forwardness for passing the inundations and making a disposition for assault; but had this expedient been resorted to, either by surprise or by progress of operation, the slaughter of the enemy must have been very great, from the circumstance of the number of inhabitants who had arms in their hands.

Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley had the population of the country to contend with, and to resist their attempts to succour and co-operate with the garrison, and had also to encounter the militia of the islands of Falster, Laaland, and Moen, which united force he defeated at Kioge. His task would have been more difficult had the siege been protracted, as it would have become daily more difficult to prevent the enemy from feeding those islands with supplies of men, arms, and ammunition from the islands of Moen and Laaland and from the Continent.

CHAPTER II.—SPANISH AMERICA.

MEMORANDUM. [24.]

2nd Nov., 1806.

Upon reviewing the plan for attacking New Spain connected with an attack upon Manilla, I find that the state of the seasons will render it impracticable.

In order to be able to make the direct voyage from Manilla to the coast of America in any reasonable period of time, it is necessary to depart from Manilla in the beginning of August. The attack, therefore, upon Manilla must be made in July.

In the months of May, June, July, and August, the south-west winds prevail in the China Seas, and blow with great violence into Manilla Bay. In order to secure the shipping, the first operation would necessarily be to obtain possession of Cavité, which would consume more time than is allotted by the plan for the operations in Luconia. But this is not the great objection to this part of the plan. The south-west winds occasion rains upon the south and west coasts of Luconia in the season in which those winds prevail; and supposing that it should be practicable to carry on the operations against Cavité and Manilla during the rains, the troops would suffer materially in their health, and would be very unfit to undertake the long voyage which would follow these operations.

The best season for an attack upon Manilla, directed from India, is in the middle of September. The troops should sail from Madras on the 1st of August, and they would enjoy the advantage of the south-west winds for their voyage, and would arrive at Manilla towards the middle or end of the month of September, when the rains on the south and west coasts of Luconia begin to cease.

If an attack should be made at any other time, the troops would be exposed either to the rains in Luconia, as I have pointed out, in the proposed attack, or they would suffer the

inconvenience of a long voyage of three months in the season of the north-east monsoon in the China Seas. The track in this case would be, after leaving the Straits of Malacca, by the south end of Borneo, and through the Sooloo and Mindanao Seas.

If it be still thought desirable to attack Manilla, and to connect the attack upon that place with the operations in New Spain, the best mode of proceeding would be that the expedition should sail from Madras on the 1st of August, make the attack upon Manilla at the proper period, and be in a situation to embark from Manilla on the 15th of October. The track for the fleet would then be down the China Seas with the north-east monsoon, till they would fall in with the track which the China Indiamen always take to the southward of Borneo, when they are too late for the south-west monsoon in the China Seas. I should imagine that this voyage would require three months, which would bring them upon the coast of Panama in the middle of January. This would be too late for anything more than a mere communication with the proposed Jamaica force of the fact that they were arrived; there could be no concerted cooperation founded upon a view of the state of affairs in America. The plan for both divisions must be fixed in this country, and must be carried into execution by each, independently of the other. This communication would be the only benefit which in this stage of the operations would be derived from the possession of Panama, and of the Isthmus of Darien.

Before I proceed further to the consideration of this part of the subject, I must point out that 1000 men will not be a sufficient garrison for Manilla, if that place should be taken. Raper was very nearly driven out after he had captured the fort, and was obliged to fortify himself, and was confined within a very narrow space in the neighbourhood of Manilla. The population of Luconia has been estimated at 2,000,000; but there is no doubt that it is 1,000,000 at least. The people, like all those in the Spanish dominions, are under the influence of the priests; and if the Spanish Governor were to adopt the measures adopted by his predecessor after the former siege, he would soon reduce the garrison to great distress, and would retake the place.

I think that 600 Europeans and 3000 sepoys would be a

sufficient garrison for the island of Luconia; and the latter could be sent from Bengal without inconvenience, either with the expedition, or after it would have sailed from India.

Thus far I have considered this plan on the ground of its being absolutely necessary that troops from India should co-operate in an attack upon New Spain, after having captured Manilla. Although I consider the capture of Manilla to be a necessary consequence of the possession of New Spain, for reasons which it is not necessary to detail at present, it does not appear possible to carry the plan into execution in all its parts and enjoy all its advantages in an attack upon New Spain. As that attack must be considered the principal object, and the circuitous voyage after the late attack upon Manilla must be exposed to great risks and delays, probably the best thing to do would be to give up the attack upon Manilla entirely at the present moment.

A question then arises upon the disposition of the force allotted for the attack of New Spain, consisting of 5000 European troops, 5000 negroes, and 3000 sepoys, to replace the latter of which 1000 Europeans, according to the plan, would be sent to India.

This would take from the Atlantic 4000 disposable European troops, with a view to collect a force upon the west side of New Spain; and I will now consider that object and the best mode of disposing of those troops with a view to the attack of New Spain.

This attack upon the two sides of the country at the same moment is intended to distract the enemy and to oblige him to divide his force. But considering the nature of the operations which we shall have to carry on, and the natural difficulties which will oppose our early advance, the enemy may without much danger leave one of the divisions to itself, and turn all his efforts against that division which, either from its numbers, or its composition, or any other cause, he may think the weakest. The operation will be dangerous in proportion to the strength of the enemy's army in New Spain, and I am convinced that no adequate advantage will be gained by it, supposing that no accident should happen to either division.

But it is useless to point out all the reasons against making a double attack upon New Spain, as from the state of the seasons I really believe an attack of that nature cannot be made. I

believe that when the fair season will commence in the Gulf of Mexico in the months of December and January, the rains will commence on the western coast of New Spain; and if that should be the case, there can be no doubt that it would not be advisable to send 4000 European troops for the purpose of obtaining possession of Panama and the Isthmus of Darien, in order that they may endeavour from thence to penetrate into New Spain by land. The chance of success in this operation is not very promising; and as I think there is reason to believe that the rains on the Isthmus of Darien are constant, I apprehend that we should lose many men by sickness while stationed there.

Upon the whole, therefore, I believe that with a view to the conquest of New Spain, the best mode of disposing of the 4000 men (3000 now at Buenos Ayres and 1000 destined to go to India) would be to send them to the general rendezvous at Jamaica in the proper season. The sepoys from India would then come in as a reinforcement, according to the original plan, when the season would permit.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[25.] RESULT OF CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. FRAZER ON THE 6TH AND 7TH OF NOVEMBER.

1st. The best season for going to Mexico is from November to May. The rains cease in November and commence in May.

2nd. There are many landing-places on the coast of Mexico to the northward of La Vera Cruz, in countries which at the distance of a few miles from the coast are healthy and plentiful. Mr. Frazer has had vessels in many of these places, from which he has sent his goods by a road communicating with the high road from La Vera Cruz to the city of Mexico.

3rd. During the months of November, December, and January, the northerly and north-west gales are frequent in the Gulf of Mexico, and would be very dangerous to a fleet at anchor upon the coast. There is no harbour in the Gulf of Mexico, excepting Pensacola. The island of St. Juan d'Ulloa, off La Vera Cruz, would not afford shelter to more than thirty-five or forty vessels. These gales of wind, however, from the north and north-west, do not last more than two or three days.

Persons accustomed to the navigation of those seas know from the appearance of the weather when they are coming on, and the common mode adopted of placing the ships in safety is to go to sea, and remain at a distance from the coast till the gale is over. The interval of fine weather between these gales is commonly about fifteen days, and in that time a fleet of vessels can remain in safety on any part of the coast of Mexico.

4th. On the north and east coasts of the peninsula of Yucatan is a bank, with soundings extending above forty leagues from the land. On this bank a fleet might ride at anchor in safety throughout one of these gales, and part of the fleet might be sheltered from its violence by some of the islands and shoals on the bank.

5th. The coast of Yucatan, excepting Campeachy, is open and defenceless, the country very dry and healthy, and one of the most plentiful in the world in rice and fresh provisions of every kind.

6th. A fleet would be sheltered from the northerly gales in the bays of Honduras and Amatique, and could anchor in security. Small vessels of 150 tons burden might go up the Golfo Dolce, at the mouth of Rio Grande, as far as Bodegas Altas, the principal port of the province of Guatemala on the east coast. According to Mr. Frazer's information acquired from the captains of vessels sent to trade there (for he has never been there himself) there would be no impediment to this voyage, and troops would land in a healthy and plentiful country, at the distance of about seventy-five miles from the city of Guatemala.

7th. Mr. Frazer does not know the ports on the west coast of New Spain on the Pacific, excepting Panama. He says, however, that the weather is uniformly so fine, and the sea so moderate on that coast, and so many islands and banks afford shelter all along the coast, that a fleet would find no difficulty in remaining at anchor on any part of it. Mr. Frazer knows that there is a port of Guatemala in the South Seas, at no great distance from the city of Guatemala; but he has no description of it.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[26.] OBSERVATIONS UPON THE CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. FRAZER.

1st. Although the rains may cease in November, the countries in the tropics are never healthy for one month at least after the rains have ceased. Indeed from my experience I should say that month was the most unhealthy in the year.

3rd. I am afraid that this expedient would not answer for a fleet of transports, any more than that proposed in the 4th paragraph. They might answer for a single ship, well found and manned, but not for a fleet of transports.

6th. Information upon this point should be sought for from General Nugent, or from some person connected with the trade in the Bay of Honduras.

7th. I doubt whether we shall be able to obtain any information upon the ports in the South Seas. Dampier differs with Mr. Frazer in his account of the state of the weather on this coast; but he was there in October, during the rainy season in Mexico. He found no harbour, and failed in many attempts to land, owing to the surf. The harbour of the province of Guatemala, on the Pacific, is called by the French authors La Trinité, and it is probably the same that is called Guatemala by Mr. Frazer.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[27.] MEMORANDUM.

20th Nov., 1806.

New Spain is accessible upon its eastern coast by the following points:

1st. In the Gulf of Mexico, on the whole coast to the northward of La Vera Cruz.

2ndly. At La Vera Cruz.

3rdly. By the river Alvarado.

4thly. By the river Grijalva.

5thly. By the river Belize.

6thly. By the Golfo Dolce into Guatemala.

7thly. By the river St. Juan into the Lake Nicaragua.

The seasons throughout New Spain appear to prevail as in the Gulf of Mexico. The rains commence in April and cease in September and October. During this season the low countries upon the sea-coasts and banks of rivers are of course unhealthy. This season is followed in the months of October,

November, December, and January by the northerly winds in the Gulf of Mexico. These at times blow with great violence; and at those times it is dangerous, and indeed impossible, for a ship to remain upon the coast, excepting under the shelter of the rock or island of St. Juan d'Ulloa. After this season the weather becomes more moderate in the Gulf of Mexico, and the wind blows occasionally from the land. But during this season the low country upon the sea-coast is more unhealthy than during the prevalence of the northerly winds, owing, it is supposed, to the unwholesomeness of the land-winds, which blow over the lagunes and marshes.

It would appear, therefore, that the most healthy season for an attack upon New Spain would be the months of December and January, after the rains would have ceased; the country would have had some time to become dry, and before the unhealthy season, occasioned by the wind blowing over the lagunes and marshes, would have commenced.

But this is the season in which the northerly winds are violent; and admitting that the attack from the eastward is that which promises most success, the question is, upon what point shall it be made?

Mr. Frazer says that those accustomed to the navigation of the Gulf of Mexico know from the appearance of the weather when the northerly gales are coming on; that the common mode adopted of placing the ships in safety is to go to sea, and remain at a distance from the coast till the gale is over; that a fleet obliged to adopt this measure for its safety would find good anchorage and security upon the banks on the north and west coasts of the peninsula of Yucatan; that these gales seldom last longer than two or three days; and that the interval of fine weather between each gale is from ten days to a fortnight, in which space of time it is supposed that a fleet might perform any operations required from it upon the coast. This plan might answer for a single ship well stored and manned, but not, in my opinion, for a fleet of transports. Supposing the whole statement to be true, viz. that the gales can be foreseen, and that each gale is followed by an interval of one fortnight's fair weather, I cannot conceive that it is consistent with the deliberation and sobriety with which this whole plan is considered, and with which it is proposed to be conducted, to land an army of 10,000 men in the Gulf of Mexico, and take away from them all their transports immediately; or that any admiral

would undertake to keep up the communication with the army under such circumstances.

I have not sufficient evidence to make me certain that there is a communication between the towns on the coast to the northward of La Vera Cruz and the city of Mexico; but admitting that there is one, I doubt whether the considerations above referred to ought not to induce us to abandon altogether an attack upon those parts of the coast, as being impracticable in the months of December and January, in which the climate in the low country upon the coast is supposed to be least unhealthy.

The next point to be considered is the attack upon La Vera Cruz itself. There a fleet would be sheltered from the northerly winds after the army would have obtained possession of the fort on the island or rock of St. Juan d'Ulloa; and upon the chance of obtaining early possession of this fort there are two questions. First, is it true that in the season of the northerly winds (that is, in December) there is an interval of ten days or a fortnight of weather in which a fleet might anchor upon the coast? Mr. Frazer speaks positively to this point; and on the other hand, I have to mention that every traveller whose voyage I have read, in whatever season he may have arrived at La Vera Cruz, experienced a gale from the northward. Gage particularly, on the 11th of September; and Chappe d'Auteroche on the 8th of March.

2ndly. Supposing the weather would allow of a fleet anchoring upon the coast in that season for ten days, would that period of time be sufficient to take the Fort of St. Juan d'Ulloa? By all accounts the fort is not very strong. It is square, with a dry-ditch, covert-way, and glacis, with bastions at the four angles; is very small; contains about 70 pieces of cannon, and has 20 casemates or bomb-proof magazines. The garrison is supposed to be 2000 men, commanded by a Lieutenant du Roi. The fort is situated upon the island or rock of St. Juan d'Ulloa, the whole of which it does not occupy; but there is not room for a regular attack by the island. Gage says that the city of Vera Cruz is not more than the distance which a musket would carry from the island; in which account other authorities nearly agree. If this be true, it might be practicable, under cover of a fire from the opposite shore, from the shipping, and from batteries which we might be able to construct upon the island, to carry the place by a *coup de main*.

If St. Juan d'Ulloa cannot be taken in this manner, of which

I entertain no doubt, I think it probable that the garrison in that fort has always depended for its supply of provisions upon the town of La Vera Cruz, immediately opposite to it. Of this we should certainly have possession; and by the distress which the garrison would suffer from the fire kept up on them, and from the want of provisions, it is more than probable they would surrender.

From La Vera Cruz to the city of Mexico there is a road practicable for an army, through a plentiful country, and the distance is about 100 leagues.

If the attack by La Vera Cruz should be thought impracticable, the next to be considered is that by the river Alvarado. This river empties itself into the Gulf of Mexico, to the southward of La Vera Cruz. It is navigable for small vessels to Zacatecas and St. Ildefonso, in the province of Oayaca, at no great distance from the city of Oayaca. This province is fertile, and abounds in everything which an army would require; and the city of Oayaca itself is only 80 leagues from Mexico, and the road excellent. Tehuantepec and Guatulco are harbours in this province upon the South Sea, each about 200 miles distant from Oayaca. The question upon this attack turns upon the state of the navigation of the river Alvarado, upon which the government of Jamaica ought to have information. But there appears no doubt that the Spaniards use this river for their commerce; and I conclude that it is a weak point, as I understand that the Spanish government have established gunboats on it.

The next point of attack is the river Grijalva. The mouth of this river is likewise in the Gulf of Mexico, and it is said to be navigable to Chiapa de los Indios, in the province of Chiapa. But the same question arises about the navigation of this river; and it is to be observed that the distance from Chiapa to the city of Mexico is more than 200 leagues, and over the mountains Quelenes. I consider this attack, therefore, to be out of the question.

The next attack is by the river Belize. This empties itself into the sea in the southern parts of the British settlements in Honduras. It is navigable for small vessels as far as a point only 15 miles from the great road leading from Campeachy to Guatemala. The distance from Guatemala to the city of Mexico is 300 leagues, and part of the road leads through a very unhealthy country bordering upon the South Sea.

The next attack is by the Golfo Dolce into Guatemala. The Golfo Dolce is navigable for small vessels to Bodegas Altas, about 180 miles from Guatemala. The country from thence to the city of Guatemala is good and plentiful, excepting the first 15 leagues. The state of the road, and distance from Guatemala to the city of Mexico, have been above stated.

The next attack is by the river St. Juan into the Lake Nicaragua. The river St. Juan is navigable during only a very short period of the year; I believe not after the rains have ceased. The country upon the bank of the Lake Nicaragua is fertile and healthy; but the distance from the lake to the city of Mexico is not less than 1500 miles. There is a good port, El Realejo, on the South Sea, at no great distance from the Lake Nicaragua.

Upon a review of all the inlets into New Spain, I should prefer to make the attack by La Vera Cruz. It will be necessary that the army should be well supplied with mortars, of different sizes, and that the fleet should be attended by gun and bomb vessels, in order to have a capacity of attacking St. Juan d'Ulloa with a very heavy fire. These vessels ought to be of a very small size, and to draw but little water.

If the attack cannot be made by La Vera Cruz, we must try it by one of the rivers. Of course, I should prefer the Alvarado, if its navigation will answer. In a view to this necessity, I should recommend that the transports employed with the troops upon this occasion should be the smallest and of the lightest draught of water that could be found, and that early measures should be taken to insure their being well found in stores, particularly anchors and cables.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[28.] MEMORANDA.

Gage arrived at La Vera Cruz on the 12th September.

A northerly gale the night before he arrived.

Mentions the approach to St. Juan d'Ulloa as very dangerous; that the ships are fastened to rings in the rock for security against the northerly gales.

The rock of St. Juan less than the distance of a musket-shot from La Vera Cruz.

The river Alvarado, the mouth of which is in the Gulf of

Mexico, is navigable to Zacatecas and St. Ildefonso, in the province of Oayaca, not far from the city of Oayaca. The city of Oayaca 80 leagues from Mexico, in a pleasant valley: the road good.

Oayaca a healthy and plentiful country; Tehuantepec a sea-port in this province on the South Sea.

The river Tabasco, or Grijalva, the mouth of which is in the Gulf of Mexico, navigable to the Chiapa de los Indios. Chiapa a rich town in the province of Chiapa, which is a rich and healthy country. The road over the mountains Quelenes I should suppose impracticable.

The Golfo Dolce navigable to Bodegas Altas; the distance thence to Guatemala 60 leagues. Guatemala a healthy and plentiful country even to the neighbourhood of the Golfo Dolce.

The harbour of Trinidad in a hot but rich country on the South Sea: the harbour not a good one.

The road from Guatemala to Mexico, through Soconusco and Tehuantepec, being centres on the South Sea, very hot and unhealthy, and very subject to thunder storms; the distance 300 leagues. Or another road over the mountains through Chiapa.

Fifteen leagues from the Golfo Dolce the road bad and the country not very plentiful; afterwards the road and country good.

The winter season begins in May and ends in September; afterwards the winds dry up the roads.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM. No. 4. [29.]

20th Nov., 1806.

After the fullest consideration of the subject, it appears decided that the principal attack upon New Spain must be made by one corps on its eastern coast; that the operations of this corps should be concentrated as much as possible in the first instance; and that the assistance to be looked for from the East Indies should be more in the nature of a reinforcement to the troops who should have made the conquest of New Spain, than of a corps to co-operate in the conquest.

The best season for an attack upon New Spain, for reasons which will appear hereafter, is the month of December; and

the rendezvous for the troops ought to be the island of Jamaica. The troops for this attack should be 6000 European infantry, 3000 Negro infantry, 200 artillery; 2 regiments, or 1400 European cavalry; 200 pioneers; 4 brigades, or 24 pieces of field ordnance, of which 6 howitzers; 4 pieces of battering ordnance on travelling carriages; 2 10-inch and light mortars upon beds which can be moved by hand, with stores in proportion. To this ought to be added 400 horses of the Artillery or Waggon Corps with their drivers, and 400 mules with their saddles and equipments and drivers, and, if possible, a corps of Rangers.

This corps ought to sail from Jamaica in the middle of November, so as to arrive on the coast of New Spain early in December. It ought to be collected as follows:

The troops ought to arrive in Jamaica by the 20th of October. 3000 European infantry, and 400 mules with their drivers and equipments, to be sent from Buenos Ayres. They should sail from Buenos Ayres in the middle of September. The orders for the sailing of these troops should be sent from England in the end of June, and those for the purchase of the mules, and the hire of their attendants, and the preparations for their transport and their food on the passage, as early as April. They ought to be trained mules. 3000 European infantry, 200 artillery, 1400 cavalry, 400 horses of the Waggon Corps with their drivers, with the ordnance and stores above mentioned, and the provisions as stated hereafter, to be in readiness to sail from Falmouth by the 20th of August. The European infantry and the artillery to replace similar numbers to be taken from the island of Jamaica.

3000 Negroes, and 3000 European infantry, and 200 artillery, to be prepared in the island of Jamaica to sail upon the proposed expedition in the middle of November. The 3000 European infantry and the 200 artillery to be replaced by the troops of the same description and numbers which will sail from England in August.

The troops to bring with them their camp equipage; and if the troops in the West Indies and at Buenos Ayres have no camp equipage, or there should be none in the stores in the West Indies, a quantity for 6000 men to be sent from England in August with the troops.

Pioneers and Rangers to be collected in the settlement of

Honduras, according to a plan which will be discussed in a separate memorandum.

Vessels for the transport of the Negroes from Jamaica to New Spain to be sent from England in August with the troops. These transports, and in general all those intended for this service, ought to be of a small size, and of a light draught of water, but well found in naval stores, and particularly in anchors and cables.

The point of attack for this expedition will be discussed in a separate memorandum.

In order to reinforce and support this corps, which will have made its attack upon New Spain, 3000 sepoys and 500 Europeans are to be sent from Bengal in the month of October. The Native troops must be volunteers, and it will take three months to collect them at Calcutta from the different corps and stations of the army; and the orders respecting them ought to arrive in Calcutta in the beginning of July. Allowing five months for these orders to reach India from England, they ought to be despatched from England on the 1st of February.

This corps ought to arrive upon the western coast of New Spain in the month of February. It may be expected that they will be four months on their passage; and one more is allowed for stopping at places of refreshment. These should be, in the first instance, for a few days at Prince of Wales Island, where they ought to fill up their water; and in the second, at Botany Bay. There they ought to be encamped in a healthy situation.

Vessels loaded with rice and other articles used by the sepoys ought to be sent with this corps for their consumption, particularly while they may be at Botany Bay. Measures ought to be taken also for the supply of fresh provisions to the Europeans during the same period.

I cannot at present determine upon the landing-place for this corps in New Spain. There is time for the consideration of this point; and at all events it will be possible to communicate to them their ulterior orders in New Holland.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[30.] MEMORANDUM.

20th Nov., 1806.

I understand that the population of the settlement of Honduras is greater than the settlement requires, or can employ, and that this excess amounts to nearly 2000 upon a population of 5000 persons, not including the Negro regiment stationed at Honduras, and calculated to have 1200 men. There appears no doubt consequently that a number amounting to between 1500 and 2000 men might be taken away for the proposed service in New Spain, without putting the colony to any inconvenience; and from the nature of the service, there is reason to believe that the principal settlers would willingly lend their aid to the plan, and that this number of people would come forward voluntarily to give their service to government.

The population of Honduras is, I understand, composed of some Europeans, some settlers born in the country, some free Negroes, and the greatest proportion Negro slaves. A proportion of all the classes might be induced to come forward in the service of government upon this occasion; and it is imagined that the masters of the slaves in particular would give the service of their slaves in the hope that they should have a share of the plunder, in the same manner as they had during the American war, at Fort Omoa.

The whole population of Honduras, whether slaves or not, are trained, and are in the habit of performing military service; but although service by slaves might answer well enough for the defence of such a settlement as Honduras, considering the circumstances in which it is placed, and the people by whom it is likely to be attacked, I should doubt whether it would be expedient to employ a very large number of these slaves in the attack and conquest of New Spain.

The plan, therefore, which I would propose would be to endeavour to raise a corps of 500 or 600 free Negro rangers, and another of from 200 to 300 free Negro pioneers, to be officered in part by the European and Native settlers at Honduras, and in part by the officers of the line to be taken from the establishment in the West Indies. If this number of free Negroes could not be procured, or could not be taken from the settlement of Honduras without distressing it for that description of population, the deficiency might be made up by the purchase

of slaves at Honduras on His Majesty's account, in the same manner as the slaves are purchased for the West India regiments. They might cost there about 80*l.* sterling a man. If the number cannot be made up in this manner, the corps of rangers might be free negroes, and the pioneers slaves.

If it should be necessary to employ the slave owners of Honduras and their slaves, whether as rangers or pioneers, government will be obliged to engage to pay 80*l.* sterling for every man who will be lost on the service; to give the slaves their pay and provisions in the same manner as other soldiers, and possibly to make some allowance to the owner for the loss of the profit he would derive from the labour of his slave while the service would be going on. The advantage which the slave owner would propose to himself would be the share which he would expect his slaves would have of any property that might be captured.

These plans in Honduras must be carried into execution through the government of Jamaica. Three months will be required to collect the men, and make all the arrangements in Honduras: therefore the government of Jamaica ought to commence them in July; and the orders respecting them ought to be sent from England on the 1st of May.

The next point to be considered is the arming of the corps of Rangers, and the transport of them and the Pioneers from Honduras to the scene of action. If there are no arms in Honduras, arms and accoutrements ought to be sent from Jamaica in August.

Transports for 1000 men must be provided in England for these troops. They might sail with the others from Falmouth in August. From Jamaica they would be sent down to Honduras in a few days; and when the armament would sail from Jamaica in the end of November, intelligence might be sent to Honduras, and the whole fleet would rendezvous off Cape Catoche. The corps from Honduras would have a long and a bad passage to Jamaica, for which reason this mode is proposed.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[31.] MEMORANDUM.

Nov., 1806.

I observe that all those who have communicated their ideas to His Majesty's government upon the subject of the Spanish dominions in America have recommended that they should have in view a revolution instead of a conquest in their proceedings. The French gentlemen who have turned their thoughts to this subject have recommended that one of the French princes should be established as king in New Spain, and the English and Spanish writers have recommended an independent government generally, without specifying of what nature it should be. None, however, have pointed out in what manner the government recommended to be established in that country should be kept in existence, carried on, and supported after the revolution should have been effected, particularly against the attempts which might be made upon it by the United States.

The protection of this independent government to be established would doubtless fall upon Great Britain; but it does not appear in what manner, consistent with the existence of the Mexican independence, Great Britain is to be compensated for the expense and inconvenience which its support and protection would entail upon her.

The first step to be taken undoubtedly is to substitute the British for the Spanish power in Mexico, and afterwards to fix the nature of the government to be established there, and of its relations with Great Britain. I refer to that part of the subject now only to draw the attention of His Majesty's government to the fact that the hopes entertained by the persons who have written upon Spanish America of assistance from the natives, are founded as much upon the wishes and expectations of the natives that an independent government would be established in their country, as upon their hatred of their present rulers the Spaniards.

From all that I have read upon this subject, it is my opinion that the force destined for the attack of Mexico ought to consist of not less than 8000 infantry with 1000 light cavalry, and a train of field ordnance consisting of 24 pieces, or four brigades (with artillerymen in proportion), of which six pieces ought to be howitzers. Of this force 3000 infantry might be negro troops. The troops ought to sail from England as early in November as possible; and considering the difficulties which

prevail generally in getting out of the Channel with a fleet at that season of the year, I should recommend that they might embark at Falmouth. From thence they should go to Jamaica, where the negro regiments ought to be collected at a period as early as possible.

I recommend that 400 horses should be sent with the troops. These ought to be the draught horses of the Artillery or Waggon Train, with their drivers. Mules ought also to be collected for this service, and means of transporting them in the island of Jamaica. This island ought also to furnish 200 negro pioneers.

The armament ought to sail from Jamaica as early as possible in the month of January, and an endeavour ought to be made to make the coast of Mexico as far to the north of La Vera Cruz as Punta Delgada.

If there should be a communication between Punta Delgada and the town of Xalapa in the upper country, the army ought to land at that place; but if there should be no communication between Punta Delgada and the upper country of Mexico, the disembarkation must be made in the neighbourhood of La Vera Cruz.

All those who have written upon the Spanish dominions in the Gulf of Mexico agree that the country upon the coast is exceedingly unhealthy; and it appears that the merchants and others who have business occasionally at La Vera Cruz, keep their families and reside generally at Xalapa, about fifty or sixty miles up the country to the north-west. The object, therefore, upon the arrival and disembarkation of the troops in Mexico, must be to remove them from the low countries on the coast to the higher and more healthy parts inland. I have asked for horses, mules, and pioneers, with a view to this object principally; but the former in particular will be useful, indeed necessary, in a variety of services with the dragoons and artillery.

I do not know of anything which can prevent the immediate execution of this object excepting the necessity which may exist of obtaining possession of La Vera Cruz and the fort and island of St. Juan d'Ulloa; and even this necessity will only prevent it partially, as will appear presently. La Vera Cruz is a large town, surrounded by a wall of no great strength, without a ditch or outwork. The suburbs to the north and west are close to the town wall, and the town itself is filled with the storehouses of merchants and other buildings, none of them bomb-proof.

The fort of St. Juan d'Ulloa, which appears to be of some strength, is situated upon an island immediately off La Vera Cruz. But it has no casemates or bomb-proof magazines. The decision whether St. Juan d'Ulloa must be attacked or not depends upon the following points: 1st. Whether the fleet can remain in safety upon the coast of Mexico without the possession of St. Juan d'Ulloa; 2ndly. The strength of the Spanish garrison in that fort and La Vera Cruz.

If it be true, as I suspect it is, that a large fleet cannot remain in safety upon the coast without the protection of the island of St. Juan d'Ulloa, that fort must be taken at an early period after our arrival in Mexico. If the garrison be strong, upon which subject the accounts differ, it might be preferable, with a view even to the preservation of the health of the troops, to attack the place at once, than to leave a large force in the lower country to mask it and impede the operations of the garrison upon the rear of the army.

But whether St. Juan d'Ulloa is to be attacked or not, which is a question that probably cannot be decided in this country, the first step to be taken, in my opinion, is to push on a considerable detachment of the army to Xalapa, in the upper country.

If the disembarkation cannot be made at Punta Delgada, it must to the northward of Rio de la Antigua, about six leagues north of La Vera Cruz. From thence the distance to Xalapa is about fifty miles, and the road by no means impracticable. Xalapa is a town containing about 40,000 inhabitants, situated in a healthy and plentiful country. It is on the high road from Mexico to La Vera Cruz, and the merchants of the latter reside and keep their families here. It is not fortified.

My views in pushing on in the first instance to Xalapa would be: 1st. To remove the unseasoned troops from the unwholesome country upon the coast; 2ndly. To form an establishment at an early period in a part of the country possessed of resources to enable me to equip the army as it ought to be equipped to perform the services which will be required from it. The number of troops which I should march to Xalapa would be limited by the extent of the force by which they could be immediately opposed, and by the prospect which I should have of being obliged to attack St. Juan d'Ulloa. I should leave the seasoned troops of the West Indies in the fleet to make that

attack as soon as I should have collected means to enable them to carry on the siege with facility, should that protracted operation be necessary.

I know of no place of strength on the road from Xalapa to Mexico excepting Peroté, about forty miles from the former. This place does not appear to be very strong, and I imagine that I should not require heavy guns to reduce it. But as the information upon this place may be incorrect, I should wish that four iron 18-pounders, upon travelling carriages, with the stores for a siege, were sent with the expedition.

In respect to the further operations in Mexico the information is so limited, that it is impossible for me to pretend to foresee of what nature they will be. The possession of the city of Mexico appears the first object; the next to engage the enemy's army. His Majesty's government will, of course, instruct me in what manner they intend that His Majesty's authority shall be established in Mexico; the advantages which I am to hold out to the different classes of the inhabitants to conciliate their attachment to the government; and the nature of the commercial relations in which they are to stand with this country and the rest of the world.

It will be necessary to take early measures to raise regiments in Mexico to provide for the future defence of the country, and to make up for the losses which we may expect to sustain in the conquest. I observe that the Spanish policy has been to govern the Americans by the influence of the priests; that the priests are very numerous, their influence powerful, and they have long been in the habit of vilifying the British nation; and it may be expected that they will exert their influence against His Majesty's forces, notwithstanding the protection which we may afford them, and the measures which we may take to conciliate them and the people of the country. If this expectation be well founded, the difficulty of the conquest will be much increased; and for that reason I have suggested that the infantry ought to consist of 8000 men. We must expect also to experience unwillingness on the part of the people to serve His Majesty, and difficulties in procuring recruits.

For these reasons I think it would be desirable to bring 3000 sepoys from India, with one regiment of Europeans, if possible.

Accompanying this paper are memoranda of orders to be given, in case this service should be determined on.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[32.] MEMORANDUM OF TRANSPORTS FOR THE SERVICE IN NEW SPAIN.

20th Nov., 1806.

Transports to be prepared in La Plata to carry 3000 European infantry and 400 mules, with their drivers, equipments, &c., to Jamaica, and thence to New Spain.

Transports to be prepared in England to carry 400 horses of the Artillery or Waggon Train, with their drivers, &c., from England to Jamaica, and thence to New Spain.

Ditto 200 artillery, 3000 European infantry, 1400 dismounted dragoons from England to Jamaica, and thence to New Spain.

Ditto 3000 Negroes from Jamaica to New Spain.

Ditto 1000 Negroes from Honduras to New Spain.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[33.] MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICTUALLING BOARD FOR THE SERVICE IN NEW SPAIN.

20th Nov., 1806.

To be in readiness to sail from Falmouth on the 20th of August next:

Beef, pork, and spirits for 11,000 men for two months.

Biscuit for the same number for three months.

Flour for the same number for one month.

Oats for 400 horses for two months.

Hay for 400 horses for one month.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[34.] MEMORANDUM FOR THE ORDNANCE FOR THE SERVICE IN NEW SPAIN.

20th Nov., 1806.

A field-train, consisting of 4 brigades or 24 pieces of light ordnance, of which 6 pieces to be howitzers, to be embarked and in readiness to sail from Falmouth on the 20th of August

next. The car-brigades would answer best, with the ammunition packed in boxes of that size which would be most easily carried by hand.

The following ordnance and stores to be embarked and in readiness to sail at the same time:

20,000 muskets and bayonets.

Intrenching tools for 8000 men.

A double quantity of ammunition and stores for the field train.

2,000,000 musket-ball cartridges.

70,000 musket flints.

100,000 carbine and pistol-ball cartridges.

5000 pistol and carbine flints.

4 iron 18-pounders upon travelling-carriages; stores for these guns.

4000 loose 18-pound shot.

A proportionate quantity of powder in barrels.

2 10-inch mortars; stores for them.

4 small 5½-inch mortars upon beds, capable of being transported by hand; stores for them.

Scaling-ladders.

Sand-bags.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM. [35.]

25th Jan., 1807.

In reference to the Memoranda which I gave to His Majesty's Ministers on the 20th of November * last, relative to the orders to be transmitted to India on the 1st of February, I have to observe that unless those orders should be now prepared, the troops will not be in readiness to sail from the Hoogly in October next, admitting that the orders will be five months on their passage to Calcutta.

If, on the 1st of May, government should be of opinion that the expedition, with a view to which these orders were to be issued, ought not to take place, they may then send orders to India to countermand the sailing of the troops, which will arrive there, calculating a passage of the same length, on the 1st of October, the period fixed for the departure of the expedition

* See pp. 45-47.

from the Hoogly. The inconvenience in this case will be the expense of collecting the volunteers at Calcutta, and of the preparations for their voyage.

If on the 1st of June government should be of opinion that the expedition ought not to be undertaken, a vessel despatched at that period from England may be expected to arrive in less than five months, or before the end of October at Prince of Wales Island, where it would meet the Bengal detachment at that period. The inconvenience in this case would be the additional expense incurred for transports, &c.

By the 1st of June it is probable that government would have been under the necessity of deciding upon the expedition with a view to the execution of the parts of the service to be performed in this country. But if, for any reason which cannot at present be foreseen, it should be necessary to give up the plan at as late a period as the 1st of August, a vessel despatched from England at that period will arrive at Botany Bay by the end of December, at which time it will find the Bengal detachment at that place.

The only inconvenience, therefore, resulting from the despatch of the orders to India at the present moment will be the expense which will have been incurred, if it should be necessary to countermand them; and on the other hand, if they should not now be sent, the expedition will not sail till after October, and possibly may not arrive in New Spain till the season when the rains will have commenced.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[36.] MEMORANDUM. No. 6.

15th Feb., 1807.

It has been suggested that it might be practicable to make an attack upon the kingdom of Terra Firma with the troops destined eventually to attack New Spain, and that the former service might be performed before the season would come round which is most favourable for the latter.

It will be recollected that according to the plan the attack upon New Spain was to be made in the beginning of December. That is the season in which the attack ought to be made on the kingdom of Terra Firma. The rains in Terra Firma commence in May and end in November; and although the rains

might not be an insuperable obstacle to the mere possession of the city of Caraccas, they would undoubtedly be so to the conquest of the kingdom.

The operations of the troops, supposing that they could keep the field, would necessarily be confined to the high lands, as the low countries on the banks of the rivers are overflowed in the season of the rains; and most particularly would it be necessary to delay till December at soonest any operations on the Oronoco.

This river begins to rise in April; it overflows its banks and vast tracts of country, and is highest in September. It then commences to fall, and is lowest in February. It appears, therefore, that the month of December is the earliest period at which it would be practicable to carry on operations on the Oronoco.

According to this view of the subject I should consider it impracticable to connect the attacks upon Terra Firma and New Spain, which must be considered as entirely distinct.

Government, however, may think it desirable to obtain possession of the kingdom of Terra Firma, and as I have considered this subject, I beg leave to offer the following observations for their consideration:—The whole population of the territories under the government of the Captain-General of Caraccas, including Spanish Guiana and the island St. Marguerite, is less than 800,000 souls, of which number 150,000 are whites, 200,000 slaves, about 300,000 enfranchised negroes or their descendants, and the remainder Indians.

The government of this territory is divided into five departments: that of the province of Venezuela in the centre, that of Maracaibo to the westward, that of Cumana to the eastward, that of Guiana to the southward, and that of the island St. Marguerite to the north-east.

There is in Venezuela an army consisting of 6558 men, of which 918 are regular infantry, 900 artillery, principally militia, 150 militia cavalry, 2400 white militia infantry, and the remainder people of colour. In Maracaibo there is a body of 1218 men, of which 308 are regular infantry, 100 black artillery, 450 white militia, and the remainder people of colour. In Cumana there are 2916 men, of which 221 are regular infantry, 450 artillery, principally militia, 175 militia cavalry, 1080 white militia, and the remainder people of colour. In

Guiana there are 1120 men, of which 150 are regular infantry, 100 militia artillery, 150 militia cavalry, 360 white militia infantry, and the remainder people of colour. In the island of St. Marguerite there are 1247 men, of which number 77 are regular infantry, 400 militia artillery, 50 militia cavalry, 360 white militia infantry, and the remainder people of colour.

The total of troops is in	Venezuela . .	6558
	Maracaibo . .	1218
	Cumana . . .	2916
	Guiana . . .	1120
	St. Marguerite .	1247
		13,059

It is probable that these numbers are not complete; but the late occurrences at Buenos Ayres show that we ought not to rely entirely upon the accounts which we have received of the inefficiency of the Spanish military establishments in America; and in this part of their dominions in particular it is probable that measures for their defence will have been adopted in consequence of the attempts made upon them in the last year by Miranda.

Adverting therefore to the state of population of these territories, particularly to the proportion which that of the great cities bears to the general population of the country, to the strength of the military establishments as above detailed, and to their probable state of preparation, I conceive that the attack upon these possessions ought not to be made with a smaller force than 10,000 men, besides artillery. Of this number 6000 ought to be British infantry, 1400 British cavalry, 2600 black infantry.

The place of assembly for this force ought to be the island of Barbadoes. Jamaica would be too far to leeward. Their operations ought to be directed in the first instance to get possession of the whole of the eastern part of this territory, from whence they would soon have the means of reducing the western parts. The plan according to which I would propose to carry these operations into execution would be to divide the army into three corps, to make their attacks nearly at the same time. One, consisting of 5000 men, with a regiment of cavalry, to attack La Guayra and the city of Caraccas; the other, con-

sisting of 2500 men, with half a regiment of cavalry, to attack Cumana; and the third, consisting of 2500 men, with half a regiment of cavalry, to ascend the Oronoco, to occupy such posts upon that river as might be necessary in order to secure its navigation, and to take possession of St. Thomé, the capital of Spanish Guiana, situated at Angustura. After their first success the movements of these three detachments should be directed to communicate with each other, by the possession of Cumana Coa, La Concepcion de la Paz, and such other points as might be necessary, and then to the conquest of the whole territory.

The principal difficulty of these operations would probably be the landing at La Guayra; but I have little doubt that it would be effected without sustaining any very material loss. There would be no difficulty in effecting the landing at Cumana; but a small fort is to be attacked, which I don't believe is of great strength.

The trade wind blows up the Oronoco with sufficient strength to enable a vessel to stem its current, and there would be no difficulty in accomplishing the objects proposed for this detachment.

I will furnish a detailed arrangement for the operations of these different detachments, if government should think it proper to attack these territories:

I should imagine from their situation, and from the fact that a great part of them is annually inundated, that they cannot be healthy. Parts of them are certainly unhealthy, but I am not enabled to point out which are least so:

Although it is probably out of my province, I hope I shal be excused if I discuss the policy of attacking them, and consider the system upon which the settlement of them is to be made.

There is no doubt that the territories under the Captain-General of the Caraccas are the most fertile in the world, and might turn out to be the most valuable colony that Great Britain or any other nation ever possessed. But Great Britain would not derive any additional benefit from them at present as a market for her manufactures and produce, as the number o inhabitants is not very large, there is no very easy communication between that country and other parts of South America, and there is reason to believe that large quantities of British

produce are already conveyed into the kingdom of Terra Firma by the means of neutrals and the contraband trade. The benefit to be derived from the possession of these countries would be gained by the extension and improvement of their cultivation, of which, as the slave-trade will be abolished, there are no hopes. On this ground, therefore, the possession of the colony would be of little positive advantage to Great Britain.

It will require at all times a large force to keep possession of it; possibly as large as that which will be employed to conquer it. There can be no doubt but that the habits and prejudices of the native creoles and Spanish inhabitants of Terra Firma will be adverse to the British government; and in consequence of the abolition of the slave-trade, these feelings will not be counteracted by the benefit and profit which they would derive from the employment of British capital and increased numbers of hands in the cultivation and improvement of their estates. I am therefore convinced that the gain which Great Britain will derive from the possession of this colony, under present circumstances, will not compensate for the loss which may be sustained and the expense which will be incurred in the conquest, and the inconvenience of maintaining it.

But if we should not take possession of these territories during the war, I have but little doubt that the French government will take possession of them after the peace. In this view the conquest of Terra Firma becomes very important, as it involves the question of throwing into the power of France the means of establishing herself in the most fertile, and the country most advantageously situated for commerce of any in South America.

The only mode which I can suggest of effecting this important object, without incurring the inconvenience of maintaining in Terra Firma a large military force, would be to establish there an independent government. Although much depends upon the details of such an arrangement, this is not the time for discussing them; and I shall only observe at present upon this part of the subject, that considering the local situation of these territories, the probability of their being attacked, and the strength of the power by which they might be attacked, there does not appear the same objection to the establishment of an independent government within them as in the other

parts of the Spanish territories with reference to which this question has been considered.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM. [37.]

8th Feb., 1808.

Having perused the different papers received from the Secretary of State's office respecting the Spanish dominions in America, and conversed with General Miranda, it appears to me that the first point for the consideration of the King's Ministers is the policy of effecting a revolution which is to establish an independent government in a part or the whole of those dominions.

I shall not now enter into a discussion of the advantages which Great Britain would derive from such a vast political revolution; but objections have occurred to my mind to effecting it, which I will state, as I imagine they have not been considered by others.

The system according to which Great Britain has hitherto contended that the colonial policy of the world should be conducted, is, that no neutral nation should have the facility of carrying on trade with the colonies of belligerents in time of war, which trade such neutral should not have been permitted to carry on in time of peace. According to this principle, all commerce between the colonies of the enemies of Great Britain and the mother country would be impeded if the principle were fully and fairly carried into execution, and the enemies of Great Britain would feel proportionate inconvenience and distress. It is true that the principle has been, and may be hereafter, evaded; but these evasions are to be attributed in a great degree to the forbearance of Great Britain herself, and to the necessity which this country may have laboured under, of conniving at them for the convenience and advantage of other branches of the British commerce. Still the principle is a salutary one, and it is necessary to weigh well any arrangement which should render it entirely nugatory. The countries in which it is proposed, by the measures under consideration, to establish independent governments, are capable of producing colonial articles sufficient for the consumption of all Europe; the governments to be established within them are to be independent, and are therefore to be at liberty to trade with the

whole world. The consequence of this freedom of commerce will be, that the belligerent nations of Europe, enemies of Great Britain, will be supplied with the colonial produce which they may require, by the means of neutrals, without the possibility of preventing such supply by the application of any of the old principles of the law of nations, or the rules by which Great Britain has been guided since the war of 1756, in reference to the commerce in these same articles. It is true that, as long as the enemy shall continue to enforce his decree of November, 1806, and this country the late Orders in Council, the trade of the enemy in colonial produce must be prevented, even though the whole of America were independent; but as the repeal of the enemy's decree of November, 1806, may be expected to be the consequence of the late measures, and the repeal of this decree may be supposed necessarily to draw after it the repeal of the Orders in Council, the state of the future commerce of the world, in articles of colonial produce, deserves the consideration of the Ministers when they will decide upon this point.

The Spanish dominions in America are divided into four great Vice-Royalties: Mexico, which extends from the northern parts of New Mexico and California to the neighbourhood of Panama; the kingdom of Terra Firma, in which are included the Vice-Royalty of Santa Fé and the Royal Audiences of the Caraccas and Quito, and extends from Panama inclusive to Dutch Guiana to the eastward, and from Panama inclusive along the South Sea as far as the Line; the Vice-Royalty of Lima, which includes the kingdoms of Chili and Peru; and, lastly, the Vice Royalty of Buenos Ayres, on the eastern side of the continent, which joins the Portuguese dominions in Brazil, and extends to the westward as far as the Cordillera of the Andes.

From what has lately passed at Buenos Ayres, and from all that I have read of these countries, I am convinced that any attempt to conquer them, with a view to their future subjection to the British Crown, would certainly fail; and therefore I consider the only mode in which they can be wrested from the Crown of Spain is by a revolution and by the establishment of an independent government within them. It appears that in all these countries frequent attempts to produce revolution have been made, particularly since the American Revolution and the

French Revolution. It is natural to believe that the discontents which occasioned those attempts still exist, and that the people are ripe for throwing off the Spanish yoke whenever an opportunity may offer, of which they can take advantage without great danger to themselves. Indeed, the abject state to which the government of Old Spain has at last fallen, and the establishment of the Portuguese monarchy in the Brazils, must increase this desire, as the latter event must point out that the means exist in those countries for establishing and maintaining an independent monarchy. I don't consider that Miranda's failure on the coast of Terra Firma in the year 1806 tends to prove that the people of that country are less inclined to a revolution than they certainly were in 1796-1797. Miranda was not sufficiently strong, and was obliged to act upon the defensive; and it would be unreasonable to expect that a people should manifest a desire to shake off an ancient government to join a man who was too weak even to protect himself. Besides that, it was known that Great Britain was then engaged in negotiations for peace, the result of which (if peace had been made, and peace was expected,) must have been the dereliction of the unfortunate inhabitants of these countries, and they would have been punished as rebels by their old masters.

At the same time I must say that I have not seen in any of the papers which I have perused, nor has Miranda, any proof that I know of that a disposition to shake off the Spanish government still exists in these countries. For the reasons which I have above stated, I think it more than probable that it does exist; and it appears to me that it will be necessary, to enable those who wish for this description of revolution to manifest their inclinations, that the country in which it is proposed to carry it into effect should be attacked by such a force as not only will render success nearly certain, but, in the event of success against the troops and establishments of the King of Spain, will enable the person entrusted by government with the management of these transactions to guide the progress of the revolution, and to fix the nature of the government thereafter to be established.

Having thus considered the general question, the next point is to see where these operations ought to be commenced; for I think there is no doubt that if the war should continue, and Great Britain should have the means disposable to be applied

to that purpose, the spirit of revolution will spread over the whole continent of South America. It would probably be advisable to commence with Buenos Ayres with a view to the aid to be given to the Portuguese government in the Brazils; but the late events in that part of the world must be supposed to have had some effect in lowering the national character at Buenos Ayres. It is probable that, at all events, the army which would be sent there would not be in a situation to attempt establishing a new government until after it had gained a victory at the expense of great loss of lives of the inhabitants, and even in that case the final arrangement through our means would be very difficult.

Any attempt upon the governments of Peru or Chili must be made after a voyage nearly round the world: its success would still be certain, but the benefits which would be derived from it would not be so great as those which would be derived from an attempt on a nearer object, although the difficulty and exertion would be greater.

The option is narrowed, then, between the governments of the kingdoms of Mexico and of Terra Firma, and there is some difficulty in making the choice. The advantage of commencing operations by the kingdom of Terra Firma is, that through General Miranda the British government have the means of communicating with the people of that country, and have reason to believe, as far as his judgment can be depended upon, that they are inclined to a revolution.

After a landing will have been effected, the same means will be used to make known to the people the object of the invasion; and it may reasonably be expected that the resistance will be proportionately less.

No such means exist of communication with Mexico; but, on the other hand, it is to be apprehended that, as soon as it will have been known that the British troops have landed in the Caraccas, and the views with which they have landed, the French or the Americans will endeavour to obtain possession of Mexico either by the same means or by conquest.

If operations were to be commenced in Mexico, it would be impossible for those Powers to interfere in the arrangement of the affairs of any other part of the Continent. It must however be observed, that the attack upon Mexico will require a

larger force than that upon Terra Firma; and from circumstances it is to be apprehended that, in case of failure in Mexico, it might be more difficult to withdraw than it would be in the event of a similar misfortune in Terra Firma. I think also that there is reason to doubt whether any independent government which should be established by Great Britain in Mexico would possess the means of defending itself against the attacks of the United States without the assistance of Great Britain. The memoranda which have already been in Lord Castlereagh's hands, and which are now returned in another form, will point out the plan of operations which in my opinion ought to be adopted in both these countries: the supplementary memoranda point out the alterations which further information has induced me to make in these plans.

I find that General Miranda is of opinion that Terra Firma can be attacked during the rains; and indeed it appears by different accounts that the rains in the government of the Caraccas are not very severe. I have been in the field during many campaigns in the rains in the tropics, but I do not recommend such a measure, and I should be induced to doubt its expediency in a country which is supposed not to be healthy, which is certainly not fully peopled, and which must be overgrown with wood. At all events, the operations cannot be extended in that season into the low lands; certainly not upon the rivers Oronoco or Magdalena till after they will have ceased and the rivers will have fallen in the month of December; and therefore, upon the whole, it might be best to delay their commencement at any place till that month.

The next point for consideration is the nature of the government to be established in the country in which we shall have subdued the troops of the King of Spain. The constitution proposed by Miranda is of a Republican form, and too regularly constructed ever to answer any practical good effect. The government to be established in each of these Vice-Royalties, if it is to be one which suits the nature and prejudices of the people, is a monarchy with such a representative body as will not be difficult to manage, at the same time that it will give the people of the country such a share in the government as will afford them a reasonable security.

The Cabildos which have been established throughout those territories afford the means of having such a representative

body. Probably the elections ought to be made by the Cabildos with the owners of the land possessing a certain qualification, of persons qualified by age and property to be a representative. The superior assembly might be composed of the ancient noblesse, being landowners, who might be named by the King for life. All the old institutions in the country ought in the first instance to be maintained, and to be changed and amended only as time and experience would point out what would suit both people and country better.

Miranda does not seem disinclined to a monarchy, and appears to have no objection to the substitution of any reasonable plan of government, such as has been above described, for that which he had proposed; but he asked whom we proposed to have for the monarch? a question which I was unable to answer.

I have said nothing in these papers respecting the amount of the naval force which would be required on the proposed service. The amount would, of course, depend upon circumstances; but both gun and bomb vessels would be required, and eventually a squadron in the South Seas.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[38.] SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM TO NO. 4.*

London, 8th Feb., 1808.

If the government should determine upon the attack of New Spain, the plan of operations, as proposed in No. 4, appears to me the most likely to answer. The corps, however, to make this attack ought to consist of 17,000 men, to be composed as follows: German light cavalry, two regiments, 1400; British light cavalry, three regiments, 2100; German infantry, 3000; Negro infantry, 3000; British infantry, 8000; besides artillery and pioneers. The artillery should consist of 36 pieces, of which one-third horse, together with a small battering train, mounted upon travelling carriages, and some of the light mortars. Horses ought to be provided to mount a proportion of the cavalry either in the West Indies or in England, and measures to be taken to provide either horses or mules to draw the artillery. The assembly of this corps ought to be on the island of Jamaica.

* See page 45.

The papers which I have lately perused, relating particularly to Mexico, do not afford any ground on which I should alter my opinion respecting the plan of operations to be followed after the landing will have been effected: There are two measures which are essentially necessary, and which there is reason to believe would both be in our power, if the intelligence which those papers contain be correct. One is, to obtain possession of La Vera Cruz and the castle of St. Juan d'Ulloa; the other is, to remove the unseasoned troops from the low countries on the coast into the higher and more healthy parts in the neighbourhood of Xalapa. The force above proposed may with safety attempt both those objects at the same time; the negro troops, and Germans probably, the former, and the British troops the latter; and it is probable that the whole army would be collected in the neighbourhood of Xalapa before the whole of the Spanish army would be collected to oppose them.

If we should proceed in this manner, on the principle of a revolution, there will be no occasion for drawing troops from India for our support, as, if we should be successful, we may expect the new government will soon raise troops in sufficient numbers to perform all the services that we can require from them.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM TO NO. 6.* [39.]

London, 8th Feb., 1808.

The plan suggested in the Memorandum No. 6 appears most likely to be successful in laying the foundation of the revolution to be effected in Terra Firma. I believe the account contained in No. 6 of the number of troops in the provinces of Cumana, Venezuela, Maracaibo, Guiana, and St. Marguerite, to be nearly correct; there are besides those 180 French infantry at Caraccas. I cannot say how many there are in Santa Martha and Santa Fé de Bogota, but probably not a large number; and it will be observed that, according to the plan of operations proposed, these troops will not come in action till the government of Cumana, Venezuela, and Guiana will have been organized, and a force will have been raised by that government.

* See page 56.

which will add to that by which the first invasion will have been made. The corps which would be required to carry into execution the proposed plan of operations should consist of about 10,000 rank and file, besides artillery and a corps of negro pioneers. This corps might be composed as follows:

Two regiments, or 1400 British light cavalry; one regiment, or 700 German light cavalry; German infantry, 2500; negro infantry, 2500; British infantry, 3000.

The ordnance ought to consist of 20 pieces, of which one-third should be horse artillery; there ought besides to be a small battering train on travelling carriages, and some of the light mortars. The number of artillerymen should be proportioned to the quantity of ordnance.

The rendezvous for this corps ought, I believe, to be the island of Grenada rather than the island of Barbadoes, as I imagine the former to be more healthy than the latter. Horses should be provided either in the West Indies or should be brought from England to mount 400 of the cavalry, and mules to draw the whole of the artillery, as an action with the Spanish troops may be expected immediately after the landing.

After this corps will have established itself in the eastern part of the territory of Terra Firma; that is to say, in the provinces of Venezuela, Cumana, and Spanish Guiana, and will have organized the authorities by which the country is to be governed hereafter, it should proceed to the further conquest of the country towards Santa Fé de Bogota. This will be done either by operations upon the rivers Oronoco and Apura, or by a march through the provinces of Maracaibo and Santa Martha, or by an operation upon the sea coast against Santa Martha itself, and thence upon the river Magdalena, so as to blockade Carthagena, or possibly by a combination of the three plans of operation. The choice of the three must, of course, depend upon local circumstances which it would be impossible to determine upon at present.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[40.] MEMORANDUM.

1st June, 1808.

According to the plan of operations at present in contemplation, a corps, consisting of about 8000 men, are to proceed from

Cork to join General Spencer's corps of about 5000 off the coast of Spain; and in case affairs in that quarter should not hold out a prospect of a successful result, it is proposed either to send all the troops to the West Indies, with a view to the operations to be carried on in the Spanish colonies in the Gulf of Mexico, or to divide the corps, and to send 8000, reinforced by a regiment of cavalry, to the River de la Plata, and 5000, reinforced by two regiments of cavalry, to the West Indies, who will there receive reinforcements which will enable them to carry on the proposed operations against the Caraccas at the appointed season.

The object of this memorandum is to point out the extent of the equipments, &c., which ought to be provided for each of these corps, the periods at which the equipment for each ought to be prepared and to sail from England, and the mode in which it is proposed to make the detachments, as far as regards divisions of stores, &c.

This subject will be considered, in the first instance, in reference to the corps now under orders for embarkation at Cork.

That corps ought to have with it stores, &c.; as stated in the paper marked A.

With a view to the detachment to be made to the La Plata, and to the operations to be carried on in that quarter, an addition ought to be made to those stores as stated in the papers marked B.; included among which is one marked B. 2, stating the whole that this corps will take with it to the La Plata.

In the paper marked C. is a statement of what will be required for the corps to be assembled in the West Indies for the operations in the Caraccas, including arms and ammunition and pikes for the use of the natives of the country.

As it does not appear that General Spencer's or General Prevost's corps are provided with a separate assortment of ordnance and stores, it will be necessary to send from England by the 1st of September the stores as stated in the paper marked C 2.

If the detachment should not be made to the La Plata, but the whole of the troops should proceed in one operation in the Gulf of Mexico, the arrangements respecting the stores will be precisely the same; and those required for this service will be composed, 1st, of those that will leave Cork at present; 2ndly, of

those to be sent from England by the 1st July for the service in the La Plata; 3rdly, those to be sent from England by the 1st September for the service in the Caraccas. Besides these stores there is a list of ordnance and stores required for the use of the native government expected to be established in South America, which will be sent in as soon as further communication will be had with General Miranda.

In respect to the artillery, two companies to be detached at present from Cork, and one from Madeira, will be sufficient for the service in the La Plata; and two companies to be detached from Halifax and one from Madeira will be sufficient for the service in the Caraccas. If the expedition to the La Plata should not take place, and the whole should join in one expedition to the territories in the Gulf, two companies now to be detached from Cork, two from Halifax with Prevost's corps, and one from Madeira, leaving one company at Madeira, and making five companies for the service, will be fully sufficient.

I recommend that horses may be sent for the ordnance required in the paper marked A, and if not wanted in Spain they will be returned to England.

In respect to provisions, the best mode of proceeding would be to send the troops from Cork with the usual proportion in the transports, which is, I conclude, for six months; and to order the Victualling Board to send with them two months' flour and biscuit and two months' meat for 13,000 men, and to send on the 1st September to the West Indies six months' flour and biscuit and two months' meat for 14,000 men.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURES.]

(*Original in hand-writing of Sir Arthur Wellesley; endorsed "Memorandum relative to certain Proposed Expeditions."*)

A.

Ordnance and Stores required for the troops now under orders for embarkation at Cork; to be sent as soon as possible.

*25,000 muskets with bayonets.
*25,000† pikes.
2,000,000 musket ball cartridges.
†50,000 musket flints.

* This is understood to be the supply for the whole service, and would be divided as will appear by the other papers.

† This would be the supply for the troops, and the remainder for the use of those to whom the arms would be given.

4,000,000 musket ball cartridges.
100,000 musket flints.
2 brigades of 6-pounder field ordnance, with carriages, ammunition, &c., complete, of the car brigade pattern.
1 brigade of 9-pounder ditto, ditto.
Scaling-ladders.
Sand-bags for one siege of a place of third order.
A double quantity of ammunition for the field train.
Intrenching tools for 8000 men.

B.

Ordnance and Stores required for a detachment to be sent to the La Plata, and to leave England by the 1st of July, to join the troops off the coast of Spain.

2 10-inch mortars.
4 small 5-inch mortars upon beds, capable of being transported by hand.
Stores for these pieces of ordnance for the siege of Monte Video.
70,000 pistol and carbine cartridges.
3,000 pistol and carbine flints.

B 2.

Ordnance and Stores which will be sent with the detachment to the La Plata from the coast of Spain.

7,000 muskets.
7,000 pikes.
2,000,000 musket ball cartridges for the troops.
50,000 musket flints for the troops.
1,000,000 musket ball cartridges.
25,000 musket flints.
2 brigades of light 6-pounder ordnance, with carriages, ammunition, &c., complete, of the car brigade pattern.
1 brigade of 9-pounder ditto, ditto.
Scaling-ladders.
Sand-bags.
Double quantity of ammunition for the field-train.
Intrenching tools for 8000 men.
2 10-inch mortars.
4 small 5-inch mortars upon beds, capable of being transported by hand.
Stores for these pieces of ordnance.
70,000 pistol and carbine cartridges.
3,000 pistol and carbine flints.

C.

Ordnance and Stores required for the operations in the Caraccas.

18,000 muskets with bayonets.
18,000 pikes.

3,000,000 musket ball cartridges.
75,000 musket flints.
(These will leave England now, and will go to the West Indies with the troops from Spain.)
2,000,000 musket ball cartridges for the use of the troops.
50,000 musket flints.
(To be sent from England by the 1st of September.)

2 brigades of 6-pounder ordnance, car brigade pattern, with the usual proportion of howitzers, ammunition, &c., complete.
(These must be sent from England by the 1st of September.)

1 brigade of light 3-pounder ordnance, ditto, ditto, ditto.
(To be sent from England by the 1st of September.)

Double quantity of ammunition for field train.
(To be sent from England by the 1st of September.)

140,000 pistol cartridges.
6,000 pistol flints.
Scaling-ladders.
Sand bags for two sieges of places of third order.
Intrenching tools for 8000 men.
4 iron 24-pounders on travelling carriages.
4,000 loose 24-pound shot.
A proportionate quantity of powder in barrels.
2 10-inch mortars.
4 small 5-inch mortars upon beds, capable of being transported by hand.

C 2.

Ordnance and Stores to be sent from England by the 1st of September for the operations in the Caraccas.

2 brigades of 6-pounder ordnance, car brigade pattern, with the usual proportion of howitzers, ammunition, &c., complete.
1 brigade of light 3-pounder ordnance, of the car brigade construction, with the usual proportion of howitzers, ammunition, &c., &c., complete.
Double quantity of ammunition for a field train of 2 brigades of 6-pounders and 1 brigade of 3-pounders.
Scaling-ladders.
Sand bags for two sieges of places of third order.
Intrenching tools for 8000 men.
4 iron 24-pounders on travelling carriages.
4000 loose 24-pound shot.
A proportionate quantity of powder in barrels.
2 10-inch mortars.
4 small 5-inch mortars upon beds, capable of being transported by hand.
140,000 pistol cartridges.
6,000 pistol flints.
2,000,000 musket ball cartridges for the use of the troops.
50,000 musket flints ditto ditto.

MEMORANDUM. [41.]

6th June, 1808.

According to the plan proposed by Lord Castlereagh, provision must be made for the operations, as stated underneath, to be performed by the corps now about to sail from Cork; by the troops under General Spencer, now off Cadiz; and by the troops under General Prevost, now at Halifax.

First, it will be necessary to provide a convoy for the troops to proceed from Cork to Cadiz.

Secondly, if, according to the plan proposed, a detachment of the troops should go to the La Plata, it will be necessary to provide the naval means to assist in the operations to be performed at Monte Video. These would be a ship of the line of a small class, 2 frigates, 4 sloops, 4 gun-brigs, 4 bomb-vessels. These vessels ought to be ready to sail from Cadiz by the middle of July.

Thirdly, a convoy to take the troops from Cadiz and Madeira to the West Indies in August or September.

Fourthly, if the expedition should go to the Caraccas, it ought, besides the general protection it will receive from the fleet in the West Indies, to have attached to it a ship of the line of a small class, 2 frigates, 3 sloops, 3 gun-brigs, 4 bomb-vessels. These to be at the rendezvous in the West Indies by the 1st of December.

Fifthly, if the expedition should not go to the La Plata, and the result of the affairs in Spain should be a great undertaking against the Spanish territories in the Gulf, it will be necessary to provide as stated in the first, third, and fourth articles, and, in addition to the fourth, a ship of the line, a frigate, 4 sloops, 4 gun-brigs, 4 bomb-vessels. All these, and those in the fourth article in this case, to be at the rendezvous in the West Indies by the 15th of November.

Sixthly, a convoy to bring Sir George Prevost's corps from Halifax to the West Indies in the month of September.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[42.] MEMORANDUM.

1808.

If government should determine to attack the kingdom of New Spain, a force of from 16,000 to 17,000 men ought to be provided, of which 2000 ought to be cavalry; if to attack the Caraccas 14,000, of which 1400 cavalry.*

The rendezvous for the attack upon Mexico ought to be the island of Jamaica; that for the attack upon the Caraccas ought to be to windward, either Grenada† or that of the islands which may afford the best means of sheltering the fleet.

The operations against the kingdom of New Spain cannot be carried on till December; neither can they be carried on in the Oronoco, or in the lower parts of the territories under the government of Caraccas, till about the same period. But I imagine that an attack might be made upon La Guayra and the city of Caraccas itself in the middle of October. At that period the rains will have ceased; and although the low countries and the banks of the Oronoco will still be overflowed, the time will be profitably employed at La Guayra and at Caraccas in ascertaining the dispositions of the inhabitants of the country and in making the arrangements for its future government till the country will be in a state to enable the army to perform the more active operations which may be necessary.

My opinion is that it is expedient to commence the operations against the Spanish colonies at Caraccas. First, the military difficulties are not so great in these territories as they are in the territories in the Gulf; secondly, we have the means of communicating with the people of the country through Miranda, and of explaining at an early period the object of our operations; thirdly, we can commence our operations at an earlier period of the year; and fourthly, success in the Caraccas will remove many of the difficulties attending our operations in other parts, and in case of failure there would not be much difficulty in withdrawing.

In making out the detail, therefore, for the collection of the

* In this number of 14,000 I include a reserve of 4000 men, which ought to be left in the islands in order to perform the operations which may be necessary in the Oronoco, or in the Spanish territories to the windward of La Guayra, or to reinforce the main body.

† We must fix upon that island to windward which has the best harbour to give shelter at that season of the year to our fleet of transports.

troops, stores, &c., for this expedition, I shall consider of the arrangements for the attack on the Caraccas in the first instance, and that it should be made at the earliest period at which it will be possible to collect the troops, stores, &c., and which may be consistent with a due attention to the health of the troops. I conclude that it will be possible to prepare everything which is to be sent from England, so that the fleet would sail by the 1st of August, and we might expect to make our attack by the middle of October. If the government should decide that it would be expedient to make it at a later period, the troops, &c., may be delayed still longer in the stations in which they are at present.

If the arrangements should thus be made, in the first instance, for the attack upon the Caraccas, and if it should be ultimately determined from ulterior information, showing a disposition in the Mexicans to receive us without much resistance, to make it upon the territories in the Gulf, the expedition can be moved with ease to the island of Jamaica.

It appears that the troops destined for this service are now distributed as follows:

	R. F.
Four regiments (General Spencer's corps) at Gibraltar ..	3673
One regiment at Madeira	1000
From England three regiments	3000
Two regiments of dragoons	1200
In the West Indies three regiments of black troops	3000
Black pioneers	300
From England artillery	300
Drivers belonging to the commissariat	200
	12,673

Camp equipage should be provided for all these troops, and they should have with them their usual proportion of musket ammunition. If those already out of England should not have with them a due proportion of camp equipage, it ought to be sent from England to the rendezvous in the transports which must go from hence in order to transport the black troops. Ordnance and stores and provisions for this service must likewise be sent from England, according to the annexed memoranda; and a commissariat, medical, and quartermaster-general's department must be prepared upon a large scale.

It will be desirable, in order to remove the difficulties which

will attend the first operations of the army, that a part of the cavalry should be mounted, and accordingly I recommend that means should be provided to send with them 500 horses.

It will likewise be desirable that the army should be equipped at an early period with all the means to enable it to move. On this ground I recommend that directions should be sent to the West Indies as soon as possible to purchase mules to the number of 500, provided with saddles, persons to take care of them, &c. It would be very advantageous that the mules should likewise be trained to the draught. The mules will eventually be delivered over to the drivers belonging to the commissariat, who will be sent from hence according to the distribution of the troops. Indeed, as soon as the quartermaster-general's department or the commissariat can be arranged, it would be desirable to send the persons belonging to it to the West Indies.

The accompanying memoranda will show in detail the orders which it will be necessary to give upon these points to each of the departments.

In respect to the naval force, it is obvious that its extent must depend upon the means of the enemy. The operations of the army, whether upon the Spanish main or in the Gulf of Mexico, will be covered and protected by the fleet already in the West Indies; and probably a ship of the line, two or three frigates, some gun and bomb vessels, and the armed launches of the fleet, in order to protect the landing of the troops, would be all that would be necessary.

It would add greatly to the strength and efficiency of the expedition if the troops were sent in the 44 and 64 gun ships (commonly called troop ships), which were used in the expedition to Egypt. The great advantage attending the use of these ships would be, that we should be able to increase our naval force according to the exigency of the moment, and that we should be able to carry a larger number of flat-bottomed boats than we could if we used for the troops only the common transports.

If we should be able to push our operations towards the South Sea, which must be the consequence of our success, it would be most desirable to have a commanding squadron in those seas.

Probably the best mode of effecting this object would be to direct the commanding officer in the East Indies to provide for

it by detaching a ship of the line and three frigates into the South Seas, the crews of which could be fed from Botany Bay.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM.—ORDERS FOR THE VICTUALLING BOARD. [43.]

1.* To prepare flour and biscuit for 14,000 men for 6 months.

2.† Meat for the same number for 2 months.

3.‡ Oats for 600 horses for 3 months.

4.§ Hay for 600 horses for 2 months.

5.‖ Wine from Madeira for 14,000 men for 6 months.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM.—ORDERS TO BE SENT TO GENERAL BERESFORD. [44.]

To embark in the ships which will be sent for them the¶ regiment by the 20th of July, and send them to the West Indies.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM.—ORDERS TO BE SENT TO GENERAL SPENCER ON THE 1ST OF JUNE. [45.]

To sail from Gibraltar for the West Indies (*query* Grenada?) on the 15th of July, with six months' provisions in his transports if possible.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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* This will provide for the army in case it should be difficult to procure flour in the Caraccas.

† This, with what will be in the transports, will provide for any future operations which may be in contemplation.

‡ This will provide one additional month, beyond the provisions in the transports, for the voyage to the West Indies; one month for the voyage to the destined place of attack; and one month after landing: at which period it may be expected that the horses will have become accustomed to the grain of the country.

§ This allows an additional month for the voyage to the West Indies, and a month for the voyage to the place of attack.

‖ This is recommended as more wholesome for the soldiers, and probably cheaper, than rum.

¶ Blank in manuscript.

[46.] ORDERS FOR TRANSPORT BOARD.

1. Coppered transports to be in readiness at Falmouth or Cork on the 20th of June to transport 3000 infantry, with six months' stores and provisions.

2. Coppered transports for 1200 cavalry and 600 horses (including those which the Staff may wish to take) to be in readiness at the same period at * . The horse ships to have hay and oats for two months, and water for three months, and provisions for the men for six months.

3. Coppered transports to be in readiness at Madeira on the 15th of July, with six months' provisions, to transport 1000 infantry.

4. Coppered transports to be sent to the West Indies by the end of August to transport 3300 infantry (including the Black pioneers); these to have four months' provisions.

5. Horse ships for 500 horses or mules to be in the West Indies by the end of August, with fodder and water for the horses for one month.

6. Transports to be prepared as soon as possible with six months' provisions to carry to the West Indies 200 drivers belonging to the commissariat.

7. Hospital ships at the end of June at Cork or Falmouth to accompany the expedition.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[47.] MEMORANDUM.—ORDERS TO BE SENT TO THE WEST INDIES.

1. Three battalions, consisting of 3000 negroes and 300 negro pioneers, to be prepared for service.

2. 500 mules with their saddles to be purchased and taken care of till they will be brought to the rendezvous, for which means must be provided by the governors of the different islands. The best mode of performing this service would be to direct the governor of each of the islands to purchase and have care taken of a given number.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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* Blank in manuscript.

MEMORANDUM.—ORDERS FOR THE BOARD OF ORDNANCE. [48.]

1. A field train, consisting of 24 pieces of light ordnance, of which six pieces to be howitzers, to be embarked and in readiness to sail from Falmouth or Cork on the 1st of July next. The car-brigades would answer best, with the ammunition packed in boxes of that description which would be most easily carried by hand.

2. 300 artillerymen and gunner-drivers, with harness, &c., complete, to accompany this train. Six months' provisions for these men.

3. Ordnance and stores as follows, to be embarked and in readiness to sail at the same time:

10,000 muskets and bayonets.
Intrenching tools for 8000 men.
A double quantity of ammunition for the field train.
4,000,000 musket ball-cartridges.
100,000 musket flints.
120,000 pistol and carbine cartridges.
6000 pistol and carbine flints.
4 iron 18-pounders upon travelling carriages.
Stores for these guns.
4000 loose 18-pounder shot.
A proportionate quantity of powder in barrels.
2 10-inch mortars.
Stores for them.
4 small 8-inch mortars, upon beds capable of being transported by hand.
Stores for them.
Scaling ladders.
Sand bags.

N.B. I rather believe that there are in the stores some light 8-inch mortars, which are capable of being moved with the greatest ease. If there should be any of this description, it would be most desirable to have six or eight of them with their stores.

Note. These stores are in addition to those required by a paper given in by General Miranda.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[49.] MEMORANDUM.

The events which have lately occurred in Spain, and the intelligence received from Gibraltar, appear to deserve the serious attention of the King's Ministers. There can be no doubt that the events which preceded the massacre at Madrid, and the revolution effected at Bayonne, had excited the jealousy of the whole Spanish nation; and the late outrages have induced some persons high in authority and command in Spain to manifest a disposition to resist the execution of the plans for the subjugation of their country.

Indeed Bonaparte himself does not appear to consider the situation of his affairs in Spain to be very prosperous; he has remarked upon the sentiments and proceedings of some of the Spaniards; and we find that he has called large reinforcements to the assistance of his troops.

Upon the whole then this would appear to be a crisis in which a great effort might be made with advantage; and it is certain that any measures which can distress the French in Spain must oblige them to delay for a season the execution of their plans upon Turkey, or to withdraw their armies from the north.

That which I recommend is to send to Gibraltar all the disposable force that can immediately be spared from England, there to join General Spencer's corps, to be prepared to act as circumstances would point out. Arms and ammunition in large quantities ought to be sent with this corps, and its commander to be instructed to encourage the insurrection to the utmost of his power. If it should be found impracticable to make any impression upon the French authority in Spain by the means of the insurrection, he should be then instructed to encourage the principal people of the kingdom to emigrate to America, under the engagement of establishing there an independent government. As the troops are not at present wanted in England, and the transports are already in the service, no inconvenience can result from this measure; and if it should be found that nothing can be done in Spain, the same troops might proceed upon the service in contemplation in the Spanish colonies in America.

The persons who may be induced to emigrate from Spain in consequence of the late events and the proposed measures would greatly facilitate all our operations in America by their

accounts of events in their own country, and by their testimony in favour of our intentions; and our plans might be revised with a view to the advantages to be derived from those persons, and to the early period of the year in which we may be at liberty to quit the coasts of Spain after having found that the discontents in that country do not promise any very great or favourable result. In this view of the question it might be possible to resume the plan of revolution at Buenos Ayres, by obtaining possession, and placing a garrison in Monte Video.

The advantages to be derived from this mode of executing the plan of operations in America are, first, that we should commence our operations and make our first impression in a climate favourable to the health of the troops; secondly, that its success would tend materially to the security of our ally in the Brazils; thirdly, that if we should be tolerably fortunate in our winds and weather, and in our operations, we might still arrive in the West Indies in time to perform the operations either in the Caraccas or in Mexico at the best season of the year.

It is not necessary to enter further upon this subject than to calculate the periods for the proposed operations, and for the different voyages.

If the troops should be ready to sail from England early in June, they would arrive at Gibraltar in the middle of that month; one month would probably be sufficient to ascertain the chances of advantage to be derived from the temper of the people in Spain; and if none should appear, the voyage might be commenced in the middle of July. The fleet would arrive in La Plata in the middle of September, and the temper of the principal people at Buenos Ayres might be tried while the operations should be carrying on against Monte Video. A garrison might be left there, and the army might sail again by the 15th of October, and would arrive in the West Indies by the 1st of December. According to this plan, the Spanish government being deprived of Monte Video, the people of Buenos Ayres would be left to adopt their own measures.

If this expedition should be thought to involve too great an extent of space, and too many objects for the length of time allotted for it, or if it should be found that the prospect of the advantage to be derived from the state of affairs in Spain is not entirely removed by the middle of July, or at a period of the year when it will be possible to go to La Plata, the army would

go to the West Indies according to the original plan in the month of August, so as to arrive there in the middle of October.

These plans upon Spain would be much facilitated by anything which could be done to alarm Bonaparte in France. Surely this is not impossible; and the manner in which his armies are now spread in all parts of Europe, each portion of them having great objects and ample employment, which cannot be given up without injury to his affairs, afford an opportunity which ought not to be passed by.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

CHAPTER III.—PORTUGAL.

To Lord Hawkesbury. [50.]

MY DEAR LORD, London, 13th June, 1808.

In arranging the commissariat for the corps to be placed under my command, it has been settled that I am to have the assistant commissaries from Ireland; and Lord Castlereagh has desired me to mention the subject to your Lordship, and to request that you would direct that two of the gentlemen might be ordered to Cork to place themselves under the orders of Mr. Pipon.

I am also to have 300 horses and their drivers from the Irish commissariat, which horses are to be eventually employed in the draught of my artillery, if the services of the troops should be required on shore. They are to be embarked at Cork; and I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you will order that they may be sent there for that purpose.

Ever, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh. [51.]

MY DEAR LORD, Dublin Castle, 21st June, 1808.

I had a very long passage, and did not arrive here till yesterday afternoon.

I find that the officers and drivers of the commissariat in Ireland are not bound to serve out of this country, and that the officers have no commissions and no half-pay. The number of horses which we shall take will be exactly for two troops; and Handfield proposes that we should promise the officers of these two troops to give them commissions and half-pay, and that we should prevail upon the private men to extend the limit of their services, according to the plan arranged by Mr. Pitt at the

period at which Handfield was to have gone upon the Continent with them.

I have desired Handfield to carry this plan into execution. If you should approve of it, and these two troops should return to Ireland, you will always have two troops of commissariat drivers upon whom you may depend for foreign service; and if you should not approve of it, all will stand as it is, and the horses, officers, and drivers will not go. The permanent expense of the half-pay for these two troops will not be much more than 300*l.* per annum.

I don't much like the news from Spain of the 29th. However, we may still hope for something from the assembly of the Junta of Andalusia.

Ever, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The rank to be given to the officers would be only during the war, which would be better than the arrangement for the officers of the driver corps attached to the commissariat in England, who have permanent rank.

[52.] *To Colonel Handfield.*

SIR, Dublin Castle, 24th June, 1808.

I have it in command from the Lord-Lieutenant to state that, in concert with His Majesty's Ministers, it has been deemed expedient to require two Assistant-Commissaries from this establishment, and to permit to the extent of two troops from the corps of waggoners to volunteer for foreign service; and his Grace, in consequence, desires that you will hold out to the Assistant-Commissaries the same pay and allowances as the Assistant-Commissaries on the British establishment, and to the men who may volunteer on this occasion the offer of the pay and allowances of the corps of waggoners serving in Great Britain, with temporary rank to the officers during the war and British half-pay on reduction; but on their return to Ireland it is to be distinctly understood that they are to receive the pay and allowances of the Irish commissariat.

His Grace, therefore, further desires that you will take the subject into your early consideration and receive the orders of

the Commander of the Forces upon this arrangement in detail, reporting as soon as practicable the most prompt means of carrying it into effect.

I am upon this occasion to observe that it has been suggested it may be necessary that the two troops should carry their camp equipage, with picket-posts and forge-carts, saddles and bridles for serjeants, watering-bridles and horse-collars.

I am likewise to state that the effective strength of the two troops in question is proposed to consist of the numbers specified in the margin.*

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To General the Earl of Harrington. [53.]

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, 24th June, 1808.

I have it in command from the Lord Lieutenant to state to your Lordship that, in concert with His Majesty's Ministers, it has been deemed expedient to require two Assistant Commissaries from the Irish establishment, and to permit to the extent of two troops from the corps of waggoners to volunteer for foreign service; and, in consequence, a confidential communication will be had with Colonel Handfield on the subject, who will be instructed to hold out to the Assistant Commissaries the same pay and allowances as the Assistant Commissaries on the British establishment, and to the men who may volunteer on this occasion the offer of the rate of pay and allowances of the corps of waggoners serving in Great Britain, with temporary rank to the officers during the war and British half-pay on reduction; but should they return to Ireland, it is to be distinctly understood that they are to receive the pay and allowances of the Irish Commissariat.

Colonel Handfield will be further ordered to take your Lordship's pleasure on this arrangement in detail.

His Grace therefore desires that your Lordship will be pleased to take the subject into your early consideration, and convey your sentiments, as soon as practicable, as to the most prompt means of carrying it into effect.

I am upon this occasion to observe that it has been suggested

* Two captains, 4 lieutenants, 20 serjeants and conductors, 8 smiths and farriers, 2 harness makers, 2 wheelers, 200 drivers, and 300 horses.

it may be necessary that the two troops of the corps of waggoners should carry their camp-equipage with picket-posts and forge-carts, saddles and bridles for serjeants, watering-bridles, and horse-collars.

I am likewise to state that the effective strength of the two troops in question is proposed to consist of the numbers specified in the margin.*

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[54.] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Dublin Castle, 29th June, 1808.

I received a letter, of which I enclose a copy, from Colonel Gordon last night, and I have written to him this day to tell him that Handfield and I are of opinion that the drivers of the Commissariat will not embark without their officers; and that if I should find that the Duke of York continues to think that the officers ought not to go, I shall direct that the attestations for general service of those men who do not choose to embark may be destroyed. In that case I hope that Lord Chatham will have no objection to allow the gunner-drivers to be removed to the transports in which the horses will be embarked.

There is no doubt that, in case the troops should land, these drivers would be highly useful, and that their utility would be much increased by the superintendence of their officers. Most particularly would they take better care of their horses if their officers be with them than they would otherwise; and, in fact, they won't embark at all unless the officers embark likewise.

While writing upon this subject, I wish to recall to your recollection that in the first papers which I gave you upon the proposed service, I stated the necessity of having 300 drivers of the Commissariat. I did this from a knowledge of the use to be derived from persons of this description, that they are always wanted, and that their places are invariably supplied, and very ill supplied, by the use of the soldiers for the services which they would perform. I hope, therefore, that you will consider of the mode of supplying persons of this description.

* Two captains, 4 lieutenants, 20 serjeant conductors, 8 smiths and farriers, 2 harness makers, 2 wheelers, 200 drivers, and 300 horses.

I declare that I do not understand the principles on which our military establishments are formed, if, when large corps of troops are sent out to perform important and difficult services, they are not to have with them those means of equipment which they require and which the establishment can afford, such as horses to draw artillery and drivers attached to the Commissariat, when these means are not wanted at home; and, what is more, considering that the number of horses and drivers in England, all of whom the public could command in case of emergency, never can be wanted excepting for foreign service.

Ever, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Since writing the above, I have received your letter of the 26th instant, in which you approve of the suggestion which I had made respecting the drivers of the Commissariat, and also your letter of the 27th.

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*To Major-General Hill.**

MY DEAR HILL, Dublin Castle, 29th June, 1808.

I received your letter of the 27th this morning, and I am glad to find that you can make arrangements for landing the corps so frequently. It will tend much to the health of the men, and will make them feel less unpleasantly the heat and confinement of the transports.

There is camp equipage complete, including havresacks and canteens for 4000 men, on board the *Grinfield*, which sailed from Portsmouth on the 21st June; and for the same number on board the *Tuscan*, which sailed from Portsmouth on the 23rd. As soon as these vessels shall arrive, you will direct the regiments to make returns for the number of canteens and havresacks that they may require, which are to be issued upon these returns from the Quartermaster-General's stores. But they are to be kept in their packages in the regimental store of each regiment, and are not to be issued to the soldiers until further orders shall be given.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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* Afterwards General Lord Hill.

[56.] *To Lieutenant-General Floyd.**

SIR, Cork, 8th July, 1808.

I have the honour to inform you that the two troops of waggoners now embarking to proceed with the army under my command have no camp equipage, &c.; and I shall be much obliged to you to give instructions for such quantities to be issued to them as may be necessary, including a blanket to each man.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[57.] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cove, 11th July, 1808.

I am concerned to tell you that the wind is still contrary, and we have no hopes of getting away this night.

I find the ordnance and stores, which I believe were intended for the province of Asturias, are come here in the *Union* and *Patty* Ordnance transports. I shall, however, take these ships with me, and will send them from Cape Finisterre to Gijon.

Ever yours,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[58.] *To Stanhope Hunter, Esq.*

SIR, Coruña, 21st July, 1808.

I had the honour of receiving your letter of the 1st instant yesterday, on my arrival here; and I enclose for your perusal the duplicate of a letter which I have written to Sir Thomas Dyer, which contains my sentiments upon the proposed expedition to Santander and the expression of my wishes respecting certain stores which will be sent to Gijon in the ships *Union* and *Patty*. If Sir Thomas Dyer should not be at Gijon or at Oviedo, or within reach of communication with you, I beg you to carry into execution the measures which I have requested him to adopt in respect to these stores.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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* Commanding in the south of Ireland.

To Colonel Gordon. [59.]

On board the *Crocodile*, Coruña,
MY DEAR COLONEL, 21st July, 1808.

I promised to write to you whenever I should have an opportunity, and I take the first which has offered since my departure from Cork. Lord Castlereagh having in his first instructions directed me to come here to procure intelligence and to obtain permission to go into Vigo if it should be necessary to wait for reinforcements, and in his second having desired me to send an officer for the same purposes, as it might be inconvenient for me to separate from the troops, it appeared to me that the intelligence which I should receive here might decide on the expedition, and that I could trust no person excepting myself with such a decision. There could be no inconvenience in my quitting the fleet after it should have cleared the land, particularly if the wind should be tolerably fair, and therefore on the 13th I removed from the *Donegal* to this ship and arrived here yesterday, and sail again this night to meet the fleet off Cape Finisterre.

The whole of Spain, with the exception of Biscay and Navarre, and the neighbourhood of Madrid, is in arms against the French. It is said that several French detachments have been destroyed, particularly one at Zaragoza, in Aragon, under Lefebre; one in Andalusia, under Dupont; and two in Catalonia. The fort of Figueras, near Rosas, has been taken by the Catalonians, and Barcelona is blockaded. The accounts of these successes, although credited, are only private; but I credit them. The Galician army, which, joined by that of Castille, consisted of 50,000 men, was posted at Rio Seco, in the province of Valladolid, and various reasons are stated for which they had taken that position. The principal one was, however, I believe, that they might give countenance to the insurrection towards Madrid, and interrupt the communication between Bayonne and that city. They were attacked on the 14th by a French corps which had been at Burgos under the command of Bessières, consisting of about 20,000 men, of which 4000 were cavalry. The Spaniards had few or no cavalry. The commencement of the action was in favour of the Spaniards, the French infantry having lost 7000 men and six pieces of cannon; but towards the close of the day the French cavalry charged the left of the Spanish line, which consisted entirely of the peasants of Castille, broke

it, and killed and wounded 7000 and took eight pieces of cannon. On that night or the following day the Spaniards retreated to Benavente, on the Esla, by which movement the French have acquired the command of the course of the Douro, and the means of interrupting the communication between this kingdom and the other parts of Spain which are likewise in arms.

This check has not created any alarm here, or diminished the hopes of ultimate success. Indeed, it is impossible to describe the sentiment which prevails throughout the country. I am informed that there is no such thing as a French party; and indeed, from what I have seen of the town, I should imagine that it could not be very safe for any man to declare himself in favour of the French.

In respect to my own operations, I learn that there are altogether 15,000 French troops in Portugal, of which number 12,000 are in and about Lisbon, and the remainder at Almeida and in other places. It is not probable that any more will be able to get there, as there is a Spanish corps of about 20,000 men at Almaraz on the Tagus, in Estremadura, which impedes the communication between Junot and Madrid. All the Portuguese provinces north of the Douro are in arms against the French, and it is said there are 10,000 Portuguese troops in Oporto, and 2000 Spanish troops have marched from the southern parts of Galicia to join them: they will join by the 24th or 25th of this month. I cannot say whether Spencer will be at Lisbon or not, as the accounts respecting his movements are so very vague.

My present intention is to leave the fleet again and go to Oporto, where I hope to acquire further intelligence which will enable me to determine on the plan which I shall follow. I think it probable, however, that I shall land to the northward of Lisbon, to receive the assistance of a detachment of the Spanish and Portuguese troops.

I did not write to you from Cork, as I intended, respecting the drivers of the Irish Commissariat, for I had not an opportunity of ascertaining whether the men would like to be removed to the English corps, of which Handfield entertained a doubt; but I propose to ascertain this point as soon as possible, and I will then write to you.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh. [60.]

MY DEAR LORD, On board the *Crocodile*, Oporto, 25th July, 1808.

I wrote to you from Cork that the ships *Union* and *Patty*, having on board the stores intended for the province of Asturias, had arrived in that harbour, and I apprised you of my intention to send them to Gijon. I made arrangements accordingly to give them convoy from Cape Finisterre; but I found, upon further inquiry, that those two ships were not in the fleet, and I conclude, from a paragraph in the Coruña papers of the 16th, that they had arrived at Gijon a few days before. I enclose the return which I had received from the commanding officer of the artillery when I was at Cove, which induced me to believe that those ships were there; and indeed when I expressed my doubts upon the subject, as I knew that the stores they contained were intended for the province of Asturias, he declared positively that they were in the harbour.

I shall be much obliged if you will communicate these circumstances and the enclosed return to Lord Chatham, who I conclude will have been surprised and annoyed at my former report.

Ever, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Mondego Bay, 31st July, 1808. [61.]

The troops are to understand that Portugal is a country friendly to His Majesty, that it is essentially necessary to their own success that the most strict obedience should be preserved, that properties and persons should be respected, and that no injury should be done which it is possible to avoid. The Lieutenant-General declares his determination to punish in the most exemplary manner all who may be convicted of acts of outrage and of plunder against the persons or property of any of the people of the country.

It is almost essential to the success of the army that the religious prejudices and opinions of the people of the country should be respected, and with this view the Lieutenant-General desires the following rules may be observed:—

1st. No officer or soldier belonging to the army is to go to any place of religious worship, during the performance of Divine

service in such places, excepting with the permission of the officer commanding his regiment, and the General officer commanding the brigade to which he belongs.

2nd. When an officer or soldier shall visit a church, or any other place of religious worship, from motives of curiosity, at periods when Divine service is not performed, he is to remain uncovered while in the church.

3rd. When the Host passes in the streets, officers and soldiers, not on duty, are to halt and front it; the officers to pull off their hats, and the soldiers to put their hands to their caps. When it shall pass a guard, the guard will turn out and present arms; when a sentry, the sentry must present arms.

Until further orders the troops will receive rations from the Commissary. The rations will consist for each day of 1 lb. of bread or biscuit, and 1 lb. of meat, salt or fresh. If the soldiers should have fresh meat, they are not entitled to spirits or wine; if they should have salt meat, and upon all occasions when it can be got for them, they shall have each one quarter of a pint of spirits, or a pint of wine. The troops are also entitled in camp to 3 lbs. of wood each man.

The women, that is to say, six for each company of 100 men, will receive half a ration *per diem*, and the children a quarter; but no spirits or wine will be issued to women or children.

Horses will receive a ration of 10 lbs. of hay and 10 lbs. of oats, if hay and oats should be delivered. If there should be none in store, the ration will be 14 lbs. of Indian corn or barley, and 10 lbs. of straw.

The number of days for which an issue is to be made will be stated in General Orders the day previous to the issue, and the returns and receipts are to be given to the Commissary according to the following regulations, viz.:

A return of the effectives of each regiment of infantry and cavalry present entitled to draw provisions agreeably to the following forms, signed by the paymaster and commanding officer of each corps, is to be sent the day previous to the issue to the Assistant-Commissary, from whom the supplies are to be drawn. On the day of delivery a receipt, in *triplicate*, is to be produced to the Assistant-Commissary, agreeably to the form herewith, signed as above, and by the quartermaster, the commanding officer being held responsible for the accuracy, as well of the return as of the receipt.

When detachments are stationed at a distance from the head-quarters of their regiments, the commanding officers thereof are to conform to the regulations above laid down for the commanding officers of regiments. On the 24th of each month inclusively, a general receipt in *triplicate* is to be furnished to the Assistant-Commissary for the whole period from the 25th of the preceding month to the 24th of the present one, both inclusive, which receipt, in *triplicate*, is to be signed by the commanding officer and quartermaster, and in which are to be recapitulated the different periods of delivery from that particular magazine, by which means the receipts before given as temporary vouchers are to be cancelled.

Assistant-Commissaries are to be allotted to each brigade and corps of the army, as will be stated in General Orders; but in case any regiment or detachment should cease to receive its provisions from one assistant in the course of the month, the general receipts in *triplicate*, as above stated, must be given to each Assistant-Commissary for the number of days which each regiment may have received its provisions from each Commissary.

The staff of the army will be guided in drawing their supplies by the foregoing regulations.

The aides-de-camp of Generals will sign receipts in like manner for the staff they belong to, which are likewise to be cancelled by a general one in *triplicate*, on the 24th of each month, or after the deliveries made from that particular depôt. Each department to give receipts in the manner as before directed for the whole of that department at the station.

If any detachment of the troops should at any time receive provisions and firewood from the inhabitants, the officer commanding the regiment or detachment will give a receipt in writing in the following form:—

i. Received from ——, magistrate of the town of ——,
Wood .. .. .. — lbs.
Meat .. .. .. — lbs.
Bread .. .. .. — lbs.
Wine .. .. .. — qts.
for the —— soldiers of the —— regiment under my command, for —— days, from the —— to the —— of —— inclusive.
(Signed) ————, officer commanding.

If detachments should consist of soldiers of more than one regiment, a separate receipt is to be given for those of each

regiment. If forage is received, the receipt must run in the following form:—

ii. Received from ——, magistrate of the town of ——, —— rations of forage, consisting of 10 lbs. of straw, and 14 lbs. of barley or Indian corn each, for —— horses belonging to the —— regiment (or if a General or field officer on the staff, the name of each officer), from the —— to the ——, both days inclusive.

(Signed) ————, officer commanding.

The receipts for carriages must be drawn in the following manner:—

iii. Received from ——, magistrate for the town of ——, a cart with two bullocks, for the use of —— regiment, of —— or detachment under my command, which went —— miles.

(Signed) ————, officer commanding.

The receipts must be given every three days for provisions and forage; and for carriages when they shall be discharged, by commanding officers of corps and detachments.

Aides-de-camp of General officers, and others who sign these receipts, will take care that they are drawn out in the regular form.

The officers and soldiers are to understand that they are to pay for everything they require from the country, excepting provisions, forage, wood, and carriages allowed by the public. For these articles when required, and not issued by the Commissary, they will make requisitions in the country, and give receipts; but they are to make these requisitions only by order of a General or other officer commanding a brigade or detachment: and in case any officer should pass his receipt for any article for which he ought to pay, or should sign a receipt for which he may not be authorized by the officer commanding the brigade or detachment to which he belongs, the Commissary will receive directions to charge such articles to the officer who shall have given the receipt, and such officer will also be liable to the penalties of disobedience of orders.

Officers to land with as little baggage as possible. [Not in the General Orders from whence this copy was made, although mentioned in the Index of them.]

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Duke of Richmond. [62.]

MY DEAR DUKE, H.M.S. *Donegal*, off the Mondego, 1st Aug., 1808.

Nothing has occurred since my last letter excepting that I have been to the Tagus to communicate with Sir C. Cotton, and the result is a determination to make our landing to the northward of the Mondego River.

Spencer has sent me a paper of information stating that the French force in Portugal amounts to 20,000 men; and although he knows I have only 10,000, and that he was not employed on any service to the south, he had determined to remain on shore at Xerez near Cadiz: but I have ordered him to join me, and I expect him in a day or two; and as I don't believe the French have so many as 20,000 men, I shall commence my operations as soon as he with his 5,000, or a reinforcement expected from England of 5,000 men, shall join me. He sent this same account to England, where they took the alarm, and ordered out 5,000 men and Moore's corps of 10,000 men, with several general officers, senior to me, and Sir Hew Dalrymple to command the whole army. I hope that I shall have beat Junot before any of them shall arrive, and then they will do as they please with me. I think it possible, however, that the ministry may wish me to return to you.

I have commenced my landing, which will not be completed, on account of the difficulties of this iron coast, till either Spencer or the English reinforcement shall arrive.

What becomes of Lord Chatham in all this?

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P.S. General Castaños has certainly beat Dupont in an action fought in Andalusia on the 20th July. Dupont surrendered, with his whole army, on condition of being sent to France by sea.

63.] [The General Orders in Italics not in the General Orders from whence this copy was made, although mentioned in the Index of them.].

G. O. Lavos, 3rd Aug., 1808.

Relative to the turning out of the line, mounting of guards, piquets, &c.

The order of battle of the army is to be two deep, and as follows, beginning with the right:—

Major-General Ferguson's brigade.
Brigadier-General Catlin Craufurd's ditto.
Brigadier-General Fane's ditto, on the left.

There is to be a howitzer and three pieces of cannon attached to each of the brigades of infantry. The 9-pounder brigade with that under Major-General Ferguson, and the remainder of the artillery not allotted, will be in reserve.

On marching days the piquets coming off duty will either be fixed previous to the march, and their place in the order of march will be stated in orders, or they will not be fixed till the army shall have reached its ground. In the same manner the piquets coming off duty will either join their regiments, or follow the army as a rear guard, as will be directed in the orders for the march.

When the army shall move from its left, the 95th and 5th battalion 60th will lead the column in the ordinary course. When the army shall move from its right, the 95th and 5th battalion 60th must form the advanced guard, and lead the column from the right of the two corps with the howitzer and 6-pounders attached to General Fane's brigade.

The Lieutenant-General requests the General officers commanding brigades will, on all occasions of march and formation of the line of their respective brigades, place the light infantry companies belonging to the several regiments under their command in a separate corps under the command of a field-officer. In the ordinary formation on parade, and in route marches, these corps of light infantry will be on the left of the brigade. In formation in front of the enemy they will be in front or in rear, according to circumstances; and in the marches of columns to take up a position, they will be on the reverse flank of the

column. The light infantry companies will, however, encamp, and do all duties with the regiments.

The cavalry is to be in reserve; and its position, as well in the line as in the column of march, will be pointed out in the orders of the day. One subaltern and twenty men must, however, be a piquet every day with a view of furnishing the necessary patrols, and keeping up the communication.

Sentries to be relieved every hour during the day.

Order respecting fires in camp.

The ration of a muleteer, or bullock driver, is to be 1 lb. of bread and ½ lb. of meat *per diem;* that of a mule 10 lbs. of straw and ¼ of an alquier of barley or Indian corn; that of a bullock 10 lbs. of straw of Indian corn.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lord Burghersh. [64.]

MY DEAR BURGHERSH, Lavos, 3rd Aug., 1808.

I received this morning your letter of yesterday, and your report is very satisfactory. I have heard this day that the infantry and artillery have nearly completed their embarkation, and I hope we shall have everything on shore to-morrow.

I should like much to have a report of the state of things at Viseu; and I have nothing else for you to do here at present. If I should move before your return, which is not very probable, you can easily overtake me.

I think that, if I can get 5000 good Portuguese troops and 2000 regulars, it is as much of that description as I should want; more would only embarrass us; and I think it very desirable that we should have an eye to the course of Douro. I suspect the truth of these second and third Spanish victories in the neighbourhood of Benavente, and I see clearly that, at all events, the intelligence respecting them, given to Colonel Trant, is not correct; for he is mistaken respecting the date even of the first action, which took place on the 14th, and not on the 12th; and he says that a reinforcement came from Andalusia, which is the western kingdom of the Peninsula.

The same reasons therefore which induced me to confine my requisition of Portuguese troops to 5000, and to recommend a

collection of troops to watch the enemy's movements from the northward, still exist.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[65.] *To Lord Burghersh.*

MY DEAR BURGHERSH, Lavos, 5th Aug., 1808.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 4th instant.

The difficulties and inconveniences attending the state of the arms of the Portuguese troops will, I hope, be removed entirely as soon as they will receive the English arms which I have sent to them, and some ammunition. I am obliged to you for your routes: one of them, that of the left column, is the best road of the three; but I am afraid that we shall not be able to use it, as in one very important part of it there is no communication between that road and the others on its right.

Loison has returned across the Tagus: the situation of my friends the Spaniards gave me some uneasiness when I heard that he had passed.

Spencer has arrived, and his corps will probably be here to-morrow. You had better return, therefore, as I shall march as soon as they will be on shore.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[66.] [The General Orders in Italics not in the General Orders from whence this copy was made, although mentioned in the Index of them.]

G. O. Lavos, 5th Aug., 1808.

Soldiers not to go beyond the limits of the camp, without a pass signed by the commanding officer of the regiment.

Outlying piquets and outposts not to turn out, by way of compliment, unless ordered.

Captain Jarvis, Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General, will take charge of all deserters who have or may hereafter come in from the enemy. The Deputy-Commissary-General will issue pay

and rations to the people according to a weekly return, which Captain Jarvis will present to him for that purpose; and one of the Commissary-General's department will muster the men under his command on the 24th of each month, agreeably to the form established for the British service.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. *Parole. Battle.* Lavos, 6th Aug., 1808. [67.]

His Majesty has been graciously pleased to appoint the undermentioned officers to serve on the staff of the forces under the command of the Right Honourable Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley from the 14th June last inclusive:

Major-Generals Spencer, Hill, and Ferguson.

Brigadier-Generals Nightingall, Fane, and Catlin Craufurd.

(*The names of the officers of the general staff here follow.*)

Officers commanding corps and detachments will immediately send in all carts, now in their possession, belonging to the Commissary-General's department, to his depôt at Lavos, where they are to remain.

Three days' bread and three days' forage will be issued to-morrow at daylight; the former from the Assistant-Commissaries of brigades, and the latter from the Commissariat depôt at Lavos from the 9th instant inclusive. Half a pint of wine will be issued this evening at 5 o'clock by the Assistant-Commissaries of brigades.

Weekly states of brigades, and corps not brigaded, will be sent in future to the Deputy-Adjutant-General's office every Monday morning at 8 o'clock.

The following orderlies to be furnished, till further orders, by the 20th light dragoons:—

Lieutenant-General commanding	2
Major-General Spencer	2
General officers, each	1
Deputy-Adjutant-General	1
Deputy-Quartermaster-General	1

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[68.] A. G. O. Lavos, 6th Aug., 1808.

Major-General Spencer's corps being expected, the following regiments will, in the morning, move out of their tents, and keep themselves in the position which will be pointed out to them by an officer of the Quartermaster-General's department: the 71st, 36th, 40th, 91st, and 45th regiments.

The 29th and 82nd regiments will occupy the tents of the 45th and 36th; the 50th the tents of the 71st; and the 6th and 32nd those of the 40th and 91st regiments.

Till the arrival of the regiments ordered to occupy the tents, small guards of those which will leave them must remain in charge of them.

The corps which are to hut, will apply at five o'clock this evening to the Deputy-Quartermaster-General, near head-quarters, for bill-hooks, and sixty will be issued to each regiment. Commanding officers are requested to give particular directions that these bill-hooks may not be lost or damaged, as the troops will require them in their future operations.

Arthur Wellesley.

[69.] *To Mr. Luis Miguel de Souza.*

Sir, Lavos, 6th Aug., 1808.

I have had the honour of receiving the letter which you wrote to me last night. I am much concerned that the people of Leiria should be alarmed to the degree which you state, and that there is reason to apprehend that the provisions which have been collected by orders given by some person will fall into the hands of the enemy; but I must repeat what I said yesterday, that I do not propose to advance my troops to Leiria till they will all be disembarked from their ships.

I have, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

G. O. Lavos, 7th Aug., 1808. [70.]

Major-General Spencer's corps having joined the army, the regiments will be brigaded as follows, from the right:

1st brigade	5th regiment 9th „ 38th „	Major-General Hill. Brigade-Major Fordyce. Assist.-Commissary Capt. Hamilton.
2nd brigade	29th „ 82nd „	Brigadier-General Nightingall. Brigade-Major Stewart. Assist.-Commissary Lieut. Nelson.
5th brigade	45th „ 50th „ 91st „	Brigadier-General Catlin Craufurd. Brigade-Major Blair. Assistant-Commissary Aylmer.
4th brigade	6th „ 32nd „	Brigadier-General Bowes. Brigade-Major Butler. Assistant-Commissary Turton.
2nd brigade	36th „ 40th „ 71st „	Major-General Ferguson. Brigade-Major Talbot. Assistant-Commissary Dillon.
6th, or light brigade	2nd batt. 95th. 5th batt. 60th.	Brigadier-General Fane. Brigade-Major M'Neil. Assistant-Commissary Lamont.

The foregoing will be the general formation of the brigades in one line, excepting that the light brigade will be ordered to take post in front or in rear, or on either flank, according to circumstances. The cavalry will be in reserve, and posted as may be necessary. A half brigade of artillery will be attached to each brigade of infantry. Howitzers will be attached to the 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th brigades, and the 9-pounder brigade will be in reserve.

Major-General Spencer being second in command, is not to be put on duty as a General officer. The Lieutenant-General requests that he will give such orders to the troops, from time to time, as he may judge necessary, reporting them to the Lieutenant-General when he finds it convenient; and the Major-General's orders are at all times to be obeyed, although they may be contradictory to those previously issued by the Lieutenant-General. Captain Bradford, Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General, is attached to Major-General Spencer.

Brigadier-General Bowes, on the staff of the troops at Gibraltar, being present with the army, will command the 4th brigade till further orders.

Captain Hamilton of the 5th regiment, Lieutenant Nelson of the 40th, and Cornet Turton of the 6th dragoons, are appointed

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to act as assistants in the Commissary-General's department until further orders, and they will report themselves to Deputy-Commissary-General Pipon.

Serjeant-Major Scates, of the 6th regiment, is appointed Deputy-Provost-Marshal of the army.

Estimates of subsistence, to the 24th instant inclusive, will be made out immediately by the different corps not yet paid up to that period, and they are to be sent in to the Deputy-Paymaster-General as soon as he arrives.

Half a pint of wine to be issued to the troops this evening at 5 o'clock.

The light brigade and artillery attached to it to receive one day's salt provisions at an early hour to-day, and to cook it this evening, and to keep it; and all the troops to receive one day's salt provisions to-morrow from the Assistant-Commissaries of brigades.

A General Court-Martial to assemble at eight o'clock to-morrow morning at Major Arbuthnot's quarters, near head-quarters, for the trial of such prisoners as shall be ordered before it.

Major-General Hill, President.

Six field-officers, and six captains, to be furnished by the 1st, 2nd, and 6th brigades.

Captain Jarvis, Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General, to officiate as Deputy-Judge-Advocate, to whom the names and ranks of the members of the Court, with a list of the evidences, must be sent in the course of this afternoon to Major Arbuthnot's quarters.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Admiral Sir Charles Cotton.

SIR, Lavos, 8th Aug., 1808.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Captain Malcolm of H.M.S. *Donegal*, which contains the result of a conference which I have had with him upon the subject of the disposal of the fleet of transports; of which I hope that you will approve.

I would suggest that Captain Malcolm should remain here till the army will be well advanced towards Lisbon, and that then he should go down the coast with the fleet.

The ships which will go under convoy of the *Alfred* contain all that can be wanted either to supply the army with provisions or ammunition; or with equipments for the attack of Peniché, if upon my arrival in that quarter I should find it expedient to undertake it.

I propose to march on Wednesday with my own corps and General Spencer's, consisting of about 10,000 men and about 5000 Portuguese troops, towards Lisbon; which place I shall approach by Mafra, and thence by the heights to the northward of the city.

You will observe that the Veteran Battalion is ordered to join your fleet off the Tagus. This corps, which consists of * men, is eventually destined for the garrison of Gibraltar; it is a good corps, but the soldiers being old, and disabled by wounds and otherwise for active service, cannot march. I have therefore sent them to the fleet off the Tagus, in order that the enemy may be induced to believe that we intend to make an attack in that quarter; and I beg leave to suggest that when the army will approach the neighbourhood of Mafra and Cintra, of which I shall be able to give you intelligence by the aid of Captain Malcolm or of Captain Bligh, you should make an attack with this corps and the marines upon the Bay of Guinsha or such other in the neighbourhood of the Rock of Lisbon as you may think most likely to be successful, and to afford a diversion in our favour.

Besides the corps already landed which will move forward on the day after to-morrow under my command, I expect 5000 men from England under the command of Brigadier-General Acland; and in a short time 10,000 men under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Burrard.

I propose to leave orders for the first to proceed along the coast from hence, and to communicate with Captain Bligh of the *Alfred*, through whose means I intend to give them their ulterior orders. My present intention is to employ this corps in the attack of Peniché, if it should be necessary to have possession of that place at an early period, and it should be impossible to obtain it excepting by a regular attack. If I should not find the possession of Peniché to be necessary, I propose to order this corps to join the fleet off the Tagus; and I recommend that they should be landed as I have above

* Blank in manuscript.

suggested that the Veteran Battalion and the marines should, when the army under my command will approach sufficiently near to render it impossible for the enemy to throw his whole force upon them.

In case the 10,000 men under Sir Harry Burrard should arrive during the continuance of my operations upon Lisbon, I intend to leave a letter to suggest to Sir Harry that they should be landed here, and march from hence towards Santarem upon the Tagus.

The object of this movement will be that they will be in a situation to cut off the enemy's retreat, whether he will attempt to make it by Almeida or by Elvas; at the same time that they will protect the rear of the army under my command, in case the enemy should detach any force from Spain into Portugal.

I shall be obliged to you if you will favour me with your sentiments upon the plan of operations above suggested.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[72.] *To Captain Pulteney Malcolm.*

SIR, Head-Quarters at Lavos, 8th Aug., 1808.

I have the honour to request that you will be pleased to issue to Deputy Commissary General Pipon, out of the public money under your charge on board H.M.S. *Donegal*, the sum of seventy thousand dollars for the use of the army under my command.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[73.] *To the Lord Bishop of Oporto.*

Camp near Lavos,

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR LORDSHIP, 8th Aug., 1808.

I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that Mr. Fernandez, of Figueras, has rendered himself extremely useful to the British army ever since it landed in this country, and that it is highly essential that the public service should continue to benefit by his exertions during the march of the army from hence, when his knowledge of the country and its inhabitants will give great facility to our endeavours to procure supplies and

means of conveyance. I am, therefore, induced to request that your Lordship will be pleased to extend the influence of Mr. Fernandez by appointing him pro tempore *Magistrado de los Transportes y Municiones de Boca del Exercito Ingles.*

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Duke of Richmond. [74.]

MY DEAR DUKE, Camp at Lavos, 8th Aug., 1808.

Since I wrote to you last General Spencer has joined me, on the 6th and 7th, and his corps have landed yesterday and this day. My advanced guard will move to-morrow, and the army on the 10th. The enemy is nearly in the situation in which he was. He has a corps of about 2000 men in my front; and he has sent a corps of 4000 or 5000 men across the Tagus into Alentejo, apparently with an intention to open his communication with Spain and to suppress the commotion in the Portuguese province of Alentejo, and to drive out 2000 or 3000 Spanish troops which had advanced from Spanish Estremadura. He will not succeed in opening a communication with Spain; and if he does not look sharp, I shall be at Lisbon before that detachment can return.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Lavos, 8th Aug., 1808. [75.]

Brigadier-General Fane's brigade, with the artillery attached to it, and a captain's detachment of 50 men of the 20th light dragoons, to march in the morning, carrying 4 days' bread, and one day's meat cooked. They will this day receive 3 days' bread, and forage to the 12th inst. inclusive.

Whenever the troops are ordered to march, they are to receive one day's meat as soon as possible after the order is issued, which is to be cooked immediately, and carried by the men on the following day.

The Lieutenant-General requests the commanding officers of regiments to pay the most strict attention in carrying into execution, at the earliest possible period, all orders that are

issued, particularly those respecting provisions. The consequences of inattention to this point must be, as no other arrangement can afterwards be made, that the men will be without provisions, as was the case yesterday with the 82nd regt. The provisions for this corps, which according to the orders ought to have been carried by the men in their havresacks, were sent in a separate boat with a guard, which could not arrive at Lavos till 4 this morning.

The Lieutenant-General is also under the necessity of drawing the attention of the officers of the army to an order twice issued to send to the Commissary's depôt all carts and mules detained in camp. He now requests the General officers commanding brigades will send round the lines, and cause all carts, not absolutely hired by individuals, to be sent to the Commissary's depôt in charge of a guard. As there are also several of the public mules detained in camp by officers, the Lieutenant-General hopes those who have them will send them back *forthwith.*

The practice of pressing carts and mules is positively forbid. If carts are wanted for any service, application must be made for them to the Commissary-General; and if the public service will admit of it, the individuals applying will be accommodated as far as may be possible.

The captains of companies of the corps lately joined with Major-General Spencer will immediately provide mules for the conveyance of the camp kettles of their respective companies.

Half a pint of wine per man to be issued at 5 o'clock this evening by the respective Commissaries of brigades.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[76.*] A. G. O. Lavos, 8th Aug., 1808.

Each staff surgeon must provide himself, without delay, with a sufficient horse or mule to be employed solely for carrying the surgical field equipment, for which a sum, not exceeding 18*l.*, will be allowed to every surgeon actually in possession of a mule or horse for the above purpose, and also 1*s.* 6*d. per diem* will be allowed each staff surgeon for the hire of a native, as a bâtman, so long as he may be actually employed. Hospital mates will be allowed 1*s. per diem* for the hire of a native, as a

servant, to be paid quarterly by the Commissary-General, on a return certified by the head of the medical department, according to the following form:

Return of Servants, not Soldiers, employed by the undermentioned Staff Surgeons and Hospital Mates, from 25th June to 24th Sept., 1808, inclusive.

Name.	Country.	Period, from	to	With whom serving.	Number of days.	Amount at per diem.
						£. s. d.

Commanding officers of regiments and detachments are requested to report in the course of this day to the Deputy-Adjutant-General the number of men incapable of marching on account of sickness.

A mule will be sent to the quartermaster of each regiment by the Commissary-General for the purpose of carrying the bill hooks delivered to the corps. This mule will march with the regiment, and is not to be employed for any other purpose. The quartermaster will receive directions from the Commissary-General respecting the payment of the muleteer, and forage for the mule.

Captain Taggart will land as soon as possible with the detachment of the Irish Commissariat waggons under his command, and march forthwith to the village of Lavos, where he will report himself to the Deputy-Commissary-General. This detachment will bring on shore 4 days' bread and 2 days' meat, cooked, and adhere strictly to the General Orders issued to the troops already landed respecting the men's necessaries, &c.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Lavos, 9th Aug., 1808. [77.]

The army will march to-morrow by the right; the mounted dragoons to lead, followed by the 3rd, 5th, and 4th brigades of infantry. The staff corps to precede the column of infantry, and the dismounted dragoons to go to Lavos as a guard to the Commissariat. In addition to the dismounted dragoons, a captain's guard of 50 men, from the 4th brigade, will remain as an escort to the military chest and the Commissariat stores.

All other guards, piquets, and other duties, to be called in at an early hour in the morning; and the tents to be struck and packed in the cases, and the number of tents in each case to be marked upon them, in sufficient time to enable the whole line to move off at 4 o'clock. A small guard to be left by each regiment in charge of the tents, for the purpose of loading them on the carts, and delivering them over to the Commissariat, after which the guards will proceed and join their regiments.

The artillery, dragoons, 45th and 91st regiments, will receive 4 days' bread; the staff corps, the 3rd and 4th brigades, 3 days' bread, to complete them all to the 13th instant inclusive; and the whole will receive one day's meat, to be cooked this afternoon for to-morrow. The issue of these provisions to be made by the Commissary at 3 o'clock this afternoon.

Dr. Deane, physician to the forces, will remain behind to superintend the management of the sick of the brigades left embarked. The assistant surgeons are to act under his directions; and all such arrangements and removals of sick as he may deem beneficial are to be complied with.

A stoppage of 4*d. per diem*, being the difference between the hospital stoppage and that for rations for each sick man requiring extra allowances of wine, vegetables, &c., is to be paid to the medical officer in charge, to provide those necessaries. The purveyor will advance money for this purpose, on account of the paymasters of regiments which have left sick in the ships.

Such sick as are considered incapable of marching, to be at 3 o'clock this afternoon at the Commissary's store in the village of Lavos, where Dr. Deane, physician to the forces, will be ready to take charge of them, and embark them on board the *Enterprise* hospital ship, No. 196. A subaltern officer of General Craufurd's brigade will collect them according to a return which will be furnished him by the Deputy-Adjutant-General, and march them down and deliver them over to Dr. Deane.

Such corps as may have had any of their ammunition damaged, will send requisitions, without delay, to the commanding officer of artillery for the number of rounds wanting to complete.

The General Court Martial, of which Major-General Hill is the President, is adjourned, and the members will return to their duty.

Three days' grain, and one day's straw for to-morrow, to be issued to-day by the Commissary to the artillery, cavalry, and other horses entitled.

Officers may receive money on account of their bât and forage allowance about to be issued, on application to the Deputy-Commissary-General.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM. [78.]

The formation of the column of march to-morrow morning:

The dragoons to march off from their ground, and form half a mile in front of the artillery park by 4 o'clock A.M.

The 29th and 82nd to follow, and form with the head of their column upon the hill near the artillery park.

The staff corps, and the artillery of the 3rd brigade, will form in the rear of the cavalry.

The 5th and 4th brigades will form with the head of their column upon the cross road leading from their ground just on the right of the artillery, and will take their place in the column of march as it passes them.

The artillery will take care to be in front of the brigades to which they are attached.

The reserve artillery and depôt mules, &c., will follow the infantry; then the baggage of head quarters and General officers, the baggage of brigades in succession, the medical stores, the Commissariat mules, &c., depôts.

A captain to be left with the equipage, until carts take it off the ground, with a subaltern's guard from Brigadier-General Nightingall's brigade, a subaltern's guard from Brigadier-General Bowes' brigade, and a serjeant and 12 privates from the 50th regiment. Men for this duty to be selected who are the least capable of marching.

If the camp equipage is got off the ground to-morrow, these guards will proceed forward and join their respective corps; if not, they will remain with the camp equipage until it is removed, and afterwards repair to Figueira, and apply to Captain Malcolm, R.N., for a transport to embark in.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[79.] G. O. Leiria, 11th Aug., 1808.

The duties of field officer and adjutant to the piquets of the line are discontinued, and will be performed by brigades, commencing to-day. Each brigade to furnish both an outlying and inlying piquet of a captain and fifty men, with a proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers from each regiment, under the orders of a field officer of the brigade. Care to be taken that the sentries of the outlying piquets of each brigade are double, and communicate with those of the brigades or corps to their right and left whenever circumstances will admit of it. The General officer of the day will visit such of the piquets as he may think necessary, and they will receive their orders from him. All the field officers of piquets will report to him whenever anything particular occurs.

In column of march the light infantry companies of brigades will move at the head of their respective brigades, and be thrown out to either flank as circumstances may require.

The pioneers of brigades will also march in future at the head of their brigades in front of the light infantry companies, and the mules or horses conveying the camp kettles of companies, and the surgeons' field chest, and the bill hooks, will march in the intervals between the divisions, and be made to keep up with their respective corps.

The line of parade or defence of the brigades and corps will always be established when they take up their ground after a march; and if the troops are required to halt, they will make their huts as near to that line as possible.

Commanding officers of corps are referred to His Majesty's regulations respecting the number of bâtmen allowed to officers, and will take care that it is on no account exceeded.

A pint of wine per man to be issued this evening, at five o'clock, by the respective Assistant-Commissaries of brigades; and such corps as did not receive meat yesterday for to-day, will be supplied with it immediately. Meat for to-morrow to be issued to the army as soon after daylight in the morning as possible.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Leiria, 12th Aug., 1808. [80.]

Representations having been made that Assistant-Commissaries —— and —— have in some instances disobeyed the orders of the Deputy Commissary-General, the Lieutenant-General contents himself at present with thus noticing the circumstance; but should a similar complaint be again made to him, his disapprobation will be marked in a much stronger manner.

The Assistant-Commissaries of brigades are distinctly to understand that the issues of provisions and forage they may be required to make by the General Orders must always be punctually delivered at the particular hour specified.

The army to be completed by the Assistant-Commissaries of brigades, at three o'clock, to four days' bread up to the 16th instant inclusive, and an issue of one day's forage to be likewise made from the commissariat stores in the principal square of the town.

Head quarters, the general staff of the army departments, and the artillery not attached to brigades, and other unattached corps, will, in future, draw their provisions and forage from Assistant-Commissary Aylmer.

Regimental surgeons will send returns to the Deputy Adjutant-General's office, addressed to the Inspector of Hospitals, of the medicines and surgical field equipments with them for immediate use, specifying the manner in which they are conveyed.

The Brigade-Majors are henceforward always to encamp or quarter themselves close to their respective brigades; and whenever they have occasion to be absent, must appoint an adjutant to do their duty. They are also to report, in writing, to the Deputy Adjutant-General, the quarters of their respective brigadiers whenever they change them.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

A. G. O. Leiria, 12th Aug., 1808. [81.]

The sick inspected this morning by the staff surgeons, and found incapable of marching, are to be sent, as soon as possible, under the charge of an assistant surgeon from each brigade, to the Portuguese hospital in town, where a medical staff officer

will attend to receive them, under the charge of Dr. Hume, and the usual stoppages for men in hospital are to be charged against them.

The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th brigades will each send, in the course of this afternoon, to head quarters, a serjeant as permanent orderly to the Lieutenant-General.

The army will march to-morrow morning at four o'clock, in two columns, by their right; the right column composed of the 20th light dragoons, the staff corps, the 6th, 1st, 3rd, and 5th brigades of infantry, the artillery park, and the commissariat depôt. This column will be conducted by Major Rainey, Assistant Quartermaster-General. Captain Gomm will conduct the 3rd and 5th brigades in the second line through the town.

The left column, composed of fifty dragoons of the 20th, and fifty of the Portuguese cavalry, the 2nd and 4th brigades of infantry and Portuguese troops, will proceed by Batalha. This column will be conducted by Captain Langton. Ensign Laing, of the staff corps, will lead the 4th brigade from their present ground through the town.

All waggons will be kept with the right column. One gun, without a car, will proceed with the left column; the remainder of the half brigade of artillery, attached to the 2nd brigade, will join and accompany the park.

All guards, excepting that over the commissariat stores, and the Provost Marshal's, to be withdrawn in the morning, and to join their corps before the army marches.

The parole and countersign are in future to be given out at sunset, until further orders.

The general court martial, of which Major-General Hill is the president, is dissolved.

Arthur Wellesley.

[82.] G. O. Calvario, 13th Aug., 1808.

The army will march at four o'clock to-morrow morning.

It is the Lieutenant-General's desire that, in route marching, a regular, steady pace should be preserved by the leading divisions of corps, without reference to those immediately preceding them. It is even desirable that each company or division should be led at an uniformly regular pace by its officer, without attention to the exact preservation of intervals, which is of less importance.

As it is found inconvenient for the mules carrying the camp kettles to march in the intervals of divisions according to the orders of the 11th instant, they will in future follow in rear of their respective brigades; but the mule or horse carrying the surgeon's field chest will proceed in rear of its particular regiment.

No baggage whatever is to precede the light and 1st brigades when the army marches by the right; nor the light and 2nd when marching by the left. The mules of both, with the led horses of officers and of the cavalry, will march in the rear of the latter of the two front brigades, and all the wheel carriages will follow the artillery park.

The Deputy Commissary-General will issue rations for the prisoners in the Provost guard, on the requisition of the Deputy Provost-Marshal.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

A. G. O. Calvario, 13th Aug., 1808. [83.]

Brigadier-General Fane will be pleased to inspect the 20th light dragoons, at six o'clock this evening, upon their own ground, and report as soon as possible to the Lieutenant-General the number of men, horses, and saddles, effective and serviceable, belonging to that corps.

The army will march at half-past four o'clock to-morrow, in two columns, from their right. The right column will consist of fifty dragoons and the 1st brigade, with the half brigade of artillery attached to it. The commissariat will follow in rear of this column. Captain Gomm, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, will conduct it, and Captain Mawe will lead the head of the commissariat depôt. The left column will be composed of the British and Portuguese cavalry, the 6th brigade, the staff corps, the 3rd, 5th, 4th, and 2nd brigades, with their artillery. They will form on their own parades. The cavalry will move off at half-past four o'clock along the road on its right, guided by Major Rainey, Assistant Quartermaster-General; the 6th brigade will follow the cavalry; the 3rd the 6th, and the 5th the 3rd. Captain Langton, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, will guide the 4th and 2nd brigades to the road. The park of artillery and spare ammunition will follow the left column. The 50th regiment will remain on its present ground

until half-past seven o'clock, when it will move off and follow in rear of the baggage of the left column.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[84.] *To Richard Allen, Esq., British Deputy Consul.*

SIR, Head-Quarters, Caldas, 16th Aug., 1808.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, with an enclosed copy of an application to the governor of the province that Corporal Francisco José Barboza should be sent to the army under my command to serve as a guide. I beg you will accept my thanks for the zeal which you have manifested for His Majesty's service; and it only remains for me to acquaint you that this person has never presented himself to me according to your instructions. Previous to my departure from Calvario I received the four Portuguese books which you have had the goodness to send me, and for which I am much obliged to you.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[85.] G. O. Caldas, 16th Aug., 1808.

The army will march to-morrow: the hour and order of march will be made known in the evening.

(*Detail of the issue of provisions and forage.*)

The Lieutenant-General being informed that many irregularities are committed and risk incurred by the soldiers strolling to a distance from their lines, the General officers and officers commanding corps will be pleased to put a stop to this practice, and prevent the soldiers from going beyond their lines without a written pass, signed by a commissioned officer; and they are not to enter any town or village without their side arms, and being dressed in the uniform of their corps. Such soldiers as may be taken up for a disobedience of this order are not to receive the allowance of wine given from time to time to the troops as an indulgence only.

Regimental surgeons will report the state of their sick, per-

sonally, to the Inspector of Hospitals without delay, and the same is to be done on every halting day.

The Portuguese troops acting with the army are to be provisioned by the Deputy Commissary-General, in the same manner as the British.

General officer for the day, to-morrow, Brigadier-General Bowes.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

A. G. O. [86.*]

The army will move off from their present ground at half-past four o'clock to-morrow morning, and assemble in contiguous columns of brigades, right in front, in the plain on this side the castle of Obidos.

(*Detail of the order of march.*)

One captain, two subalterns, two serjeants, one drummer, and fifty rank and file, from the 2nd brigade, to be added to the guard already over the commissariat depôt and military chest, at four o'clock to-morrow morning; and the officers and non-commissioned officers of these guards are held responsible that their men keep sober, and abstain from taking any of the public stores placed under their charge.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Duke of Richmond. [87.*]

MY DEAR DUKE, Caldas, 16th Aug., 1808.

We are getting on as well as possible. The army is in high spirits, and beginning to march tolerably well, and I have every prospect of success. The enemy are retiring before us in two divisions, one of 4000, the other of 5000 men; and I would try to cut off one of them, only they outmarch us.

The Commissariat horses do as well as they can; but they are not exactly what we ought to have.

We had yesterday evening a little affair of advanced posts, foolishly brought on by the over-eagerness of the riflemen in the pursuit of an enemy's piquet, in which we lost Lieutenant Bunbury of the 95th, killed, and Pakenham, slightly wounded, and some men of the 95th and 60th. The troops behaved remarkably well, but not with great prudence.

I am perfectly well. The troops very healthy, notwithstanding that they are in the sun all day and in the dew all night, for they have no tents.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P.S. I have written to Longford to desire him to apprise his mother and his family of his brother's wound; but if he should be out of the way, and you should have reason to believe that Lady Wellesley will hear of it before she will see Longford, give her the enclosed letter.

[88.] *To Captain Pulteney Malcolm, R.N.*

MY DEAR MALCOLM, Lourinha, 18th Aug., 1808.

I fought an action with the enemy yesterday, of which you will find the details in the enclosed despatch to Sir Harry Burrard, which you will read and seal up. The French received a terrible beating; I am informed that they lost 1500 men. Our loss is 489 killed, wounded, and missing, officers included; of that number about 70 are killed.

I have not time to write more. We shall have another brush with the whole of them in a day or two, when you shall hear from me again.

I am landing General Anstruther's corps; that is, I intend to do so to-morrow.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[89.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon.*

SIR, Head-Quarters, Lourinha, 18th Aug., 1808.

I have the honour to enclose herewith a schedule of recommendations, in consequence of the casualties which took place in the army under my command in the action of the 17th instant, which I request you will submit to His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief for his consideration.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[Enclosure.]

SCHEDULE.

29th Regiment.

Subject.	Observations.
Brigadier Lieutenant-Colonel D. White to be Lieutenant-Colonel, *vice* Lake, deceased.	Lieutenant-Colonel White is a Major of 1799; Lieutenant-Colonel Lake killed in action.
Brigadier-Major Thomas Egerton to be Major, *vice* White, promoted.	Brigadier-Major Egerton is a Captain of 1796; and was severely wounded in the action on the 17th.
Lieutenant Brigadier Birmingham to be Captain, *vice* Egerton, promoted.	A Lieutenant of 1801; severely wounded in the action.
Ensign Coker to be Lieutenant, *vice* Birmingham, promoted.	Present with the regiment; date of commission not known.
Volunteer Thomas Evans to be Ensign, *vice* Coker.	Serving with the ——; a fine young man.

45th Regiment.

Volunteer —— March, from the 32nd Regiment, to be Ensign, *vice* Dawson, deceased.	Serving with the 32nd since that corps left England with General Spencer.

The Duke of York to Lieut.-General Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Sir, Horse Guards, 5th Sept., 1808.

Your letters of the 11th and 18th August to Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, and your letter to Lieutenant-General Sir H. Burrard of the 21st August,* containing a full account of the operations of the army under your command up to the latter period, have been duly laid before me.

It is impossible for me to peruse these papers, and to examine into the various operations so clearly explained in them, without feeling a strong impression of the zeal and ability with which your whole conduct was governed, and a very high sense of the spirit and exertions which actuated every individual under your command throughout this short but decisive and brilliant campaign in Portugal.

I did not lose a moment in submitting these reports to the King, and it must afford you the highest gratification to be informed that His Majesty was graciously pleased to express in the strongest manner his approbation of your conduct, and to desire that you would take an early opportunity of conveying the same to Major-General Spencer, and to all the Generals, officers, and men under your command, and to assure them that His Majesty has the greatest pride in this additional proof of their decided superiority in discipline and valour over the best troops the enemy can boast.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. iv., pp. 80, 101, 108.

It remains but for me to offer my cordial congratulations both to you and those under your command upon this brilliant occasion, and to assure you that I participate most cordially in everything that can raise the character of the British soldier, and uphold the army in the estimation of the world.

I am, Sir, yours,

FREDERICK,
Commander-in-Chief.

Lieut.-Col. Gordon to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Horse Guards, 5th Sept., 1808.

I have to acknowledge your several despatches of the 11th and 18th August,* containing an account of your operations in Portugal up to the latter period, the whole of which I have laid before the Commander-in-Chief; and I have it in command to convey to you the thanks of His Royal Highness for the clear and ample details you have furnished him of your transactions in that country, and to express to you the high sense he entertains of your whole conduct, and of the spirit and exertions of all under your command, and which it is his intention to communicate to you in a letter from himself.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient humble servant,
J. W. GORDON.

[90.] *To Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Burrard, Bart.*

SIR, Head-Quarters at Lourinha, 18th Aug., 1808.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the Secretary of State, in which I have reported the circumstances of an action with one of the enemy's corps yesterday.

I have, &c.,
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[91.] *To the Duke of Richmond.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Camp at Lourinha, 18th Aug., 1808.

You will see that we have beaten a French corps yesterday. The action was a most desperate one between the troops engaged. I never saw such fighting as in the pass by the 29th and 9th, or in the three attacks made by the French in the moun-

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. iv. pp. 80, 101.

tains. These were in their best style; at the same time, if I could have got a sufficient number of troops up in time, I should have taken or destroyed their whole corps.

The whole French army is now collected, and I have come here to favour Anstruther's landing and junction. He will join me to-morrow with 2500 men.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Lourinha, 18th Aug., 1808. [92.]

The Lieutenant-General was perfectly satisfied with the conduct of the troops in the action of yesterday, particularly with the gallantry displayed by the 5th, 9th, 29th, 60th, and 95th, to whose lot it principally fell to engage the enemy.

From the specimen afforded yesterday of their behaviour in action, the Lieutenant-General feels confident that the troops will distinguish themselves whenever the enemy may give them another occasion; and it is only necessary for him to recommend to them a steady attention to the preservation of order and regularity, and strict obedience to the commands which the officers may give.

Returns of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the action of yesterday, to be sent as soon as possible, through the major of brigade, to the Deputy Adjutant-General, and lists of all officers of corps, specifying ranks and dates of commissions, to Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary.

(*Detail of the issue of provisions, &c.*)

The army will march to-morrow: the time and order of march will be hereafter notified.

General officer for the day, to-morrow, Brigadier-General C. Craufurd.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To ———. [93.]

20th Aug., 1808.*

You have done quite right; but as we have no ground to go upon excepting a report given to your patrols by a villager,

* In the hand-writing of Sir Arthur Wellesley, but without superscription.

you may allow the men to fall out and lie down; but they must sleep accoutred. Before I had heard of this report I had ordered two 9-pounders to your ground, and since I have received it I have desired that you may continue to send patrols to your front, and that you will do me the favour to let me know if they should report anything extraordinary.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Desire that Anstruther's brigade will likewise accoutre, and be ready to turn out at a moment's notice. I am a little jealous of your left.

[94.*] G. O. Vimeiro, 20th Aug., 1808.

The army will march at half-past four o'clock to-morrow morning. Half a pint of wine per man, and one day's meat for to-morrow, to be issued at four o'clock this evening to all the troops excepting the 7th, or Brigadier-General Anstruther's brigade, which will receive one pint of wine per man.

Returns of the number of bill hooks in possession of the several corps to be sent immediately to the Deputy Quarter-master-General.

(*Detail of guards ordered.*)

The several regiments of infantry will forthwith send in to the Deputy Commissary-General twenty camp kettles each, for the purpose of supplying the 7th brigade, who are unprovided with them; and the 95th will, for the same object, furnish eight camp kettles. As soon as the whole are collected, the Deputy Commissary-General will issue an equal proportion of them to the 2nd battalions of the 9th, 43rd, and 52nd regiments, and the 97th regiment, and will allot to each of those corps one cart for the conveyance of the kettles.

No wine being procurable, an issue of spirits will be made to the troops.

A piquet of twenty Portuguese and ten British cavalry, with an infantry piquet to be furnished by the 5th brigade, consisting of one captain, two subalterns, and 100 men, with non-commissioned officers in proportion, will be posted, at seven o'clock this evening, at a large house on the hill in rear of Brigadier-General C. Craufurd's brigade, which piquet will patrol the front of the ravine, as far as the sea, during the night.

Night Pass Order.

The army will halt to-morrow. The men to sleep accoutred to-night, in readiness to turn out, and to be under arms at three o'clock in the morning.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Vimeiro, 21st Aug., 1808. [95.]

Lieutenant-General Sir A. Wellesley congratulates the army on the signal victory they have this day obtained over the enemy, and returns them his warmest thanks for their resolute and heroic conduct. He experienced the sincerest pleasure in witnessing various instances of the gallantry of the corps, and has, in particular, to notice the distinguished behaviour of the Royal artillery, 20th light dragoons, the 36th, 40th, 43rd, 50th, 52nd, 60th, 71st, 82nd, 95th, and 97th regiments.

It will afford the Lieutenant-General the greatest pleasure to report to the Commander-in-Chief the bravery displayed by all the troops, and the high sense he entertains of their meritorious and excellent conduct throughout the day.

The brigade under the orders of Brigadier-General Acland is denominated the 8th brigade. The two companies of the 95th, attached to it, will join those with the 6th brigade; and one rifle company of the 60th will be transferred immediately from the 6th to the 7th brigade, and another from the 6th to the 8th brigade.

Returns of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the action of to-day, to be sent to the Deputy Adjutant-General's office before eight o'clock this evening.

An allowance of spirits, and one day's meat for to-morrow, to be issued to the troops as soon as possible.

General officer for the day, to-morrow, Brigadier-General Nightingall.

A guard, consisting of one serjeant, one corporal, and eighteen privates from the 4th brigade, to be sent immediately to Lieutenant-General Sir H. Burrard's quarters, in the village of Maceira on the river side, near the sea shore, and the following guards to be relieved at five o'clock this evening, by the 1st brigade.

(*Detail of guards.*)

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[96.] *To the Duke of Richmond.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Camp at Vimeiro, 22nd Aug., 1808.

Sir H. Burrard came here on the night of the 20th, but did not land, and, as I am the most fortunate of men, Junot attacked us yesterday morning with his whole force, and we completely defeated him. You will see the account of the action. The French have lost not less than 3000 men.

Since I wrote to you last, I came here to facilitate Anstruther's landing and junction, which took place on the 20th, in the morning. In the evening Acland came up from the Tagus, and I landed him immediately, and he joined us before the action yesterday morning; but Sir Harry did not come up till the action was nearly over.

Although we had, when Acland joined, not less than 17,000 men, and between 6000 and 7000 Portuguese in our neighbourhood, Sir Harry did not think these sufficient to defeat 12,000 or 14,000 Frenchmen, but determined to wait for Moore's corps, notwithstanding all that I could urge upon the subject. The action of yesterday has, however, had more effect than all my eloquence, and I believe he will march to-morrow. If he would have allowed me to move that part of the army yesterday evening, which had not been engaged in the morning, the French would not have stopped till they reached Lisbon.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[97.] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Camp at Ramalhal, 23rd Aug., 1808.

You will have heard that one of the consequences of our victory of the 21st has been an agreement to suspend hostilities between the French and us preparatory to the negotiation of a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French. Although my name is affixed to this instrument,* I beg that you will not believe that I negotiated it, that I approve of it, or that I had any hand in wording it. It was negotiated by the General himself in my presence and that of Sir Harry Burrard; and

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. iv. p. 116.

after it had been drawn out by Kellermann himself, Sir Hew Dalrymple desired me to sign it. I object to its *verbiage;* I object to an indefinite suspension of hostilities; it ought to have been for forty-eight hours only. As it is now, the French will have forty-eight hours to prepare for their defence, after Sir Hew will put an end to the suspension.

I approve of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal, more particularly as it appears to be deemed impossible to move Sir John Moore's corps upon Santarem, so as to cut off the retreat of the French towards Elvas. They could establish themselves in Elvas, Fort La Lippe, Almeida, and Peniché, which places we should be obliged either to blockade or attack regularly in the worst season of the year in Portugal, viz., the months of September and October; and the advance of the army into Spain would be delayed until after that period. It is more for the advantage of the general cause to have 30,000 Englishmen in Spain, and 10,000 or 12,000 additional Frenchmen on the northern frontier of Spain, than to have Frenchmen in Portugal, and the Englishmen employed in the blockade or siege of strong places. If they are to be allowed to evacuate, it must be with their property; but I should have wished to adopt some mode of making the French Generals disgorge the church plate which they have stolen.

I see no objection to the substance of what is done respecting the Russians: indeed, if the Russians had persevered to the end of the contest in the neutrality which they have observed since its commencement, and the Portuguese officers had desired that their port should be respected as that of a power in a state of neutrality between Russia and England, we might have laboured under some difficulties in the attack of the Russian fleet. But the French ought not to have been allowed to stipulate at all for the Russian fleet; and this is the great fault of the whole arrangement. However, bad as it is, it is fortunate that it is not worse; and you will readily believe that I did everything in my power to prevail upon the General to alter it, and to persist in his objections to it.

I will not conceal from you, however, my dear Lord, that my situation in this army is a very delicate one. I never saw Sir Hew Dalrymple till yesterday; and it is not a very easy task to advise any man on the first day one meets with him. He must at least be prepared to receive advice. Then I have

been successful with the army, and they don't appear to me to like to go to anybody else for orders or instructions upon any subject. This is another awkward circumstance which cannot end well; and to tell you the truth, I should prefer going home to staying here. However, if you wish me to stay, I will: I only beg that you will not blame me if things do not go on as you and my friends in London wish they should. It appears that General Spencer and Sir Hew did not agree very well when they were at Gibraltar together; and poor Spencer is very low indeed. I wish that you would confer upon him some mark of the King's favour. There never was a braver officer, or one who deserves it better.

I enclose you a memorandum* which I have sent to Sir Hew respecting the convention which he is to negotiate in person with Junot. Kellermann objected to my going to the Admiral through the French posts, as he had found that I objected so strongly to the arrangement; and yet he was the person who first proposed to Sir Hew that I should sign the arrangement which he was going to sign himself.

Ever, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

27th Aug.

Charles will have informed you of the state of things here since the date of this letter. The Admiral relieved us from the difficulty in which the 7th article of the agreement respecting the Russians had involved us by refusing to agree to it; and Murray was sent the day before yesterday to apprise Junot of this refusal by the Admiral, and to negotiate the Convention if Junot should be inclined to negotiate upon the remaining part of the proposed basis, and at all events to bring the suspension of hostilities to a conclusion by 12 o'clock to-morrow. Junot has consented to negotiate, and Murray is authorized to continue the suspension for twenty-four hours longer if necessary in order to complete the treaty. In the mean time I march to-morrow if the Convention should not be concluded, and hostilities should not be further suspended, and Sir John Moore with a part of his corps the next day. Murray has been instructed to insist upon the points in the enclosed memorandum in the negotiation

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. iv. p. 120.

of the Convention. Notwithstanding blunders, I think we shall yet bring our affairs in this country to a happy conclusion.

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*Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-General Sir Arthur Wellesley.**

My dear Wellesley,. Downing-Street, 4th Sept., 1808.

You will easily believe that few events in my life—indeed, I may say none—have ever given me more gratification than the intelligence of your two splendid victories, to which I hardly know how to give the preference. That of the 21st was certainly the most important in all its results, and had more the character of a great victory; but there were features in the first which I need not particularise, which render it, as a military transaction, not less deserving of applause. There was something whimsically providential in the enemy forcing upon you, at the very moment the command was passing—indeed, had formally passed into other hands—the glory of an achievement which your personal moderation and sense of duty had induced you not to invite by any extraordinary acceleration of your operations. You have received the reward of the principles which have governed your conduct in an important accession of military reputation, and you have laid the foundation, I trust, of a succession of triumphs as often as we can bring British troops, on fair terms, in contact with the enemy.

I have not seen the King since Captain Campbell arrived. His note to me marked the sense he entertained of your services, and I understand that he listened to the details of your letters with so much interest and attention as to have got them nearly by heart.

I cannot suffer any other subject to mix itself with the undivided sentiments of gratitude and admiration with which I offer to you my thanks and congratulations on the services you have rendered to the army, to the great cause in which we are engaged against France, as well as to the more immediate interests of your own country; and I am persuaded that, in whatever station you may be placed in the army, your qualities as an officer will be displayed with equal zeal as whilst you were charged with the supreme command.

I shall reserve till another occasion writing on other points.

Ever, my dear Wellesley,

Yours most sincerely,

Castlereagh.

To Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, Bart. [98.]

My dear Sir, Ramalhal, 25th Aug., 1808.

I have received your letters of the 22nd instant, and I am much obliged and highly flattered by the handsome manner in which you have congratulated me on our success of the 17th.

* In reply to letters from Sir Arthur Wellesley, dated 18th, 20th, and 22nd August, 1808. See 1st edition of *Wellington Despatches*, vol. iv., pp. 100, 105, 115.

That of the 21st was more complete; and the French army would have been entirely destroyed if I had been allowed to follow up my blow as I wished.

I am very much obliged to you for the names of the officers at Lisbon.

In my opinion the people of Lisbon will do well to remain quiet till we shall be between them and the French army; and at all events I should doubt the expediency of giving them arms. The arms which were sent with me were intended to be delivered out only in case I should be certain that great benefit would be derived from the use of them; and for this reason I have always declined to deliver any excepting to troops from whose skill and knowledge of the use of arms some advantage might be expected. I should accordingly recommend you not to deliver any arms to the inhabitants of Lisbon, or to the peasantry of any other part of the country. We must of course arm the Spanish troops; but before that can be done, it will be necessary to release them.

I agree entirely in opinion with you respecting the Russian fleet. We ought not to allow the French to interfere in any manner between us and the Russians; and although I signed the agreement for the suspension of hostilities at the desire of the Commander-in-Chief, I consider it most fortunate that by your interference that article in it has been struck out; and that if the Convention is to be made, it will be upon a new basis.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[99.*] *To the Duke of Richmond.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Ramalhal, 27th Aug., 1808.

I wrote to you after the battle of the 21st. On the 22nd, in the morning, Sir H. Dalrymple arrived; and on that evening General Kellermann came in to ask for a suspension of hostilities, to give time for the negotiation of a Convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French by sea. Sir Hew consented to this, and desired me to sign it, notwithstanding that I neither negotiated nor approved of it.

This agreement contained many improper stipulations; among others, it gave the French forty-eight hours' notice of an intention to put an end to it. It likewise contained a stipulation in respect to the Russians which ought never to have been admitted; and it was in other respects objectionable on account of its French *verbiage*. I have not got a copy of it. The objections to it have, however, since been considerably removed, by the refusal of the Admiral to consent to the stipulation respecting the Russians, and by the determination of the suspension of hostilities to-morrow at 12 o'clock, unless Murray, who is negotiating the Convention, should be of opinion that an additional period of twenty-four hours is necessary to enable him to perform his work. I am ready to march in the evening, and Sir J. Moore next day; and, whether there is a Convention or not, I hope to be in Lisbon by the beginning of September.

I approve of allowing the French to evacuate the country, for I am convinced that, if we did not, we should be obliged to attack Elvas, Fort la Lippe, Almeida, and Peniché, regularly, or blockade them, and thus the autumn would pass away; and it is better to have 10,000 or 12,000 additional Frenchmen on the northern frontier of Spain, and the English army in Spain, than the Frenchmen in Portugal, and the English blockading them in strong places. This necessity would have been avoided, if Sir H. Burrard would or could have carried on with Sir J. Moore's corps the operations upon Santarem, which I recommended to him, by which the French would certainly have been cut off from Elvas and Almeida.

The French got a terrible beating on the 21st. They did not lose less, I believe, than 4000 men; and they would have been entirely destroyed, if Sir H. Burrard had not prevented me from pursuing them. Indeed, since the arrival of the great generals, we appear to have been palsied, and every thing has gone on wrong.

I am getting plans done for you of both the battles of the 17th and 21st, and I will write to you if any thing further should occur. I am not very well pleased, between ourselves, with the way in which things in this country are likely to go on, and I shall not be sorry to go home, if I can do so with propriety, in which case I shall soon see you. But I don't like to

desire to go, lest it should be imputed to me that I am unwilling to serve where I don't command.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P.S. I have heard nothing of Ireland since I left it. Pray remember me most kindly to the Duchess, and Louisa, &c., and Lady Edward. Lord FitzRoy has been very useful to me, and I have this day lent him to Sir H. Dalrymple, to go to the French head-quarters.

[100.] *To Major-General Ferguson.*

MY DEAR GENERAL, Torres Vedras, 29th Aug., 1808.

I send you my letters to General Burrard, which I request you to return to me when you will have perused them. They contain my opinion of the line of operations which ought to have been followed by Sir John Moore's corps; and as the troops under his command were nearly all landed by the 21st, it is almost certain that if this plan had been persevered in, and the troops had not been re-embarked, we should have been some days ago in a situation to have refused to the French any capitulation excepting on the terms of their laying down their arms. However, as we are now situated, we have no alternative excepting to get them out of Portugal as soon, and at as little cost of honour, as we can.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[101.] *To the Duke of Richmond.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Sobral, 1st Sept., 1808.

A Convention was signed on the day before yesterday, for the evacuation of Portugal by the French, and they will be off in the course of seven days. I have not seen the Convention, and I know it contains some matter of which I disapprove, as much as I did of the agreement for the suspension of hostilities, but it is useless to trouble you with my objections to it. I told you

in my last letter that I thought it right to agree to the main point in the Convention, viz. the evacuation; and it is not of much importance in what manner that is carried into execution.

The armies are now situated as follows: my corps is on the left, about twenty-four miles from Lisbon, and I shall march to-morrow to Bucellas and Tojal, where I shall be about twelve miles from thence; and the army, consisting of Moore's corps, and Anstruther's and Ackland's brigades, are this day at Mafra, and will be to-morrow at Cintra. They will occupy St. Julian and Cascaes, and we shall remain in these situations until the French shall evacuate. We got all the forts in the interior and on the coast immediately upon the ratification of the Convention.

I shall wait till I see the French fairly off, by which time I hope that I shall hear from ministers whether they wish me to return to my office. If they do, I shall be with you immediately; and I assure you that, considering the way in which things are likely to be carried on here, I shall not be sorry to go away.

Remember me most kindly to the Duchess and the children.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P.S. Lord FitzRoy is come back from Lisbon, and gives a fine account of Junot, who was very civil to him.

Major-Gen. Beresford to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Lisbon, 5th Sept., 1808.

I send by the bearer the sugar you wished to have. I arrived yesterday about 10 o'clock, and commenced on my mission, which is neither agreeable, nor do I think it can be very useful, as, after reading the Convention, I could scarcely find out any occasion for appointing Commissioners for seeing carried into effect the full execution of the treaty. The speedy execution *à la bonne heure*, but full, is only to insist on the French doing and carrying off whatever they wish. I had been much surprised at what I had heard of the terms, yet I had not a conception, till I read them, that they could by words have been so unfavourable to our cause and to the general cause as they now appear to me. The people here of every class are enraged to the highest degree, and this treaty has lowered us much in their estimation, which, however little we may think of the people, it was not worth our while to lose.

I breakfasted yesterday with Junot, but he does not appear to have taken any great liking to me, at which you will believe I am not breaking my heart. I only wish I had had the framing of the Convention; it should have been better, or you would have been left to break his head. You will be perhaps a little surprised to hear that his troops in this neighbourhood amount to about 19,000, and he has about 4000 in the garrisons of the interior. They will altogether embark about 27,000 persons, so that I think our negotiations have pretty well shut up our own army or confined its operations to this Peninsula, for out of it we have no longer the means of getting, except *à la nage*.

Provisions and camp-equipage are this day going up the Tagus for your corps. How long you will remain on your present ground I know not, as there is no officer here on the part of the navy with whom to communicate or arrange relative to the embarkation. The first division of French are ready, and I have just written to Sir C. Cotton to send some officer to superintend the embarkation, and with whom we may communicate.

Anything you may want, pray let me know.

Yours most truly,

W. C. BERESFORD.

The Duke of York to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Horse Guards, 5th Sept., 1808.

I have to acknowledge your letter, dated August 18th, at the camp at Lourinha, acquainting me with the loss of Captain Bradford, of the 3rd regiment of Guards, Assistant Adjutant-General, who fell in the performance of a most essential duty, in rallying a detachment of the 60th Regiment, which had given way; and I have to assure you of the sincere regret I feel in the loss of this young officer, of whose services and merits I had the most favourable opinion, and that I shall very readily contribute to the utmost of my power to alleviate the sufferings of his family by recommending to His Majesty that an Ensign's commission in the army should be sold for their benefit.

I am, Sir, yours,

FREDERICK,
Commander-in-Chief.

Lieut.-Colonel Murray to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.*

MY DEAR SIR ARTHUR, Oeyras, 6th Sept., 1808.

I shall urge General Clinton to come to a fixed determination about the deserters immediately; perhaps till you have intimation of it, all that can be done is to put them in charge of an Assistant-Adjutant-General for supplies, &c.

The arrangement of the troops in brigades was given out yesterday, and of course you have it by this time. I have never seen that it was a matter which pressed till the business of the evacuation was further advanced, or

* Afterwards Sir George Murray.

over. The arrangement itself I have not interfered with in the smallest degree, but think that the feelings of the General officers should be a good deal consulted in the brigading the corps, as it can make little difference to the service how it is done.

If I may be allowed to give an opinion about our future operations, whether in the Asturias or elsewhere, it is that government ought to have fixed what was to be the theatre of the war after we had recovered Portugal. Were the army under your command, that would be less necessary; but sending a letter consisting chiefly of queries and speculations is not the kind of despatch that should have been sent to Sir H. D. under the present circumstances. The moments are precious, and if the Spaniards are willing to allow us to act with them, no time should be lost. Indeed we shall begin immediately to find our force an encumbrance instead of being useful to the common cause at the most important crisis that has occurred during the war.

I am inclined to think that carrying our force into the Asturias would be the best thing we could do, if the army amounted only to 15,000 men; but, strong as it is likely to be, it appears to me that we may widen our field. Had I a voice, therefore, in regard to how we should act at present, I would propose to begin without loss of time our arrangements for pushing on one corps after another by the Tagus, and also by Almeida, towards the province of Leon; and look to sending round a corps of 10,000 or 12,000 men to the Asturias by sea, or perhaps, instead of that, land there the troops coming from England, and send from hence a General to command them.

The operations of the British army would then be in the north of Leon, tending towards Burgos and the Western Pyrenees, if things go on well, and falling back on the coast and on Portugal if the affairs of Spain do not thrive, or if the inferiority of our force required our refusing ourselves a little in that quarter. The operations of the principal Spanish army might be diverted towards the upper part of the Ebro and Navarre, whilst they acted upon the defensive on the side of Catalonia, and perhaps we could encourage them there by some troops from Sicily.

In regard to some other parts of your letter I shall only say at present that, as far as I can judge, there is no want of confidence in the head towards you. There may be something in a man being placed in a situation so new to him, and in regard to whose appointment so many other circumstances and considerations than that of selecting a good General had weight. There may be at first an apprehension of appearing to yield too much, which, if nothing is pressed, will soon wear off.

"I write you my sentiments without the least reserve. I have been accustomed to their being well received, and I have no other wish but that of seeing matters go on well, and that the opportunity of a British force acting an important part may not be lost.

Believe me ever very faithfully yours,

GEORGE MURRAY.

Lieut.-Colonel Murray to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Head-quarters, Oeyras, 8th Sept., 1808.

I have the honour to acquaint you that the officer commanding at Torres Vedras has been ordered to occupy Peniché by a detachment from the 45th regiment, and to cause the French garrison which evacuates that place to march to Lisbon for embarkation by Montachique: One company of the 45th will accompany the French troops, and Lieutenant-Colonel Gerard has been informed that a detachment from the troops under your command will relieve that company at such point as you may judge proper before their arrival at Montachique, and he will give you the necessary intimation of their march for that purpose.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE MURRAY.

[102.] *To the Duke of Richmond.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Zambujal, 9th Sept., 1808.

Nothing particular has occurred since I wrote to you last: the French are about to evacuate Lisbon, under the Convention, as soon as the transports shall be ready; and the Russians have concluded a convention with the Admiral from their fleet, under which they are to be taken to a British port. I have neither seen one nor the other of these conventions, and I cannot tell you their contents; but I am convinced that neither are what they ought to be, considering the success of the army. The country has, however, acquired the honour of reconquering Portugal, and of restoring the rightful ruler to this government; and with these advantages I hope they will be satisfied.

I have only to regret that I signed the agreement for the suspension of hostilities without having negotiated. I have already told you the reasons why I did so, but I doubt whether good nature, and a deference to the opinion of an officer appointed Commander-in-Chief on the day of his taking the command, and to his orders, and a desire to avoid being considered the head of a party against his authority, will be deemed sufficient excuses for an act which, on other grounds, I cannot justify. I have had nothing to do, however, with any subsequent transaction, excepting to advise stronger measures, and that the Commander-in-Chief should insist on better terms.

I am sick of all that is going on here, and I heartily wish I

had never come away from Ireland, and that I was back again with you. Remember me kindly to the Duchess.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Duke of Richmond to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

DEAR ARTHUR, Phœnix Park, 12th Oct., 1808.

I last night received your letter of September 9. When I saw your name to the agreement to suspend hostilities, I felt certain of the motives which induced you so to do.

I think it is unlucky; but you acted on the most honourable principles, and your character stands too high for you to mind the blackguard attacks of Cobbett or the whispers of those who dislike the name of Wellesley, or are jealous of your exploits. I believe after Burrard prevented your following up your victory of the 21st, that it became a great object to get the French out of Portugal; but I do not think the terms would have been considered as very good even before that glorious action. I cannot agree in wishing you had not left Ireland. Had you not gone to Portugal, it would have still been probably in the hands of the French. I, however, agree most heartily in the other wish, namely, that you were back again here. When do you think you will be able to come?

All in this country but the rebels are anxious for your return. Kerry and some parts of the south continue in a very unpleasant state.

Believe me, dear Arthur, yours very sincerely,

RICHMOND.

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*Lieut.-Gen. Sir H. Dalrymple to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.**

SIR, Head Quarters, Oeyras, 9th Sept., 1808.

Two days ago a Spanish officer arrived express with despatches from Coruña addressed to Sir Harry Burrard. They were, however, of nearly the same date as those you gave me soon after my arrival, and contained a duplicate of the same letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Doyle. Mr. Stuart, however, says (what I did not before know) that General Castaños was marching to Madrid, under the control of a Board of officers established at Seville. I also learn, from an officer that was not long since at Cadiz, that soon after the battle of Baylen the dispute for precedency, or, at least, for independence, which had been very early broached by the Junta of Granada, broke out afresh, and that, consequently, the Granada army was recalled from General Castaños, and we hear no more of its movements. That army is commanded by General Reding, and certainly fought and defeated Dupont at the battle above mentioned. The armies of these provinces thus claimed by the Juntas were distinct commands under the

* For answer to this letter see *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. iv., p. 152.

monarchy, and in many, if not in most cases, are held by the persons appointed by the King.

The defeat of the French in Valencia, Cordova, &c., and the concentration of their force at Burgos, administered a reason, if not an absolute necessity, for marching those armies to a point. Could these armies have met, and the generals commanding them been united, the consequence might have been the establishment of a central government by the power or influence of those officers, and the gradual and natural diminution and final extinction of the revolutionary governments called Juntas, which only rule by popular opinion, and perhaps by the influence of the Church, which is nearly the same thing.

Unfortunately the armies which have already met (those of Blake and Cuesta) seem not likely to be united, and the influence of Britain, which I believe (at least I hope) has at this moment in every part of Spain a preponderating influence, is administered by Lieutenant-Colonel Doyle, who seems to exert himself solely to recruit cavalry for Blake, whose part I rather think he has espoused, although certainly a very much younger officer than Cuesta, and, only since the establishment of a junta, commander of the province of Galicia.

Under all these circumstances I feel very much disposed to send to Madrid an officer high in military rank and family connexion; but, above all, distinguished as a statesman and a soldier, of course to learn to understand the meaning of these petty intrigues, which at a moment like this it is difficult to discover; but principally to hold a language that may bring these people to their senses. I have myself already experienced that a firm language, and even in his own name by a British officer, has produced its effects; and if that was in an early stage, and my individual opinions might not now avail, I yet feel confident the sentiment, from fear of the people, still remains, and would be actuated by the sort of officer upon the spot which I have now described. The description being given, I need not add that I had you in view. If you see the matter in the light I do, I think you will feel the importance of the object, and dedicate a portion of the time which we must remain here inactive to a mission so important, and which would lead, perhaps, to the forming a project for our future operations with generals over whom I think you would obtain an influence which, I am fain to confess, I think the feeble missionaries at present sent into Spain are well calculated to forfeit, both for their nation and themselves.

The appearance of the Duke of Infantado at this most critical period I cannot like. His character stood high, but he conducted his Sovereign to Bayonne, and now comes back by himself. Lieutenant-Colonel Doyle seems to have taken the Duke under his protection.

If the army of Estremadura means to be useful, it now ought to march, the war in Portugal being over. I believe General Galluzzo has 15,000 men.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

H. H. DALRYMPLE.

*Lieut.-Gen. Sir H. Dalrymple to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.**

SIR, Head Quarters, Oeyras, 11th Sept., 1808.

I feel sensible that the mission I took the liberty to propose to you is not of a nature to fulfil the important objects to which one fully authorized and empowered by government might lead; and, indeed, before I received your letter, I began to fear I had, without sufficient consideration, made a proposal that it might not be agreeable or proper for you to accept.

I heard yesterday from General Castaños, and he wishes an immediate reinforcement of 2000 cavalry from this army, which he seems to entertain no doubt might easily be spared.

Lieutenant-Colonel Doyle strongly urges the same measure. I find from the latter, that having succeeded in forming a corps in Biscay, and reinforcing it with 5000 Asturians, the French fell upon Bilboa and Vitoria, and plundered both, putting a great number of persons in the former to death.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

H. H. DALRYMPLE.

Lieut.-Colonel Murray to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

DEAR SIR ARTHUR, Head-quarters, Oeyras, 12th Sept., 1808.

I have fixed upon Major Montalembert to go to Almeida, because Colonel Bathurst tells me that you are perfectly aware of it being accidental that he has found himself latterly at the head of the department with you.

If it should subject the 6th regiment to very great inconvenience to move the whole battalion to-morrow, I beg you will be so good as order such arrangement as may appear best, such as the regiment marching by half battalions, or one company remaining till the 14th. Whatever you are pleased to direct in that respect, has the sanction of the Commander of the Forces.

An officer of engineers and a captain, with thirty men of the Royal Artillery, will march with the 6th regiment, and have been ordered accordingly. An assistant commissary has also been attached to it.

I have settled with Lieutenant-Colonel Bathurst that the bât and forage of the troops which came out with you should be paid as proposed in your warrants. I had not adverted, when I thought of its being otherwise, to the difficulties that would arise respecting the staff. I think the grounds for omitting on this occasion to act on the late regulations from the Commander-in-Chief's Office are so strong that His Royal Highness would see the expediency of it. The troops with Sir J. Moore, and those with General Spencer, both received, I understand, on the old scale. Sir J. Moore I know did.

It would oblige me much if you would have the goodness to lend me the survey you have of the country round Lisbon which shall be returned whenever you desire it.

* Reply to letter from Sir Arthur Wellesley, dated 10th September, 1808.

Brigadier-General R. Stewart tells me you have the original of a report partly made by him on the plans and resources of this country a few years ago. You will judge whether I could derive any information from it that might be of service in the present moment.

Believe me ever very faithfully yours,

GEORGE MURRAY.

Lieut.-Colonel Murray to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

MY DEAR SIR ARTHUR, Head-quarters, 14th Sept., 1808.

In answer to the letter from the commanding officer of the 6th, respecting the march of the regiment, it has been directed to move in half battalions, whatever may delay the march being to accompany the 2nd division, as it is very desirable that some of our troops should reach Almeida as soon as possible. Their being able to canton must depend upon the accommodation to be found.

I am not certain what supply of spare ammunition they have been ordered to carry. They should take 60 or even 100 rounds per man.

The knapsacks of the regiment were ordered to proceed from hence by water several days ago, but there seems hitherto to have been a good deal of delay in the arrival of everything sent in that way. I should apprehend it must occur in the communication from the landing-place to the troops. The camp equipage for your corps was ordered up so far back as the 4th, and reported to me to have sailed then, but even now I have no account of its arrival.

In regard to the regiments providing meat for themselves, I apprehend it will not be found practicable except in the case of detached corps. The Deputy-Commissary-General represented that it would be done, but the contract, I conclude, is of course to be continued either on the footing of the commissary bringing a market within reach of the troops, or, at all events, till their being able to supply themselves is fully ascertained, and reports received of their being ready to commence doing so.

As to the supply of the 6th regiment on the march, Mr. Kennedy told me several days before the order was sent, that the arrangements were made for it. An Assistant-Commissary goes to Almeida for that purpose, and to provide for the French garrison on its march to Oporto.

I can easily credit what you say respecting General ———'s report, and the four folios you mention. Several of the like description may perhaps be compiled for the labours of the missions in Spain.

I have not seen Sir H. Dalrymple's answer to your letter. Lord W. Bentinck, however, I know is to go to Madrid, which I concluded had been explained to you.

I shall settle what you propose about the bât and forage. I should think the order of the 8th is quite sufficient authority for Bathurst to write to the regiments that came out with you to make out their returns according to it.

Believe me ever very faithfully yours,

GEORGE MURRAY.

Lieut.-Colonel Murray to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

MY DEAR SIR ARTHUR, Head-quarters, 14th Sept., 1808.

The French have come to the determination of evacuating Lisbon to-morrow morning and completing their embarkation near Belem. This was intimated to me to-day by General Hope.

The Commander of the Forces is desirous that the troops under your command should move nearer Lisbon as soon as possible, but leaves it to you to determine their march as may be most convenient, and accord best with the arrangements respecting issues of provisions and the disembarkations that may be going forward.

I am not sufficiently acquainted with the country on your side of Lisbon to form an opinion whereabouts the corps can be placed with most advantage in point of situation and convenience for water and supplies. Lieutenant-Colonel Bathurst thinks there is no favourable ground nearer than Loures. You will be good enough to cause that matter to be ascertained, and let me know the place you fix upon, and the time when you will march to it. If you come pretty near Lisbon you will be so good as report the same also to Lieutenant-General Hope, commanding in the town.

Believe me ever very faithfully yours,

GEORGE MURRAY.

Lieut.-Gen. Burrard to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

DEAR SIR ARTHUR, Oeyras, 15th Sept., 1808.

I enclose you a copy of a letter* just received from Lord Viscount Castlereagh, and I request you will do me the honour and justice to believe, and to impress it upon the minds of your corps, that if I could have found words that would have more strongly conveyed to His Majesty's Ministers my thorough conviction of the conduct and bravery displayed by yourself and the troops under your command upon the 21st of August, I should have been happy and proud to do it.

I shall ever consider it as one of the most fortunate circumstances that an opportunity was afforded me of witnessing what an able General can accomplish with a well-disciplined British army.

I have the honour to be, with great respect and esteem,

My dear Sir Arthur,

Your very faithful humble servant,

HARRY BURRARD.

Brigadier-Gen. Anstruther to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

DEAR SIR ARTHUR, Oporto, 16th Sept., 1808.

I arrived here last night and found your friend and admirer the Bishop in good health and high spirits. He made many anxious inquiries about you.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. iv., p. 158, for letter from Lord Castlereagh dated 4th September, 1808.

He views the matter which we talked over at Tojal exactly in the light you do, and will consent to become President of the Regency on condition that he is called to the situation by the other members who have the power of election. This may be very easily managed, and I hope will be done.

I shall set out early next week for Almeida. My last request is, that you will recollect my anxious wish to be employed under your command, and that you will endeavour to manage that for me should you have a separate command, which I conclude will be the case. Farewell.

Believe me always most truly yours,

R. ANSTRUTHER.

Colonel Kemmis to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Camp at St. Anna, near Lisbon, 18th Sept., 1808.

It has happily fallen to my lot, as the oldest field-officer in your army, to have the honour of presenting the enclosed address from the commanding officers of corps and field-officers serving in it. We have but one sentiment on the occasion, admiration of your talents and confidence in your abilities.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

JAMES KEMMIS,
Lt.-Col. 40th Regt., and Colonel.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Address from the Commanding Officers of Corps and Field-Officers serving in the Army to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Camp at St. Antonio de Tojal,
SIR, 6th Sept., 1808.

The undersigned commanding officers of corps and field-officers, who have had the honour of serving in the army under your command, anxiously desirous of expressing the high opinion they entertain of the order, activity, and judgment with which the whole force was so ably directed from the time of landing to the termination of your command in the action of Vimeiro, request you will accept from them a piece of plate as a testimonial of that sincere esteem and respect which your talents and conduct have so justly inspired.

W. W. Blake, Major 20th Light Dragoons.
William Robe, Lieut.-Col. commanding Royal Artillery.
James Viney, Major Royal Artillery.
H. Elphinston, Captain Royal Engineers.
Edward Copson, Major 5th regiment and Lieut.-Col.
Henry Bird, Captain 5th regiment and Major.
Thomas Emes, Major 5th regiment.
Thomas Carnu, Major 6th regiment.
Arthur Miller, Major 6th regiment.
J. Cameron, Lieut.-Col. commanding 1st battalion 9th foot.

H. Crawfurd, Major 1st battalion 9th regiment and Lieut.-Col.
D. White, Lieut.-Col. 29th regiment.
G. Way, Major 29th regiment.
Thomas Egerton, Captain 29th regiment and Major.
Andrew Creagh, Captain 29th regiment and Major.
Samuel Hinde, Lieut.-Col. commanding 32nd regiment.
H. Johnson, Major 32nd regiment.
John Wood, Major 32nd regiment.
Robert Coote, Captain 32nd regiment and Major.
Robert Burne, Lieut.-Col. commanding 36th regiment.
Lewis Davis, Major 36th regiment.
J. Grevell, Lieut.-Col. commanding 38th regiment.
J. W. Deane, Major 38th regiment and Lieut.-Col.
E. Miles, Major 38th regiment.
David Ross, Captain 38th regiment and Major.
James Kemmis, Lieut.-Col. commanding 40th regiment and Col.
Henry Thornton, Major 40th regiment.
Richard Archdall, Major 40th regiment.
Edward Hull, Major 2nd battalion 43rd.
Daniel Heane, Major 2nd battalion 43rd.
—— Guard, Col. commanding 45th regiment.
—— Pattan, Major 45th regiment.
—— Guyn, Major 45th regiment.
—— Leckey, Brig.-Major 45th regiment.
—— Coghlan, Brig.-Major 45th regiment.
G. Walker, Col. commanding 50th regiment.
John Ross, Lieut.-Col. commanding 2nd battalion 52nd regiment.
H. Redwood, Major 52nd regiment.
W. G. Darey, Major 5th battalion 60th regiment.
W. Woodgate, Major 5th battalion 60th regiment.
John Gaffe, Brevet-Major 60th regiment.
D. Pack, Lieut.-Col. 71st regiment commanding.
D. Campbell, Major 71st regiment.
Harry Eyre, Major commanding 82nd regiment.
Chichester M'Donall, Major 82nd regiment.
James Robinson, Lieut.-Col. 91st regiment.
J. Douglas, Major 91st regiment.
B. H. Ottley, Major 91st regiment and Lieut.-Col.
D. M'Donnell, Captain 91st regiment and Major.
Robert Travers, Major commanding 95th regiment.

Staff.

Lieut.-Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.
Lieut.-Col. Tucker, Deputy Adjutant General.
Major Arbuthnot, Deputy Assistant-Adjutant General.
Major Patten, Deputy Assistant-Adjutant General.
Major Gum, *Deputy Assistant-Adjutant General.*
Major Lecky, *Deputy Assistant-Adjutant General.*
Major Coghlan, *Deputy Assistant-Adjutant General.*
James Bathurst, Lieut.-Col. *and Deputy Quartermaster-General.*
J. Rainey, Assistant Deputy Quartermaster-General.

[103.*] *To Senhor Fernandez Thomas.*

SENHOR, A Lisbonne, ce 19 Sept., 1808.

Je viens de recevoir la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire, et je puis vous assurer que je prendrai toutes les occasions qui me seront offertes pour faire savoir, au gouvernement qui sera établi dans ce pays-ci, les grands services que vous avez rendus à l'armée Anglaise.

Il est malheureux que je ne suis pas moi-même dans une situation dans laquelle je pourrai vous être aussi utile que je voudrais; mais je viens de recommander vos services au Général Beresford, qui commande à Lisbonne, dans une lettre dont je vous envoie la copie; et je vous prie de passer chez lui aussitôt que vous le pouvez.

Je vous promets aussi de ne pas oublier de vous recommander à M. de Sousa, l'Ambassadeur Portugais en Angleterre, auquel j'espère que je pourrais demander la grace de vous recommander au gouvernement.

J'ai, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir H. Dalrymple to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, 19th Sept., 1808.

The Bishop of Oporto is elected by the other members of the Regency, which is the mode pointed out by the Prince when the Regency was constituted; but there is no president. There are five members, and the Marquess of Abrantes presided merely on account of his rank.

Another objection may arise, as I understand from Brig.-General Anstruther the Bishop wished that his brother, the Principal Castro, who accepted of the French the ridiculous office of Minister for Religious Worship, and is therefore inadmissible on the general opinion, should be considered as not having forfeited his claim to his situation in the Regency.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient and most humble servant,

H. H. DALRYMPLE.

C. Stuart, Esq., to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

MY DEAR SIR, Madrid, 20th Sept., 1808.

I have been favoured with your two letters, dated the 25th August and the 1st September,* and condole with you most sincerely on the malediction.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. iv., pp. 118, 134.

which seems to have prevented every obvious measure subsequent to your victory at Vimeiro. Other officers appear, indeed, to have arrived for little purpose but to deprive the common cause of the advantages which had been hardly earned by the bravery and talent of those who first commanded the expedition. As, however, the mischief is now done, nothing remains but to prevent the evil consequences as far as shall be in our power; and for that reason I have in the accompanying letter to Sir H. Dalrymple, which I leave open for your perusal, together with the despatch to the office (which I beg may be forwarded without delay), detailed the species of assistance which I conceive it may be in our power to render Spain at present. The disembarkation of Spaniards and Portuguese in Catalonia and in the Montaña is anxiously looked for, and in the former is necessary not only for offensive operations against Barcelona, but for the defence of the province and the protection of Palafox, whose flank will be exposed while at Sanguesa, if reinforcements enable St. Cyr to come forward from Perpignan, where he is endeavouring to assemble an army.

The only Spanish corps unequal to its object is that of Cuesta. If, therefore, the British come to Spain, it must be to do his work, to march straight on Burgos, and, cooperating with Blake and Castaños on each side, to endeavour to push the French beyond the frontier. Corps landed at Irun and other points on the coast will be of material advantage acting on his flanks. I must, however, most strongly recommend the importance of an army sufficiently numerous to be independent in all its movements and conduct, and perfectly complete in every arm. The wants of those we are to cooperate with will allow them to supply us with nothing. If, however, we do not require their assistance, I am convinced that our head quarters well understood will have the direction of the whole war. As common friends they must look up to us to decide their differences, to combine their movements, and to urge them forward. The efforts of individuals, when they are left to themselves, may be of some avail, but never can do much. The mere knowledge that 35,000 English are approaching the scene of action will, I am convinced, almost change the fortune of the war; and far from wishing us not to come, there is no General officer with whom I have conversed who is not anxious for our arrival, and our arrival in body is real assistance to them and a credit to ourselves, while our efforts in small corps are unavailing for every purpose but that of pleasing officers who are desirous of small and independent commands.

What I say to you are not only the sentiments of myself and of Doyle, but Castaños, Cuesta, Infantado, Montijo, Palafox, Blake, and Llamas repeated the same thing too often for mere compliment or a desire to make obliging speeches. In short, if government wish to turn the fortune of the war before sickness and the cold of the northern provinces shall thin the ranks of the southern Spaniards who are going towards the Pyrenees, they will not hesitate to send you here at the head of our Portuguese army without a moment's delay.

Truly yours,

C. STUART.

Pray have the goodness to seal Sir H. Dalrymple's letter and the despatch, and send them.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

DEAR WELLESLEY, Downing-street, 30th Sept., 1808.

It has been suggested to me that you may possibly feel it necessary to your own satisfaction to ask leave to return to England for the purpose of giving such explanations as you may deem right with respect to the share you have taken in the late transactions, whilst the army is assembling in Spain.

Should such be the case, the King's government would certainly not wish to oppose the smallest impediment in the way of your doing so; but as they can only consider the Commander-in-Chief, in the first instance, responsible for any act done under his authority, I beg you will understand that your return is not desired by them.

I am, dear Wellesley,

Yours faithfully,

CASTLEREAGH.

Major-Gen. Spencer to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

DEAR SIR ARTHUR, Camp, near Lisbon, 30th Sept., 1808.

I take the first opportunity of doing myself the pleasure of writing you since you sailed. I cannot let any subject precede the expression of my thankfulness to you for your kindness and for the confidence you were pleased to repose in me while in Portugal, and I hope by this time that you are safely arrived in England, greeted by the whole country, as you so very justly merit, in every possible way, if the people possess only common gratitude, and in which the whole army thinks with me.

The *Pallas* frigate arrived a few days ago from England, without bringing anything particular, since which Major Dalrymple has returned, and I learn that the Commander of the Forces is to go home immediately; and from the letter that I have received relative to the disapprobation of the Convention at home, I am quite happy that you took the early resolution of returning to England as you did. You have often declared to me your unequivocal disapprobation of the terms generally. You had no exclusive power to form treaties, and, had you not been interfered with in the field just after the battle of the 21st, the French and Russians never would have obtained any other terms than those dictated by yourself entirely.

I hope I need scarcely say that, should you require my presence in England to corroborate the whole of your noble conduct, I shall be both proud and happy to attend to your wishes most heartily and cheerfully at a moment's notice. Your laurels can never be destroyed by imbecility, or something worse, which must ever be a glorious reflection to you.

Since you left the country nothing has occurred respecting the army but the march of Generals Hope and Paget's divisions towards Almeida and Elvas. There is something awkward in the Spaniards bombarding the latter place: they say that they first invested Elvas, and claim it accordingly, I understand. The French decline giving it up but to the English.

Colonel Bathurst is gone with General Hope's division, very much to his annoyance, I do assure you. He regrets excessively that he did not ask leave to go home when you did.

I shall do myself the pleasure of writing you again the moment that it is in my power to acquaint you with our future movements, in which situation I shall always be proud and delighted in being directed by you.

With every sentiment of high esteem and regard,

Believe me, dear Sir Arthur,

Your very obliged,

Most faithfully and very sincerely,

B. SPENCER.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

DEAR WELLESLEY, Downing-street, 30th Sept., 1808.

That you may feel no difficulty, as far as the government is concerned, if you should wish to return home, I send you a demi-official letter, which may give every facility, as far as depends on us, to your doing so. Pole has written so fully to you as to leave me little to add. I perfectly approve of the reasons which determined you to decline the mission I suggested into the north of Spain, being satisfied, under your relations at the time with the Commander-in-Chief, that the framing a plan of operations for him was a task you could not charge yourself with. I feel much obliged to you for your long military letter. The game in Spain becomes one of equal anxiety and importance. The French are making great exertions to reinforce their armies; they are moving troops even from Germany. The Spaniards have now little less than 100,000 bearing upon the Ebro. Taking 40,000 as the maximum of a French army, I think we may venture to look them in the face.

I lost no time in executing your wishes about Colonel Burne. The Duke of York very obligingly gave him a government immediately, which luckily happened to be vacant. You will easily understand why, *for the present*, your wishes in favour of Spencer are suspended.

Ever, my dear Wellesley,

Most sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

You will have learnt from Charles what our future plans are. What I write to him I consider as not unlikely to reach you.

The Hon. W. W. Pole to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Admiralty, 30th Sept., 1808.

An express goes off to-night for Lisbon, and you will receive by it (if you do not leave the army before its arrival) a letter from Castlereagh, which will relieve you from all difficulty you may have been under at the

idea of coming home without having his sanction. I had some conversation with Castlereagh this morning, and it was agreed that he should write to you in such a manner as to leave you at liberty. His great anxiety seems to be that nothing done by him should bear the appearance of anything like your being recalled; but I explained to him that it was evident from all your letters that, however anxious you were to come home, yet you always felt it a point of duty to remain if he desired it. It, therefore, I thought, would be but fair to you to express that if you thought it proper to come home, you were at liberty so to do. Castlereagh wrote to you by the last conveyance, and he enclosed his letter to Charles Stewart. I saw a copy of the letter to-day, and I am sure it is meant most kindly, and, I think, is very friendly. It is in some measure formed, I think, upon the reasoning that I told you in my last I had used to Castlereagh, and, indeed, contains some of the points touched upon in my letter. You can have no idea of the public feeling here, and, circumstanced as matters are, in my conscience I believe government could not do otherwise for the present than they have done; and in my own mind I am satisfied that it will be necessary for you to have a plain and full explanation to do yourself justice. I entered so fully into everything relating to your affairs in my last that it is not necessary now for me to say much. The *Podargus* arrived on the 28th: the letters from her were received yesterday; I had not any from you. I think the effects of the accounts brought by the *Podargus* are very favourable to you, and I am much mistaken if the public clamour has not also subsided. All the private letters from the army, I am told, are most flattering to you. There has also been received by Souza a letter of yours, under date the 6th instant, to the Bishop of Oporto, which I consider as much the most valuable document we have yet got possession of. There has been published in the newspapers, and much animadverted upon, a thing purporting to be a letter of yours to the Bishop of Oporto, in which you are made to say that in the suspension of hostilities there was nothing remarkable but the neutrality of Lisbon and the Russian fleet. A great deal of vehement abuse has been heaped upon you for this letter. I hope and believe it is a forgery; but, as we cannot yet be certain that it is so, I have kept back the letter and not said one word about it. It certainly will be, in my judgment, best to reserve our fire till we can bring the whole to bear; and if the letter of 24th of August is a forgery, the more it is now relied upon the greater will be the impression when the impostor is detected.

The *Podargus* brought a second treaty of Cotton's with Siniavin, which government have refused to ratify. We cannot account for Cotton's conduct.

As I am persuaded in my own mind that I shall very soon see you, I shall not enter any more into a discussion respecting affairs. I wish, however, to explain to you that Campbell has been extremely anxious to get back to you, and very uneasy at being detained. He has been kept from day to day waiting for despatches, and the circumstances that have arisen have prevented Ministers from allowing him to go. He was much inclined to have proceeded by this conveyance, but I dissuaded him, as I am sure the chances are ten to one against his finding you in Portugal on his arrival, or at least against your remaining there a day after he arrived.

I told him that I would take it upon myself to tell you I had kept him, which I did, in fact, I may say, by force; and, if I had not done so, he would have proceeded at all events, which, I think, would have been foolish. I hope you will approve of my having kept Campbell: if you come home, as I think you will, he may be of use to you; if you should remain, he can easily proceed to join you.

We cannot account for not hearing from you by the *Podargus* of a later date. Your letters to Castlereagh are dated the 5th; the *Podargus* sailed on the 13th.

I sometimes hope you are in the *Crocodile*, which we expect every moment.

I must conclude.

Ever yours most affectionately,

W. W. POLE.

Lieut.-Colonel Murray to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

MY DEAR SIR ARTHUR, 1st Oct., 1808.

I think it may be interesting to you to have the enclosed copy of a paper that fell into my hands two days ago. I had before learnt from Setaro that the enemy had prepared a very large dépôt of biscuit at Santarem, with a view, as was supposed, to a retreat into Spain.

As things have turned out in Spain, Junot would have been arrested in his progress probably; but it certainly was not to be supposed that the French force said to be concentrating at Burgos was to prove so inefficient as it has been. One could not be accused of despondency in expecting rather that it would make a very considerable impression in the north of Spain; and had that (which was most likely) been the case, the arrival of 15,000 men from Portugal, in the rear of the Spanish operations, might have been extremely embarrassing. Nobody can say that we should have been able to overtake them, and nobody who has been in Portugal will say that the Portuguese could have stopped them.

Very faithfully yours,

GEORGE MURRAY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Colonel Vincent's Report upon the Defence of Portugal.

Lisbonne, le 28 Juin, 1808.

Une flotte ennemie menace le port et la ville de Lisbonne. Toute indépendamment de ses moyens de la bonne intelligence dont elle est bien sûre, à raison des avantages momentaires qu'elle procurera, elle peut agir avec la confiance qui doit lui inspirer la certitude d'être puissamment secondée par les secours qui ne manqueront pas de se multiplier au milieu de la fermentation des idées que des hommes exaltés et corrompus par l'or de l'ennemi se feront un jeu de disséminer pour porter le peuple à tous les excès.

L'on doit donc penser que la ville et le port de Lisbonne peuvent être attaqués en même temps par terre et par mer; l'on pourroit même avancer que ce moment d'attaque ne seroit peut être pas éloigné, si l'on peut en

croire les différens rapports qui nous parviennent des points les plus éloignés occupés par l'armée, rapports auxquels on n'ajoute toutefois qu'une foible croyance.

Dans cette état des choses il est urgent de rechercher quelles sont les attaques les plus dangereuses à redouter, et par quels moyens on peut les repousser.

L'on ne considérera comme attaques par mer que celles qui pourroient se tenter en forçant le port, ou sur cette portion des côtes qui est compriso entre Peniche et Setuval : toute autre tentative opérée par des débarquemens rentreroit dans l'hypothèse des attaques par terre, dont il sera mention après avoir considérés celles par mer. L'on supposera donc que l'ennemie, informé des mouvemens et des progrès d'une attaque par terre, songe à faire une diversion en faveur de l'attaquant, il profitera du vent du moment, qui sera probablement du Nord-Est, et passant par la petite entrée rangera de très près le fort de St. Julien pour s'élever dans le port. Le fort de St. Julien, dans le cas d'une pareille attaque, ne peut pas espérer d'arrêter la flotte en tirant en plein bois les seules bouches à feu qui pourront être bien servies à boulets rouges doivent avoir cette destination, mais toutes les autres doivent avoir pour principal objet de hâcher les manœuvres des vaisseaux ; les batteries hautes du fort doivent tirer à démonter et à désemparer les navires, le véritable avantage à remporter seroit de rallentir le mouvement des vaisseaux, de les forcer peut être à dériver, et comme ils doivent tenir le vent au plus près pour entrer, il n'est point hors de vraisemblance qu'un bâtiment pourroit être affalé sur le banc du nord de la passe, ce qui est le plus grand avantage que l'on puisse se proposer.

Il n'est nullement probable que l'attaquant veuille mouiller dans l'avant port, pour y tenter un débarquement ; et cependant il l'osoit, le soin de la défense de la côte confie au Général Travot procureroit bientôt des secours pour repousser cette entreprise nullement vraisemblable vû l'état d'armement de la rive droite.

L'on peut donc croire que l'ennemi chercheroit à dépasser les défenses de Belem et Torre Velza, l'on doit renforcer autant que possible ces deux points, l'on s'en occupe sans relâche, et il n'est pas douteux que dans l'état actuel des choses l'ennemi trouvera des difficultés ; mais c'est surtout de la part des vaisseaux Russes qu'il doit éprouver une résistance imposante ; la ligne des vaisseaux appuyée à droite à la batterie de Belem, et par sa gauche au delà de l'Arsenal de la Marine, en rangeant de plus près possible la rive droite du Tage présenteroit la ligne de défense la plus redoutable qui puisse être proposée. Pour aider cette même ligne, des batteries de mortiers doivent être établies le plutôt possible dans le Bastion d'Alcantara et la Batterie de St. Jean de Dieu ; ces deux points sont disposés pour recevoir les bouches à feu que l'on ne sauroit placer nulle part ailleurs aussi utilement, car en supposant que l'ennemi ayant dépassé nos défenses soit parvenu à venir mouiller dans le port, il ne scauroit tenir sous les feux multipliés des vaisseaux et des batteries des mortiers d'Alcantara, St. Jean de Dieu, et de l'Arsenal de la Marine. Il faut donc sans perte de temps établir ces batteries de mortiers.

L'on ne pense pas devoir détailler ici aucun des mouvemens et moyens de défense à employer dans le cas où l'ennemi débarqueroit sur l'une ou l'autre rive de la rivière entre Setuval et Peniche ; la défense de cette portion est confiée à des officiers qui connoissent au fond le théâtre des opérations militaires qui devroient avoir lieu, et les avantages que présentent les localités laissent de grandes probabilités à des succès.

Après cette aperçu des moyens à opposer à un ennemi que tenteroit à forcer le port à l'aide de la flotte, l'on va prendre en considération les attaques

de terre qui paroissent les plus vraisemblables à redouter pour le pont et la ville de Lisbonne.

L'on va supposer ce qui n'est nullement vraisemblable, que des nuées d'insurgés sans gouvernement, sans chef à talens, sans moyens de subsistance, et très probablement fort peu d'accord, oseront pénétrer dans l'Alentejo, et laisser derrière eux une place comme celle d'Elvas, qui ne doit jamais être avec moins de trois milles hommes, pour venir passer le Tage devant un corps d'armée que l'on peut porter à six milles hommes. L'on ne hésite point à penser que l'on pourroit se porter au delà du Tage, et prendre pour première ligne de défense le cours du Soro à partir de Salvatierra, et le remontant jusqu'à Sovereigno, d'où la ligne appuyeroit au fleuve; mais si le pont sur le Tage ne peut pas être construit, et si la tranquillité de Lisbonne ne permet pas de trop s'écarter, l'on peut voir une position bien plus concentrée et bien plus forte sur la rive droite du fleuve. Son centre seroit au confluence du Zezere dans le Tage, elle s'étendroit par sa droite jusqu'à Lisbonne, et cette droite ne paroissant pas pouvoir être forcée, les plus grands moyens de l'armée seroient développés sur Thomar, Ourem, et Leyria, où un officier instruit trouveroit probablement dans la nature du pays des positions d'une excellente défense; admettant toutefois que la gauche de cette position peut être forcée, elle se retireroit de lors entre Santharem et Peniche, où le terrein étudié et reconnu à l'avance offrirait probablement des puissants moyens de repousser l'attaque.

Non loin de là se trouveroit aussi la bonne position d'Alenquer et Torres Vedras, dont la droite se prolongeroit jusqu'au Tage et la gauche jusqu'à la mer.

Venant enfin à ce fâcheux état des choses, où l'armée seroit réduite à se replier de la position d'Alenquer et Torres Vedras, sa retraite ne peut se faire que sur Lisbonne, elle auroit encore en avant de la ville une belle position, la droite appuyée au ruisseau de Sacarem, et la gauche sur les hauteurs de Bellas. Cette position mise un peu en état de défense, et qui ne laisseroit à l'ennemi aucun ressource pour la tourner, ou pour aucune diversion, l'obligeroit absolument à l'enlever de vive force, opération très délicate, et qui ne laisse guères de probabilités d'aucun succès pour les troupes vraisemblablement peut aguerries, qui oseraient s'en charger.

Les moyens de défense que l'on vient de considérer laissant l'Alentejo à la disposition de l'ennemi, l'on doit redouter avec toute raison qu'il dirige des troupes et de l'artillerie pour aller occuper les hauteurs d'Almada, d'où il pourroit faire infiniment de mal à la ville et aux vaisseaux; il est indispensable de pourvoir à ce danger en s'assurant d'une bonne position qui couvre Almada, et le mette à même d'être bien défendu.

La première ligne dont il a été mention, et dont la droite s'étend de l'embouchure du Zezere à Lisbonne, supposée bien établie, il n'est pas vraisemblable que l'ennemi puisse passer sur la rive droite du fleuve par cette partie de son cours; il le tentera peut être au dessus de l'embouchure du Zezere, mais l'on en seroit instruit, et en se portant le long de la rive droite de cette rivière, on lui disputeroit son passage au moins jusqu'au Pedrogao, grand hauteur à laquelle il deviendroit difficile de lui empêcher de faire sa jonction avec le corps qui viendroit de la Haute Beira, de Porto, et Coimbre; mais en supposant cette réunion faite, la défense devient absolument la même que celle dont on s'est occupé précédemment, et sans s'arrêter à des nouvelles combinaisons de défense.

Si l'on suppose deux à trois milles hommes entre Leyria et Mafra, ces forces, qui pourront facilement concerter leurs opérations avec les six milles hommes chargés de la défense de la rive droite du Tage, et de la ligne par Thomar et Leyria, suffiront probablement pour les approches de la capitale

pendant que les troupes laissées dans son intérieur seroient occupées du soin important d'en maintenir la tranquillité.

Cependant achevant de parcourir toutes les combinaisons les plus ou vraisemblables et les plus funestes pour l'armée, obligation que l'on doit s'imposer alors même que l'esprit réfuse de s'y soumettre, l'on supposera que l'armée est forcée d'évacuer Lisbonne; la division Travot se sera rapprochée de Belem, tenant les hauteurs de Memoria Necessidad, pour concourir à assurer la tranquillité de la ville, les dépôts de tout genre de l'armée seront tous repliés sur la rive droite de la rivière, qui n'aura pu être attaquée; Sacarem seroit le point de ralliement, et l'armée forcée de faire retraite la fera en partant de ce point, pour se rendre par Santarem à Thomar, d'où passant le Zezere à Villa del Rey, elle remontera à Belmonte, Guarda, et Almeida par Corticado, Monte Gardo, et Atalaya.

L'on n'entrevoit aucun obstacle de nature à pouvoir inquiéter l'armée dans sa retraite, qui pourroit avoir lieu en masse jusqu'à Thomar; mais arrivée à ce point de ressource, et même auparavant, elle peut se partager en plusieurs colonnes pour se rendre à sa destination par la Haute Beira.

Parvenu à Almeida, l'armée conservera probablement assez de forces pour traverser l'Espagne, ou ce qui est plus probable pour opérer sa réunion avec le corps de troupes le plus voisin d'elles.

L'on a supposé que la retraite de l'armée se feroit par le Beira et sur Almeida, retraite qui seroit la seule possible, si la rivière étoit tombée au pouvoir de l'ennemi; mais il est bien plus probable que dans le cas contraire la retraite seroit ordonnée sur Elvas. Le passage du fleuve qui auroit été prévu ne présenteroit probablement aucune difficulté, l'on auroit rassemblé un grand nombre de barques dans la rivière de Sacarem, et le long de la rive droite occupée par l'armée, les troupes retranchées à Almeida se replieront pour venir favoriser le débarquement sur la rive gauche, et l'armée feroit sa retraite par la plus belle route de Portugal, ce qui laisse tout espoir qu'elle la feroit dans le meilleur ordre, avantage que l'on a tout droit d'espérer qu'elle ne sera jamais dans le cas d'ambitionner.

Le Colonel du Génie,

Vincent.

The Marquess of Buckingham to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

My dear Arthur, Stowe, 7th Oct., 1808.

I received your letter from Plymouth this morning, and am very thankful for all the attentions you have shown to my wishes respecting Ebrington. Long before this reaches you, the note which I sent to your brother Wellesley, and the letter which I find my son Lord Temple had written to him upon your subject without any communication with me, will have shown you how much we both desire to separate the long and steady friendship we have borne to you from any political consideration whatsoever in the matter of Portugal, so far as you may be implicated in it, well knowing that it was quite impossible that you could, after Vimeiro, be the author of, or even the advocate for the preliminaries which you signed, or the final Convention of the 23rd August. I do not mean by this communication to you to call for any confidence that may commit you with a government whom I am inclined to think very criminal in many of the points connected with

Portugal, nor do I desire to influence your judgment on what you may think best for your fair fame and honour; but I do desire very distinctly (so soon as you know the whole of your situation and shall have decided on your course) to be considered the warmest as I am the oldest of your friends, and to be made useful to you in any way that you may point out as likely to assist you. The prospects that have opened to you from your conduct to the moment in which the command was taken from you, are cruelly clouded. I have no doubt but that they will again present themselves with increased splendour; but your situation is very difficult, and I should deceive you if I did not add that the whole of your future public life of fame and honour must depend upon the impressions which the public will entertain on this subject. I again repeat that I have not a doubt upon your conduct, and that I burn with the impatience of leading the public to think of one whom I so affectionately love with the same partiality as I do.

Adieu, dear Arthur. You know that I am and ever shall be most truly yours,

BUCKINGHAM.

P.S. Do not think of coming here, and write as little as you can to me till you see the whole of your ground.

His Royal Highness the Prince, who is with me, is disposed as kindly to you as I could wish: he leaves me to-morrow. Pray leave your name with him immediately.

To the Duke of Richmond. [104.]

MY DEAR DUKE, Plymouth, 4th Oct., 1808.

As soon as I heard of the death of Mr. Trail, I determined to return home without loss of time; and whether I am to continue to hold my office or to relinquish it, it will be a convenience to you that I should be in the way when his successor in the first case, or mine in the second, shall be appointed. Accordingly I sailed from Lisbon on the 20th September, and arrived here this day; and I shall go to Ireland as soon as possible. Pray write to me to London.

The French troops were nearly all embarked, and two divisions had sailed when I came away, and our troops were in possession of Lisbon; and as the equinoctial rains were expected at every moment, it is impossible to commence any further operation by land.

I have not heard from England since the end of August, and the only letter I have received from you since I left Ireland is dated the 8th August.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Duke of Richmond to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Dear Arthur, Phœnix Park, 10th Oct., 1808.

I am delighted to hear you are returned, and I hope soon to see you here. You will be wanted in England for the inquiry on Sir Hew's conduct; but if you can be here even for a few days it will be of much use. As you say nothing can be done in Portugal, I hope you will be inclined to resume your office. I am only just in time for the post. Lady Wellesley, &c., are all well.

Yours very sincerely,

Richmond.

[105.] *To Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, K.B.*

My dear General, London, 8th Oct., 1808.

I arrived in London on Thursday, and I yesterday took an opportunity of mentioning to Lord Castlereagh what I told you I should, notwithstanding that I found, upon my arrival in England, that the object I had in view in conversing with you upon this subject at all had been accomplished by your appointment to command the army. I told Lord Castlereagh that you thought that government had not treated you well, and that you had considered it incumbent upon you to express your sentiments upon that treatment; but that after you had done so, you had thought no more of the matter, and that it would be found that you would serve as cordially and as zealously in any situation in which you might be employed as if nothing of the kind had ever passed.

Lord Castlereagh said that he had never entertained any doubt upon this subject; and that after he had communicated to you the sentiments of the King's government upon what had passed, his only wish respecting you had been to employ you in the manner in which you were most likely to be useful to the country.

I find that by the distribution I am placed under your command, than which nothing can be more satisfactory to me. I will go to Coruña immediately, where I hope to find you.

You'll have seen by the newspapers that the late transactions in Portugal have made a stronger sensation here than it was imagined they would; and I have had what I think more than my share of the blame. I suppose that there must be an inquiry

into the transactions; and till that takes place I shall leave the public to find out the truth in the best way they can, and shall not adopt any illegitimate mode of setting them right. In the mean time the abuse of the news writers of London will not deprive me of my temper or my spirits, or of the zeal with which I will forward every wish of yours.

Ever, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Since writing the above I find that it will be necessary that I should wait in England till Sir Hew Dalrymple will return, and it will be known at what time the inquiry will be made into the late transactions in Portugal, on which I am to be examined. I will join you, however, at the moment I am set at liberty, for which I long most anxiously.

I will send a duplicate of this letter to Coruña.

To the Duke of Richmond. [106.*]

MY DEAR DUKE, London, 10th Oct., 1808.

You will readily believe that I was much surprised when I arrived in England to hear of the torrents of abuse with which I had been assailed; and that I had been accused of every crime of which a man can be guilty, excepting cowardice. I have not read one word that has been written on either side, and I have refused to publish, and don't mean to authorise the publication of a single line in my defence.

I think, however, that the King and his ministers, and my friends, have a right to an explanation of the cause for which my name appeared to the Armistice of the 22nd August, as I have already told you in a former letter, written from Portugal, in which I entered into the details of what passed on that occasion, and stated generally my motives for signing that instrument.

I think that Sir H. Dalrymple's letter of the 3rd September has, by fixing upon me, by a purposed inaccuracy of expression, the odium of negotiating that instrument, enabled me to explain the share I had in it to the King's ministers and to the King.

I enclose a copy of the letter * which I have written to the Secretary of State upon this subject, in which you will see that not only I have explained this point, but I have thought it but just and fair to Sir H. Dalrymple to avow that I was of opinion that the French ought to be allowed to evacuate Portugal, and my reasons for entertaining that opinion *on the evening of the 22nd August.* This is the whole amount of what I shall do in my defence at present; the rest I shall leave to chance, and to the result of the inquiry into Sir H. Dalrymple's conduct.

I propose, however, if I should have time, to write you a narrative of the whole campaign, stating the measures which I had adopted, and the principles on which I had adopted them, how far they were carried into execution, and the consequences which resulted from a departure from them on the arrival of the officers who relieved me.

I shall be obliged to you if you will show the enclosed paper, in confidence, and not on any account to be copied or printed, to the Chancellor, Attorney and Solicitor General, Lord Edward, and any friends of mine in Ireland.

I hope to be able to go to you in a few days.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

P.S. Pray remember me most kindly to the Duchess and Lady Mary, and give my love to Louisa and Charlotte.

[107.] *To the Marquess of Buckingham.*

My dear Lord, London, 11th Oct., 1808.

I assure you that I am most sensible of the friendship and kindness of Lord Temple and yourself, of which I hope to prove myself worthy. My situation is a very awkward one, and I can relieve myself from it only by the result of an inquiry.

I am accused of being the adviser of persons over whom I had no control, and who refused to follow my advice, and am made responsible for the acts of others. The real share which I have had in the transactions which, in my opinion, have de-

* See letter to Lord Castlereagh, dated 6th October, 1808, in *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. iv., p. 161.

servedly incurred the displeasure of the public, cannot be known till they will be inquired into; and in the mean time, Sir Hew Dalrymple has left the government and the public so completely in the dark respecting the military expediency of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal, that that part of the question, which is the only one in which I am involved, is as little understood as the rest. I know of no immediate remedy for these difficulties of my situation excepting patience and temper; and I thank God that the undeserved abuse which has been heaped upon me has not altered the latter.

In respect to the conduct of my case, I have determined that I will publish nothing, nor will authorize the publication of anything by others. This forbearance is particularly incumbent upon me, as the whole subject must be inquired into. I have also determined that I will not involve others in scrapes because they differed in opinion with me previously to the 22nd of August, notwithstanding that difference of opinion and the alteration of system were the cause of the military expediency of allowing the French to withdraw from Portugal. I am afraid that I shall experience some difficulty in carrying this intention into execution, because the truth must come out; but I will endeavour not to bring others (viz. Sir Harry Burrard) into a scrape, not only out of regard to him, but because I think it fatal to the public service to expose officers to the treatment which I have received, and to punishment for acting upon their own military opinions, which opinions they may fairly entertain. I have also determined to stand singly. There is nothing in common between Sir Hew Dalrymple and me, or between the government and me, if the government are supposed to be involved in the questions, and I shall act accordingly.

I now enclose your Lordship the copy of a letter which I have written to the Secretary of State since my arrival. The principal object of this letter was to relieve myself from the imputation of having negotiated the Armistice, which was cast upon me by an inaccuracy of expression in Sir Hew Dalrymple's letter of the 3rd of September; and, in doing this, I thought it fair to avow to the King and his Ministers that I had concurred with Sir Hew Dalrymple in the opinion that it was expedient to allow the French to evacuate Portugal, and to state my reasons for entertaining that opinion. In fact, I am convinced that if we had not allowed them to evacuate that kingdom in August,

we should have been glad to do so in November or December, after we should have lost many men in the operations which we must have carried on against them, in a most unhealthy country (Alentejo), in the worst season of the year.

I request your Lordship not to allow any copy to be taken of this letter, as, however desirable it might be to set the public right even upon that part of the case to which it refers, I am determined that they shall know nothing from me excepting through the channel of a regular inquiry.

Pray present my best respects to Lady Buckingham and Lady Mary, and

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Lieut.-Colonel Robe to Lieut.-General Sir A. Wellesley.

SIR, Lisbon, 11th Oct., 1808.

I hope you will pardon the liberty I now take; I am encouraged so to do by the kindness of Major-General Spencer, and I acknowledge I would gladly have spoken to you on the subject before you left Portugal had I not feared that the time I had the honour to have been known to you might not be thought to justify it.

I feel too sensibly the advantage of serving in any army under your orders (and more particularly in my branch of it) not to wish for a renewal of it; and should esteem myself highly honoured if on some future occasion where you may require artillery my name should occur to your memory with approbation.

Permit me to mention to you that Captain Geary, who was killed on the 17th of August, an officer of much service and merit, has left a widow and four children, to whom any mention you may be pleased to make to the Master-General of the Ordnance cannot fail to be of essential service.

I have, &c.,

WILLIAM ROBE.

Acknowledge the receipt of his letter, and tell him that, under existing circumstances, I do not think that I shall have any command which would give me an opportunity of selecting him for the command of the artillery; but that if ever I should, he may depend upon my wish to have the benefit of his assistance.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To George Burrard, Esq. [108.]

SIR, London, 14th Oct., 1808.

I have received your letter, in answer to which I have to assure you that I have seen the abuse which has been thrown upon Sir Harry Burrard on account of late transactions in Portugal with as much concern as could have been felt by any of his friends; and I would gladly do anything in my power to relieve them from the anxiety which they must feel upon this subject. But I have refused to publish anything, or to authorize any publication, in justification of myself from the calumnies which have been heaped upon me; and therefore, although no person, whether friend of mine or otherwise, has authority from me to speak of those transactions, and certainly not in the terms stated by you, I cannot give you authority to publish any contradiction of such assertions.

The fact is, that Sir Harry Burrard and I did differ in opinion upon more than one point in relation to the late military operations in Portugal; and, as my commanding officer, his opinion did guide those operations (excepting during the battle of the 21st August) while his command lasted. There existed fair military grounds for the opinions entertained by each of us, and I don't conceive that either of us can be blamed for entertaining these opinions, or the honour or character of either attacked for acting according to opinions really entertained upon such grounds.

I certainly did and do think that great advantages would have resulted if the battle of the 21st of August had been followed by a pursuit, and the army had marched that evening. At the same time I must say that others besides Sir Harry Burrard were of a different opinion, and that there were not wanting military grounds to support the latter.

I have thought it proper to state thus much for your information and that of the friends of Sir Harry Burrard.

If you should wish to go farther into detail upon this subject, I shall be glad to see you or to wait upon you at your hotel; and I beg you to believe that there is nothing which will give me more concern than to see Sir Harry Burrard involved in any unpleasant discussions on account of the late transactions in

Portugal, and that my most anxious wish and endeavour shall be that he should be kept out of them.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

George Burrard, Esq., to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Fenton's Hotel, St. James's Street, Thursday, Oct., 1808.

SIR,

Reports of a most serious tendency, involving the military character of my near relation, Sir Harry Burrard, are very prevalent: his name has been mentioned with odium both in public and private societies. Some of the papers have libelled him in the grossest manner. It is confidently, and I have heard it as confidently said by a gentleman of your acquaintance, that had not General Burrard superseded you in the command after the battle of the 21st and prevented you from pursuing the enemy, that the French army might have been destroyed.

Of course General Burrard's family are most anxious and desirous to have his character cleared from all imputation: will you, therefore, allow me to ask you whether I may contradict from you any sentiments of the above tendency which may come to my knowledge that shall at all prejudice his military character?

My motive in thus troubling you is that I may render Sir Harry Burrard's family more comfortable than they are at present, and that, if necessary, I may give him an opportunity of vindicating himself. Although I have not the honour of your acquaintance, I feel confident, both from your public character as well as from the tenor of General Burrard's letters, that you will be anxious to do him the justice I request.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE BURRARD.

George Burrard, Esq., to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Fenton's Hotel, Friday night.

Your answer to my letter has been most open and candid; and, however deeply I may regret that any difference of opinion should have arisen between yourself and my relation, I cannot but, from the sentiments of both, anticipate a result that shall not in the remotest degree affect the military reputation of either party.

Most anxiously is this to be desired, however the zeal of unguarded friends might lead them to raise the one on the ruin of the other.

I leave London to-morrow morning for Lymington in Hampshire.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE BURRARD.

To Earl Temple. [109.]

My dear Lord, London, 14th Oct., 1808.

I am very much obliged to you for your letters of the 16th September and 9th instant; the former of which I received from Mr. Dardis this day. I intended to address you upon the latter while you were at Stowe, and to refer you to a letter which I had written to Lord Buckingham on the transactions to which it relates, of which letter, however, as you are gone to Eastbourne, I now enclose you a copy.

I have but little to add to what that letter contains, and that little will, I fear, tend to diminish the favourable impression which the zeal of my friends had given you of the prudence of my conduct in signing the Armistice of the 22nd of August. I did not protest against any part of that instrument. I stated to the Commander of the Forces the objections which I felt to the form which was adopted, to allowing the French to treat for the Russians, to the time which was given for the suspension of hostilities, and to the *verbiage;* and, in point of fact, it was settled and afterwards carried into execution, as I understand, by a separate Article of the Convention, which (strange to tell) was never sent home, that the property to be carried away by the French troops was to be only their military equipments. The objections which occurred to me, and which I stated, were overruled by the Commander of the Forces; and I signed the Armistice by his desire, which he made at the suggestion of General Kellermann. I don't think that the expression of this desire could be considered tantamount to an order. I certainly think that it was so put that I could have declined to comply with it; and here is the great difficulty of my situation. Such is the temper of the times and the violence of the prejudices excited against me upon this subject, that my motives will never be understood, and I shall never have credit for those which really actuated me.

I signed it, notwithstanding my objections to it, because I would not, in the face of the whole army, set myself up in opposition to the Commander of the Forces on the very day he joined his army. His task was sufficiently difficult without adding to it that further difficulty. I agreed with him upon the main point, viz. the evacuation by the French troops. My refusal to sign would not have prevented the execution of the

instrument, and would only have tended to raise my character at the expense of others, and probably at that of not a little outrage and want of discipline in the army. These were my motives. Besides that, to tell you the truth, when I consented to sign, I did not conceive the instrument was to be of that formal nature which it has since been made. One article, that regarding the Russians, I knew depended, as was understood and stated by Sir Hew Dalrymple, upon the Admiral; and it is an extraordinary circumstance that this instrument, upon which so much stress has been laid, was never ratified, and no one article of it was ever carried into execution, excepting that by which hostilities are suspended.

I will send Lord Buckingham a copy of this letter, as well as that which I have written to himself.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

Earl Temple to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

My dear Sir Arthur, London, 16th Sept., 1808.

Upon the receipt of the splendid news of your victory I wrote to Lord Wellesley a letter expressive, not of all my feelings, because no letter could express anything like all that I felt upon such a subject, but of as large a portion of them as I could. This letter I requested him to have the goodness to transmit to you, as I would not unnecessarily take up your time, which you have proved you know how to employ so well. Lest, however, my letter should have miscarried, or in such a moment Lord Wellesley's other occupations should put a matter of so little consequence as a letter of mine out of his recollection, I cannot help trespassing upon your time to offer you my truest and sincerest congratulations upon this glorious addition to your country's triumphs, and to the testimonies of your military fame. It is indeed the proudest and most gratifying feeling to me, that in addition to the exultation which as an Englishman I must feel at this glorious effort of our arms, it should be the exclusive and brilliant effort of an old friend for whom I have always felt the deepest interest and the highest value. With the warmest and most anxious zealous hopes that your country may long profit by your bravery and your talents, believe me, my dear Sir Arthur,

Yours very sincerely,

Chandos Temple.

Earl Temple to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

My dear Sir Arthur, Stowe, 9th Oct., 1808.

Upon the receipt of the intelligence of the glorious victories which you had gained I wrote a letter expressive of my feelings, which I begged Lord

Wellesley to transmit to you. As I, however, felt unwilling to trust even to your brother exclusively the communication of my sincere congratulations to you, I wrote on the 16th ultimo a letter to you, which I sent by Major Campbell. I trust, my dear Sir Arthur, that you will give me credit for the warmth and sincerity of the joy which I felt at your glorious success; and at the same time that I felt how much the country owed you for the important and splendid advantages you had gained for her, and for the lustre which you had cast upon her arms, I felt no little pride that they were the work of an old and valued friend. Convinced that you could not be, and in fact were not, a party to the disgraceful issue of that contest, and that you neither negotiated, nor approved of, nor suffered to pass without protest, the terms to which your name was affixed, I can only regret that by a strict adherence to your principles of military duty you apparently made yourself a party to what I am certain your mind revolted from. In that confidence and under that conviction I offer you my feeble but warm services to assist in vindicating your character from the imputations which your ungrateful country has now cast upon you, and which the cruel manner in which you were prevented from completing the great work you had begun has so much assisted in encouraging. In the peculiar situation in which you stand I do not wish those services to be accepted or any answer to be returned to this letter until you have maturely considered all the points bearing upon your case and have finally taken your determination, being convinced, without seeing it under your hand, that you do not mistake the motives which induce me to make this offer, and that you do justice to the feelings of old and continued regard with which I am, my dear Sir Arthur,

Yours very sincerely,

CHANDOS TEMPLE.

To the Marquess of Buckingham. [110.]

MY DEAR LORD, London, 14th Oct., 1808.

The enclosed letter was written to you two days ago, and was not sent on the day it was written by mistake.

I had then intended to write to Lord Temple in answer to a letter which I had received from him from Stowe, and to refer him to that which I had written to your Lordship for further particulars. I found, however, that he had passed through London to Eastbourne; and I now enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to him this day, from which you will observe that I have sent him a copy of the letter which I have written to your Lordship.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[111.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon.

My dear Gordon, London, 15th Oct., 1808.

I am about to set out for Ireland, as some time must elapse before the nature of the inquiry to be instituted on Portuguese affairs will be decided on, and I am wanted in that country. If the inquiry should be delayed till the officers shall return, I shall go to Spain immediately; if it should be commenced at an early period, I shall go to Spain as soon as I shall be dismissed; and, in either case, I should think that my stay in Ireland will be short.

I promised my brother-in-law, Captain Pakenham, of the 95th, that I would speak to you in his favour. He is anxious to get a majority, and his time is about out. He was with me in Zealand: he was wounded on the 15th August, and served in both the actions of the 17th and 21st afterwards; and he is really one of the best officers of riflemen that I have seen. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will keep his promotion in your mind.

Having said so much of his military character, it is scarcely fair to him, or to you, to mention that he is the member for the county of Westmeath, and a steady friend; but the Secretary in Ireland must take care of a claim even on this ground.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

[112.]

To Earl Temple.

My dear Lord, Holyhead, 19th Oct., 1808.

I received this morning your very kind letter of the 16th,* and I agree entirely with you that it would be most desirable that my zealous friends should cease to defend me; but it will be very difficult to prevail upon them to do so, and, indeed, I don't know how to set about the work, for I don't know who the writers are. I can safely declare that neither I, my brothers, my aides-de-camp, nor my immediate friends, have written or published one word upon the late transactions in Portugal, excepting the letter to the Secretary of State, of which I enclosed you a copy; and that letter has not been, and cannot be, published excepting by the government.

* See p. 163.

I have an insuperable objection to justify myself for the share I had in the Armistice of the 22nd of August by attacking Sir Harry Burrard for his conduct on the 20th and 21st; and, in fact, if your Lordship will consider the matter, you will see that to attack him will be no justification to me, but a bad *set off*, which can only take in the vulgar. On the 22nd of August I was to consider the state of things as they then were, not in what manner they had been brought into the situation in which they were found. If I had been capable of allowing the last-mentioned consideration to weigh with me, I might with justice be accused of having given an opinion in favour of the measure of allowing the French to withdraw in resentment of the difference of opinion on former operations which had existed between Sir Harry Burrard and me. The situation of the army then, on the 22nd of August, is and can be my only real justification; the mode in which it was brought into that situation is another question, which will very probably come under consideration when the transactions will be inquired into. But they must come out in the course of the inquiry, and cannot be alleged by me as any justification, or as the foundation of the opinion I entertained and gave.

Besides the objection I have to blaming Sir Harry Burrard by way of justification of myself, I object to it on the ground that I consider it injurious to the public service, and particularly to the officers of the army, to institute public inquiries into their conduct in instances in which they have acted fairly upon their own opinions, for which opinions they had fair military grounds. I thought, and still think, that Sir John Moore's corps ought not to have been diverted from its proposed position at Santarem, and that much advantage would have resulted from the pursuit of the enemy on the 21st. But there were fair military grounds for entertaining a different opinion upon both these points; and I acknowledge that I should be very sorry to have my own opinions and conduct taken up and scrupulously weighed and considered perhaps by prejudiced persons weeks and probably months after the occurrences which gave them birth have passed by and been forgotten. Indeed, who knows that this may not yet be my fate, and that the *imprudence and temerity* of which I am accused may not become a regular charge as the foundation of the evils which rendered the Convention necessary?

But there is another reason why Sir Harry Burrard's conduct

cannot now become the object of inquiry, and for which Ministers could not remove him from his command on account of transactions and opinions entertained and acted upon on the 20th and 21st of August. In point of fact there is not, and could not be, any official report or account of those transactions and opinions. I delivered the command to Sir Harry Burrard on the evening of the 20th on board the frigate in Maçeira Roads, and he actually exercised it by ordering me to halt on the morning of the 21st, for which day I had ordered the army to march. He likewise on the same night altered the disposition which I had proposed to him on the 8th of August for Sir John Moore's corps, which disposition Sir John Moore was at that moment in the act of carrying into execution. There was, of course, at that moment an end of my correspondence with the Secretary of State, and I doubt much whether Sir Harry Burrard ever reported what he did on that evening, which I consider to have been fatal to the campaign.

To this succeeded the morning of the 21st, and I took the command in the battle because Sir Harry was still in his ship, and because, if he had been upon the ground, he could have done nothing. He arrived upon the ground when the battle was half over, and I asked him whether I should continue the operations in the manner in which I had commenced them. He desired me to do whatever I pleased. After the enemy were repulsed entirely in both attacks, I proposed to him the pursuit with the left wing, to which he objected, and desired me to halt the pursuing troops on a neighbouring height. You will observe that I then reported to him the circumstances of the action, and he, as my commanding officer, reported them to the Secretary of State, and certainly never mentioned to him that he had stopped the pursuit of the enemy. This circumstance would probably not have been known if the discussion between Sir Harry Burrard and I on the field of battle had not been heard by above twenty officers; but it has not been, and cannot be, in any manner stated officially.

Under these circumstances government may have sufficient reasons to remove him from his command, not to trust him, and not to employ him again; but there are none for inquiry into his conduct.

I must also observe to your Lordship that my conduct is not to be, and cannot be, inquired into, excepting for transactions

prior to the evening of the 20th and during the action of the 21st. Sir Hew Dalrymple's conduct, I conclude, will be inquired into, and I shall then have an opportunity of explaining by evidence the whole of my conduct in respect to the Armistice, which is all that I have to explain.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Earl Temple to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

MY DEAR SIR ARTHUR, Eastbourne, 16th Oct., 1808.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, with its enclosures, for which I return you many thanks. It is most unfortunate for you that the mistaken though well-meant zeal of your friends has put your justification upon different grounds from those on which it really stands, as, when the facts come out upon inquiry different from those which those friends have assumed, the candid and cool-judging public will impute to you the shifting your ground, instead of seeing that your friends, in their eagerness to vindicate you, have been the cause of your real vindication resting on facts and reasoning different from those to which the public have been made parties. I cannot too earnestly advise you to lose no time in putting a stop to that system which your friends are following up in the public papers, every day's continuance of which is most mischievous to you. As I wish to consider this subject wholly and entirely as one in the discussion of which the character of one for whom I entertain the greatest value is involved, you must permit me to doubt the prudence or the fairness to yourself of abstaining from all complaint and attack against those who prevented you from following up your victory of the 21st, and who put the army on the evening of the 22nd in such a situation as made you think the negotiating with the enemy the best step that could then be taken, though I am confident you did not conceive any negotiation to be the necessary result of your victory. And this I cannot help thinking is the more necessary to attend to, in consequence of ministers having thought it right to keep in command the person who put the army in that situation, and whose conduct, therefore, they appear to approve of by so leaving him in command. You cannot both be right. Either you by the action you fought at Vimeiro put the army into this situation, or Burrard by the steps he pursued afterwards did. If Burrard, therefore, is not recalled in order that his conduct may be inquired into, and *à fortiori* if he is kept in command, he is justified thereby, and you consequently and necessarily are blamed. Such I think is the natural result of the conduct of ministers towards you, in consequence of which you will be to go to your inquiry with the first impression taken, and by authority too, against you. I am prevailed upon to say thus much, perhaps impertinently, by my anxiety to see your conduct stand as high in the public estimation as it ought; and it cannot escape you that it is the wish, the object, and the interest of some persons to ride off upon you, and, if possible, to lay upon your shoulders what they ought to bear themselves, and this they inevitably will do if you stand aloof and take no step to prevent it by vindicating your own character, even though it may be at

the expense of theirs. Such are my feelings upon this part of your case, which perhaps I have expressed with too much freedom, but certainly with sincerity.

Believe me always, my dear Sir Arthur, with real esteem and regard,

Yours very sincerely,

CHANDOS TEMPLE.

The Hon. W. W. Pole to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Admiralty, 19th Oct., 1808.

I have just seen Sir W. Scott, who has given me some information which it is necessary you should be in possession of without a moment's delay.

Sir William has seen Sir Hew Dalrymple's papers, and he informs me that Sir Hew makes no scruple of saying, be the Convention bad or be it good, it is no measure of his; that it is all Sir Arthur Wellesley's; that the whole measure was Sir Arthur's; that the Armistice was negotiated between Sir Arthur and Kellermann; that he scarcely put in a word or made any objection to anything whatever; that in this he acted according to his instructions, which were to consult Sir Arthur in everything, and to be guided by his opinion; that Sir Arthur was stated to him to have the full confidence of Ministers, and that he did in everything submit his judgment to his, and was guided by him; that the Armistice was discussed point by point between Kellermann and Sir Arthur, to whom Sir Hew had committed the whole management of the affair; and that after the paper had been settled and arranged between Kellermann and Sir Arthur, Sir Hew was going to sign it, when Kellermann set him right in point of form, and he desired Sir Arthur to sign it, which Sir Arthur did without the slightest hesitation. Sir Hew says, that considering the confidence of Ministers in Sir Arthur, the instructions he had received to consult and defer to his judgment in everything, the success Sir Arthur had had in his battle, and his experience and knowledge of the country and of the situation of both armies, he should have been unpardonable to have imposed any opinion of his own in contradiction to Sir Arthur's view of what he thought ought to be the fruit of his own victory, and therefore he let Sir Arthur have his own way entirely in the management of the Armistice, and, as I understood Sir William, of the Convention. Sir Hew told Sir William that he was ready to substantiate all he said by documents that he had the Ministers' orders to show, &c. &c., but that Sir Arthur Wellesley was an honourable man, and therefore he was sure he would not deny anything that he had stated to be correct.

This being the state of the case, and it appearing to me evident that Sir William Scott was satisfied by Sir Hew Dalrymple that he would substantiate his assertions by official documents (Sir William did not say so, but I gather so much from his manner), it will become matter of deep consideration with you whether you should not immediately return to London. I am of opinion that you ought not to lose a moment in coming back, for I have little doubt but that Sir Hew is now here, and he will certainly be as active as he can in making his impression. It is now quite clear that you and Sir Hew are at issue upon points of fact, and that he means to hold you out as responsible for everything that has passed respecting the Armistice and Convention. No person can act for you in this affair: you must

conduct your case yourself; and it is in vain to attempt to disguise from you that it will require every effort you can use, with all the assistance of all your friends, to set before the King and the public the true state of your case. Nothing can be done for you of any consequence till you are upon the spot yourself, and therefore I hope you will not delay your return. Castlereagh is at Dover: I conclude he will come to town upon hearing of Sir Hew's arrival.

Ever yours most affectionately,

W. W. Pole.

I have seen this letter, and entirely concur with William in the necessity of your immediate return to London. Sir Hew's line of conduct is so extraordinary, that it is impossible for any other person than yourself to meet it.

Ever yours most affectionately,

W.

To —— Blachford, Esq. [113.]

My dear Blachford, Dublin Castle, 20th Oct., 1808.

I received your letter of the 17th on my arrival here yesterday, and I will make application to Lord Mulgrave in favour of Captain Baker of the *Kangaroo*. I cannot, however, be certain that I shall succeed, but I will do what I can.

Let me know to whom I shall apply at Deal respecting my pipe of port, that I may pay the duties and have it sent to my house in London.

I was sorry that I did not see you when I was in town, but I hope that you are in good health. You will have read, probably with some surprise, the abuse which has been heaped upon me for transactions over which I had no control, and which would certainly never have occurred if my advice and opinion had been followed in Portugal. However, all this abuse has not deprived me of my temper or my spirits, or of the satisfaction which I feel from a consciousness that I did what was right to the best of my judgment, although not in every instance what was best for myself.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon. [114.]

My dear Gordon, Dublin Castle, 21st Oct., 1808.

I am afraid that I did not explain myself sufficiently about Captain Pakenham's wish to be promoted. His object is to purchase, which will possibly facilitate his advancement.

I agree with you in thinking that I cannot leave these countries till the mode and period of the inquiry into the late transactions in Portugal will have been determined upon. If the inquiry is to be made immediately, I can give my evidence and go: if, as I think it most probable, it cannot be made till other officers, besides myself, are in the way to be examined, I can go, and return, when they will, to attend the inquiry. This is my notion at present; but, of course, the decision must rest with those who are at the head of affairs.

I am obliged to you for your Spanish news. The Spaniards must either accelerate their operations upon the French corps now in Spain, or take up their position to oppose the French reinforcements marching into that country. If the reinforcements should catch those engaged in the operations, they will make a woeful example of them.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[115.]

To Sir John Sinclair, Bart.

SIR, Dublin Castle, 21st Oct., 1808.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your two letters, and I am much concerned that I was not at home when Lieutenant-Colonel Shrapnell did me the favour to call upon me in London. I shall have great pleasure in testifying at any time the great benefit which the army lately under my command derived from the spherical case shot in two actions with the enemy, a benefit which I am convinced will be enjoyed whenever they shall be judiciously and skilfully used.

I consider it, however, to be very desirable that this invention, and the use which the British army have made of it, should not be made public. Our enemies are not aware of the cause of the effect of our artillery, of which they have complained; and we may depend upon it that any public mention, or notice, of the benefit which we have derived from this description of shot, would induce them immediately to adopt it.

At the same time I consider Colonel Shrapnell to be entitled to a reward for his ingenuity and the science he has proved he possesses by the perfection to which he has brought this invention, and, more particularly so, because I am of opinion that the

public interests require that the advantages which we have derived from the use of the shot should not be made public, and he is thus deprived of the fame and honour which he would have enjoyed.

I am ready to give this opinion whenever it may be wished, and to assist by every means in my power to obtain a reward for Lieutenant-Colonel Shrapnell.

I have thought proper to trouble you so far on this subject, as you have expressed a great interest in it.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major-General Spencer. [116.*]

MY DEAR SPENCER, Dublin Castle, 22nd Oct., 1808.

I received your very kind letter yesterday upon my arrival here, and I am very much obliged to you for it. I had intended to write to you from London, but I was much hurried while I was there, and I found that there was no ship going to Coruña, where I think a letter is most likely to reach you.

You will have seen in the newspapers the attacks which have been made upon me, as well as upon Sir H. Dalrymple and Sir H. Burrard; and that I have my full share, at least, of the blame with which the public have received the Convention in Portugal. I never approved of but one point in that Convention, viz., the allowing the French to withdraw with their arms and baggage. This I thought expedient, viewing the relative state of the two armies on the evening of the 22nd August; that the French had their retreat open, and that we had at that time no means of preventing it; and considering that we should, in all probability, be glad, in the month of December, to give them the same terms which we had given in August: so far I approved; but I disapproved of the whole of the detail of both the Armistice and the Convention.

However, notwithstanding the calumny and abuse of which I am the object, for measures not my own, and against which I gave my opinion, I have neither lost my temper nor my spirits; and I look with pride and satisfaction at the confidence and kindness of yourself and the officers of the army, who, after all, are the best judges of my conduct, and at the affection of my

friends. The King, the Prince of Wales, and the Duke of York, received me most graciously; and I think I may defy the mob of London.

The transactions in Portugal must be inquired into; and my intention is to wait with patience for the result of the inquiry, for my justification with the public. I shall adopt no illegitimate means of setting them right, and shall neither publish anything myself, nor authorise a publication by anybody else; nor shall I, in order to raise myself in the public opinion, state circumstances respecting the difference of opinion between Sir H. Burrard and myself on the 20th and 21st August, although those circumstances led to the expediency of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal. As the truth, however, must be told upon the inquiry, it is very possible that those circumstances may come out; but they shall not be brought forward by me, unless I should be questioned upon them.

The worst of this inquiry is, that I fear it may keep me for some time from the army. I must wait until it is decided in England what course shall be taken in respect to Sir H. Dalrymple. If his conduct is to be inquired into immediately, I shall go over and give my evidence, and then join the army, and shall possibly see you before much time will elapse. If it should not be inquired into till more officers than me are in the way to be examined, I shall then join the army also immediately. In short, in either case I hope to see you soon; and I have come over here only to arrange the business of my office till Sir Hew shall arrive, and the mode and period of the inquiry shall be settled. I enclose you a letter which I have received from Mrs. ——. I wish that I could have done something more substantial for her.

Pray remember me kindly to Hill, and all friends with the army.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

P.S. I conclude that Nightingall is on his way home. Ferguson is better, and is gone to Scotland, but will soon be back, and will join the army. I shall be much obliged to you to desire somebody to buy two or three mules for me, and leave them for me at Coruña. The American Consul, Dos Santos, will take care of them for me.

To John Wilson Croker, Esq. [117.]

My dear Sir, Dublin Castle, 23rd Oct., 1808.

I have just received your letter of the 17th instant, and I am very much obliged to you for the kindness towards me which dictated it.

I acknowledge that I have not read even one, much less all, the calumnies which have been circulated against me during my absence in Portugal; but, upon a full consideration of the case, I have determined that I will not publish myself, or authorise by others the publication of anything in my defence. The late transactions in Portugal must be inquired into; and the result of that inquiry will show what share I had in them, and how far I deserve what has been said against me.

I am, however, as much obliged to *you* for your kind offer of assistance as if I had accepted your services.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

P.S. I wish that you would call upon me at the Castle about two o'clock, as I want to speak to you.

To ———. [118.]

Dublin Castle, 25th Oct., 1808.

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 23rd inst. I am highly flattered by your favourable opinion, and much obliged by your intention to enlighten the public mind in respect to the late transactions in Portugal. But as I have determined that I will neither publish, nor authorise the publication of, anything upon that subject, I must decline to answer the queries which your letter contains relating to it.

I have, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

To the Right Hon. ——. [119.]

Dublin Castle, 25th Oct., 1808.

I have received your letter of the 24th instant, and I should be very happy to have an opportunity of forwarding your views

for the promotion of your step-son, Mr. ——, and I will accordingly make application for his promotion to the Commander in Chief. I must inform you, however, that an officer is rarely, if ever, promoted from an Ensigncy to a Lieutenancy in a regiment to which he does not belong; and this injustice to Ensigns in the regiment to which it may be desired to promote him is never done when such regiment is employed on active service. I must also inform you that the promotion of Mr. —— to a Lieutenancy in a regiment now employed in Portugal or Spain would not, of course, place him in either of those countries, as each of these regiments has a 2nd battalion, now in England or Ireland, and he would be in the first instance the junior Lieutenant of the 2nd battalion. Under these circumstances the application which I shall make for Mr. ——'s promotion will probably not be successful; and if successful, will not accomplish the object which you have in view in making it; but still I shall make it to His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, in order to show my respect for you, and my desire to gratify you.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

The Hon. W. W. Pole to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

My dear Arthur, Admiralty, 27th Oct., 1808.

I feel so very much alarmed at the idea of your not doing yourself justice in the inquiry which is about to take place, that I cannot forbear to send you some ideas that occur to me for your consideration.

I am most strongly impressed with the notion that the mode of establishing the court that is to enter into the investigation of Sir Hew Dalrymple's conduct, and the orders and instructions issued for its guidance, will in a great measure determine the chance you will have of setting yourself right in the public opinion, and of doing justice to your own cause; and I own I am most apprehensive that such measures may be taken in your absence as to preclude you from making any statement, or entering into any examination of witnesses, that may enable you to claim the fair merits due to you for your services in Portugal. I cannot but think that excluding you from all inquiry on the plea of your not being responsible for anything that passed after the close of the battle of Vimeiro would be a fatal blow to your character with the public as a statesman, and in some degree as an officer; and I believe I speak the language of everybody who admires you, or wishes you well, when I say that a thorough investigation of your conduct, from the day you landed in Portugal to the day you left it, is indispensable for your reputation.

The difficulty there will be in your obtaining this, unless you come here

directly, I think will be insurmountable. There are, as it strikes me, in this case many parties:

1. Sir Hew Dalrymple, whose object must be to take up the inquiry from the time he assumed the command, and to commence it by a mere dry statement of the military positions, state, and force of the two armies at that moment, as if he and the armies had just dropped from the skies. It will not be his interest to examine how the armies were brought into the situations in which he found them; but it will be his interest to show that you concurred with him in thinking that, under existing circumstances, the Armistice and the Convention were desirable and proper.

2. Sir Harry Burrard, who will not be displeased if the inquiry is taken up from the moment of Sir Hew's arrival, because if it is, he cannot be implicated at all; neither generals, army, nor public having accused him of taking any part in the negotiation.

3. Lord Castlereagh, whose interest I believe it to be to narrow the inquiry to the proceedings from the arrival of Sir Hew Dalrymple; because by so doing he will in a great degree, if not wholly, keep out of sight the equipment, arrangement, sailing, delays, want of cavalry, &c. &c., of your expedition; the management and disputes respecting the sailing and command of Sir John Moore; the appointment of Sir Harry Burrard to supersede him, and the placing Sir Hew at the head of the army, with the views and circumstances of that appointment; all these and many more unpleasant topics which might be enumerated would be avoided by taking up the inquiry from the period of Sir Hew's assumption of the command; and, indeed, if Sir Hew should make out a case to justify the Convention, Castlereagh would be relieved from almost all his embarrassments, and the public would be left completely in the dark as to the degree of merit or blame attached to the conductors of the army previous to the Armistice, or to the ministers in the election of their commanders, or pushing forward their reinforcements. If the inquiry were to embrace the whole campaign, it is obvious that many statements must be recorded that would tend to fix responsibility and perhaps blame on the War Minister, insomuch that a prudent man would certainly be for a narrow inquiry in preference to one which should enable the court to sift the whole transaction to the bottom.

4. Head-quarters. So many reasons combine to bias the wishes of head-quarters on this subject, that one does not know to which one ought to give a preference. The desire that there has been manifested for active command will render it natural for all that has passed to be seen through a false medium. To encourage the idea that there is blame, I think most natural; but it is equally natural to wish to have it understood that the fault lay in the appointment originally of a very young officer; and the suppression of any opportunity of exhibiting the meritorious conduct of that officer, and of recording the opinions entertained of him by the generals and officers of rank who served under him during the campaign, will not be neglected, if it can be done by a manœuvre which may mask the intention under any plausible plea of investigating the conduct of those *only* who are responsible. The object of head-quarters, if it has any object at all, must be much more to keep down the officer for whom the army has the greatest enthusiasm, and to prevent him from being called by the voice of the nation to the head of the forces upon active service, than to crush

old officers of known incapacity or want of following, who never can be competitors; and, therefore, in my mind there can be no doubt but that, merely upon this one principle, head-quarters must be for an inquiry commencing with the arrival of Sir Hew Dalrymple in the camp. But there are other and most weighty reasons that will operate to strengthen this desire on the part of head-quarters. Dalrymple is a Guardsman, Burrard is a Guardsman, Clinton is a Guardsman; the connections of all these are closely united to Windsor and Whitehall, and have for years not only been in the most confidential situations about head-quarters, but have either imbibed all their military notions from thence, or influenced the military system there, so that their ideas of service are certainly framed upon similar principles to those of the Horse Guards. All these are to me powerful reasons for supposing that a narrow inquiry is the one most acceptable at the Horse Guards.

5. The fifth party, viz. yourself, must on every account be desirous of the most comprehensive and open inquiry, and one commencing at least as far back as your landing in Portugal. The reasons for this are too obvious to need much detail. It is only necessary to show the state of the public mind respecting you, and then the propriety of your seeking this inquiry I conceive will be self-evident.

From a variety of causes, which it is unnecessary to enumerate, the public are brought at length to look upon you as responsible for everything that passed in the army in Portugal after your command and consequently your power had entirely ceased, and you are considered as the cause of all that passed after you were superseded. So unjustly and so whimsically has this sentiment been instilled into the public mind, that it is a fact (strange and almost incredible) that while you are thought responsible for acts performed when you had neither power, nor responsibility, nor command, you are not given any credit for anything you achieved while you had power, command, and responsibility. We have entirely lost sight of your campaign and your two battles, and we hear of nothing but the share you took in the Armistice and Convention, and the responsibility attached to you for those measures. Incredible as it may seem, it is a fact, that the public mind is brought to this feeling; and what would have shocked any person, from its injustice and absurdity, at first, is now by habit rendered so familiar, that it is received as a matter of course, and nobody hesitates or ventures to deliberate about it. I can compare this transition to nothing but what we have heard of vice: at first it startles, but it soon becomes familiar; and the same person who when he is first corrupted shrinks with horror at the idea of a trivial crime, soon commits a murder without much remorse. From this state of delusion nothing can recover the public mind but your having an opportunity of recording all your conduct in your campaign, as well as in the Armistice and Convention; and nothing can enable you to do this but the inquiry being open, and extended as far back as possible. Unless the public mind is restored to health, you never can recover your place in the public estimation; and to restore the public mind I am sure it is necessary for you to take the pains of having your conduct placed fairly before the public.

6. The army you commanded is another party to this inquiry, and it calls aloud, at least through all the officers I have seen or heard of, for

the most full and the most extended inquiry in point of time and circumstances. Nothing will satisfy your army but your going into your whole case, and placing your conduct in the fair point of view it deserves; and be assured they will grieve sorely if you do not insist upon so doing. They feel their own honour and glory implicated in yours, and I believe there is the greatest anxiety amongst them.

7. The nation at large may be considered as the last great party interested in this affair; and, inasmuch as they wish you well, in so much do they desire that you should step forward and develop the whole mystery of the whole proceeding. This in my conscience I believe to be religiously true; and I never was more convinced of anything in my life than I am that you never can stand as high in the public estimation as you deserve unless you insist upon a full inquiry into every particular of your command, as well as of the Armistice and Convention.

If I am at all correct in the view I have taken of the parties interested in the inquiry (by the by I have confined myself to England, though a great deal ought to have been said of the feelings of Europe on the subject), it must be obvious that an inquiry extended as to time and circumstances is for you most desirable; and I own what I fear is, that by your not being here when the court of inquiry is ordered to assemble, and receives its instructions, those interested in narrowing its objects may contrive so to constitute it, and to frame the limitations by which it is to be guided in its proceedings, as to render it impossible for you, when you do come, to go into your case, or to bring before the public the material parts of your conduct. Suppose, for example, that the court is a court of inquiry, "to inquire into the conduct of Sir Hew Dalrymple from his taking the command of the army in Portugal, or from the arrival of General Kellermann at the British army to the ratifying the Convention, &c.; the said General being responsible from the time he took the command, and being recalled to account for his conduct." The court assemble, Sir Hew proceeds to show the exact situation of the two armies at the time of his arrival, &c. He calls Sir A. Wellesley to state it; Sir Arthur proceeds. After stating the situation of each army, their positions, &c., on the 22nd of August in the evening, he proceeds, by desire of Sir Hew, to show the power the French had of retaining Lisbon, retreating to Elvas, &c. He proves Sir Hew's case as to the necessity of a convention. He states his opinion that for these reasons he thought the French ought to be permitted to retire from Portugal with arms, ammunition, and baggage; and that they should be sent in British transports, &c. Sir Hew stops. Sir Arthur desires to state how the armies came into the situation in which Sir Hew found them. He wishes to go into some account of the difference of his opinions on the 21st and 22nd of August. "Hold!" says the President of the court: "We are not inquiring into the merits of the battle of Vimeiro; we are not met to try Sir Arthur Wellesley for his conduct while he held the command; we are a court of inquiry to investigate Sir Hew Dalrymple's conduct from 22nd August, 3 P.M., to the 30th of the same month; we have nothing to do with Vimeiro or Sir Harry Burrard; *Sir Arthur*, you *must not proceed!*" "No!" echoes Sir Hew; "all that passed before I arrived is nothing to me. I have shown the position of the armies when I took the command, and the opinion of Sir Arthur Wellesley that a con-

vention was then necessary, &c. I have *no more to say to him.*" Thus, then, might you be recorded as approving of the main principle of the Convention, and yet not be permitted to enter into a single reason to exculpate yourself from having brought the army into the relative state with the enemy in which Sir Hew found them, and the whole inquiry might go off without your being able to bring forward one single circumstance relating to your conduct in the command of the army. So far am I from thinking that what I have stated is overstrained or exaggerated, that I am strongly persuaded it will be the very course which will be pursued if you do not come over till you are sent for; and if it should, I see not how you are to be set right in the eyes of the public, or put into the station to which your conduct has entitled you.

Were you here, you might with perfect fairness insist upon knowing precisely the mode in which it was intended the court of inquiry should proceed, and you would be able to take such measures as must ensure your having a fair opportunity of vindicating yourself; but, unless you come, what is it possible for your friends to do? How can I, for example, say one word to Lord Castlereagh on the subject? I do not know that he will open very much to me; he seemed a little shy when I last saw him; but if he does, what am I to say? You are against any inquiry into your conduct. I think that nothing but inquiry can be beneficial to you. I can only be silent; and yet never was my opinion so fixed upon any subject, and never were opinions so unanimous as those of your friends. I saw General Nightingall to-day; he said he would write to you to-night. He agrees with me that you ought to be here, and not to lose a moment. All agree that Sir Hew is most artful and assiduous, and that he is favoured at head-quarters. I own I am most uneasy at your absence; I cannot but fear that it will be productive of the worst consequences.

I send you a copy of Sir Robert Calder's letter to the Admiralty, on which Sir Robert was brought to a court-martial: you will see, by my note upon it, that old Barham tricked Sir Robert, took him at his word, and tried him merely for the proceedings subsequent to the action, by which Sir Robert was precluded from going into his case, and suffered accordingly.

Ever yours affectionately,

W. W. Pole.

The Hon. W. W. Pole to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

My dear Arthur, Admiralty, 28th Oct., 1808, 8 P.M.

Since I sent away my letter I have seen Castlereagh, who called upon me and showed me two drafts, of which I now enclose you copies. He has allowed me to send you the copies in confidence. I hope and believe that you will find the papers I send quite satisfactory, for I conceive that the instructions to the Duke of York must ensure such a court of inquiry as will enable you to make a full and clear statement of all your proceedings from first to last; and that you know, in my view of your case, must be satisfactory. Castlereagh conducted himself when he was with me this evening in such a manner as to make me lament that I had sent away my

letter, for he cleared away all my doubts about the wish of the government not to have the fullest inquiry, or to enable you to go into the whole of your case; and he also convinced me that his most anxious desire was that you should have an opportunity to place your conduct in the most conspicuous point of view, and that full justice should be done to you without regard to any of the consequences that may thereby fall on him, the government, or either of the Generals. It is the intention, as I think you will see by the copies of the drafts I send, that the inquiry should embrace the whole of the proceedings from the moment you sailed till the conclusion of the Convention, and every opportunity is given of bringing forward anything that you or any other person concerned may wish to elucidate respecting any part of the business of the campaign; and Castlereagh desired me particularly to say to you that he begs of you to arrange for entering into every particular of your proceedings, and the fullest account of all your motions, actions, &c. &c., so as to place your own merits most prominently forward, and not upon any account to consider his character or that of the government in anything you may have to state. He is most anxious that you should rise triumphant and that your fame should be increased by the inquiry; and he looks upon his own part in the appointments and the part his colleagues may have had in your equipment as quite secondary considerations, and what he implores you not to allow to enter into your thoughts when you frame the mode of proceeding best adapted to do you justice. Castlereagh's whole conduct to me quite charmed me, and made me feel that I had done him great injustice in the arguments I used in my letter to you of this day respecting the part he might wish to take in the inquiry. Castlereagh desired me to tell you he thought you ought not to lose a moment in coming over: in this he only speaks the language of all your friends. He has seen Tucker, whose evidence he says will be for you most material: Cooke has also got Major Way in *Cotton* for you. I understand Way's account of the state of Lisbon on the 22nd is most interesting. Junot's cot was brought on board the *Vasco de Gama* on that night, and all was consternation after the battle of the 21st. I understand from Castlereagh that the Duke of York means the Court should meet on Monday se'nnight, and that you are to be written to by His Royal Highness to-night. Burrard is sent to; but the Court, it seems, may assemble before he comes, as they will have plenty of work, and he will certainly be in time. Depend upon it you have not a moment to lose, and I hope you will no longer delay your departure. Castlereagh desired me to say that he should not write to you, as he depended upon me to inform you of what was passing. He spoke very much to me about your affairs. He said he had mentioned to the Duke of Portland his desire, according to your wishes, to apply for the ribbon for Spencer, and the medals, and also to go as far as precedent would warrant respecting the other Generals. The Duke observed that it would perhaps be an awkward thing to the King and unpleasant to the officers to have anything said or done till the inquiry was over. Castlereagh said he conceived this to be so, but he would do as you desired, and he requested me to find out your determination. I told him I would; but I added (what is strictly true) that I had already found out from Nightingall that the Generals and the army would be very much vexed and dissatisfied if any honours were given to the Generals without any mark of

distinction being conferred on you, and therefore that they would be best pleased to have the whole deferred. I am sure this is the best mode of proceeding, and I hope you will approve of it; but it is not necessary to decide till you arrive, which I think you now must do in a very few days.

Ever yours most affectionately,

W. W. Pole.

To Major Barclay.

My dear Barclay, Dublin Castle, 28th Oct., 1808.

I have received your letter of the 25th February, and my Mahratta prize money, and my bazaar money to the period of my departure, for which I return you my thanks. I rejoice to find that you are employed by Sir G. Barlow, and I have no doubt but that you will make yourself useful to him.

You will have heard that I commanded the army in Portugal for some time, and I was equally, if not more fortunate against the French than I was against the Mahrattas. I never saw such desperate fighting as we had on the 17th August, or troops receive such a beating as the French did on the 21st; and it is unfortunate that I was not allowed to carry my own measures into execution after the action of that day. If I had, we should have destroyed them entirely. As usual, I had an unanimous army, who would have undertaken any thing for me; and I took care that the troops should be well provided with every thing they wanted.

You will also have seen that the public are not satisfied with the result of the transactions in Portugal; and I think they have attributed to me more than my share of the blame for them. When the action of the 21st August was not followed up, when the principle of all my measures was altered, and the corps which I had proposed should cut the French off from their strongholds south of the Tagus was diverted from its destination, it was very clear to me that we should never get the French out of Portugal excepting by an agreement; and that we should be very glad to make an agreement with them in December, after we should have lost half our army, if we had refused to make it in August. You will see my reasoning upon this subject detailed more fully in a letter to the Secretary of State, of which I enclose a copy. So far I agreed with the arrangements of that period. As to every thing else, I objected to it not in the form of protest, as is stated by my zealous defenders in the newspapers, but in reason-

ing with the Commander in Chief; and I signed the Armistice, not because he ordered me, for I certainly might have declined it, but because he desired me, and I did not choose, and did not think it proper for me, to set myself up as the head of a party against him on the day of his arrival.

I have no objection to your showing the enclosed to any friend of mine in the East Indies, for I consider that all my friends have a right to an explanation of the reasons which induced me to sign my name to the Armistice; but it must not be printed on any account, and no copy must be taken of it, as I am determined that I will not publish, or authorise the publication by others, of a single line upon this subject.

Pray remember me most kindly to all my friends. I don't write by this opportunity to Malcolm, because I think it possible that he may be in Persia, and my letter might fall into hands which ought not to possess it. But I beg you to show him this letter, if he should be in India; and tell him that his brother Pulteney was our Commodore on the expedition to Portugal, that I lived with him in the *Donegal* for some time, and that he is in great style. His ship appears to have been made head-quarters by most of the Generals who came successively from England after I had marched. If Malcolm should be in Persia, and you should think the communication with him secure, write him the purport of this letter and of the enclosed.

I received a letter from Colonel Close while I was in Portugal; and I will write to him as soon as I can get a moment's leisure. In the mean time I beg you to communicate to him and to Wilks the enclosed letter, and this if you like it.

Present my best respects to Sir G. Barlow.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Dublin Castle, 9th Jan., 1809.

P.S. I have had no opportunity of sending this letter till now.

You will have seen that I have been in London since I wrote it, to attend the Court of Inquiry, of which you will see the ridiculous report in the newspapers. I enclose a printed copy of the narratives and statements which I put on the minutes of the Court; which you may show as well as this letter to my friends.

[121.*] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon.*

My dear Gordon, Dublin Castle, 29th Oct., 1808.

I enclose a letter to me, and a memorial to His Royal Highness, which I have received from Major Travers, of the 95th regiment; and I can assure you with great truth that no troops could behave better on all occasions than those of the detachment of the 95th regiment; and there was no officer of his rank with whom I had more reason to be satisfied than Major Travers, during the period that I commanded the army. From the nature of the country, and the description of troops, such as the 95th are, they were probably more exposed and more frequently engaged than the others; and as I have had many opportunities of testifying, they always conducted themselves well.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

[122.*] *To James Donald, Esq.*

Dear Sir, Dublin Castle, 29th Oct., 1808.

I have received your letters of the 20th instant, the one relating to the second division of the Mahratta prize money, the other to a claim of your own to share as a Captain.

In answer to the first, I have to inform you that I have reason to believe that the second division of the Mahratta prize-money has been made, and I conclude we shall all hear of it in a more substantial way at no very distant period. It appears to me that the general orders by Lieutenant-General M'Donald have provided in a satisfactory manner that their prize-money should be sent to the 19th Dragoons and 74th and 94th regiments.

Upon the other point in your letter of the 20th, viz., your claim to share as a Captain, I wish that it had been brought forward at an earlier period, when it would have been in my power to consider of and decide upon it. When I left India the decision upon all points of claims which, under the orders of government and according to the custom of the service, had been referred to me, was referred to a committee, consisting of Colonel Wallace, Major Barclay, and * ; and I should be

* Blank in manuscript.

obliged to refer your claim to their consideration if it were now possible to give effect to any decision which might be passed upon it. But I apprehend that, as the second division has been made, there are no funds remaining, and you could derive no benefit from any decision that might be passed upon your claim.

When you wrote to me on the subject of Mr. Leatt's prize-money, my attention was much occupied by other subjects, and I was not able to answer you; and I don't know what I have done with your letter, nor have I any recollection of the particular points of the case. I rather believe that I sent your letter to India; but if you and Mr. Leatt should be of opinion that you will derive any benefit from a consideration and a decision on your claims at present, I beg you to send me a letter from each of you containing the grounds of the claim of each, which I will forward to the East Indies, with my opinion upon each, if you should be desirous that the committee should have my opinion.

I am concerned that you feel the bad effects of the wound you received in the battle of Argaum. You do me great injustice if you suppose that I have not a lively recollection of the different events in which we were concerned, and the circumstances of those days.

I beg you to present my best compliments to Colonel Campbell and the officers of the 94th regiment, and that you will

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major-General Spencer. [123.]

MY DEAR SPENCER, Dublin Castle, 30th Oct., 1808.

Since I wrote to you on the 22nd I have received your letter of the 9th, in which you announce your intention to return to England. It will give me the greatest satisfaction to meet you there; but we must both join the army again, you as soon as your health will allow you, and I as soon as the state of the inquiry into Sir Hew's conduct will permit me.

I find that Sir Hew founds his justification on the fact that he was desired by the ministers to attend to my advice, and on what is not fact, that he followed my advice in everything. I can show not only that he did not follow my advice, but that

he adopted measures, when recommended by others, which he refused to adopt when recommended by me.

You will recollect that I always thought that he would treat my signature as a proof of my opinion and approbation; and little thinking that my opinion would be such a broken reed, I imagined that it, and the relief from the French army to be embarked, would serve him. But Sir Hew, by his management, has contrived to throw so large a share of the odium upon me, and has opened the eyes of the public so little to the real causes which rendered the evacuation of Portugal by the French a measure of expediency, that I fear it will be most difficult to reconcile them to it.

However, as I told you in my last letter, my temper and spirits cannot be affected by anything that may be said or done.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major-Gen. Spencer to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

DEAR SIR ARTHUR, Camp near Lisbon, 9th Oct., 1808.

Since I did myself the pleasure of writing to you last I have determined to return to England on leave of absence, finding my health would not admit of the intended march into Spain. I expect to leave this in the course of four or five days, and hope in a short time to meet you in London. It will give me no little pleasure to have an opportunity of bearing testimony to the talents and noble conduct you have displayed throughout our campaign in this country, and I sincerely hope, and indeed have not the smallest doubt, of your completely silencing the contemptible and insignificant illiberality.

I need not add how extremely anxious I feel to get to England as soon as possible, not only on account of my health, but to be in the way in case of an investigation taking place relative to the latest operations of your army, and the moment I shall have arranged my passage I shall quit Lisbon.

I remain, dear Sir Arthur, with great esteem,

Your obliged very faithfully and sincerely

B. SPENCER.

Major Travers, of the 95th, has begged me to transmit you the enclosed memorial.

[124.] *To Lieutenant-General ——.*

Dublin Castle, 30th Oct., 1808.

Your letter of the 26th August was sent to Portugal, and did not arrive there till after I had quitted that country, and I

only received it two days ago. I should not have recommended you in any case to serve with the Portuguese troops, because their conduct was not likely to do you credit; and I doubt the expediency of your serving with the Spaniards, for, to tell you the truth, I don't give credit to the histories we see in the papers of their successes. The public opinion and hope must be kept up in Spain, as in other countries, by success; and it is a venial offence to conceal disasters and exaggerate successes, of which I know the Spanish provincial governments are guilty. Our foolish editors of newspapers copy from the Spanish newspapers all they see, and the gulls of England believe all that the English newspapers tell them.

In point of fact the Spaniards have had no great success excepting against Dupont, and in the defence of Zaragoza. From the manner in which the story of the first was told, and supported by evidence, and comparing that with the histories of other successes, I am convinced that, if there is any foundation for them, it is but very small; and that the corps of French troops said to have been cut off in Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia, and Estremadura were at most straggling battalions, or probably even individuals. With regard to the last, I believe that the Spaniards have a good intrenched position at Zaragoza, which the citizens have defended manfully; but on the other hand, the French have never been able to attack it with heavy cannon.

Under these circumstances, and adverting to the temper of the public, I should doubt the expediency of your serving with the Spaniards. They must meet with severe reverses; and with their usual liberality, the good people of England will be disposed to attribute to an English general the reverses of their friends the Spaniards, which they do not at present expect, and will not believe can happen under any other circumstances whatever. I therefore recommend to you not to go to the Spaniards at present; but if you should still wish it, I'll bear your wishes in mind, and try what I can do for you when I shall return to the army, which I hope will be in a short time.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

[125.] *To Admiral Whitshed.*

My dear Whitshed, Dublin Castle, 31st Oct., 1808.

I am very much obliged to you for your kind letter of the 29th, which I have just received. I think that if I had been allowed to bring the operations in Portugal to a conclusion, the public would not have been so much displeased with them as they appear to be with the late transactions in that country. However, that is a misfortune to be lamented, and cannot now be avoided; but I hope it will be a lesson to our ministers, in future, not to incur the risk of altering the principle on which an operation is conducted in the middle of it. Pray make my best respects to Mrs. Whitshed.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

[126.] *To Brigadier-General Nightingall.*

My dear Nightingall, Dublin Castle, 31st Oct., 1808.

Hearing that you are in England, I write a few lines to ask you how you are, and what your plans are, and to make you acquainted with mine.

You see what a scrape I am in, but you must be with me to know how little I care about it. I believe that the kindness of the officers stands me in the stead of popular favour and reputation.

I must attend the inquiry upon Sir Hew Dalrymple. If that should take place at an early period, I shall not join the army till after I shall have been examined; if it should not take place till other officers will be in the way to be examined, I shall join the army almost immediately.

I hear from Spencer that he is coming home, and I shall certainly see him in England. I enclose you two letters from him, which I beg you to deliver to him upon his arrival, or if you should go aboard before he will arrive, leave them in the hands of somebody who will certainly deliver them to him.

(Confidential.)

The Ministers intend to give him the red ribbon and a pension; and I have requested them to give the red ribbon to

Hill and to Ferguson. I cannot say whether I have succeeded in this last; but I hope I may. Besides this, the officers of the army are to have medals in the same manner as for Maida: at least this is what I have asked for, and I believe will be done.

They wanted to delay these arrangements till I should be cleared by the result of an inquiry into Sir Hew's conduct; but I have told them that none of you have been guilty of acts of indiscretion or crime which should subject you to punishment, and that there is no reason for delay. Besides that, to tell you the truth, however well satisfied I may be with my own motives, or my friends may be, I doubt very much whether the world will be inclined to judge favourably of them; and in these days we are governed by the newspapers. Pray let me hear from you, and

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

I enclose the letters to Spencer open that you may peruse them, and I beg you to seal them.

To the Duke of Portland. [127.]

MY LORD DUKE, Dublin Castle, 1st Nov., 1808.

I have the honour to enclose a letter which has been transmitted to me for your Grace from Captain Baker, of His Majesty's ship *Kangaroo*. In forwarding this letter to your Grace, I cannot avoid mentioning to you that Captain Baker waited upon the coast of Portugal for some days for my despatches, with great politeness to me; that I believe it is usual to give promotion to an officer who brings home despatches upon important events, such as those to which the despatches in question referred; and that I have recommended Captain Baker in consequence.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To ———. [128.]

Dublin Castle, 3rd Nov., 1808.

I have received your letter of the 28th October, and I am very sensible of your kindness towards me; but I have determined

that I will not publish, and I will not authorise the publication of a single word on the subject to which you refer. The inquiry which must be made into the late transactions in Portugal must show the public that they have done me great injustice.

I am happy to hear of your hopes of the amendment of the state of the county of Kerry. With every desire on the part of the Lord-Lieutenant to appoint you to a situation which you will like better than that which you now fill, I apprehend that it will be found most difficult to appoint you to one, of which the duties will not take up a great part of your time. The office which you now hold allows of your residence in the county of Kerry, which is a great benefit to the public, and I should think must be a convenience to you.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Downing Street, 4th Nov., 1808.

I am much obliged to you for your letter from Holyhead, which I shall not reply to, as we shall meet so soon.

Pole undertook to apprise you of the measures in progress for assembling the Court of Inquiry. It is to meet on Monday se'nnight, and as you will probably be early called on, I conclude you will soon come over. Until the Court meets, no person can be summoned regularly as an evidence; but I shall suggest to Gordon the expediency, in order to save time, of desiring all the officers now at home, who are likely to be called on, to be in the way of attending the Court on its meeting.

The cavalry have had a fine wind for Coruña. Moore's last regiment was to be on the frontier of Spain on the 29th. He brings 23,745 rank and file with him. Baird has 14,561, exclusive of the four regiments of cavalry under orders.

Buonaparte left Paris on the 30th for Spain, so we shall see what he can do without delay. The Spanish armies certainly meant to try their strength with the enemy in Biscay and Navarre about the 20th of last month: if they cannot strike a blow before the French reinforcements arrive, they must fall back, I should suppose, from the Ebro, and act on the defensive.

Ever yours, my dear Wellesley, most sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

To Viscount Castlereagh. [129.]

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH, London, 14th Nov., 1808.

After I saw you on Saturday I spoke to Colonel Gordon, and he agreed entirely in opinion with me, that it was expedient to recommend General Spencer to the King, at an early period, for some mark of His Majesty's favour; but he promised to speak to the Duke of York upon the subject.

I have always been of opinion that I should not be able to convince the public of the goodness of my motives for signing the Armistice; and the late discussions in Middlesex and elsewhere, and the paragraphs in the newspapers, which, after all, rule every thing in this country, tend to convince me that it is determined that I shall not have the benefit of an acquittal; and that the news-writers and the orators of the day are determined to listen to nothing in my justification. I am therefore quite certain that the government will not be able to recommend me for any mark of the King's favour, to which they might otherwise think me entitled. If this turns out to be true, the ministers will be obliged to recommend that a mark of the King's favour should be conferred on General Spencer, and not on me, although both were employed on the same service, and this after an inquiry will have been held in which my conduct will have been investigated. They will be obliged to adopt this line, notwithstanding that I hope they will be convinced of the propriety of my conduct, and the goodness of my motives in every instance; or they must determine not to confer upon General Spencer those marks of the King's favour which his services undoubtedly merit.

I have no doubt of the alternative which the ministers will be inclined to adopt. I am convinced that Spencer himself will urge them not to think of him, if the King's favour cannot be extended to me, and thus he will lose what he so well deserves. I am convinced that this will be the result of any further delay.

I wish, therefore, that you would immediately recommend Spencer for what you think he ought to have. There can be no doubt of his merit on every ground; and nobody can with reason complain that an injustice is done to me, because even my most sanguine friends cannot think that I am in a situation to receive any mark of His Majesty's favour.

I wish you would turn this subject over in your mind, and you

will discover that great difficulties will be avoided by adopting immediately the measure which I most earnestly recommend.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P.S. It is said that Spencer would not like to accept any mark of the King's favour at present; but I am convinced that I shall be able to prevail with him.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Stanmore, 18th Nov., 1808.

I did not neglect to confer with the Duke of Portland relative to Spencer's Red Riband. He feels the same reluctance to move in it I did; but in compliance with your wishes, so strongly and repeatedly expressed, he has promised to speak to the King upon it on Wednesday next.

Ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Vicsount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Downing Street, Thursday.

The Duke of Portland spoke to the King yesterday on the subject of Spencer's Red Riband. His Majesty expressed himself very graciously towards that officer, but did not think it advisable that any step should be taken relating to the late operations in Portugal pending the inquiry.

I fear Blake has been roughly handled. The enemy are stated to have pushed a corps to Valladolid.

Ever yours most sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

[130.] *To the Duke of Richmond.*

MY DEAR DUKE, London, 23rd Nov., 1808.

The Court of Inquiry are going on as well as I could wish. I made my statement respecting the Armistice and the Convention yesterday; and I was obliged to go further into the subject than I intended, owing to the attacks which Sir Hew Dalrymple had made upon me, not only on the opening of the Court, but in his narrative of his proceedings. The consequence is that he can't escape censure.

If he had done what a gentleman ought to have done, and

what he has done before the Court of Inquiry, namely, relieved me from the responsibility of negotiating the Armistice in his answer to the letter of the Secretary of State by which my letter of the 6th October was communicated to him; and if he had not attacked me when he first addressed the Court of Inquiry, and in his narrative, I should have defended for him the measure of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal, and should not have said one word about the details of the Convention. I only hope that Burrard will be a little more fair, or a little more candid, than Sir Hew has been.

You see that the papers have already changed their tone about the evacuation; and, excepting personal abuse of me, and misrepresentation of what I have said, they do what one could wish.

I will send you copies of my narrative of my own proceedings, and of my statement on the negotiations in reply to Sir Hew Dalrymple.

Ever, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Downing Street, 6th Dec., 1808.

I may venture to communicate to you in confidence that it has been decided to give the army and navy employed at Copenhagen nine-tenths of all the booty, instead of three-fourths, as at first intended. I hope those interested will feel that nothing but a wish to save the principle of not granting the whole in a case of droits has prevented the King's government from advising His Majesty in this case to confer every part of the spoil upon those who so well earned it.

Ever, my dear Wellesley, yours most sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

The Dep. Commissary-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Bath, 11th Dec., 1808.

On the 12th of last month I had the honour of transmitting to you from Lisbon one set of my cash and provision accounts regularly attested, for the period of my responsibility whilst in the direction of the Commissariat department attached to the army under your command.

Whenever you may have been pleased to examine and approve these statements, although not complete for the reasons therein adduced, I shall

be thankful if you will do me the honour of forwarding them to me. With those papers there is also an account for bullocks supplied under the direction of the Bishop of Oporto, and of ninety-eight mares for the cavalry from the same place.

The service now ended, in which I had the direction and responsibility of the Commissariat department, I trust to be excused for submitting myself a candidate for your approbation. Those testimonials have heretofore been furnished me when exertions and zeal, so fortunate in the event, were not called forth in so extraordinary a degree, and where an army experienced such few wants in the most difficult situation in which a British force ever acted, in a rapid march, daily in sight of the enemy.

I am aware the difficulties of the Commissariat department can only be known and felt to their full extent by the head of that department, and the more so as in this instance, however in others rarely and not necessarily the case, personal exertions were put in practice to promote the efficiency of the whole.

I shall further take the liberty of observing that after the arrival of Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple, whilst the contractors were supplying the main body of the army, without any aid from them the force under your command was supplied by me from the 30th of August with fresh meat, wine, and forage, to the 18th of September, when you quitted the command, without any want remaining unsatisfied.

These circumstances cannot, I hope, detract from the professional character which it has been my pride to uphold for the many years during which I have enjoyed the confidence of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury.

I have the honour to remain, Sir,
Your most obedient and most humble servant,

JAMES PIPON,
Deputy Commissary-General.

Acknowledge the receipt of his letter, and tell him that I shall examine his papers as soon as I shall receive them. Inform him that he is aware that I did think I had reason to be dissatisfied, not with his want of zeal, but his want of experience and ability to conduct the great concerns which he had undertaken. That this dissatisfaction was perfectly well known to the army, and that therefore any certificate of the kind he requires would do him no good, and would be highly injurious to me. Assure him that I was perfectly sensible of his zeal, of his honour, and of his integrity; but that the situation which he filled required other qualities which I could not say with truth that he possessed; and that I shall be happy to have any opportunity of being of use to him.

A. W.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Stanmore, 20th Dec., 1808.

I understand from Sir Rupert George, Abercromby will not consider himself at liberty to serve unless a consent is signified in terms by the French government to the exchange between him and General Brenier. Till this is obtained the General cannot be permitted to return, as all the indulgences have hitherto been on one side (except during Fox's love-scene with Talleyrand), and the conditions of which have been as uniformly violated.

I send you a letter from Sir J. Stewart, the Member for Donegal. If you feel an objection to his request, write him a conciliatory letter, and he probably will come over. I should suppose it too good an office to dispose of lightly.

Ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Sir James is a very good man, well disposed to government, but shy and lazy.

To Colonel Gordon. [131.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Dublin Castle, 22nd Dec., 1808.

I enclose a letter and a memorial which have been transmitted to me by Captain Clunes, of the 50th regiment, whom I beg you to recommend to the favourable notice of His Royal Highness.

The great degree of the public attention and the accurate examination of all the circumstances attending the battle of the 21st of August must, together with the official reports, have proved to His Royal Highness the distinguished share which the 50th regiment had in producing the events of that day. I am convinced, therefore, that His Royal Highness will excuse me for taking the liberty of drawing his notice to the claims of any individual who served in that corps upon that occasion, more particularly when it appears that he has been present in all the distinguished services in which the British army has lately been engaged, and that his claims will be recommended by other officers under whose immediate orders he had before served.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

E. Cooke, Esq., to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

DEAR SIR ARTHUR, 26th Dec., 1808.

There being no sentence passed on the Armistice or Convention, and an opinion being demanded upon them by the Warrant, the report has been referred back. I understand there are four to three: the four will say the Armistice and Convention were, under all circumstances, expedient and necessary; the three are to state their reasons for dissent, Moira, Pembroke, Nicholls.

How does it stand?

You were right in advancing from Mondego.

You were right in beating the enemy at Roliça and taking the coast-line.

You were right in gaining a glorious victory at Vimeiro.

But you were wrong, with 17,300 fresh men against 11,000 beaten French, to propose pursuing the enemy, or to cut off a part of them.

Sir H. Burrard was right in stopping your army from pursuing, and in waiting for reinforcements, though he had 17,300 men against 11,000; and by so doing showed zeal and firmness.

Sir H. Dalrymple, finding the army in the situation of the 22nd at night, was right in concluding an Armistice, which was expedient and necessary.

And when joined by Sir J. Moore he was also right in concluding the Convention, which was expedient and necessary.

I think the decision of the Court as to Sir H. Burrard will be very dissatisfactory, both as to principle and example.

As to the 24,500 men Junot embarked, my division is:

Women, Portuguese, civilians, drivers, attendants, artisans, &c.	1,500
Wounded	2,000
Common proportion of sick	1,000
Officers, serjeants, drummers	2,000
	6,500
	24,500
	18,000
Rank and file	18,000
In Almeida, Elvas, Lisbon, St. Ube's, Belem, St. Julian, Bugio, Cascaes, and Peniché, depôts, &c.	5,000
For the field	13,000

If you were wrong in pursuing, you must have been more wrong in fighting, and more wrong in leaving Mondego. If Sir H. Burrard is supported, they will say you have been let down easy by the Court, and that you wiped off by victory the stain of temerity.

But the Court have approved your advance so completely, that I think the other line will be taken.

You were right in advancing; your victories proved it: had you been suffered to pursue, you would have completed the work; therefore, the defending the non-pursuit being so entirely contradictory to the other parts of the statement, it will be merely attributed to a partial wish to support Sir Harry at the expense of the character of the service.

We have nothing from Spain since Moore's letter of the 5th, and the French note of the capitulation of Madrid.

Pray do not *know* what I write till you hear from others.

Yours ever,

E. COOKE.

Brig.-Gen. Anstruther to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

DEAR SIR ARTHUR, Wednesday Evening.

I return you the papers with many thanks.* They fully satisfy me on every point as far as you are in the least concerned. I am satisfied that with the force you had, the wisest object was Portugal; and it is demonstration itself that with the force you had a right to expect within a given time, the enterprise you undertook was not what ought to be called hazardous, unless war is to lose its hazards, or unless our officers are not to move till they are in a state to render opposition foolish.

The next point is the situation just after the battle. The hazard then seems to have been only from the accumulation of your own force starving itself; and the calling down Moore's force seems only to have limited the operation of your force by limiting the time of feeding it, while it equally enabled the enemy to concentrate his force, and multiplied the facilities of retreat. As to the Convention, even in the midst of all the clamour I have always affirmed that *a* convention was wise; I have equally thought that the two main objects to be gained were the disjoining the French and the Russians, and being speedily in a state to join the army in Spain: both these points would, I think, have been gained either by moving on the 22nd, or if the Convention had been negotiated in your paper, or if even the Commander-in-Chief had done as he ought, appointed *you* to negotiate with Kellermann. He lost the dignity of a conqueror the moment he began himself to treat; and he discovered to Kellermann by the mere act itself what was the truth, that he trusted nobody and knew nothing. There is no wonder, therefore, that every advantage was taken.

There is another point of less real importance, but of infinitely more effect on the public, I mean the tone of the Convention. This arises entirely from allowing the vanquished to dictate the terms in which the treaty was to be couched, a thing, I believe, never done before, nor ever will again, unless there are more Sir Hews.

I beg your excuse for stating any opinion on points I am so inadequate to form any just opinion of; but I could not return you the papers without letting you see I had formed on them the best opinion I could; and in my view of the subject the early possession of Lisbon and speedy

* See Parliamentary Papers on the Convention of Cintra.

embarkation of the French were the most important objects. They have both been lost; and I think it demonstration they would both have been gained had your friends kept both Burrard and Dalrymple at home.

Now to explain what I began with when I said, as far as you are concerned. I own I doubt if Portugal really was the best object; and I think your government had, when they sent you, no regular plan, and the whole was what the Admiralty call a roving commission. I doubt if a man should have sailed from Cork till the object was more defined, the plan more settled, and the force not only much greater, but compared with the difficulties and commensurate with them. This never could be the case while the object was indefinite: as it was, a very able and confidential officer was sent with a force to no definite object, although some were generally pointed out, and one probably with a decided preference. As the thing went on, the army grew too big for the seniority of the commander, and they sent two fools to supersede him. You, however, stand high, and both the judgment and the execution will reflect on you the highest honour.

Yours truly,

J. ANSTRUTHER.

[132.] *To Colonel Gordon.*

MY DEAR COLONEL,

When the army lately under my command went abroad in the month of July last, it was deemed expedient that a detachment of the drivers of the Irish commissariat, with their officers, should attend the horses belonging to that corps which were to be employed in drawing the artillery on the proposed service.

The terms as follows were held out to the officers and men on this occasion. The former had rank, and the latter were attested to serve in Ireland only; and it was necessary to hold out these inducements to the former, that they might exert themselves to prevail upon the latter to extend the limit of their services by a fresh attestation.

The officers were to have the same temporary rank in the army during the war as they had in Ireland, the same pay and allowances as the officers of the waggon corps in Great Britain, and the same half-pay on reduction. In case they should return to serve in Ireland, they were to have the same pay and allowances as the officers of the Irish commissariat; but this last condition not to affect the rate of their half-pay.

The non-commissioned officers and privates were to receive the same pay and allowances as the non-commissioned officers and privates of the waggon corps in Great Britain. They were

reattested for general service and received no bounty, but were informed that they would establish their claim for the pension of Chelsea and Kilmainham in the same manner as the rest of His Majesty's forces.

I enclose a list of the names, with the rank of the officers, who accepted these conditions, performed the services required from them, and are now with the army in Spain; and I shall be obliged to you if you will request His Royal Highness to grant them commissions, and to give directions that the other conditions held out to them and the soldiers may be carried into execution in course of time.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major (afterwards Sir Colin) Campbell to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

MY DEAR SIR ARTHUR, Limmer's Hotel, London, 29th Dec., 1808.

Having this instant learnt from unquestionable authority the opinion of the Court of Inquiry, and what they recommend should be done thereon, I hasten to communicate it to you.

The Court all approve of your advance from Mondego Bay with 13,000 men.

They also give you the highest praise for your decision, and the manner you attacked the enemy on the 17th August.

They notice your having received a reinforcement of 5000 men before the action of the 21st August.

They give you full credit for the manner you conducted the army to Vimeiro, and pass a high panegyric on you and the troops for your conduct during the battle of the 21st at that place; but they say that it was to be expected that 18,000 British troops should defeat 14,000 or 15,000 of the enemy.

They then take up Sir Harry Burrard, and say that they think he was justified in not following up our advantages on the 21st, particularly as he expected a reinforcement of 10,000 men. Lord Moira in particular writes a long article on this subject.

They then notice the Armistice, which all the members of the Board approve of, except Lord Moira. His Lordship also writes a long article on this subject, and, as far as my recollection carries me, says that an Armistice was desirable if it was made with the view to gain time; but that the Armistice being made the basis of the Convention is the cause of his disapproving of it.

The Court then notice the Convention, which they approve of, with the exception of Lords Moira and Pembroke, and General Nicholls: the two latter say that the army should have advanced, and that we ought to have

had better terms, particularly after having received the reinforcement under Sir John Moore. Lord Moira's reasonings are very voluminous on this subject.

In this opinion they give a deal of praise to Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir H. Burrard, and yourself, for the zeal and firmness showed throughout the periods each of you had the command, and recommend that no further inquiry should be instituted.

I may be wrong whether it was the opinion of all the members of the Court, or of only Lord Moira, that Sir Harry was justified in not following up our advantages on the 21st. Lord Moira writes a long article on that subject.

The Court make each of you only responsible for the time you commanded.

The above, I believe, you will find to be nearly correct.

His Majesty, I understand, has approved of the proceedings, and they will be published in three or four days.

The Court, in their opinion of what relates to you, approve highly of everything you have done, and I understand pass the highest panegyrics on you.

Thus ends the inquiry. I think the members of the Court will be more railed at than ever any of the Generals whose conduct they inquired into were.

They certainly show a great deal of inconsistency (or Lord Moira does, if it were his opinion only) in justifying Sir Harry Burrard in not advancing after having defeated the enemy on the 21st. When they approve of your advance from Mondego with 13,000 men to attack the whole of the French disposable force in Portugal, I think it appears that it was doubly incumbent that he should have advanced after having defeated the enemy, and particularly when he had a force of 17,000 or 18,000 men.

The above are, as far as I recollect, the leading features of the report; but probably you may have received a more correct statement of it from other quarters.

I wish you may be able to read this, as I have not time to write a fair copy before the post goes.

I saw a letter from General Clinton, dated at Salamanca on the 8th, to General Calvert, which states that the Spaniards were then fighting for their existence in Madrid. Sir John Moore must have had information. Sir David had not joined him. A large body of French cavalry have proceeded by the high road from Madrid towards Portugal.

I remain, dear Sir Arthur,

Your most obedient and faithful humble servant,

C. CAMPBELL.

[Tell Campbell that I am much obliged to him for his letter, which appears to be very correct.]

A. W.

To Colonel Macleod. [133.]

SIR, Dublin Castle, 2nd Jan., 1809.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 24th instant, and I am highly flattered by the interest which you take in my concerns, and by the kind expressions in which you have conveyed the sentiments of General Brenier and your own.

I am much concerned that circumstances have not permitted Lord Castlereagh to consider the exchange between General Abercrombie and General Brenier as settled, more particularly as it appears that the latter had reason to believe that the answer of the French government to the proposition for the exchange was not in the first instance considered to be necessary. In fact, I believe that our government did at first determine that the exchange should be concluded in six weeks, if an answer in the negative did not arrive in that period; and this determination was afterwards altered in consequence of a representation of the circumstances which had occurred when a former attempt was made to exchange General Abercrombie, by those who made it, and of an apprehension that a limitation of the time in which the answer must come would be the cause of the refusal of the French government to agree to any exchange whatever. The disappointment of General Brenier, to whatever cause it may be attributed, is nevertheless very grievous; and I have but little doubt that Lord Castlereagh may be induced, upon a representation and a fair consideration of the circumstances, to allow him to go to France upon his parole. I will join with you in any application for this purpose when I shall return to London.

I shall be happy to have it in my power to attend to any recommendation of yours in favour of Mr. Fitzgerald.

I have the honour, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Honourable Henry Wellesley. [134.]

MY DEAR HENRY, Dublin Castle, 3rd Jan., 1809.

I enclose some papers which I have received from Sir Charles Asgill relative to the issue of eight months' off reckonings for the 2nd battalion 11th regiment. He is entitled to this issue; but the ground on which he desires to have the money at an early period is, that he raised the regiment in this country and

purchased for them the accoutrements and other articles, the expense of which this advance is intended to defray, and that whenever articles of this description are purchased in Ireland, they must be paid for in ready money, as the tradesmen are unable to give credit, as they do in England. An officer, therefore, who incurs the expenses here ought to receive the money from the Treasury to defray them as soon as possible, otherwise he must borrow the amount which is his due, and pay interest for it. I shall be obliged to you if you will endeavour to manage this matter in such a manner as that Sir Charles Asgill may receive his eight months' off reckonings immediately.

Ever, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[135.] *To Lord, Viscount Burghersh.*

MY DEAR BURGHERSH, Dublin Castle, 11th Jan., 1809.

I have received your letter of the 5th, and I have put the memorial of your friend in a train of examination, and that which can be done will be done for him.

The Report of the Court of Inquiry is indeed an extraordinary production. Opinions, like colours, are now matters of taste, and may in this view of them be inconsistent with each other. But a court of this description ought, if it touches facts, to state them correctly; and a principal member, if he observes upon the subject, ought not to pass unnoticed, or contradict, the principal fact bearing upon the question on which he observes.

Ever, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[136.] *To the Mayor, Commonalty, and Citizens of Londonderry.*

GENTLEMEN,

I received the honour which you conferred upon me in the last year by electing me a freeman of your city with the respect and gratitude which were due for such a mark of your approbation of the manner in which I had carried into execution the measures and orders of his Grace the Lord-Lieutenant; and I have now to return you my thanks for that honour, for the

mode in which you have conveyed it, and for the handsome terms in which you have addressed me.*

It is very satisfactory to me to know that my conduct has met with your approbation in the situations which I have hitherto filled; and I hope that in whatever situation His Majesty may think proper to employ my services hereafter, I may deserve a continuance of that honour.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Masters, Wardens, and Brethren of the Corporation of Cooks. [137.]

GENTLEMEN,

I thank you for the honour you have conferred upon me by presenting me with the freedom of your ancient and loyal Corporation, and I am particularly flattered by your address.† Nothing can be more gratifying to me than to find that the

* *To the Right Honourable the Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., Chief Secretary to his Grace the Duke of Richmond.*

SIR,

We, the Mayor, Commonalty, and Citizens of the City of Londonderry in Common Council assembled, feel great pleasure in taking this opportunity of expressing to you our entire confidence in the firm but conciliatory manner in which the affairs of Ireland are governed under the administration of his Grace the Duke of Richmond, whose Minister you are; and in humble testimony of our sincere regard for you personally, we last year unanimously elected you a Freeman of this City, at which time we had hopes of the honour of your presence amongst us, when a certificate of your Freedom in a gold box would have been presented to you in the most respectful manner. We now request your acceptance of the same.

We should on that occasion have endeavoured to express our pride, our gratitude, and our self-congratulations in possessing in you a fellow countryman who had, by the gallantry of your military exploits, already reflected so much honour on the British arms and on your native land; and we do now, with unfeigned satisfaction, recognise the lustre you have since added to your own and to your country's fame.

To the discrimination of our most gracious and beloved Sovereign we anxiously look up to reward your distinguished merits, and to give again to our country the advantage of your military services.

Signed by order, this 12th day of January, 1809,

JOSEPH CURRY, Chamberlain.

† *To the Right Hon. Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., &c. &c.*

Be it remembered that on Friday the 12th January, 1809, being Christmas quarter-day of the Corporation of Cooks or Guild of St. James, Dublin, it was

bravery and discipline of the army lately under my command in Portugal have inspired among their countrymen that confidence in the prowess of His Majesty's troops which they so eminently deserve.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[138.] *To the Citizens of Limerick.*

GENTLEMEN,

I am much obliged to you for the kindness which you have manifested towards me in the handsome terms in which you have addressed me.*

resolved unanimously that the Freedom of said Corporation, in a silver box, accompanied by the following Address, be presented to the Right Hon. Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., Chief Secretary to his Grace the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland:

SIR,

We, the Masters, Wardens, and Brethren of the Corporation of Cooks or Guild of St. James, Dublin, deeply impressed with sentiments of most sincere esteem for your private worth, and urged by motives of patriotism and respect for those high military talents which have rendered you so honourably conspicuous in the service of your King and country in various climes, and under whose recent command in Portugal British prowess and discipline shone so brilliantly in the discomfiture of our enemies,—feel we should be greatly deficient in gratitude not publicly to acknowledge these your very eminent services; and by the only tribute in our power to bestow as marks of our approbation and regard, to present you with the Freedom of our ancient and loyal Corporation, and our best wishes that when our Gracious Sovereign shall again be pleased to call you into action, that victory and prosperity may ever be the reward of your valour, and fame rank you highest amongst the heroes that this your native land has given birth to.

* *City of Limerick Address to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.*

SIR, Limerick, 10th Jan., 1809.

We, the citizens of Limerick, feeling, in common with all His Majesty's subjects, the great and important value of the signal victory obtained over the French at the battle of Vimeiro, beg leave to convey to you, with sentiments of gratitude, our admiration of that happy combination of gallantry and judgment displayed by you on that occasion.

We congratulate the empire at large upon this presage of future triumphs. The battle of the 21st of August has left this most gratifying impression upon the minds of all persons, that a British army is invincible when led by a commander who, like you, unites the qualities of coolness and promptitude.

We rejoice that the result of the late inquiry has secured to you the

I participate in your confidence in the discipline and gallantry of His Majesty's troops; and I rejoice that I should have been so fortunate as to be placed at the head of a detachment of the army upon an occasion in which, by the conduct of the troops in the field, they augmented the confidence of their countrymen in their prowess, and increased the security of the country against the attempts of its inveterate and relentless enemy.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the High Sheriff of the County of Limerick. [139.]

SIR, 3rd Feb., 1809.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 24th January, in which you enclosed an address from the gentlemen, clergy, and freeholders of the county of Limerick, which they had desired you to present to me.* I now enclose an answer to that address, which I request you to communicate to the county of Limerick in such manner as you may think most proper.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

establishment of that great character, acquired by a succession of public services.

Signed on behalf of the Citizens of Limerick,

JOHN CRIPS, Mayor.

* *Address from the County of Limerick.*

16th January, 1809.

At a Meeting of the Gentlemen, Clergy, and Freeholders of the County of Limerick, held at St. Francis's Abbey this day, pursuant to public advertisement,—

The High Sheriff in the Chair,—

Resolved unanimously, That the following gentlemen be appointed a Committee to prepare an Address to be presented to Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., &c. &c. &c.

Bolton Waller,
Thomas FitzGibbon,
Thomas Grady,
Lieut.-Col. Lloyd,
Edward Croker.

Resolved unanimously, That the Address now produced be adopted as the Address of this County, and that the High Sheriff be requested to sign the same, and present it to Sir Arthur Wellesley, and have it, together with Sir

[ENCLOSURE.]

To the Gentlemen, Clergy, and Freeholders of the County of Limerick.

GENTLEMEN, 3rd Feb., 1809.

I have received from the High Sheriff of the county of Limerick the unanimous address which you have desired that he should present to me; and I beg leave to return you my thanks for the honour you have conferred upon me.

The approbation of my countrymen must at all times be gratifying to my feelings; and it is particularly satisfactory to me to find such a respectable body as yourselves have approved of my conduct during the time I commanded His Majesty's troops in Portugal, and that the circumstances which occurred during that period should have made so just an impression upon you as to increase your confidence in their bravery and discipline, and in the security which those qualities must afford to His Majesty's dominions.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,

With the greatest respect,

Your most obedient humble servant,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Arthur's answer, published in the Limerick newspapers, the *Courier* and *Correspondent:*

SIR,

The termination of the inquiry instituted by His Majesty's command having left us at liberty to express our sentiments, we avail ourselves of the earliest opportunity to convey to you our thanks for your conduct whilst commanding His Majesty's forces in Portugal.

The successful issue of the battle of Vimeiro has not only had the happy effect of adding to your laurels, but must demonstrate to Europe that British valour, when skilfully directed, is irresistible, except opposed by a force so superior in point of number as to render the greatest efforts of human exertion hopeless.

While we contemplate these glorious consequences, and when we recollect the many brilliant services you have rendered to the empire at large, we cannot avoid feeling the most interesting gratification in claiming as our countryman a commander of such distinguished gallantry and judgment.

BRUDENELL PLUMMER, Sheriff.

To Colonel Gordon. [140.]

DEAR COLONEL, London, 1st March, 1809.

The officers and soldiers who have served under my command in different parts of the world have thought proper to sue me as the channel of their applications to the Commander-in-Chief, and they do not readily understand the meaning of those rules which are opposed to their advancement.

I do not like to refuse stating their claims for them when they desire it, and yet I feel that I only give you and myself a great deal of unnecessary trouble.

The person in whose favour I now trouble you is John M'Ray. He was a corporal in the 71st Regiment in the battle of the 21st August. He was the man who took General Brenier, and he behaved well upon that occasion. He was promoted to be a serjeant, and I appointed him to be an assistant provost. I believe that his commanding officer then required him to resign his halberd; he has lost his office by the breaking up of the army, and he has desired me to ask His Royal Highness to provide for him in some manner. He would prefer being an assistant provost, I understand, to being in any other situation.

Ever, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of the Patriotic Fund. [141.]

SIR, London, 10th March, 1809.

I beg you will do me the favour of bringing under the consideration of the gentlemen who have the management of the Patriotic Fund the situation of Mrs. Bradford, the widowed mother of the late Captain Bradford.

This officer, who was Assistant-Adjutant-General to the army lately under my command in Portugal, and aide-de-camp to General Spencer, was killed at a most interesting and critical moment of the battle of the 17th of August, in the performance of a most important service on which he had been employed by me. He was sent to ascertain the exact situation of a detachment of riflemen, who, I imagined, had pushed themselves into the enemy's rear, and to form a judgment in what manner they

could be supported. When he reached them they were about to give way, pressed by superior numbers, and he succeeded in rallying them before he received the wound of which he died.

This officer was a most meritorious one; his life had been spent in the service, to which his abilities, his gallantry, and good conduct rendered him an ornament. He belonged to the Guards, but he was generally employed on foreign service. Out of his pay he supported the lady in whose favour I now solicit the gentlemen who have the management of the Patriotic Fund, and I am convinced that I shall not solicit in vain, in favour of the distressed and disconsolate mother of such an officer as the late Captain Bradford.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[142.] *To Frederick Cornwallis, Esq.*

SIR, London, 11th March, 1809.

I have received your letter, to which I ought to have replied in due course, and should have replied, if my attention had not been taken up by other more important objects.

As well as I recollect your accounts, I am not in your debt at all; but I should wish to see them again, and request you to send them to me, with copies of the vouchers by which you support them. If upon an examination of them I should have reason to believe that I am in your debt, I shall pay you immediately; but if you should prefer to proceed against me at law for what you alledge that I owe you, you are perfectly at liberty to do so.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[143.] *To the Duke of Richmond.*

MY DEAR DUKE, London, 28th March, 1809.

Sir Edward Littlehales has referred for my consideration the enclosed papers respecting barrack bedding.

I believe there is no doubt that the barrack bedding is much more dirty than in England, and so in every thing else; and it

is, besides, the fact that the barracks, the temporary barracks particularly, are in such a state as that it is very difficult to keep in order either that or any other description of store. It is, however, the duty of government to provide as far as possible for the comfort of the soldiers; and most particularly to take care that they are not liable to contagious distempers for the want of any precautions which government may have it in its power to take.

My opinion is, therefore, that the Barrackmaster-General should be directed to provide as speedily as may be convenient a sufficient quantity of bedding, at least in all the permanent barracks, to provide for the demands which will be made upon him in consequence of the introduction of the new system.

That is the first step to be taken; the next, to issue the order to the troops upon the subject. To issue the order to the troops before the Barrackmaster will be provided with the bedding, will be to put the cart before the horse, and to create discontent among the troops with what they have at present, without being able to remove any of the inconveniences and grievances which are the cause as well as the subject of the order. As soon, therefore, as the Barrackmaster-General will be prepared with bedding at the principal permanent barracks, and not sooner, the order might be issued; but I conceive that before it is issued it ought to be altered as I have marked in the margin.

We know well the inclination of officers to complain of Barrackmasters; these two classes are in fact natural enemies; and if the former are not controlled as proposed, they would carry on the war against the Barrackmaster through the means of exaggerated reports of dirty and unwholesome bedding at the public expense and inconvenience.

Ever, my dear Duke, yours, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel Thomas Browne to Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley.

SIR, March, 1809.

I have the honour to inform you that I sent to Mr. Perceval two military inventions of mine for his inspection, which he desired me to present to the Duke of York and the Master-General of the Ordnance.

I had previously shown the models of them to my friend Lord Moira,

who highly approved of the principle and form of them, and was of opinion they would be of essential service to the army in Spain.

Understanding that you are going on service, I take the liberty of mentioning to you that, whenever you are pleased to inform me you are at leisure and have a wish to inspect them, I will do myself the honour of waiting upon you at any time you may appoint.

The first invention is a bateau, made of prepared canvas, so as to be impervious to water: its dimensions are 17 feet in length, 5 in width, and 3 in depth, and weighs 65 pounds.

It will convey 30 men, with their arms, accoutrements, and baggage, across the widest river with safety; and on occasion, if the soldiers lie down, it will carry from 40 to 50.

When fully laden it draws 1 foot water, so that 2 feet are above water.

By lashing two together and filling the centre with wood, they will convey a 24-pounder, with the carriage, &c. &c. &c.; and by uniting a number, a bridge may be formed for any purpose.

As the bateau only weighs 65 pounds, it forms an easy load for a soldier where there is no road for a carriage or horse.

The bateau may be put together or taken to pieces in three minutes.

The bateau is fitted with iron ribs, gunwales, and keel, only to show its form and shape, as the wood of an old house or small trees of any kind, if only 6 feet long, are sufficient to put it together for service.

The other invention I call a *military cat:* it is formed of iron, and intended to secure infantry from the charge and attack of cavalry.

The cat weighs 1¾ pounds, and may be easily carried suspended to a soldier's belt.

If 40 or 50 are thrown in front of a body of infantry, they form so impenetrable a barrier that no cavalry can pass them.

When on service in America with my regiment during the revolution, I was encamped with about 850 men on a height, across which the public road led; and expecting an attack in the night (when the moon shone very bright), I ordered all the hatchet-men of the regiment to cut off the extreme points of the branches of trees and strew some thousands in the road which led to my encampment, and stretched the lashings of my baggage-horses from the trees across the road, about the height of a dragoon's breast, and posted a party in ambuscade on each side of the road.

When the rebels approached the camp they charged at a full gallop, and got so entangled with the caltrops or small branches that their horses, having no firm footing, fell to the ground; and such dragoons as retained their seats, coming in contact with the ropes, were dismounted. The firing of the party in ambush so increased the disorder of the rebels, that they quitted above 900 horses and fled.

In America, where we could procure no canvas, but plenty of leather, I had twenty canoes made of the latter, which I always carried with me on service, and derived the greatest benefit from their use; as a river, which was the greatest obstruction to the enemy, proved my greatest security.

On many occasions I threw a body of men across and dislodged the enemy, who occupied the opposite banks of a river four or five miles in width.

One of the bateaus and cats is much at your service, and if you think them of use will serve as models.

I shall also show you the mode of fitting up the bateau with short pieces of wood, which will render the carriage of iron unnecessary.

I have the honour to be, with sentiments of respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient and humble servant,

THOMAS BROWNE.

Please to direct to Colonel Browne, Holyland's Hotel, near Somerset House.

[Tell him that I am much obliged to him, but have had the pleasure of seeing his ingenious invention at the office of the Commander-in-Chief.]

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM. [144.]

[Written 25th February, 1850.]

I have read part of the 31st chapter of the 9th volume of M. de Thiers' History, from page 169 to page 189, of the first edition, published at Leipzig.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, in his despatch to Lord Castlereagh of the 17th August, 1808, from Villa Verde, written on the day of the battle of Roliça, states that the force under General Laborde was 6000 men, which he had attacked. General Laborde stated openly that he had not 6000 men.

The historian states that they were 4000 men.

In his report of the action, Sir Arthur Wellesley gave the enemy full credit for their gallant defence of the post which they had taken up; and he stated that, after he had carried with the 9th and 29th regiments the gorges of the defiles, and had endeavoured to establish these troops on the tops of the defiles carried, he was attacked repeatedly, and that he could not bring up troops and cannon with sufficient celerity to enable him to get the better of these attacks for some time.

The army had landed but a few days before from its transports, and, comparatively with its opponents in the field, must have been inefficiently equipped with the means of moving its artillery. The proceedings in the military and political organs of the day, all in the hands of the historian, must have shown him that this was the case, that Sir Arthur Wellesley had been under the necessity of leaving behind him at Leiria a

part of the artillery attached to his corps, owing to the want of horses to move the carriages.

This was the difficulty referred to in the reports of the 17th August to the Secretary of State, and not the difficulty of moving the troops with celerity.

The historian states that General Laborde carried off all his wounded men. But he omits to state that he did not carry off all his artillery, having left three pieces in the hands of his opponents.

The loss sustained by the British army in the battle of Roliça was 70 killed, of whom 4 officers; 335 wounded, of whom 39 officers; 74 missing, of whom 4 officers. These were the 1200 or 1500 stated by the historian to have been killed or wounded by General Laborde in the battle. Sir Arthur Wellesley reports that three pieces were taken from the enemy by the troops who carried the position.

In respect to the battle of Vimeiro, the historian has been equally incorrect. Sir Arthur Wellesley reported, on the day the battle was fought, that he had been attacked by 14,000 men. The accuracy of this estimate of numbers was confirmed by a paper called 'Ordre de Bataille,' found on the ground, which stated the numbers to be 14,000 men, not 9000, as stated by M. Thiers.

The position occupied by the British army had not been selected as one for defence, but one of encampment, till joined by its reinforcements, at the time in the offing; and, in fact, the army must have marched on the morning of the * if it had not been halted by special command.

The historian forgets his own description of the position when he states that there was no retreat from it. He forgets the road across the heights from Lourinha into the valley and thence to Maceira, besides the road from Vimeiro to Maceira, through the same valley. But the position, occupied by 20,000 men as it was, could not be forced; and the proof is, that the French troops, after repeated attacks upon all points, made no impression upon it. They did not even carry the height on which the advanced guard was posted in front of the valley of Vimeiro.

In fact, the different parts of the position flanked each other,

* Blank in manuscript.

and, defended by resolute soldiers, could not be carried by assault, and part could not even have been attacked.

The historian says it was defended by large numbers of guns of the heaviest calibres. Reference to the published returns produced before the Court of Inquiry would have shown him that Sir Arthur Wellesley had in the position ten 6-pounders, five 9-pounders, and three 5½-inch howitzers: total, eighteen pieces of field ordnance.

The historian, after relating the failure of all the attempts to carry any part of the position, states that the Duc d'Abrantes retired in good order to Torres Vedras. But he omits to state that he left in the hands of the holders of the position thirteen pieces of artillery, General Brenier, and many other prisoners.

The loss sustained by the British army in the battle of Vimeiro was 135 killed, of whom 5 officers; 466 wounded, of whom 37 officers; 46 missing, of whom 2 officers.

The French army evacuated Portugal after the battle, and embarked, under the Convention, 22,000 men, according to the statement of the historian.

The official embarkation return states 26,000 officers and troops.

The historian states that only 26,000 men followed Junot into Portugal. The Imperial muster rolls state as present effective on the 23rd May, 1808, 29,584 troops. This was three months before the battle, but could not have included the garrisons of Almeida and Elvas.

WELLINGTON.

CHAPTER IV.—PENINSULA.

[145.] MEMORANDUM.

25th March, 1809.

It appears from General Stewart's memorandum that there are now in Portugal 5 brigades of field artillery.

There are 2 light brigades with General Sherbrooke's corps, making a total of 7 brigades, of which it appears that 2 are of 9-pounders.

In my memorandum of the 7th March* I required 30 pieces of field artillery for the British troops; the number of guns now in Portugal, according to this account, is 42, so that there are 12 more than I thought necessary.

There are in Portugal 30 pieces of cannon, 24-pounders, on travelling-carriages, which will answer as *pièces de position*, and are in number 10 more than I required.

There are in Portugal of artillerymen,

1½ Company British.
2 Companies of Germans.
1 Company of Germans gone with the 40th regiment.
1 Company (supposed British) with General Sherbrooke.
3 Companies (Irish) lately sent from Plymouth.

8½ Companies.

This number, even if the German company gone with the 40th regiment should not return, will be as many as I required.

Of horses, it appears that the two 9-pounder brigades in Portugal are horsed with,

	Horses.
Say	200
It is supposed that 300 horses are returned to Lisbon from Vigo	300
300 under orders at Cork	300
And 300 in preparation at Portsmouth .	300
	1100

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. iv., p. 261.

This number, allowing that the 300 supposed to have returned from Vigo have not returned, will be sufficient.

30,000 stand of arms ought to be sent out.
20,000 suits of clothing.
20,000 sets of accoutrements for the Portuguese troops.
20,000 pairs of shoes for the same.

A good corps of Engineers is required for an army of 60,000 men.

A Commissariat is required, consisting of 1 Commissary-in-Chief, 2 Deputy Commissaries, 25 Assistant Commissaries for the British troops only, and 1 Deputy Commissary, and at least 12 Assistants, for the Portuguese troops.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Duke of Richmond to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

DEAR ARTHUR, 3rd April, 1809.

George Berkeley tells me you have been so good as to ask for him as an Adjutant-General. Many thanks. I really can recommend him as a very zealous young man, and one who I am sure you will like on acquaintance. If you could take Robertson, you would find him very useful. What he would like best would be to command flankers, as he prefers fighting to writing. I hear Howard of the Artillery is going with you. He is a very good fellow. Edward Somerset's regiment I find is embarked. She wants to go to Lisbon with him. I have advised against it. Any army you are with will be actively employed. At Lisbon they heard news of Moore's army first from England. From the day his rear-guard left Lisbon they only heard of him from England.

I have understood you wanted a place in England for Lady Wellesley. My uncle left a very comfortable small house a mile from Goodwood for five years to a person who had lived with him. I believe she would willingly give up the remainder of her term for a small consideration. If you think it would suit, I will inquire about it. The distance from London is under sixty miles. The situation very pretty and retired. Chichester is four miles off, with good medical people. Serjeant Moore has thought it best to put off Ryan's trial. I think he was right under all circumstances. Eight capital convictions, and twelve for transportation and whipping at Clonmel.

Yours, dear Arthur, very sincerely,

RICHMOND.

[146.] *To Colonel Gordon.*

SIR, London, 4th April, 1809.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a letter, dated the 3rd instant, from the Commander-in-Chief, containing instructions for me to take the command of the troops in Portugal.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Downing-street, 2nd April, 1809.

His Majesty having been graciously pleased to nominate Lieutenant-General Sir John Cradock to the chief command at Gibraltar, has thought fit to select you to replace that officer in the command of His Majesty's forces in Portugal.

You will receive enclosed a return of the troops either actually arrived or under orders for Portugal; and it is His Majesty's pleasure that you do proceed without delay to Lisbon in execution of those orders which I am now to convey to you by His Majesty's command.

Your attention will be directed in the first instance to prepare and equip the British army for the field.

You will in the next place direct your utmost exertions to the bringing forward the Portuguese army, and rendering it capable of co-operating with His Majesty's troops.

In furtherance of the latter object, in addition to the arrangements already made, you will make such requisitions from time to time, either to the Portuguese government or to the government at home, as, upon communication with General Beresford, you may deem requisite for rendering the Portuguese troops fit for service.

The defence of Portugal you will consider as the first and immediate object of your attention. But as the security of Portugal can only be effectually provided for in connexion with the defence of the Peninsula in the larger sense, His Majesty on this account, as well as from the unabated interest he takes in the cause of Spain, leaves it to your judgment to decide, when your army shall be advanced on the frontier of Portugal, how your efforts can best be combined with the Spanish as well as the Portuguese troops in support of the common cause.

In any movements you may undertake, you will, however, keep in mind that until you receive further orders your operations must necessarily be conducted with a special reference to the protection of that country.

Mr. Villiers will be instructed to procure for you every necessary assistance from the Portuguese government, and you will consider him as the

proper channel for such communications as you may have to make to the Regency.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Effective Strength of the Force serving in Portugal, and of the Troops embarked and under Orders for Foreign Service.

April, 1809.

Portugal.

			Rank and File.
14th Light Dragoons	8 Troops	..	672
20th ,,	4 ,,	..	304
Royal Waggon Train	3 ,,	..	250
			1,226
2nd Foot Guards	1st Battalion	..	1198
3rd ,,	1st ,,	..	1229
			2,427
3rd Foot	1st Battalion	..	856
9th ,,	2nd ,,	..	645
27th ,,	3rd ,,	..	811
29th ,,		..	726
31st ,,	2nd ,,	..	784
40th ,,	1st ,,	..	871
45th ,,	1st ,,	..	856
60th ,,	5th ,,	..	828
87th ,,	2nd ,,	..	710
88th ,,	1st ,,	..	758
97th ,,		..	660
King's German Legion :—			
1st Line Battalion		..	748
2nd ,,		..	801
5th ,,		..	765
7th ,,		..	721
Garrison Company		..	49
			11,589

Embarked at Cork.

7th Foot	2nd Battalion	..	576
30th ,,	2nd ,,	..	630
48th ,,	2nd ,,	..	717
53rd ,,	2nd ,,	..	699
66th ,,	2nd ,,	..	667
83rd ,,	2nd ,,	..	850
			4,139

Under Orders for Embarkation.

		Rank and File.
3rd Dragoon Guards, 8 Troops	Portsmouth	672
1st Dragoons .. .. ,, ...	Cork	672
4th ,, ... ,, ...	Portsmouth	672
16th Light Dragoons ,, ...	Falmouth	672
1st German Light Dragoons	Ipswich	606
		3,294
24th Foot	2nd Battalion	780
GENERAL TOTAL (Cavalry, Foot Guards, Infantry)		23,455

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Downing Street, 3rd April, 1809.

Upon the fall of Madrid and the retreat of the Spanish armies into the south of Spain, His Majesty was pleased to signify through his minister to the central government of Spain that His Majesty was ready to send an auxiliary army to sustain the Spanish efforts in that quarter, provided the British troops were assured of the port and fortress of Cadiz as a secure point of retreat in case of disaster in the field.

The government of Spain not having thought fit to accede to this preliminary and indispensable condition, and having actually declined to permit the British troops under Major-Generals Sherbrooke and M'Kenzie, who were sent with the advanced guard of the British army, to land at Cadiz, His Majesty does not feel that he can in justice to the safety of his own troops again employ an auxiliary army in Spain till the Spanish government and nation shall cease to entertain those feelings of jealousy which are equally inconsistent with their own interest and the effectual prosecution of the war.

You will therefore understand that it is not His Majesty's intention, in authorizing you to co-operate with the Spanish armies in the defence of Portugal and of the adjacent Spanish provinces, that you should enter upon a campaign in Spain without the express authority of your government; and in any concert you may form with the armies of Spain, you will cause it to be understood that it is to be confined to the special object in view, and that the service of your army (under the orders you have received) cannot be employed on general operations in Spain as the force under Sir John Moore was intended to have been without a previous arrangement being settled to that effect between the two governments.

Should the enemy penetrate in force towards Cadiz, it is not improbable that the reluctance of the Spanish government to admit a British force into Cadiz may yield to the sense of immediate danger. Should such a change of sentiment take place, every effort should be made to assist in the preservation of that important place; and I am to convey to you the King's commands that in case Mr. Frere should at any time notify to you the actual consent of the Spanish government to admit a British garrison into Cadiz, you do detach an adequate force for that purpose, notifying

immediately to me the amount of such force, that measures may be adopted for supporting the corps so detached, and for replacing it in Portugal.

Should you receive a requisition to the above effect from the governor of Cadiz or other competent authority, you are authorized to act without waiting for a communication through the British minister.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

To Viscount Castlereagh. [147.]

MY DEAR LORD, London, 4th April, 1809.

I wish to draw your attention to the enclosed return of ammunition in Portugal, received from Lord Chatham, compared with the return of the 28th February, 1809, given by Colonel Robe to Sir John Cradock, and enclosed to your Lordship by Sir John. It is possible that some of the ammunition, supposed by the return given to me by Lord Chatham to be in Portugal, was on shore, or it might have gone out with General Sherbrooke or General Hill, or might have been sent away and have since returned with General Mackenzie. But as there is the great difference of seven millions of musket-ball cartridges and two millions of rifle cartridges between the two returns, I think it proper to call your Lordship's attention to them.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Frederick Cornwallis, Esq. [148.]

SIR, London, 6th April, 1809.

I have fully considered the nature of your demand upon me, and the account by which it is supported; and I believe it is the first instance in which any man has been called upon to pay a debt stated to be due for thirteen years at least, upon an account unsupported by any voucher, without a date to any payment charged, or any one of those circumstances which are generally supposed to be necessary in support of such a demand.

However, deficient as your demand is, in all that could

justify it, it is my intention, as you will observe by the enclosed copy of a letter to Messrs. Greenwood and Cox, to pay it as soon as you will produce the receipt of Mr. Dixon for the sum of one hundred and fifty pounds (which, by the bye, I suppose were Irish currency, although charged as British in the account), and as soon as you will have given satisfactory proof to Messrs. Greenwood that you will have settled your accounts as Paymaster of the 33rd with Messrs. Meyrick and Messrs. Fraser and Reed.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[149.] *To Messrs. Greenwood and Cox.*

GENTLEMEN, London, 6th April, 1809.

Mr. Cornwallis, the late Paymaster of the 33rd regiment, claims from me a debt amounting to two hundred and thirty-seven pounds two shillings and two pence, in which there is one sum of one hundred and fifty pounds charged as paid on my account to Mr. Dixon in Ireland, of which I have no recollection whatever. Mr. Cornwallis has not, I believe, yet settled his accounts as Paymaster of the 33rd regiment, either with Messrs. Meyrick or with Messrs. Fraser and Reed, the agents of the regiment in Ireland; and it is not reasonable that he should receive the amount of a debt due by me who was commanding-officer of the regiment during a great part of the time in which he was Paymaster until his documents will have been settled.

If, therefore, Mr. Cornwallis can produce to you the receipt of Mr. Dixon for one hundred and fifty pounds, stated to have been paid to him for me, or any other voucher or proof of its payment, I request you to hold at his credit the sum of two hundred and thirty-seven pounds two shillings and two pence, to be paid to him as soon as he will have satisfied you that he has settled his accounts, as Paymaster of the 33rd regiment, with the late agents, Messrs. Meyrick and Messrs. Fraser and Reed. If he can produce no voucher for the payment of this sum of one hundred and fifty pounds, of course the sum due to

him by me is only eighty-seven pounds two shillings and two pence, and that sum only is to be credited to him accordingly.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Mr. Cornwallis.

To Viscount Castlereagh. [150.]

MY DEAR LORD, London, 7th April, 1809.

Upon referring to General Beresford's private letters to your Lordship and General Stewart, I observe that he is particularly anxious to have the assistance of a larger proportion of British officers than have yet been sent out to him; and, although at this distance from the scene of action, and with such scanty materials of information as I have in my possession, it is not possible for me to form an opinion respecting the mode in which the number of officers which this country could afford could be employed in Portugal, or the degree of utility which would result from the employment of their services in this manner, I think it would be advisable to increase the number now there by an addition of 12 or 14 more.

I think it probable that when General Beresford will find that this country cannot afford the number of officers which he would require to discipline the Portuguese troops, he will employ them more in general duties; but even for this purpose the number now in Portugal would not be sufficient; the army in that country would not be able probably to afford any; and it is therefore desirable, whatever may be the decision ultimately upon the mode of employing them, and whatever may be the numbers required for this employment, that at least 12 or 14 more officers should be sent out without loss of time.

Ever, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, 9th April, 1809.

I send for your private information copy of a letter from Garay to Canning, which does not show much disposition to receive us at Cadiz.

Ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURES.]

Translation of Mr. De Garay's Letter to Mr. Canning, containing Reasons for not admitting British Troops into Cadiz.

Seville, 12th March, 1809.

May it please your Excellency,

MUCH ESTEEMED SIR,

Being entrusted with the department of Minister for His Catholic Majesty's Foreign Affairs, I have thought it expedient to address myself to your Excellency individually as to a Minister whose penetration and probity will know how to appreciate fairly the candour of the sentiments by which the conduct of the Spanish government is regulated, confidently hoping that the observations which I have at present the honour to submit to your Excellency on the dispute that has arisen relative to the garrisoning of Cadiz by the British troops will merit all your attention.

It would certainly be offering an insult to the honesty of the sentiments of the Supreme and Central Junta with regard to the government of its intimate ally, Great Britain, if I were at present to enter on a defence of the former. The whole Spanish people and their Central government have witnessed with enthusiastic gratitude the generous assistance and the marked interest with which Great Britain has hastened to succour Spain, and this gratitude is engraved with indelible characters in the hearts of all Spaniards. The Central government, besides possessing more ample information than the Spanish public, know all the frankness and purity of intention by which the British Cabinet is actuated in the aid it affords to our cause. Your Excellency, then, will easily be satisfied that the Supreme and Central Junta cannot by any means entertain doubts as to the uprightness of the intentions of a government which, prior to its alliance with Spain, has so gloriously and with so laudable an anticipation resisted the common enemy.

In fact, I can assure your Excellency that the opposition shown by the Supreme and Central Junta to the admission of a British garrison into Cadiz has not even the remotest foundation in distrust or apprehension. A government guided by honour and patriotism, in addition to gratitude, is far from entertaining the mean sentiments of distrust, which His Britannic Majesty's government cannot deserve. The principles which regulate the conduct of the Supreme Junta on this occasion are of a different nature.

If opinion constitute the principal strength of a State, there never has been a government in more critical circumstances, and in which it is more necessary to consult opinion, than those in which the Spanish government is placed.

Had the British troops garrisoned the important city of Cadiz at a time when the nation had just beheld the same troops retreat precipitately from Galicia, leave Coruña and Ferrol open to our enemies, and instead of directing their march to some other of the many interesting and menaced points, seek shelter in their own native country, and finally, when a disposition is manifested to garrison Cadiz, notwithstanding that there exists no body of English troops in a

more advanced position who might wish such a security, what an odious impression would the consent of the Supreme Junta make on the whole nation! To what risks would not the sovereign authority of the Central government, and the subordinate one of the Provincial Juntas, be exposed! The enemy of both governments, who is so skilful in the arts of seduction and imposition, would elicit from that measure a powerful weapon to mislead the people and bias public opinion, especially in that part of Spain which he occupies; and those oppressed inhabitants, cut off from all genuine intelligence from their government, and who, in common with all other Spaniards, bear still in mind the disasters caused by the surrender of our frontier-fortresses to the French troops, would perhaps at a distance not sufficiently attend to the difference of circumstances, nor distinguish between perfidious ambition, that passed itself as friendship on a degraded Cabinet, and an honest and generous government, which is anxious for the liberty and independence of nations—those sacred interests which it has defended for such a number of years—and they might in the end distrust a paternal government such as that of the Supreme Junta. To what a multitude of calamities would not this distrust expose the Central government, whose principal weapon is the opinion and confidence of its subjects! Your Excellency very well knows with what circumspection a government ought to proceed, which, though lawfully established, is new, and has risen and exists under circumstances that are as uncommon as they are delicate.

To these considerations must be added others that carry no less weight, and have no less influence on public opinion. It is notorious that the Spanish armies occupy very distant positions from Cadiz; that it is necessary for the enemy to defeat these armies, penetrate through other intermediate positions, and march through a considerable extent of ground before he is capable of menacing that city; that consequently Cadiz is not threatened at present, and may moreover be easily defended; and that all efforts and succours ought at this moment to be directed to more remote points which are menaced and endangered. This state of things must give rise at least to an apprehension that the wish to garrison Cadiz proceeds from an erroneous idea, or an ignorance of the fact, and such an apprehension may have a disadvantageous influence over the public opinion.

It appears to me equally unnecessary to remind your Excellency of the marks of confidence which my government has given to that of His Britannic Majesty. Your Excellency cannot be ignorant of the spontaneous offer made by the Supreme Junta of placing our troops under the command of any authorized English General, whose own forces they might join; and that lately, when the auxiliary troops were about to enter Andalusia, His Majesty has pointed out to Mr. Frere as places proper for the disembarkation and first quarters of the troops the harbour of Santa Maria, San Lucar, Xeres, and other similar ones whose proximity to Cadiz is sufficient to promise safety to those troops in the case of any reverse of moment. Besides, the Supreme Junta could not but persuade itself that your Excellency and His Britannic Majesty's government knew the delicacy of the measure in question, as may be inferred from the explanations which your Excellency has had with His Majesty's Minister at your Court, and which he has communicated to me. From them it would appear that the intention of the British government was to propose to His Majesty a question which seemed delicate and difficult, but not to make a formal demand, the refusal of which would of necessity cause a diminution of cordiality in a co-operation which may be so useful to the common cause, and of which neither the Supreme Junta nor the nation have rendered themselves undeserving.

I cannot help flattering myself that these observations and this frank expla-

nation, when taken into consideration by your Excellency and laid before all those who compose His Britannic Majesty's meritorious government, will convince the enlightened Ministers of Great Britain that the Supreme Junta is by no means capable of distrusting an ally who distinguishes himself in Europe as the guardian of the independence of nations, and in Spain as the generous and honest auxiliary of the justest cause, and which is most congenial to his own principles; and that if they object to the proposed measure, it is because they know the political situation of Spain, the force of opinion, the measures and appearances that are likely to warp it, and the irreparable mischief which would result from its influence if it were ill directed..

On the first glance, it will appear useless to write to your Excellency individually on this subject, as your Excellency may be supposed to possess full information concerning it from the notes communicated to Mr. Frere, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at this Court, and with those which I have addressed with the same view to Don Juan Ruiz de Apodaca. But Mr. Frere has discovered so much interest, anxiety, and activity relative to this business, notwithstanding its being in the course of discussion at this Court, that I deemed it most proper to address myself to your Excellency personally, that you might be more amply and certainly informed about it.

Being in duty bound both as a Spaniard and public character to recognise in your Excellency an enlightened statesman who is all uprightness, and who, through the medium of his virtues, influences the deliberations of his government, I have the honour to entreat you that you will weigh the above statement, which cannot fail of producing in your Excellency and the British Ministers that conviction which the Supreme Junta is solicitous about, as well as that justice which its honest sentiments deserve.

As to myself, I have the honour to assure your Excellency of my constant and respectful consideration.

God preserve your Excellency many years.

Your Excellency's, &c.,

MARTIN DE GARAY.

MY DEAR CANNING, Jonquières, 25th March, 1809.

The papers which accompany my despatch will show you the alarming state in which we are, and I have no doubt the representations of the Generals will confirm it. I understand that our actual fighting force is nothing like the number, or even two-thirds of the number, mentioned in your letter. Soult will probably soon be in possession of Oporto. If, instead of pursuing Cuesta, Victor (who has been joined by Sebastiani) should penetrate this country, his progress would be irresistible; and this place is ill calculated for an obstinate resistance at the last.

There is also a very considerable force at Salamanca, by no means held in check by Romana, of whom we know little or nothing, ready to make any movement against this country. Nothing but the most immediate and extensive reinforcements can put our security upon any other ground than the pleasure and choice of the enemy.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Stanmore, 9th April, 1809.

You will receive herewith enclosed the substance of intelligence received from General Beresford with respect to the advance of the French army

towards Oporto, and against General Cuesta's army, which has retreated upon the Guadiana. I have not by the present conveyance received any despatches from Sir John Cradock, which has probably been occasioned by his absence from Lisbon when the vessel sailed.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your faithful and obedient servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Advices have been received from Major-General Beresford, Commander of the Portuguese army, dated Lisbon, 24th March.

These state that on account of the advance of Marshal Victor, who had been joined by Sebastiani's division, which augmented his army to 33,000 men—5000 of it cavalry, but in bad order—General Cuesta had left his positions, and was retreating across the Guadiana, but had not communicated his intentions to the British officers. General Cuesta began his march on the 20th March.

Accounts had also been received by him from Oporto, which state that the Portuguese troops had risen against their General, Bernardino Freire, and massacred him; they had then obliged Baron Eben to take the command. Baron Eben gained advantages in actions with two corps of the French, but at length Marshal Soult's cavalry turned his position at Braga, and obliged him to abandon Braga, and retire to Oporto, where he had arrived, and there was much confusion.

General Beresford thinks Soult will not pass the Douro without some combined movement from Salamanca, or unless Marshal Victor, having driven Cuesta to a distance, and left a corps to watch him, should enter by the Alentejo.

General Beresford intends collecting the Portuguese force as much as possible, and making it act with the British.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

DEAR WELLESLEY, Stanmore, 9th April, 1809.

I take chance of this communication finding you at Portsmouth. Should any vessel arrive with letters from Lisbon before you get off, you may open and read any despatches addressed to me either by Sir J. Cradock or General Beresford.

Ever, my dear Wellesley, yours sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

The Chevalier de Souza Coutinho to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

DEAR SIR, London, 9th April, 1809.

I called at your house just a moment after your departure; and although I would not, as I wrote to Mr. Canning, incur the blame even of a wish to detain you a minute, yet I cannot help expressing the regret not to have seen you once more.

I am confident you are as much convinced of the sincerity of the joy I

manifested on being informed of your appointment to the command of the army in Portugal, as assured of the truth of the profession I made in the presence of Mr. Canning, that I was ready to furnish you with every local information it would be in my power to give you, and that you had but to command it.

Since we separated on Tuesday last I have been thinking on some subjects that I had no opportunity to mention to you at our interview; and although not requested, I think it right to inform you of what I would have said verbally, and it appears to me that this form of a private letter is preferable to an official communication through his Excellency Mr. Canning.

I have been long since informed, both by English and Portuguese gentlemen of respectability, that some dissatisfaction existed in Portugal as to the mode adopted by the British Commissariat of addressing themselves to the country magistrates; and the requisitions ordered by the latter not having at all times been regularly paid, I am told that some discontent prevails amongst those who furnished the animals or articles required.

Considering the services that the British army renders to Portugal, if the government of that country was in a pecuniary situation to be able to defray these arrears, I would have advised them rather to pay them than to permit any murmurs to subsist amongst the lower classes; but this not being the case, and in whatever manner the accounts may be settled afterwards, it seems to me that a remedy to this evil ought to be provided for. You, most undoubtedly, will have thought of it, since in your despatch of the 18th August last you have manifested your opinion about the British commissariat. I will only state, for your information, what has been suggested to me, that all the wants of the army would have been better supplied, and the people of that country satisfied, if, instead of requisitions to the magistrates, the British Commissariat would direct all its bargains to be made through respectable houses long established and accredited in trade in the two principal towns of Lisbon and Porto; these houses would then apply to the magistrates, if necessary, and would be responsible to the parties.

Another recommendation has been made to me, of the importance of which you are the better judge; that a part of the arms and ammunition that the British government may be disposed to send to Portugal should be forwarded direct to Porto for the troops in the northern provinces; in short, for every service to be performed to the north of the line between the sea and Almeida: 1st, to avoid the double voyage from Porto to Lisbon and back again; 2ndly, on account of the northern winds generally blowing on that coast in the ensuing months; 3rdly, on account of the accidents that schooners sent from Lisbon may meet with off the bar of Porto (as lately happened to one captured by the French, then recaptured, sent to England, and detained here until a convoy sailed); and lastly, for the purpose of gratifying the inhabitants of the northern provinces, of late in some dissatisfaction with Lisbon.

It has been equally recommended to me to suggest that ammunition should be sent from this country rather than lead, labour being dearer at present in Portugal, and time most precious there.

I finish with an observation which I need not much impress upon your mind. I am told that the English soldiers returning from Spain acknowledge the difference of treatment they met with from the lower classes in

Portugal. Whatever motives may have existed of late to the contrary, and in spite of the few partisans the French may have kept there (less certainly than in any other country in Europe), the fact is, that in the bottom of their hearts the generality of the Portuguese are all prepossessed in favour of the English. The Portuguese allow much to the difference of manners: a long intercourse with the English has rendered them insensible to the difference of religion. The soldiers at least have no objection to British officers, and if they form a good opinion of them; attach themselves extremely to their commanders; but they don't like harsh manners, so that with a very little attention and general civilities the English officers will be obeyed, esteemed, and beloved.

I conclude by assuring you that, should you consider my interference here of any use towards promoting your military plans, you have but to write me a line, and command me.

I have the honour to remain, with the greatest regard, dear Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

THE CHEVALIER DE SOUZA COUTINHO.

MEMORANDUM BY SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY. [151.]

11th April, 1809.

From the late accounts from Portugal, it seems evident that a determination has been taken by the enemy to make a rapid advance into Portugal, for which purpose a combined operation seems to have been planned by the corps of Soult, supported by that at Salamanca in the north and by Victor in the south. It is plain the general movement indicates the immediate attempt at driving the English from the Peninsula.

From the date of the last accounts (25th) from Lisbon, and calculating the period before Sir Arthur Wellesley can arrive in the Tagus, he feels satisfied that affairs must be decided prior to his getting there; and as the enemy's proceedings have assumed so certain a shape, Sir Arthur apprehends one of the three following alternatives must occur: either that he will find General Cradock has been engaged and successful in the field; that he will find the British army re-embarked; or that General Cradock will be so far engaged in a scene of operations as to render it a doubtful point how far it may be consistent with general advantage that the command should devolve upon another.

Had the enemy remained longer passive, as there was reason to apprehend from the sickness said to be in Soult's army, and had not Sebastiani joined Victor so quickly, time would have been gained, and the whole force destined for Portugal would

have arrived, in which case the strong defensive position towards Santarem might have been completely occupied and well defended; whereas now the troops there, without more than one regiment of cavalry, were not sufficient to take that position. And if the left bank of the Tagus should not have been secured by some force (against that of Victor advancing), the British troops, if forced in front of Lisbon, would lose their harbour by having the enemy on the heights on the left bank of the river, and would be reduced to embark at Cascaes, which would be uncertain in case of bad weather.

In the event of General Cradock's success in any repulse of the enemy, Sir Arthur could not reconcile it to his feelings to supersede him.

In the event of failure, and a re-embarkation having commenced or being completed, Sir Arthur wishes to know if he, with his whole force, is to return to England or go to Gibraltar? As it is pretty evident that British troops will not at present be admitted into Cadiz, would government wish so large a force, with cavalry, to get so far off as Gibraltar? If Sir Arthur precedes his convoy in a fast-sailing frigate, he might find things, on his arrival in the Tagus, in such a state as to make a general knowledge of the wishes of His Majesty's government in this respect essential.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Downing Street, 11th April, 1809.

I am to acquaint you that upon a full consideration of the state of affairs in Portugal, as communicated in the despatches received up to the 24th ultimo inclusive from Lisbon, it does not appear to His Majesty's government expedient that any alteration should take place in the measures in progress for reinforcing the British army in that country.

Should the British army be unfortunately compelled to evacuate Portugal, His Majesty, notwithstanding the late refusal to admit his troops into Cadiz, is nevertheless prepared to renew that offer on the same conditions; and, in the event of its acceptance, it is the King's pleasure that the whole force now in Portugal, including the cavalry, should be disembarked at Cadiz, from thence to be employed in such manner as may appear to you expedient for the support of the common cause.

Should this proposal of generous and disinterested aid be again declined by the government of Spain, it is His Majesty's intention (unless you receive orders to the contrary) that, after reinforcing the garrison of Gibraltar to 8000 British infantry, the detailed arrangements for

which you will concert with Sir John Cradock, you do return home with the remainder of the force.

A copy of these instructions will be sent to Mr. Frere, through whom, in the above contingency, you will make the offer directed to the Central government.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Downing Street, 11th April, 1809.

In the event of the British army returning to England; it is the King's pleasure that three companies of British artillery, of those now in Portugal, should be left at Gibraltar.

The detachment of the 20th Light Dragoons, for whom a remount of 200 horses is under orders from hence, you will recollect, has been already ordered to join their regiment in Sicily. If the 200 horses should not be arrived at the time of their being so detached, you will complete them by drafts from the other cavalry regiments, which will afterwards be replaced by the horses intended for the 20th.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Downing Street, 11th April, 1809.

If circumstances, on your arrival in Portugal, shall render it, in your judgment, expedient to place yourself under the orders of Lieutenant-General Sir John Cradock, you will deliver to him the enclosed despatch.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

To Viscount Castlereagh. [152.]

MY DEAR LORD, Portsmouth, 12th April, 1809.

Charles arrived this morning, and we intend endeavouring to sail this afternoon, notwithstanding that the wind is contrary. As it is possible, however, that it may prevent us from getting out, I take the opportunity of the return of the messenger to

draw your attention again to the orders which you have last sent me in respect to my leaving the command in the hands of Sir John Cradock.

It occurred to me when I read the accounts of the state of affairs in Portugal up to the 25th of March, that it might be expedient that Sir John Cradock should continue to exercise the command after I should arrive at Lisbon, even if no event should have occurred; and I certainly considered that I could not with propriety assume the command if he had been in any manner successful. The question whether it is expedient or not that I should assume the command will become difficult only in case no event should have occurred, and the difficulty will consist in its being one personal to the two parties most interested in it, and resting entirely upon a consideration of their personal qualifications and means of bringing the army through the difficulties in which it is supposed they will be involved.

The decision of this delicate question must, in a great measure, rest with me, and I hope that I have fairness and firmness to decide it according to the best of my judgment.

I acknowledge that I think I shall find the difficulty of making the decision much increased by having in my possession the orders sent to me last night, and I could prefer to let the decision rest, as, indeed, it must in any case, on my private judgment.

The only possible inconvenience which can result from my want of these official orders is, that General Cradock may be inclined to refuse remaining in the command of the army, and that his remaining in command would be in fact an official irregularity. But it must be recollected, that if he is likely to refuse the command in this case, he would take it unwillingly in the other; and in respect to the official irregularity, I conceive that it would be removed by both of us stating to the Secretary of State our opinion that on my arrival we considered it essential that he should retain the command.

I wish, upon the whole, not to have these despatches; and as we may be detained, I beg you to reconsider the necessity of leaving them with me. If we should be able to sail, or if you should decide to leave them in my possession, you may depend upon it that I will endeavour to decide upon the delivery of

them, or otherwise, according to the best of my judgment; and pray send down the messenger as soon as you can, in case I should be detained here.

My dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Downing Street, 11th April, 1809.

Brigadier-General Stewart, on his arrival in town, has, in obedience to your orders, communicated to me your very honourable feelings of disinclination to interfere with Sir John Cradock's command in Portugal, in the event of finding that officer engaged in active operations in the field. Should this case exist, which you have represented as by no means improbable from the movements the enemy is making towards Portugal, His Majesty trusts that the same feelings of zeal for his service which induce this suggestion on your part will determine you to place yourself under the orders of Sir John Cradock until His Majesty's further pleasure is known, and I have no doubt that every communication which you may have with Sir John Cradock on this point will be conducted on both sides by considerations only of what may at the moment be most for the advantage of His Majesty's service.

I am, Sir, your most obedient and humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, St. James's-square, 13th April, 1809.

I consider that you have the most entire discretion to abstain from making any communication to Sir J. Cradock under the instructions sent you, which were framed only with a view of giving a regular sanction to any arrangement with respect to command, which, under peculiar circumstances, you and Sir J. Cradock might, upon personal communication, deem best for the King's service. They were not meant to encourage any unnecessary alteration of the former orders to Cradock to deliver over the command to you; they were not intended to force Sir J. Cradock to continue in a temporary command under circumstances unpleasant to his own feelings; they were merely calculated to give the King's sanction to a suspension of the former orders to Sir J. Cradock, which he might otherwise consider obligatory, if the circumstances should induce you to propose, and him to concur in, the propriety of such a suspension. It certainly did appear to the King's government, that, if such an arrangement once took place, the moment when it should cease, and the former arrangement revive, was a point of so much delicacy, it was hardly fair to leave it to the parties concerned to settle; and that a point of this nature hanging upon circumstances might be productive of much embarrassment to both.

It was therefore decided, that, in the event of *your determining* to leave the command with Cradock, he should continue to exercise it till he received further orders from home.

Where there is no difference of opinion as to the substance, my wish would certainly have been, in the execution of a suggestion entirely proceeding from yourself, to have conformed implicitly to your feelings upon it; but the subject having been brought under the consideration of the government, the cabinet having felt themselves called upon to form an opinion upon it, and that opinion having been submitted to the King, I do not feel that I can now propose a reconsideration of it without considerable delay and inconvenience, and I persuade myself from the terms in which your letter is expressed, that under these circumstances you would not wish the question to be revived.

Ever, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

[153.] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Portsmouth, 13th April, 1809.

The messenger who will deliver you this letter takes up despatches just arrived from Lisbon in the *Iris*, and I have opened the letter from Cradock to your brother, according to your desire. The progress of events is exactly what was expected it would be, and Cradock appears to have determined to remain in his position in the neighbourhood of Lisbon.

The captain of the *Iris* informs me that, as he was coming out of the Tagus, he saw a fleet of transports going in, and he spoke a merchantman, by which he was informed that the transports had troops on board.

The wind is still contrary, and it blows so hard that it is impossible to go to sea. It rains, however, and we hope that the rain will change the wind by to-morrow morning.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P.S. If there should be any alteration in the orders to me in consequence of these despatches, have a telegraph message sent to stop us at daylight in the morning till the messenger will arrive.

To the Duke of Richmond. [154.]

My dear Duke, Portsmouth, 14th April, 1809.

I am still detained here by contrary winds, which have blown for these two days past with considerable violence.*

In the mean time affairs are in a critical state in Portugal. We have accounts from thence of as late a date as the 3rd April. Soult, who had advanced from Galicia, and had defeated some small Portuguese corps at Chaves and Braga, had advanced to Oporto, which town he took on the 29th March. His corps consisted of about 15,000 men. There was another French corps, of about 10,000 men, advancing from Salamanca, and had arrived at San Felices, on the road to Almeida.

Marshal Victor, at the head of another, consisting of about 35,000, had lately driven the Spanish army, under Cuesta, from the bridge at Almaraz, upon the Tagus; and had since destroyed Cuesta's army, in an action fought upon the Guadiana; and had afterwards arrived about the 1st April at Badajoz.

Hill's corps entered the Tagus on the 4th or 5th, having been seen by the vessel which brought the last accounts; so that by the 5th or 7th we shall have about 22,000 British troops in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, and whatever Portuguese troops they may have.

The plan of operations for the French will be to move Victor's corps from Badajoz to Abrantes; then cross the Tagus; and as soon as that corps is ready to move on towards Lisbon, to bring on the other two weaker corps from Oporto and Salamanca; and the whole to join in the neighbourhood of Santarem; unless, indeed, they should be certain that Cradock cannot move, in which case they will move down according as they may find it convenient.

As soon as the junction and co-operation of the three French corps shall be secure, they will detach from 5000 to 10,000 across the Tagus to the southern bank, where we have not a man, either British or Portuguese. They will post this corps upon the heights of Almada, which, you will recollect, are opposite Lisbon, and in their continuation command the harbour. As soon as they will have possession of this ground, the Admiral will find out that he cannot remain there with his ships of war;

* The *Surveillante* frigate, in which Sir A. Wellesley sailed, was very nearly lost in bad weather, at the back of the Isle of Wight, in the night after quitting Spithead

and the General, that he cannot embark his troops; and by this manœuvre alone the French will obtain possession of Lisbon, most probably before I shall arrive there. If they should not make this detachment, I have no doubt that Lisbon may be, and will be, defended; and I have long determined to fortify the heights of Almada, so as to be able to hold them with a small body of men, as the first step I should take upon my arrival.

You shall hear from me constantly.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Downing Street, 14th April, 1809.

Should you, in execution of my orders of the 11th instant, have occasion to proceed, with the whole of your force, to the southward before the determination of the Spanish government as to your reception at Cadiz is ascertained, it is the King's pleasure that you do repair, in the first instance, to Gibraltar, and not to Cadiz, unless previously assured of being admitted.

As it is material, however, that the intentions of the Spanish government should be known without delay, Mr. Frere will be instructed to press for a decision on this point, in order that His Majesty's government may know how far they are to consider the force now in Portugal is required for service in Spain, or disposable, in the event of the evacuation of Portugal, for other services.

Mr. Frere will communicate to you, for your guidance in the execution of the orders you have received, the result of his inquiries.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

DEAR WELLESLEY, St. James's Square, 14th April, 1809.

The accounts are very unfavourable from Portugal, but not such as to induce the King's government to make any alteration in the course they are pursuing. The only additional instruction that occurs is to avoid the appearance of being a second time refused at Cadiz. With this view, we think it desirable that the army should rendezvous at Gibraltar rather than in Cadiz Bay. The troops can be landed there, if necessary for their health and accommodation, either within or without the fortress.

We shall also have time to send you any further instructions that circumstances may point out before your arrangements can be completed for breaking up the army.

Yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

A.D.A.Q.M.G. Monro to Field Marshal Beresford.

SIR, Monasterio, 15th April, 1809.

I trust that ere this the arrival of Colonel D'Urban has put your Excellency in possession of the operations of the adverse armies since I had the honour of communicating them to you in person at Lisbon. The unfortunate result of the attack made on the French position at Medellin on the 28th ultimo has not induced the enemy to make any movement of importance. They still occupy the line of Talavera, Lobon, Merida, and Medellin. From whence proceeds this unusual inactivity I am at a loss to guess, but I think it probable that Marshal Victor is delaying his operations until Sebastiani (who has returned to the province of Toledo) shall have made such advances as will enable them to carry on in conjunction, by the two great passes through the Sierra Morena, their attack on the four kingdoms of Andalusia. Victor is drawing his force towards his left: this, perhaps, favours my idea. General Sebastiani has with him about 12,000 men; his exact position I am unacquainted with, but have no reason to suppose he is making rapid advances.

General Cuesta is diligently employed in the reorganisation of his army, and the scattered forces are daily collecting. Our strength is estimated at 11,000 infantry and* ; of the infantry I think this number overrated, the cavalry correct. We are to be joined by from 9000 to 10,000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry; we shall then again wear the appearance of an army. General Echavarria is in advance with 1500 men at El Puente de Cantos; he is a bold and active partisan, and keeps the enemy confined. The Duque de Alburquerque has been advanced to the rank of Lieutenant-General, and commands *pro tempore* the Army of the Centre: it is respectable. In Catalonia affairs wear a favourable aspect; the enemy are preparing to evacuate Barcelona, and with this view have commenced the demolition of Mont Juiz.

In Galicia the peasantry have returned to a sense of that duty which they owe to their lawful sovereign, and have taken from the enemy the town of Vigo and its garrison, consisting of 1300 men. On the whole the affairs of Spain look bright; but, alas! the people have no confidence in their government, and I may even say mistrust it. How far this opinion may be just, or how far the present inactivity of the enemy in the field may be connected with some intrigue in the cabinet, time will alone show; but certain it is, that the disloyal schemes of the Conde d'Urbino were to have opened to them their entrance into Andalusia: happily these schemes have been frustrated.

Badajoz has been strengthened by 800 of their best troops from Alcan-

* Blank in manuscript.

tara. This was done by the Governor of the former place without the knowledge of the Captain General, and it leaves the latter place defenceless; an important consideration, looking to the Portuguese territory. Badajoz is now considered as safe.

I proceed to-morrow to the advanced posts to make an exact reconnaissance, and any commands your Excellency may think proper to honour me with, I shall execute to the best of my abilities with pleasure.

I have the honour to be

Your Excellency's most obedient humble Servant,

GEORGE MONRO.

Heads of Intelligence from Captain M'Kinley at Vigo.

April 13, 1809.—The *Loire* landed arms and ammunition at Corcubion, and sailed for England again with a Spanish Deputy.

April 13.—The French attacked and carried the bridge of St. Piao, near Vigo, with 1500 infantry and some cavalry, and lost an officer and some men; they halted at Povrino and meditated an attack on Vigo, but seeing the English troops on the heights (300 marines) and the castle prepared, on the 14th, at night, they retreated to St. Jago by the bridge of St. Piao. They had escorted 700 of Soult's convalescents to Tuy. In their route they burnt and massacred everything. Tuy was evacuated, and the French marched to Valença to join in an attack upon Silveira.

April 12.—Francisco João Gomez de Molta left Vianna at noon. At Valença 500 French: these were the remains of 2000 who had left Oporto to reinforce Tuy, and take possession of Valença; it was reported they had lost 1500 men in repeated attacks.

April 21.—A letter from Captain Capel of the *Endymion* at Finisterre states that on the 20th an attack was made on the town of Corcubion and the neighbouring villages by a detachment of the enemy with artillery from St. Jago, which they destroyed, and it is feared the greatest part of the arms which the *Loire* had landed fell into their hands. Captain Capel had, however, got 800 muskets and 100 kegs of ball cartridges, which he sent to Vigo, to Captain M'Kinley.

Marquis of Romana.—On the 25th of March the Marquis attacked the enemy at Villa Franca, and of 11,000 French only 700 are reported to have been saved. The 10th instant the Marquis was at Oviedo with 20,000 men, 15,000 of whom are armed, and 10,000 Asturians. His advanced guard are within five leagues of Lugo, amounting to 5000 men exclusive of the above, commanded by General May. The Marquis had formed a junta at Monforte.

It is reported the French have evacuated St. Jago.

April 16.—The French evacuated Tuy, destroying every cannon and throwing the ammunition into the river, as also the muskets, after breaking them; crossed the river to Valença, where they did the same; then proceeded to Vianna, destroying everything as they passed; they arrived there the 19th, consisting of 4 generals and about 3000 men, from which they marched in great haste to Oporto. The mate of the *Pomona* transport,

who was prisoner with them, made his escape from Vianna, and gives this intelligence: he says the army is mostly composed of Germans, who are all anxious to desert to us, and only wait a favourable opportunity. The French are stated to be much alarmed, and in confusion, and to be in a most miserable state from fatigue and harassing marches.

Translation of Intelligence from Coruña and Ferrol.

April 13.—On the 10th April they began to dismantle the walls of the artillery, and have not left a piece; they have placed them all on the walls of the Alta Ciudad, which they intend to defend.

Marshal Ney marched out the 13th for Lugo with 4000 men. In St. Jago there are 2000 men with 11 pieces of cannon; they say they are to march for Pontevedra. 500 men left in Coruña, 500 men in Ferrol, so that they have not enough left to relieve guard: but they say they mean to unite to make a grand stroke (probably at Romana). The French are in very low spirits. On the 11th they took a servant of Romana's brother, with his equipage, which had been here since the day of Travadad. I warn you to be cautious, as there are many traitors; Don Philip de Lara is one, and if you could seize him, it would be of great service. The inhabitants of Coruña are almost all traitors.

Give timely notice to all the posts of Ney's departure; he took the road to Lugo. It is said they mean to join all their forces from St. Jago and Mondenids, in all about 10,000 men.

J. H. Frere, Esq., to Lieut.-General Sir J. Cradock.

SIR, Seville, 21st April, 1809.

The copies of intercepted letters which I have the honour to transmit will enable you, upon your own judgment, to form a satisfactory conclusion upon the point respecting which in your last letter you express yourself as particularly anxious, namely, the intention of the enemy with regard to a movement into Portugal from the side of Estremadura. The letters of latest date and greatest authority seem to speak decidedly of the march of an army against this city; but as it is probable that the destruction of a British army, and the rescue of Marshal Soult, would at the present moment be considered as objects preferable to every other, I have much satisfaction in informing you that General Cuesta's army, which consists at this moment of 24,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, and which by the arrival of daily reinforcements will be increased to the amount of 25,000 infantry and at least 4000 cavalry in the course of a week, have received orders to observe a strictly defensive system, from the consideration that a second defeat on the part of this army might enable Marshal Victor either to march himself or to detach considerably against the British force while advancing northward to the attack of Marshal Soult. If Marshal Victor should evacuate the country which he now occupies, and undertake a march to the relief of Marshal Soult, General Cuesta would advance in proportion and endeavour to harass and detain him as far as

possible without risking a general action. This latter point I consider as agreed on, and with respect to the first I have the honour to enclose copies of the instructions transmitted to General Cuesta.

I have been urged by the Junta to represent in the strongest terms the necessity of some immediate active operation on the part of the British; but ignorant as I am even of the number of our troops in Portugal, and without any pretension to judgment in a case which must depend entirely upon military combination, I can only represent to you their wishes and the arrangements which they have made in the expectation that it may be found possible to realise them.

Enclosed I send a statement of the enemy's force, which appears detailed with sufficient exactness.

The detention of the 40th regiment has not proceeded from any inattention to your repeated instances upon that subject, but from the idea, which I found likewise entertained by the officers, that, under the then situation of things, military delicacy would hardly admit of their abandoning a point so immediately menaced. I shall consult the feelings of Colonel Kemmis upon this point, and shall be entirely guided by them, having no wish, and being very far from the pretension, of interfering with or deferring the execution of your orders upon any other ground.

At the instance of the government I took upon myself to sound Colonel Kemmis upon the subject of an advance to Santa Olalla, but I found his opinion so decided and his reasons so satisfactory against a movement of that kind, that I did not think it proper to propose the subject to him in a formal shape.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect, Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

J. H. FRERE.

[ENCLOSURES.]

Le Général de Division Solignac à son Frère Michel.

Au Quartier Général à Salamanque, le 23 Mars, 1809.

Nous partons demain matin avec une division (Lapisse) qui doit pénétrer par Abrantes en Portugal. J'espère avoir rejoint le Quartier Général du Duc de Dalmatie sous 8 à 10 jours; et comme l'état de ma blessure m'oblige d'aller aux eaux de Barège, j'aurois le plaisir de vous embrasser à Madrid dans le courant de mois de Mai prochain. Je vous prie de m'adresser vos lettres à Lisbonne.

A M. le Commandant Berton, Chef de l'Etat Major de la Division Valence à Tolède.

MON CHER BERTON, Merida, 1 Avril, 1809.

Nous avons eu deux très belles affaires le 17 et 28 du dernier à Mesa de Ibor et à Medellin. Dans cette dernière journée nous avons tué à l'ennemi 10,000 hommes bien comptés, et nous leur avons fait 4000 à 5000 prisonniers, pris 6 drapeaux, et 16 pièces de canon.

Nous attendons l'arrivée de la 2e. division, qui doit déboucher par Alcantara pour marcher sur Seville.

Les Généraux Pactor et Palhod sont partis pour la France. Le Général

Callaque commande une brigade de la 3e. division. Gaut ne commande plus le Quartier Général; il est remplacé par M. Bigen.

GAULE.

King Joseph to General Sebastiani.

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL SEBASTIANI, Madrid, le 9 Avril, 1809.

Je reçois votre lettre. Le Général Victor doit se tenir entre Merida et Badajoz jusqu'à ce qu'il ait des nouvelles du Général Soult, et qu'il ait été joint par le Général Lapisse.

Je ne veux rien entreprendre sur Valence tant que je n'aurais des nouvelles du Général Ney, et que je ne saurais la destruction totale du corps de la Romana.

Comptez, mon cher Sebastiani, que je ferai toujours ce qui vous sera agréable, et que je solliciterai moi même votre départ d'Espagne dès que je croirai que vous aurez mieux à faire ailleurs pour votre gloire qu'en Espagne; jusque-là je vous garde. Vous connaissez ma vieille et jeune amitié pour vous.

Votre affectionné,

JOSEPH.

Le Maréchal Jourdan à M. le Général Sebastiani.

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL, Madrid, 10 Avril, 1809.

J'ai reçu la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 8 du courant, et je l'ai mise sous les yeux du Roi. S. M. me charge d'avoir l'honneur de vous dire qu'elle ne juge pas àpropos de faire attaquer les rétranchemens de la Sierra Morena avant le moment où M. le Duc de Bellune se portera sur Seville, et que M. le Duc de Bellune ne doit se mettre en marche que quand il aura été rejoint par la division Lapisse, et quand il aura des nouvelles de M. le Duc de Dalmatie.

En attendant, M. le Général, S. M. désire que vous vous occupiez à disperser les rassemblemens qui se montrent de tems en tems derrière l'armée; à bien assurer vos communications; à désarmer la province que vous occupez, et y ramener l'ordre et la confiance.

Voilà, M. le Général, ce que S. M. m'a expressément ordonné de vous écrire.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

Le Maréchal de l'Empire, Major-Général de S. M. C.,

JOURDAN.

General Belliard to General Sebastiani.

MY DEAR GENERAL, Madrid, 10th April, 1809.

I thank you for your good memory. I have learnt with pleasure that you have recovered your health. Why did you not put an end to the canaille? The opinion of the Madrilenians does not improve: it is true that the ministers of the Church do not put themselves to much expense to form it. You were right in saying that the ministry . . . . . How is it that La Mancha is not organised? Why do you not make it known to King Joseph and to Napoleon? Why do you not establish the new system? I think you would do well, my dear General, to avail yourself of the moments of tranquillity to overrun the country with two moveable columns, and disarm the people entirely.

BELLIARD.

Orders of the Supreme Junta to General Cuesta.

MOST EXCELLENT SIR, Seville, 20th April, 1809.

The Supreme Junta of the kingdom orders me to express to your Excellency that, supposing the enemy's force which took possession of Alcantara to be on their march to reinforce Victor, it is to be inferred that they intend to put in execution the attack, as ordered by King Joseph in his letter which I transmitted to your Excellency yesterday.

His Majesty, in consequence, having consulted the general Military Junta, and concerted measures with the Minister of His Britannic Majesty, judges necessary that, taking up such positions as you may deem most advantageous, you should avoid a general attack, disputing with the enemy any passage they may attempt against those points and this city; that these measures are necessary from the consideration that on your Excellency's army depends the salvation of the country, as does that of the French on the force under Victor; and that, continuing the operations of your advanced posts, your Excellency should hinder the enemy from molesting and pillaging the villages. In this understanding the English Minister has promised to make the strongest representations to the Commander in Chief of the British troops, in order that, going in force against Soult, he may beat him, and then, subsequently, come down in respectable numbers by Elvas for the purpose of agreeing upon the future plan of operations.

On this account His Majesty thinks that it might be advisable for you to write to the British Commander in Chief, pointing out to him the great utility which such a movement would be of to the common cause.

His Majesty is also of opinion that, considering Badajoz has at present nothing to fear in its rear, and in the event of your being attacked by Victor, a sortie should be made of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in order to harass him and call off his attention; and if your Excellency should judge it expedient that the Army of the Centre should make any movement, you will give such instructions to Venegas as you shall think fit. And, lastly, the annexed letter is enclosed for your Excellency's guidance, His Majesty not doubting that you will compel such peasants as have arms to repair wherever you may order them.

CORNEL.

Memoranda relative to Measures which, in the humble opinion of the undersigned, ought to be adopted in the present situation of the Affairs of Spain.

Seville, 21st April, 1809.

The most important object to be immediately attended to is to prevent the French troops from passing the *Sierra Morena*. Not a moment should be lost in sending the most peremptory orders to General Cuesta to act entirely upon the *defensive*, and to fortify in the strongest manner possible every position which he now holds. All the peasants in the country adjoining that quarter should be put in requisition directly to assist in these defences, and whatever tools are wanting for the construction of the works should be forwarded from this with the utmost expedition. The safety of Spain will depend almost entirely upon preventing the French from forcing that position. No success should induce General Cuesta to advance until either the French army under Marshal Victor retire from their present position, or unless the army of the English advance upon

Badajoz. The undersigned is confident that the French under Victor will soon begin the attack, if it has not already commenced; for, in their present situation, it is obvious that the possession of the passes of the *Sierra Morena* is of the highest importance to their interest. They have withdrawn all their outposts, and are uniting their forces for an attack upon Cuesta's army.

All the engineer officers should be sent without a moment's loss of time to General Cuesta to assist in superintending the construction of the defences, and a plentiful supply of grape shot should be sent for the use of the great guns placed in the defiles. It is supposed that Cuesta's army consists of about 30,000 men, including 6500 cavalry. As such a number of cavalry cannot be required in such a position, and with difficulty can be subsisted there, it is humbly recommended that 3500 of them should be sent to *La Mancha*, where their exertions may be of the most essential service to the army under General Venegas.

The army of General Cuesta should, however, be augmented with 10,000 infantry with the utmost expedition. If there are not arms sufficient for them, pikes should be given them, and let the recruits be then trained to the use of arms. It is unnecessary to retain any troops *here*. The defence of the *Sierra Morena is the true defence of Seville*, and upon *that* will depend entirely the possession of all the country on this side of Cadiz.

Every horse in the kingdom should be put in requisition by the government, and also many of the most active mules. In all the different towns and villages those persons the most capable of being made good horsemen should be immediately instructed in their exercise, and forwarded to Seville when complete. A great body of cavalry and of horse artillery will be of the most essential service, and upon them will in a great degree depend the speedy termination of the power of the French in this country. A body of 10,000 cavalry, well appointed and organised, would decide the fate of Spain at this moment. That number, attended with a certain proportion of flying artillery, would rid this country of every Frenchman in *three months*.

Every man capable of bearing arms as an infantry soldier should be called out throughout the whole kingdom, and immediately instructed in their exercise. If there are not muskets for them, they should be armed with a *pike*, and learnt to march, and to form into column and line. All those persons so called forth, if really requiring pecuniary support, should receive an allowance from government upon the days when they are exercised. Those in towns should be exercised for two hours every day, and those in the country should assemble twice in the week, upon convenient spots for their different places of abode; and when in some degree advanced in their discipline, should be formed into regiments and act together.

Every town and village in the kingdom should be fortified in the best possible manner consistent with the present circumstances, and the inhabitants should be enjoined to make every resistance in their power. The noble defence of Saragossa will undoubtedly be in their recollection; that defence, by impeding a large French army, saved the kingdom.

All the ordnance stores not immediately wanted, all the valuable property, and all the public archives should be sent directly from this to

Cadiz as a place of certain safety; for if the enemy should force the passes of the Sierra Morena, great confusion will inevitably prevail here, and much valuable property will be lost. A proclamation should be issued by the Supreme Junta in the most public manner, recommending to all families to send their valuable moveable property to Cadiz; and the Junta should state that this is done, not from any apprehension of the passes being forced, but from the propriety of placing the property of the inhabitants in a place of certain safety. The Junta should nominate two of their own body to remain in this town, in case the enemy should force the passes and advance upon Seville. The government should then remove their court to Cadiz. This should be proclaimed as the determination of the Junta immediately, which may afterwards, if necessity required their removal, prevent much confusion and bloodshed.

Every exertion should be used to complete the defences of this town expeditiously; and the inhabitants whose time is not employed in working for the government should be called forth to aid in so laudable an undertaking. Four months' supply of grain and provisions should be placed in the cathedral, and in other places where the best defence can be made. Returns should be immediately demanded from the adjacent country of the quantity of grain on hand, and the inhabitants should be compelled to sell to the government whatever exceeded a certain supply for their families, and the excess above four months for Seville be forwarded to Cadiz.

It would be of importance to ascertain directly the population of this town, and to arrange beforehand that the aged and children be removed upon the approach of the enemy to other towns and villages nearer to Cadiz, for their presence would render no service; on the contrary, consume the food necessary for the defenders. Those persons who are not desirous of remaining in the town to aid in the defence of it should be called upon to give in their names and places of abode within a given time to government, in order that they may calculate upon the quantity of provisions necessary for the four months' supply.

All the small craft of vessels and boats now at Cadiz should be directly ordered here to assist in removing whatever property is valuable from this, and a certain number of them should return afterwards here, and be kept for the purpose of removing the government to Cadiz in the event of the enemy's approach.

If the enemy force the passes of the Sierra Morena, and advance upon Seville, the general commanding the retreating troops should be directed to lay waste all the country through which they pass, and the Supreme Junta should warn the inhabitants to drive all their cattle to this side of the river upon the approach of the enemy.

A quantity of food for cattle should be put directly into different places of this town for supplying the cattle to be retained for the use of the defenders, and salted provisions and flour should also be laid in for the four months' supply for the garrison, with a quantity of firewood. It would also be desirable to have a quantity of flour baked into biscuit.

The above directions, if issued at this moment, may render service to the just cause for which this nation is sustaining so spirited a resistance, and will convince all Europe that the country of Spain never will be governed by a Frenchman.

The undersigned served his own country for above 24 years, both in military and civil situations, in various quarters of the globe; but in all the places he has been he can with truth state that he never witnessed more enthusiasm in the inhabitants than prevails in this country to defend the constitution of their nation from the encroachments of the French.

The Supreme Junta have certainly the means in their power of preserving the attachment of the nation by assuring them that, as soon as the common enemy have been exterminated from Spain, they will then most readily and cheerfully embrace the earliest opportunity of giving to the Spaniards that constitution which they may desire, and which, under Divine Providence, may be the best calculated to render the people happy.

Such is the anxious wish of the undersigned, who, equally with his nephew, Lord Cochrane, feels desirous of rendering any service in his power to the Spanish nation.

A. COCHRANE JOHNSTONE.

To *

DEAR SIR, City of Seville in Spain, 26th April, 1809.

The interest which you have always taken in the affairs of this country induces me to give you every information in my power which I have been enabled to collect since my arrival here. When I quitted England the end of March, the cause of the Spaniards was then considered as desperate, and that they must submit to the power of the French. Such I can assure you is not the case, and that this country never will submit to be governed by a Frenchman. The greatest enthusiasm prevails throughout every part of the kingdom; and if there were arms sufficient to put into the hands of the people, there would not be a Frenchman left in Spain in three months. I wish you were here to witness, as I have done, the anxiety of the peasants of this country to receive arms to march against the enemy, and the regret which is visible in their faces to know that there are *none in store* for them. I am anxious that you should be fully informed on this subject, and that you would employ your able pen in addressing the people of England to come forward with a subscription of arms to be sent to this country as expeditiously as possible. Grateful would the Spaniards be for old arms of every kind, which at the present moment would be of essential service.

I ought to begin with saying something in regard to the operations of the last winter, and particularly relative to the armies commanded by the Marquis de la Romana and the late Sir John Moore; but I wish to throw a veil over the misfortunes of these generals, from whose exertions great advantages were expected by our nation, particularly in a country possessing every advantage for making a vigorous defence. I shall confine myself solely to the actual positions of the different armies, upon which subject I can write to you with some degree of accuracy.

The army of the Spanish general Cuesta is encamped on the heights of *Monasterio* and *Santa Olalla*, in one of the passes of the *Sierra Morena*, at the entrance of the province of *Estremadura*, and this army now consists of about 30,000 men, including 6500 cavalry. The French army opposed to this force is commanded by Marshal Victor, and consists of about an

* It is not ascertained to whom this letter was addressed.

equal number. This important post is only about 75 English miles from this, is one of the roads into this fertile province, and upon the defence of it will depend entirely the possession by the Spaniards of all the country on this side of Cadiz. I enclose to you the "Gazette" of the other day, giving an account of an attempt on the part of the French to negotiate, which has been rejected by the Supreme Junta, and we expect every moment to receive accounts of this post being attacked by Marshal Victor.

The army of the Spanish general Venegas, stationed in the other important pass of the *Sierra Morena*, leading to *La Mancha*, consists of about 16,000 infantry, 1500 cavalry, and 7000 men without arms. This is a very strong pass, and this force is fully adequate for its defence. To this army is opposed the French, under General Sebastiani, which does not exceed 12,000 men.

General Blake has got the command of the provinces of *Murcia*, *Valencia*, and *Aragon*, and has now taken the command of the division of the army in the last province, and which consists of about 10,000 men. The province of Valencia has 23,000, including the garrison of that city, and Murcia musters about 10,000 men. To this army is opposed the French, commanded by Generals Mortier and Junot, and which does not exceed 15,000 men.

The Spanish army in Catalonia is commanded by General Reading, and amounts to above 30,000 men. To this army is opposed the French, commanded by General St. Cyr, and it does not exceed 17,000 men, including the garrison of Barcelona, which fortress you will recollect was put into the possession of the French before the revolution commenced by the infamous intrigues of the Prince of Peace.

The Marquis de la Romana, with a force of about 14,000 men, after having the other day attacked and made prisoners a French regiment in *Villa Franca*, has directed his course to the mountains of *Leon*, where he has united his forces with those of the Principality of Asturias, which has increased his army to 30,000 men. The position which this general has taken will enable him to cut off all communication between the French in Galicia and Madrid. In Galicia the French army is commanded by Marshal Ney, and consists of about 12,000 men, including the garrisons of Ferrol and Coruña. The army at Madrid is commanded by General Belliard, and it is supposed amounts to about 8000 men.

The French army which lately captured and plundered Oporto consists of about 9000 men, and it is supposed that this army is now marching to strengthen Marshal Victor, unless the communication be prevented by the English army from Lisbon; which in the present situation of affairs ought certainly to advance upon *Badajoz*.

The enemy's plan of operations is clearly stated in an intercepted letter from King Joseph, at Madrid, to Marshal Victor, which says, "General Sebastiani must immediately occupy himself in disarming and quelling the spirit of insurrection in *La Mancha*, and not by any means to attack the *Sierra Morena* until your Excellency has forced *Cuesta's* army, which you are not to attack until you are joined by La Pige's Division, and concerted your plans with *Marshal Soult*, who is at Oporto."

Such is the present situation of the different armies of the two nations. The force of the Spaniards could be augmented to any number if there were arms, and the spirit of insurrection against the French is general in

every province. The French force is dwindling away daily from sickness, and they receive no reinforcements. Contrast their present situation with that three months ago: Bonaparte then at the head of his seven favourite marshals and 228,000 men in this country; in possession of all the country of Spain on the other side of the Sierra Morena; his army in high health and spirits, and their communications with each other uninterrupted. What is it now? Bonaparte and his seven favourite marshals are out of Spain; the army, reduced to 100,000 men, scattered all over the country; and the communications with several of them cut off. The name of the French held by every Spaniard in the utmost abhorrence, and every province in Spain in insurrection against them.

Much military knowledge is not necessary to see what ought to be done. General Cuesta should undoubtedly strengthen by every possible means his present position, and act entirely upon the defensive. This pass of the *Sierra Morena* is not so strong as that where the army of General Venegas is placed, but I hope it will be found fully adequate for its defence. Cuesta is a brave and gallant officer; he has the confidence of the troops, and will, I am confident, make a noble defence.

We have accounts this day from Lisbon, stating that the English army there had taken the field, that it consisted of 23,000 men, and that Sir Arthur Wellesley was momently expected with 10,000 more, and to assume the command. We are in hopes that this army will advance immediately upon *Elvas* and *Badajoz*, which would certainly prevent the junction of Soult with Victor's army, and compel the last officer to retire with his force upon Madrid. This done, Cuesta would then effect a junction with the English army, which would then be fully adequate for offensive operations.

If the Marquis de la Romana's army could be augmented by a British force landed at Gijon, in the province of Asturias, and particularly of cavalry, the army of Marshal Ney would be cut off, and possession would then be obtained of Ferrol and Coruña. I am confident that a body of 10,000 British cavalry acting together, attended with a proportion of flying artillery, supplied with Shrapnel's shells, would in three months rid this country of every Frenchman.

It would be extremely desirable if a British force could be landed in Catalonia to assist General Reading. How profitably the army in Sicily under Sir John Stuart might be employed in that quarter, instead of being cooped up in that island, attended with an incredible expense to the English nation! Our fleets surely might secure Sicily without the troops, and the possession of it is not to be put in competition with the advantages which would be derived from Sir John Stuart's army acting in Catalonia, which would certainly drive the French beyond the Pyrenees, and secure the important port of Barcelona.

The Supreme Junta of this kingdom consists of 36 members, being the deputies from provinces, which send two each. Count Altamira, a grandee of Spain, is the president, a virtuous and well meaning man, and I must do him and the other members of the Supreme Junta the justice to state that I never saw more activity, vigilance, and attention to business than exists in their administration of the government. The contrast is so great betwixt our administration in London and the one here in the mode of executing the duties of it, that I cannot avoid giving you a detail of it.

At 9 o'clock every morning in the week the Supreme Junta assemble to transact business, and they remain until 2 o'clock. They then go to their respective houses to dinner about half-past 2 o'clock; they do not sit above an hour at table. They again assemble in the evening at 7 o'clock, and remain until 11 or 12 o'clock, agreeable to the business on hand. All the secretaries of state and other public officers are always ready to give audience, even to the lowest peasant if he wishes it, before 8 o'clock in the morning, and again in the evening, and they despatch business with a promptitude and regularity which does them infinite honour. There are no holidays in the different offices, *not even on Sundays;* every secretary of state and public officer (even under the old government) are every day in the year at their public boards. You hear of no turtle feasts, haunches of venison, or country seats; no expense for messengers carrying the red box at an enormous expense as in England, from one watering place to another. Don Francisco Saavedra is the Secretary of State for the Finance Department, and Don Martin Garay is the Minister for the State Department in the absence of Don Pedro Cevallos, now in England. These two men are highly esteemed by the nation, and justly so, if virtue, talents, and unremitting attention to their public duties are to be held in estimation.

Each member of the Supreme Junta has 6000 dollars a year (about 1200*l.*). They have no lords of the bedchamber, grooms of the stole, or sinecure placemen about them. The President has a guard of honour, which attends him going and returning from his house to the Palace where the Junta assemble; but this guard is composed of 180 young men of the town, who, at their own expense or that of their employers, find their horses and appointments, and it does not cost the nation one shilling.

It would afford you, I am confident, much satisfaction to observe the alacrity and anxiety of the peasants, daily flocking in here from all quarters of the country, to learn their exercise, and to receive what arms can be spared them. I never saw in any country such enthusiastic ardour for a military profession; and those who volunteer their services are all fine young men, accustomed from their infancy to the use of firearms, and well adapted to act as sharpshooters. This province of Andalusia alone could in ten days produce 80,000 such men. It is impossible not to feel sincere regret at observing the deficiency of firearms for them. England is the only place from which the Spaniards can procure them, and I entreat of you to exert your powerful eloquence in procuring a supply. I have promised all the aid in my power, and I have to request that you will put my name down (if you will set about a subscription) for a hundred muskets, with bayonets. I have written to order them, and have requested Mr. Abram Atkins of Finsbury-square to purchase and forward them to this country. He will, I am confident, take the trouble of receiving all that may be tendered of every sort and description of a military weapon, whether swords, guns, pistols, or pikes, all of which will be useful in this country.

I am, dear Sir, yours very faithfully,

A. COCHRANE JOHNSTONE.

P.S.—Since writing the above, accounts have been received this morning from *Barcelona* (the capital of Catalonia), that Marshal Mortier has retired

from that place, leaving only the foreigners in the garrison, and has taken hostages with him. He is gone apparently with the view of laying siege to *Gerona*, but it is strongly supposed that he has received orders to return to France immediately, and that such instructions have been sent to all the French generals. The packet arrived this morning from England, and brings the agreeable accounts that Sir Arthur Wellesley had actually sailed with a large force for Lisbon, which is intended to advance into Spain. I trust, however, that the army now there has already advanced upon Elvas and Badajoz, to cut off the communication of Soult with Victor's army. A Spanish officer was sent from the Junta the last week to Lisbon, to lay before the English general the actual position of the different armies, and the advantages which would arise from the army advancing upon *Badajoz*.

To all Corregidors, &c. [155.]

(Translation.) 1809.

You will take notice that I have directed the Commissaries attached to the British army to settle accounts for all supplies, means of transport, &c., received from the inhabitants of any part of Portugal, immediately upon the receipt of such supplies or means of transport, and either to pay for the same in ready money, or to give the owner a bill or bills upon the Commissary-General, at the head-quarters of the army, for their value.

Having made this arrangement for the benefit of the people of Portugal, I require from them that they shall assist the army with the provisions, supplies, and means of transport which may be wanted and the country can afford; and that if they should furnish these articles to any officer or soldier upon his receipt, they will send the receipt and their claim for payment to the Commissary-General at the head-quarters of the army, within one month after the period at which such receipt will have been granted.

The value of the articles for which receipts will have been granted will not be paid hereafter unless payment should be demanded within one month after the date of the receipt.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[156.] OBSERVATIONS UPON THE PLAN PROPOSED FOR THE PORTUGUESE COMMISSARIAT.

*_Page_ 1.—The Commissariat should be composed of a Commissary-General, Deputies, Assistants, Clerks, Treasurer, Accountants, Conductors, Sub-Conductors.

These denominations of officers would comprise all the functions required from the other officers specified in the text.

Page 2.—The Commissary-General and all the officers of the Commissariat should be appointed by a Minister of State or by the Commander in Chief. Whoever shall make the appointment should be answerable for the selection of competent persons.

The inferior Clerks might be appointed by the individual under whose authority it is intended they should be employed.

The Conductors should be appointed by the Commissary-General; but whoever may make the appointment should be answerable for the competency of the person to fulfil the duties of his appointment.

The continuance of the officers in their several places should be during pleasure.

The establishment must be a military one; the persons of whom it is composed should be liable to trial by military law (_Page_ 3); but the tenure or title by which they hold their employments should depend entirely upon the will of the government, and so should also their promotion.

Page 4.—It is the duty of the Commissary-General, and of the persons under his authority, to collect, to preserve in good condition, and to issue provisions and forage to the troops and to the horses and mules belonging to them. It is their duty also to provide the means of transporting the several articles from one place to another, and to furnish all other means of transport which the army may require.

Page 5.—The Commissary-General should, between the 24th and the 30th of each month, render to the Secretary of State and Commander in Chief a return of all such provisions as are in being in the different depôts of the kingdom and belonging to the army, stating what portion he has furnished in the preceding month, and giving in an estimate of the quantities

* The reference is to pages in a report.

which he thinks may be required of him in the following month, pointing out from whence they should be drawn and whither they should be transported; and besides this, he should give in a calculation of the expense likely to be incurred in each of the following articles: viz. Provisions and forage for the troops and their beasts, means of transport, also stating the purposes for which they will be required, and the salaries of the persons employed in the Commissariat.

These arrangements having been completed, and the funds necessary to meet the expenses of his department having been placed at the disposal of the Commissary-General, it will then become necessary to consider in what manner he shall make his purchases. These should always be made at the cheapest rate, and should be accompanied with certificates of the prices of them. After this, the object will be to ascertain the best way of keeping in good order the several articles, of making his issues to the troops, and of giving an account of the issues which he shall have already made. All these are matters of detailed regulation, which cannot fail to exist already in the department of the Commissariat, and nothing more will be necessary but to compel obedience to the regulations, whatever the nature of them may be, and to ensure the punishment of disobedience.

The estimate by the Commissary-General should comprise the value of the provisions which are to be bought by his deputies attached to the different divisions of the army or stationed in forts. These deputies must render accounts in the manner prescribed, and within the time limited, of the money which they have expended; but the Commissary-General and all his subordinate officers must be apprised that they will have to answer for the omissions of their inferiors if they do not give them up to punishment.

Page 17.—The Deputy-Commissaries must be under the immediate authority of the Commissary-General, and must be stationed in those places and attached to those divisions of the army which he may be pleased to fix upon.

All must be under the direction of a deputy, appointed by the Commissary-General, and charged with the duty of issuing the necessary orders. They must fulfil that portion of the obligations generally incumbent upon the Commissary-General

which he shall allot to them, whether it be in making purchases or looking to the preservation of the articles already purchased, watching over the transport of the same, and the issuing them to the inferior Commissaries for the supply of the troops, and directing the fulfilment of the general engagements of the Commissariat, and of the Commissaries attached to any particular division, or stationed in any fort or district, pursuant to the orders which they shall receive from the Commissary-General and to the general regulations of the service.

Every Deputy-Commissary through whose hands either money or any articles may pass must be answerable for such money or for such articles until he shall have been exonerated either by a receipt or some other official document which may be required.

Whenever the articles which shall have been entrusted to any Deputy-Commissary shall have been considered as of a quality unfit for the service, this circumstance must be made known to the Commissary-General; but the said articles must not be destroyed until they shall have been first examined by a Board of Officers, whose decision must be confirmed by the Commander in Chief.

The Commander in Chief shall then direct that the said articles be destroyed in the presence of the Board of Officers who had examined them, and nothing short of this order from the Commander in Chief should exonerate the Deputy or other Commissary.

Page 25.—I do not see that any advantage will result from making regulations for the Clerks of this department.

The Commissary-General will employ, whenever he may think fit, a Deputy-Commissary in each province, and will instruct him as to the nature of the services which will be required of him.

The Commissary-General should, nevertheless, place himself in communication with the magistrates in all the great cities and provinces, and should by their aid provide the means of supplying the small detachments of the army which move from one place to another along the high roads, by virtue of routes which the Quartermaster-General will give them.

Page 26.—In those provinces in which any species of grain may exist, it is clear that the Commissary-General must

employ some of his deputies to collect this grain, and he must render an account thereof in his return of the state of the depôts every month to the Secretary of State and the Commander in Chief.

Page 49.—The duties of the Deputy or Assistant-Commissaries attached to divisions consist especially in receiving or collecting provisions and forage for the use of these divisions, in taking care to preserve these articles in good condition, in effecting the transport of them from one place to another, in issuing them to the troops upon receiving proper documents and receipts, and in giving an account as well of the money expended as of the state of the depôts of provisions.

All these duties necessarily require regulations in detail from the Commissary-General, and the Commissaries attached to divisions or brigades must answer for the fulfilment of them.

Page 59.—The duty of directing the transports from one place to another, and watching over the transit of the several articles from one Commissary to another, might be fulfilled through the medium of one or more Deputies or Assistants under the direction of the Commissary-General, and in conformity with certain rules and orders, either general or particular, established for their government.

Page 69.—There ought to be a Treasurer of the Commissariat; but, as a general rule, no money ought to stop in the hands of the Commissary-General. He ought to have a credit opened with the military chest, in the beginning of each month, to meet that portion of the amount of his estimate which shall have been granted to him by the Secretary of State and by the Commander in Chief, and he ought to draw bills upon the military chest from time to time for the amount of his payments, never exceeding in any one month the sum total of his absolute necessities, stating on each bill what head of those services which are specified in his estimate is to be liquidated by the said bill.

In the same manner the Treasurer should keep an account of the payments made by the Commissary-General conformably to those heads, setting apart what the estimate of each month consists of; and every Commissary who lays out money should render an account after the same form to the Treasurer of the Commissariat.

Page 124.—I do not possess sufficient knowledge of the

Portuguese language, nor have I time to examine the detail of these regulations, the whole of which may probably be very expedient. Nevertheless, the duty of the Commissary-General is set forth generally in the observations which I have made. This duty both he and his Deputies and Assistants should fulfil, pursuant to certain convenient regulations.

In collecting provisions, care should always be taken to select them of the best quality and at the cheapest rate, and the object of all and every regulation should be to render this effect certain, as well as to show with exactness the sum of money which shall have been expended.

In receiving the provisions, the object of all and every regulation should be to obtain the certainty, by means of receipts or some other form, that the provisions have really been received by each of the persons through whose hands they shall have been stated to have passed.

In keeping the provisions in good condition, whether it be upon the march or in depôt, the object of every regulation should be to attach responsibility to the person charged with the care of them, in order to avoid waste or loss through negligence.

In making issues of the provisions, the object of regulations should be to exonerate the person who shall have made a just and true delivery of them, and to attach responsibility to the person who shall have received them; further, to ascertain the accuracy of his receipts, and to make him answerable as well for the quantity as the quality thereof.

In making a detailed issue of provisions, the object of regulations should be to ensure that every individual shall receive what belongs to him, and nothing more, and that the proper requisitions and receipts shall be passed by those who shall receive, and by the Commissary who shall make, the issue.

In procuring transports, the object of regulations should be to secure that the person who makes requisition for them shall apply to the proper magistrate, and shall not apply for more than is absolutely necessary.

In paying for transports, the object of regulations should be to make it certain that the owner of the transports shall receive the money which is due to him, and which is paid and carried to the account of the public.

The duties of magistrates form another subject, and are entirely distinct from the duties of the Commissary-General.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh. [157.]

MY LORD, Lisbon, 24th April, 1809.

A late regulation respecting the pay of the staff on foreign service having been just transmitted from England, and which differs materially from that which has been acted upon for some years past, particularly with regard to the heads of the staff, viz. the Quartermaster-General, the Adjutant-General, their deputies, and the Military Secretary, who are curtailed of one half of their usual allowance, as will be seen by the enclosed statement, I beg leave to submit to your Lordship the propriety of continuing the customary allowances to these officers, particularly as an assistant in either of these departments has, even in England, the allowance of 15 shillings *per diem*, which is 5 shillings more than the late regulation for the deputies; and as the lowest ranks in them, viz. Deputy-Assistants, receive the allowance of 10 shillings *per diem*, which is the same as now allotted to the Deputy-Quartermaster-General and the Deputy-Adjutant-General.

In some parts of the world where the late regulation formerly prevailed, it was even the custom to issue the additional allowance out of the extraordinaries of the army, which custom has latterly been abolished in order to simplify the accounts, and the whole pay has been drawn for under one head.

I trust your Lordship will consider these circumstances, and that His Majesty's government will be pleased to authorise the issue of the customary pay to these officers; as it is by no means more than adequate to their respective situations as heads of the military departments of the army, through whom the most important duties of the service are carried on, and as the heads of the civil branches of the staff receive a very increased rate of pay and allowances.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[158.*] G. O. Adjutant-General's Office, Lisbon, 27th April, 1809.

1. His Majesty has been pleased to appoint Lieutenant-General Sir A. Wellesley, K.B., to be Commander of his Forces in Portugal, and his Excellency having arrived in this country to assume the command, all reports, applications, &c., are henceforward to be addressed to him through the usual channels.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[159.*] G. O. Coimbra, 3rd May, 1809.

1. Returns to be sent, by the General officers, and other individuals, entitled to bât men, and by the Commanding officers of corps, stating the number of natives of Portugal that have been hired, to serve in lieu of bât men, given by each corps, and of the names of the several officers in whose service they are employed.

2. Upon all occasions, when the army will march, it will be in one or more columns, on one or different roads, with a view to take up a position, or by separate battalions, brigades, or larger divisions, with a view to occupy certain cantonments. In the first case, the reserve artillery and stores, drawn, or carried by horses or mules, are to follow the troops; then the baggage of regiments, and individuals of each column, is to follow, arranged in the order in which the corps or individual will stand in the column; and lastly, the artillery and commissariat stores on carts, drawn by bullocks.

3. In the other cases, when battalions or larger divisions are to take up cantonments, the baggage of each division, going to a separate cantonment, is to follow that division, and is to be arranged in the order in which each corps or individual will stand in the order of march of the division to which he may belong.

4. On all occasions, the leaders of columns, whether composed of the whole army or of smaller divisions, will halt, once in every hour and a half, for five minutes, to allow the men to fall out; and Commanding officers of companies will be held responsible if any man falls out of the ranks at any time during the march, excepting during these halts, or is absent from his company, at the end of it, upon any occasion, excepting sick and consequent inability to keep up.

5. If any man should be taken ill on a march, measures are to be taken for the care of him, according to the mode heretofore pointed out in the General Orders, particularly paragraph No. 11 of the General Order 24th April; and the Commanding officer of his company will send a non-commissioned officer with him to the nearest magistrate as therein pointed out.

6. When circumstances will oblige battalions, in rear of any column, to halt, the head of such column must not be halted without the special orders of the officer commanding the column, who will judge of the necessity of halting, according to the length of the interval which will thereby be occasioned in his column, the necessity there is that the column should be well closed up, and the probability that from the nature of the impediments of the road, the head of the column will soon be halted, and give time to the rear to close up.

7. Two Assistant-Provosts, in addition to those already authorized, are to be appointed; and Commanding officers of regiments and brigades will recommend such non-commissioned officers as they may think trustworthy and capable of performing the duties which will be required from them; they will receive Ensign's pay and allowances.

8. Depôts are to be established at the following places, upon which subject the Commissary-General will receive directions, viz.:—

Rio Maior, Leiria, Coimbra. An officer and twenty men of the 80th regiment are to be stationed at Rio Maior, and conduct the details of the duties there; the senior officer, in charge of the sick and convalescents at Leiria, is to conduct them at Leiria; and an officer will be established at Coimbra, for the same purpose.

9. These officers will correspond constantly with each other, and with the Quartermaster-General of the army and Town-Major at Lisbon.

10. Whenever stores or provisions are despatched from Lisbon, the Quartermaster-General is to be informed thereof, of the number of waggons or other means of conveyance on which they are laden, and of the route which they are directed to take, specifying by what stages. The Town-Major is likewise to give notice of this despatch to the officer at Rio Maior; this officer is to relieve the escort, and send it back to Lisbon, and is to report

the arrival and the probable departure of the convoy to the Quartermaster-General and the officer commanding at the next station; the officers stationed at Leiria and Coimbra are to do the same respectively.

11. Non-commissioned officers in charge of convoys will be held responsible for the conduct of the soldiers under their command on the march with convoys, and returning to their cantonments.

18. General Orders will be issued, at the Adjutant-General's office, at 10 o'clock precisely, every morning. The officers in the department and Majors of Brigade to be responsible that the Adjutants have them by 12.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[160.] G. O. Coimbra, 4th May, 1809.

1. The army will be brigaded, and stand in line, as follows, until further orders:—

CAVALRY.

	14th Light dragoons	Major-General Cotton.
	20th	
	3rd Light dragoons, K. G. L. ..	
	16th	
	Coldstream Guards, 1st battalion	Brig.-Gen. F. Campbell.
	3rd do. 1st do.	
	1 company 5th batt. 60th regt.	
1st brigade	3rd or Buffs	Major-General Hill.
	66th	
	48th	
	1 comp. 5th batt. 60th regt. ..	
3rd brigade	5 comps. 5th batt. 60th regt. ..	Major-General Tilson.
	88th	
	1st batt. Portuguese grenadiers	
	87th	
5th brigade	7th	Brig.-Gen. A. Campbell.
	1st batt. 10th Portuguese regt.	
	53rd	
	1 company 5th batt. 60th regt.	
7th brigade	9th	Brig.-Gen. Cameron.
	2nd batt. 10th Portuguese regt.	
	83rd	
	1 company 5th batt. 60th regt.	
6th brigade	1st battalion detachments	Brig.-Gen. R. Stewart.
	1st do. 16th Portuguese regt. ..	
	29th	

4th brigade	2nd battalion detachments ..	Brig.-Gen. Sontag.
	2nd do. 16th Portuguese regt.	
	97th	
	1 company 5th batt. 60th regt.	
2nd brigade	27th regiment	Major-Gen. Mackenzie.
	45th	
	31st	
K. G. L.	Brig.-General Langwerth	Major-Gen. J. Murray.
	——— Drieberg	

2. Although this is to be the order of the line of battle, circumstances of ground and situation may render a deviation from it necessary.

3. The light infantry companies belonging to, and the riflemen attached to each brigade of infantry, are to be formed together, on the left of the brigade, under the command of a Field-officer or Captain of light infantry of the brigade, to be fixed upon by the officer who commands it. Upon all occasions in which the brigade may be formed in line, or in column, when the brigade will be formed for the purpose of opposing an enemy, the light infantry companies and riflemen will be of course in the front, flanks, or rear, according to the circumstances of the ground, and the nature of the operation to be performed. On all other occasions, the light infantry companies are to be considered as attached to their battalions, with which they are to be quartered or encamped, and solely under the command of the Commanding officer of the battalion to which they belong.

4. An Assistant-Commissary, with the necessary number of clerks, will be attached to each brigade of infantry, to each regiment of cavalry, to the artillery, and to head-quarters, to whom application must be made for provisions and supplies of all kinds required for the brigade, corps, or department, to which he will be attached. No requisitions must be made upon the country, excepting by the Commissary-General, or his deputy or assistants, excepting in cases of necessity, in which small bodies of troops may be upon their march, unattended by a Commissary, which case of necessity must always be clearly made out to the satisfaction of the Commander of the Forces.

5. All requisitions made contrary to this order will be paid for by the Commissary, and the amount charged to the account of the officer who will have signed it.

6. The officers of the army must have observed the scarcity

of all supplies which our army requires in Portugal; at the same time that the discipline and efficiency of the troops depend upon their regular delivery. The Commander of the Forces trusts, therefore, the General officers of the army, and the Commanding officers of regiments, particularly those who may be detached, will communicate constantly with the officers of the Commissariat department attached to their brigades and regiments, and will advise and assist them as far as may be in their power in their endeavours to procure supplies for the troops.

8. The pay of the officers who have been transferred to the Portuguese service, must be paid by the Paymaster of the regiment to which they belong, till it will have been notified in the Gazette, or in General Orders, that His Majesty has approved of their promotion.

9. Major Campbell, Assistant-Adjutant-General, is appointed to act as Commandant of head-quarters until further orders. Major Campbell will regulate all matters concerning the quartering, marches, and police of head-quarters. Whenever the head-quarters are to move, all persons concerned are to send an officer to the Commandant, for instructions relative to the moving of their baggage, &c., and for which a proper guard will be allotted by the Adjutant-General.

Officers belonging to head quarters will give strict injunctions to their servants in charge of their baggage, to have it ready at the place and time that shall be fixed by the Commandant; and they must be warned that all orders issued by him are to be implicitly obeyed, as he is answerable to the Commander of the Forces for the regular march of the baggage of head quarters, and conduct of those who accompany it.

10. Brigades' sick returns to be sent weekly, on Sunday morning, and monthly, on the 20th of every month, to the head of the Medical department of the army, by the staff surgeons attached to brigades; and in the absence of the staff surgeon, all his duties, as directed in General Orders, are to be performed by the senior medical officer, of whatever rank.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Coimbra, 5th May, 1809. [161.]

2. Whenever an order is given for the troops to march on the following day, the Commissaries attached to those troops are to issue to them one day's meat, which is to be cooked on that night for the following day, so that the troops, on their arrival at their new ground, having carried their provisions for the day, will be sure to have them.

12. Those horses of the dragoons and artillery, which will eat the corn and forage of the country, are to feed with that description of forage only; the commanding officers of dragoons and artillery will give directions that all their horses may be accustomed to the corn and forage of the country, by being fed at first in the proportions of half English and half Portuguese corn and forage; then of two-thirds Portuguese and one-third English; and lastly of the whole Portuguese: the Commissary-General will make his issues accordingly to cavalry and artillery.

13. The Commander of the Forces calls the attention of the general, field, and staff officers to the foregoing order: it is very desirable that all horses should feed upon the forage of the country; and it is certain that none will, unless they should by degrees be accustomed to it; he therefore recommends that all the horses of the army should be fed in the proportions above directed for those of the dragoons and artillery. The Commissary-General will be pleased to attend to the requisition of any general, field, or staff officers, who may require a larger proportion of English forage for any particular horse, as far as his stores will allow.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Coimbra, 6th May, 1809. [162.]

9. The Portuguese troops attached to the British brigades are to be victualled by the Assistant-Commissary of brigades to which they are attached, and are to receive each man 1½ lb. of bread, or 1 lb. of biscuit, and ½ lb. of meat *per diem*. Cavalry the same as the British cavalry.

11. The Commander of the Forces recommends the companies of the 5th battalion of the 60th regiment to the particular care and attention of the general officers commanding the brigades of infantry to which they are attached; they will find them to be

most useful, active, and brave troops in the field, and that they will add essentially to the strength of their brigades.

Major Davy will continue to superintend the economy and discipline of the whole battalion, and for this purpose will remain with that part of the army which will be most convenient to him, with a view to that object.

The regimental surgeons of the brigades about to march will immediately report the number of sick they intend to leave behind to Staff-surgeon Morrell, charged with the duty of superintending them. An assistant surgeon from each regiment will remain with the sick till they are properly given over, and one or more assistant surgeons per brigade, according to the numbers, will remain in Coimbra to take care of them.

Subsistence to the 24th instant, at the rate of 10*d.* per day for every man, must also be left in the hands of the brigade assistant surgeon.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[163.] G. O. Coimbra, 7th May, 1809.

4. The commanding officers of regiments will make reports to the officers commanding brigades, at the moment they find any ammunition, of any man in the regiment they command, damaged or deficient, in order that requisition may be forthwith made to replace it, and that the requisitions may not be made out at a moment a corps is to march.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

RETURN of HORSES and MULES of the Royal Artillery under the Command of Brigadier-General HOWORTH.

Coimbra, 7th May, 1809.

Captain LAWSON'S *Light 3-pounder Brigade.*

	Horses.	Mules.
6 Guns	4	20
6 Cars	0	12
1 Forge Cart	0	6
4 Ammunition Carts	3	5
Officers	5	2
Non-commissioned Officers and Trumpeters	3	2
Spare	3	2
	18	49

Captain LANE'S *First Light 6-pounder Brigade.*

	Horses.	Mules.
6 Guns	34	2
6 Cars	34	2
1 Forge Cart	2	4
1 Cart for small Stores	0	2
Officers, including an Assistant-Surgeon	3	2
Non-commissioned Officers and Trumpeters	5	1
Spare	10	3
	88	16

Captain BAYNES'S *Second Light 6-pounder Brigade.*

6 Guns	36	0
6 Cars	24	12
1 Forge Cart	2	4
1 Cart for small Stores	0	2
Officers	3	0
Non-commissioned Officers and Trumpeters	4	1
Spare	12	2
	81	21

General Field Officers and Staff.

General Howorth, including Conductor Ambrose and Interpreter	2	5
Colonel Framingham	2	2
Colonel Robe	0	3
Major Dickson	1	1
Captain Terrell	1	0
Lieutenant Johnstone (Quartermaster)	1	1
Lieutenant Arbuthnott (Adjutant)	2	0
Lieutenant Woodyear (Adjutant)	0	2
Surgeon Fitzpatrick, including Medical Instruments and Bedding	3	1
	12	15

With the Park and Reserve.

7 Ammunition Waggons	16	26
1 Forge Cart	2	4
Captain Sillery	1	0
Lieutenant Evans	0	1
Mr. Commissary Pickering, his Clerks and Conductors of Stores	11	8
Riders for Non-commissioned Officers	2	7
	32	46

	Horses.	Mules.
Total present	231	147
Left at Lisbon	6	6
Total strength	237	153

REMARKS.

The guns are supplied with English horses except the 3-pounder Brigade, which is furnished with large Lisbon mules.

All the other wheel draught is in general from English horses, and the leading draught from the country horses and mules; the latter are too small and weak for this service.

38 horses and mules examined at Coimbra and returned unfit for service would be applicable to carry small-arm ammunition if replaced by English horses. A proportion of those with the brigade of Captain Baynes will be in a similar state, amounting, perhaps, altogether to 60 horses and mules.

Part of the non-commissioned officers of drivers, the clerks and conductors of stores, are supplied from the most inferior horses and mules not fit for draught.

E. HOWORTH,
Brig.-General R. H. Artillery.

RETURN of HORSES and MULES of the Royal German Artillery, commanded by Major HARTMANN.

Coimbra, 7th May, 1809.

Captain RETTBERG'S *Light 6-pounder Brigade.*

	Horses.	Mules.
6 Guns	36	0
6 Cars	28	8
1 Forge Cart	2	4
1 Cart for small Stores	0	2
Officers	4	0
Non-commissioned Officers, including 1 Farrier	3	0
Spare	7	5
	80	19

Captain HEISE'S *Long 6-pounder Brigade.*

6 Guns	48	0
6 Cars	22	14
1 Cart for spare Wheels, &c.	0	6
2 Forge Carts	10	2
2 Carts for small Stores	2	2
Officers	3	1
Non-commissioned Officers, including 1 Farrier	1	4
Spare	7	0
	93	29

Staff.

Major Hartmann, including 1 Mule for an Orderly	2	1
Lieutenant Mielmann (Adjutant and Quartermaster)	1	0
Assistant-Surgeon Heise, including 1 Mule for carrying the Medicine Chest	1	1
	4	2

Reserve.

Captain Daniel	0	1
1 Clerk and 2 Conductors of Stores	3	0
1 Portuguese Conductor	1	0
1 Serjeant of the Royal Waggon Train	0	1
	4	2

	Horses.	Mules.
Total present	181	52
Left at Lisbon	2	0
At Peniche	1	0
Total strength	184	52

REMARKS.

Two horses (being private property) not included, belonging to Major Hartmann.

E. HOWORTH,
Brig.-General R. H. Artillery.

To Viscount Castlereagh. [164.]

MY DEAR LORD, Abrantes, 8th May, 1809.

I forgot to write to you yesterday to tell you that none of the regiments of this army have any spare arms and accoutrements, and, if you should send out any recruits for them, it will be necessary to send arms and accoutrements. The latter of these ought to be supplied by the colonels of regiments; but probably the best mode of supplying them would be for the Storekeeper to send them out, and pray let them be of buff.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. A. O. Coimbra, 8th May, 1809. [165.]

1. Lieutenant-General Paget being arrived to-day, the army is to be divided as follows, till the other Lieutenant-Generals attached to it will join:—

Guards .. ..
Major-General Hill's .. ..
Brigadier-General A. Campbell's
Brigadier-General Cameron's .. } Right wing.

with a brigade of heavy 6-pounders, and a brigade of light 6-pounders.

2. The King's German Legion ..
Brigadier-General Sontag's .. } Left wing.
Brigadier-General R. Stewart's ..

with one brigade of 6-pounders, and one brigade of 3-pounders.

3. These wings will be formed into two or more lines, as circumstances may require, and brigades will be detached from

them according to circumstances, to form advanced guards and reserves: there is to be no alteration in the orders of march to-morrow.

Memorandum. Orders will always be given out immediately on the arrival of head quarters at a new station; brigade-majors will come provided with the addresses of their General officers.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[166.] The memoranda for the movements of the army were given by the Commander of the Forces to the Quartermaster-General, and circulated by him, as the General Orders were by the Adjutant-General, to the different corps and divisions of the army. The detailed instructions, however, of each day's march have not been introduced, but only those relating to strategical movements preparatory to active operations and battles.

Extracts from the Instructions communicated by the Quarter-master-General relative to the advance of the Army towards Oporto.

"Coimbra, 8th May, 1809.

"The brigade commanded by Major-General Hill, which has been already ordered to be at Aveiro early on the 9th instant, will embark there the same day, on board the boats which will be prepared for it; so that the embarkation may be completed a little before the time of low water, which will be about 4 o'clock P.M. The brigade will then proceed towards Ovar; but orders are to be previously given for the boats to bring-to about two leagues short of Ovar, and there remain till slack water on the morning of the 10th, which will be about 4 A.M., when the whole will again proceed. The object of this delay is to prevent the enemy becoming aware of General Hill's approach until the advanced guard of the column under Major-General Cotton, which is to march by the great road from Coimbra, shall have arrived near the French outposts.

"General Hill will cause three companies of light infantry to be disembarked at a landing place which is on the western side of the Lake of Aveiro, about half a league from Ovar, with instructions to advance rapidly and possess themselves of the town and harbour, in order to facilitate the landing of the rest of the brigade.

"As Brigadier-General Cameron's brigade, with a brigade of 6-pounders, is to be at Aveiro on the 10th instant, to follow General Hill, the boats are to be sent back to Aveiro with the least possible delay, for the conveyance of these troops; and precautions must be taken to prevent the escape of the boatmen, and to cause them to proceed direct to their destination.

"General Hill will inform himself at Ovar respecting the roads which lead from that place towards the river Vouga, lest any event should occur to render it necessary to use them; a small detachment of Portuguese cavalry will be sent by the road leading from Angeja to Ovar, very early on the morning of the 10th, to join General Hill, and he will be so good as not to move forward from Ovar until he has certain intelligence of General Cotton's troops having reached Oliveira on the Oporto road.

"Major-General Cotton will cause the cavalry to begin their march during the night of the 9th instant, or very early on the morning of the 10th, so that the head of the column may arrive by daybreak at the outposts of the Portuguese troops under the command of Colonel Trant. The brigade of 3-pounder guns may either accompany the cavalry, or move with the nearest brigade of infantry, as General Cotton may think proper. Brigadier-General R. Stewart's brigade of infantry, with half a brigade of 6-pounders, will follow the cavalry. The King's German Legion, with half a brigade of 6-pounders, will follow General R. Stewart's brigade; and Major-General Murray will regulate the march of the Legion so as to be at hand to give efficient support to the troops in front.

"Major-General Cotton's first object will be to endeavour to surprise the enemy's advanced guard near Albergaria Nova: and when a junction shall have been effected with General Hill, where the roads from Coimbra and Ovar meet, he will press the enemy; and if an opportunity should offer for doing so, he will attempt to pass the bridge at Oporto with the French rear guard, or at all events endeavour to prevent, if possible, the destruction of the bridge. He will secure whatever boats may be found on the left bank of the river.

"Brigadier-General Cameron's brigade, with a brigade of 6-pounders, will form on the Oporto road, three miles in advance of Coimbra, early on the morning of the 9th instant, and will march at 6 A.M. to cantonments at Murtede and adjacents.

These troops will proceed on the 10th to Aveiro, there to embark and join General Hill at Ovar.

"The brigade of Guards, with one brigade of 6-pounders, Brigadier-General Alexander Campbell's brigade, and Brigadier-General Sontag's brigade, will form, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke, on the morning of the 9th instant, in rear of General Cameron's brigade; and will proceed at 6½ A.M., by the Oporto road, to Mealhada and adjacent villages. These brigades will continue their march on the morning of the 10th instant, at the same hour.

"All the troops are to be marched off by their right. The baggage of head quarters will precede the troops under Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke."

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[167.*] G. O. 9th May, 1809.

3. The Commander of the Forces requests that attention may be paid to the order relative to soldiers marching out of the ranks, and he desires that the files may be counted; and if men are absent, the roll shall be called of each company when the men will reach their ground after a march, and absentees are to be reported to the officer commanding brigades.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[168.*] G. O. Convento do Grijo, 11th May, 1809.

4. The Commander of the Forces calls the attention of officers commanding regiments and companies relative to the orders respecting the regularity of march, keeping their companies collected, not permitting their men to straggle. Lieutenant-Colonel Doyle, of the 16th Portuguese, is referred particularly to this order.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[169.*] G. O. Oporto, 12th May, 1809.

The Commander of the Forces congratulates the troops upon the success which has attended their operations for the last four

days, upon which they have traversed above 80 miles of most difficult country, in which they have carried some formidable positions, have beaten the enemy repeatedly, and have ended by forcing the passage of the Douro, and defending the position they had so boldly taken up, with numbers far inferior to those with which they were attacked. In the course of this short expedition the Commander of the Forces has had repeated opportunities of witnessing and applauding the gallantry of the officers and troops, the activity and conduct of the 95th, and of the light infantry of the 29th, 43rd, and 52nd. The bravery of the 16th Portuguese regiment, the able movement made by Major-General Murray with the 1st and 2nd battalions Hanoverian Legion, under Brigadier-General Langwerth, and the gallant attack made by Brigadier-General the Hon. C. Stewart, with a squadron of the 16th, and a squadron of the 20th light dragoons, under the command of Major Blake of the 20th, contributed essentially to the success of the attack on the enemy's advanced guard on the 11th, and the steady gallantry of the Buffs, 48th and 16th regiments under the command of Major-General Hill. The timely passage of the Douro and subsequent movement on the enemy's flank by Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke with the brigade of Guards and 29th regiment, and the bravery of the two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, under the command of Major Hervey, and led by Brigadier-General the Hon. C. Stewart, obtained the victory, which has contributed so much to the honour of the troops on this day. The Commander of the Forces has to express his acknowledgments to Lieutenant-General the Hon. E. Paget, for the manner in which he conducted the advanced guard on the 10th, 11th, and 12th, and in which he took up the position beyond the Douro, and he regrets the misfortune which has deprived him (he hopes only for a time) of his assistance.

To Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke, Major-General Murray, Major-General Hill; to Brigadier-General the Hon. C. Stewart; to Lieutenant-Colonel De Lancey, Quartermaster-General's department, and Captain Mellish, Adjutant-General's department, for the assistance they rendered General Stewart, in his charge of the enemy's defeated infantry, on the 11th and 12th, and to Major C. Campbell, of the Adjutant-General's department, for the assistance he rendered General Hill, in the defence of his

post, and Brigadier-General the Hon. C. Stewart in his charge on the enemy's infantry, on the 12th.

The Commander of the Forces also acknowledges the assistance he has received from the Adjutant-General and Quarter-master-General, and the officers of these departments respectively, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Bathurst and the officers of his personal staff.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Deposition of the Secretary of the late Governor of Oporto.

13th May, 1809.

It appears that the French intended to collect their force at Peñafiel on the 14th, and to unite at Amarante with General Loison; that they there intended to risk an action if there was any prospect of success; and if not, to fall back and attempt a junction with the corps of General de Pice, whom they supposed to be on the frontiers. Orders had been given not to return the British fire on the morning of the 12th across the river, and they conceived it impossible that the British army could pass over. When, however, they perceived the column (General Hill's, as described), they prepared for defence; but soon perceiving the column which crossed at Avintas, they in the first place ordered four battalions against it to keep it in check whilst the remainder of the garrison should evacuate the place. Orders were at this time sent to the troops at Valongo, &c., and on the road, to proceed by Peñafiel to Amarante without delay.

Last night they were in two divisions, one at Balthae and the other at Peñafiel. This morning the first of these proceeded to Esperada, and that at Peñafiel retreated, from the belief that their communication with Amarante was cut off. General Loison's corps there consists of 2500 men, with 8 or 10 pieces of cannon, two of which are 12 pounders.

At Esperada they destroyed a number of tumbrils, tents, and powder. The balls they threw away, and may be found in some pits. This happened between nine and twelve this morning. The whole of the army then took the road to Basto, from whence the road branches off to Braga and Guimaraens. This, however, is from report, as the informer had made his escape before they marched. The deponent is of opinion they still will attempt to retire on Braganza. He also positively asserts, under the assurance of being hanged if not true, that he saw the powder and tumbrils destroyed, and that he was present when an aide-de-camp of General Soult brought the order to bring back the cannon from the heights of Peñafiel. To General de Luloi he assigned as a reason "nous sommes arrêtés."

[170.] G. O. Ruivaes, 17th May, 1809.

*

2. The troops will have observed the extreme difficulty of supplying them with bread in this part of the country, and the

necessity that exists that they should take care of that which is issued to them, and make it last for the time specified in General Orders: for want of attention to this object, and care of their bread, the best operations are necessarily relinquished.

3. On leaving Oporto, the troops had all bread to the 16th inclusive; some of them received bread at Villa Nova, and all one day's bread at Braga, and yet, in this day, they had none: the state of the provisions requires the continual superintendence of the Commanding officers of regiments, and of the General officers.

4. Till the army will be in a more plentiful country, the allowance of bread is to be 1 lb., and 1½ lb. of meat each man.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. San Pedro, 19th May, 1809. [171.]

2. The different brigades will leave at Braga such men as are unable to march, in charge of an assistant surgeon from each brigade, till an hospital can be established there.

Officers must be left at Braga, in charge of the sick of each brigade, in the proportion of one subaltern for 30 men, one captain and one subaltern for 100. A serjeant must be left in charge of the sick of each brigade, if the number left should be under 30, and a serjeant and corporal, besides the officer, for each 30 men above the number.

4. When bread cannot be delivered to the troops, they must have 2 lbs. of beef for their ration.

5. It is to be understood by the soldiers, that wine forms no part of their ration; it is given to them at the pleasure, and upon the responsibility, of the Commander of the Forces, and must be discontinued when circumstances prevent its being procured.

6. The ration of bread is to be increased to 1½ lb., by order from the officers commanding brigades, as soon as the assistant commissaries of brigades will report that they can make issues to that amount.

7. All horses, mules, bullocks, &c. taken from the enemy, are to be offered for sale to the Commissary-General, who will buy them, if they should be found to answer for the cavalry, the artillery, or for commissariat purposes.

8. All purchases of captured horses, mules, &c. contrary to this order, will, in future, be considered null and void, unless they should be purchased by officers commanding troops or companies, with the knowledge and consent of the General officers commanding their brigades, for the purpose of carrying camp kettles, &c.

9. The officers commanding troops and companies will recollect, that although mules are given to them from the commissariat at the commencement of the campaign, they have received an allowance from the public to purchase them; and it was expressly understood that they were to purchase others, if the mules given to them by the commissariat should be worn out.

10. As the Commander of the Forces has reason to believe many horses and mules are kept by even the soldiers of the army, and maintained by means entirely inconsistent with discipline and good order, he desires the officers commanding regiments and brigades to inquire into the number of horses and mules which are attached to the regiments under their command, and to enforce the immediate sale of those not allowed to be kept by the regulations of the army.

11. The Commander of the Forces is much concerned to learn that the unmilitary practice of firing off their pieces in their quarters, which he had attributed entirely to troops not supposed to be so well disciplined as those of His Majesty, is to be attributed equally to those from whom he expected a better example.

12. The practice of firing off pieces by the soldiers in their quarters, or at all, but by order of their officers, is strictly forbidden, and any man guilty of it is to be punished for disobedience of orders.

13. The soldiers are to be accountable for the quantity of ammunition in their possession, and any man who shall be found to have made away with it is to be tried and punished.

14. This is not the only irregularity of which the Commander of the Forces has to complain.

15. Under the pretence of taking horses from the enemy, the soldiers have taken them from Portuguese gentlemen, and have even gone so far as to take two horses belonging to the 16th light dragoons, which the Quartermaster-General had at Ruivaes.

16. The attention of the officers commanding regiments and brigades is called particularly to the conduct of the soldiers under their command.

17. The officers of companies must attend to their men in their quarters, as well as on a march, or the army will very soon be no better than a banditti: if these practices are continued, he desires that officers commanding brigades will give directions that the rolls of companies may be called every hour, and all absentees may be punished. He is, besides, determined that those troops who plunder shall be in the rear instead of in the front of the columns.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Ruivaes, 20th May, 1809. [172.] *

1. The Commander of the Forces calls the attention of the officers commanding brigades and regiments to the following extract of a letter from the Bishop of Braga; it points out forcibly the necessity which exists that the officers of companies should attend to the conduct of the soldiers under their command, and in what manner want of discipline and good order must defeat the best combined operations.

2. The bread represented to have been irregularly seized by the soldiers in the rear was intended for those at the head of the column, who have, therefore, been in want. Commanding officers of regiments are held responsible for obedience to the General Orders of the 4th instant relative to requisitions from the country.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Oporto, 23rd May, 1809. [173.] *

1. The Quartermaster-General will forthwith furnish a corps of mounted guides, to be under the immediate superintendence of an officer of the Quartermaster-General's department; this corps will receive the pay and allowances of cavalry, and the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates will be mounted on horses, or mules, found by the public. The corps to be composed as follows: 4 officers receiving the pay and allowances of lieutenant; 4 officers receiving the pay and allowances of cornet; 6 serjeants; 6 corporals; 2 farriers; and 20 privates.

2. As the officers on the staff of the Adjutant and Quarter-master-General's department are not allowed in Portugal to keep the same number of horses which are allowed to officers in the same situations in other parts of the world, and as it is necessary that the communications between the different divisions of the army should be kept up, in a great degree, through their means, they will be allowed to go post, and to charge for post mules when sent above 10 miles from head-quarters.

The bill for these charges must, however, be vouched by the signature of the head of the department, and further by a copy of the order to take the journey, specifying the distance.

3. As the General staff officers of the army experienced the greatest difficulty in getting their horses shod, whereby they are frequently disabled from the performance of their duty, the Commander of the Forces will allow of smiths from the corps of infantry being attached, by permission of the Commanding officers of the regiments to which they belong, to the officers hereinafter named, to shoe the horses of the General staff officers under their command, or in the neighbourhood of their stations, viz. Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke; Major-General Murray; Major-General Hill. These officers will each be allowed to draw forage for one mule to carry the implements and tools of the smith: the mule must be provided by those who will benefit by the establishment. Two smiths are also to be attached in the same manner to the Commandant at head quarters, to shoe the horses of all the staff.

9. On the arrival of the army at Aveiro, where the ship with medical stores has been detained, every surgeon, whether staff or regimental, is immediately to renew and complete all deficiencies in any part of the original field equipment directed in General Orders.

The Commissary-General will replace, on application, any of those public mules that have been so injured as to be unserviceable.

General officers commanding brigades are requested to facilitate, as much as possible, the conveyance of what has been ordered during the approaching march, as the succour of the sick, and the preservation of the wounded in the field, must, in a great degree, depend upon what regiments carry with them.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. A. O. Oporto, 23rd May, 1809. [174.

1. The Commander of the Forces has been informed, and, indeed, has observed, notwithstanding the orders issued by the late Commander of the Forces and himself, much of the private baggage of the army is moved upon bullock cars. The officers must have felt the inconvenience which this mode of transporting their baggage must be to themselves personally. It is scarcely possible that the baggage can keep up with them, even at present, and when the army will move in larger divisions, will become quite impossible.

The public inconvenience resulting from this mode of transporting private baggage is still greater. The Commander of the Forces is aware that in forced marches, and in bad weather, it may happen that animals provided for carriage will knock up, but hopes that officers of the army will consider it as a determined measure, that no baggage is to be carried upon bullock cars, excepting those allowed by the late Commander of the Forces, and that those who have baggage to carry must be provided with mules or horses.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Don Perez de Castro. [175.

MONSIEUR, À Oporto, ce 24me Mai, 1809.

Je viens de recevoir la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 20 de ce mois; et j'avais déjà reçu par un courrier de Séville des copies des dépêches du Général Cuesta que vous m'avez envoyés.

Depuis la poursuite du Maréchal Soult dont M. Villiers vous donnera les détails, l'armée Anglaise est en marche vers le Mondego, et elle arrivera à Coimbre le 26 et le 27 de ce mois. J'y vais demain. De Coimbre je continuerai la marche vers le Tage, où je tournerai vers Ciudad Rodrigo selon les mouvemens de l'ennemi. Si je trouve que l'ennemi reste aux environs du Tage, j'irai à la rencontre, et j'entrerai en communication et coopération directe avec le Général Cuesta; si je trouve que l'ennemi marche vers le nord de l'Espagne, j'irai vers Ciudad Rodrigo, et je tâcherai de lui couper la communication avec les

corps Français en Galicie, et de lui faire autant de mal qui est en mon pouvoir.

J'ai reçu hier une lettre de la part du Marquis de Romanof, dont j'ai envoyé copie et la copie de ma réponse à M. Villiers. Je vous prie de voir ces deux pièces.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[176.*] G. O. Oporto, 24th May, 1809.

2. The army being likely to go into huts at an early period, the Commander of the Forces is disposed to supply the officers with tents from the public stores, in the proportion of one tent for each field officer, and one tent for the officers of each company, and one for the staff: it will be necessary, however, that the officers to whom these tents will be issued shall provide means for the carriage, without increasing the demands for forage.

3. The officers commanding regiments will send to the Quartermaster-General, through the officers commanding their brigades, returns of the names of those officers who are desirous of having tents, stating the numbers required for the regiments under their command, according to the proportions above specified.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[177.*] G. O. Ovea, 26th May, 1809.

1. The Commander of the Forces begs that the officers commanding brigades will ascertain the number of men left behind, on the march, by each of the regiments under their command, from the time the army left Coimbra; and they will make a return of them to the Adjutant-General's office, stating the names of the officers commanding the companies from which those men have absented themselves.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. C. Villiers. [178.]

MY DEAR VILLIERS, Aveiro, 27th May, 1809.

I return your letter to Marshal Soult, which I never had any opportunity of transmitting to him.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

To Marshal Soult.

SIR, Lisbon, 7th April, 1809.

I observe that you have presumed to call yourself Governor of a kingdom in which His Britannic Majesty has a Minister, and it is impossible for me, who have the honour and duties of that character to sustain, to suffer so gross an outrage to decency and truth to pass unnoticed.

The assumption of civil authority, neither gained by force of arms nor conferred by the legitimate power or sovereign of a country, is treason. It is nothing else by all the laws of nations; and you change the character of a soldier into one of a very different description when you resort to such means of imposing on the people, and to such assumptions of civil authority.

It rests with the government of a brave and loyal nation, who have no thoughts whatsoever of submitting to your yoke, to determine in what light they will consider the proclamations you have issued; but I should not do justice to the character I bear if, without the hope of influencing your conduct, I suffered them to pass unnoticed, and did not protest against them, in thus declaring how such usurpations are liable to be considered by the laws of nations among civilized states.

I have, &c.,

J. C. VILLIERS,

Minister Plenipotentiary, &c., of His Britannic Majesty in Portugal.

To Major-General Murray. [179.]

MY DEAR GENERAL, Cantanhede, 28th May, 1809.

I am very much obliged to you for all the pains you have taken about our guns. Trant has employed some people to get in those left at Peñafiel, and I'll write to the Bishop of Braga respecting those left at Povoa.

I was in hopes that the letter from England in respect to Beresford's rank would have been entirely satisfactory to you.

However, it is difficult to judge in what manner any measure may affect the feelings of another, and I may be mistaken in my notion that what has been done ought to be satisfactory. I shall be much grieved on every account to lose your assistance, and I think that, as you have seen Soult out, you might as well see what we can do with Victor. By the time our operations against him will be brought to a close, we shall know whether those already appointed Lieutenant-Generals to this army are coming out; and, if they are not, you may depend upon my exerting myself to have those officers who have served promoted to the local rank rather than others who have not. If, however, it be disagreeable to you to serve in your present situation, I cannot object to your going away. I shall only lament that any circumstances should have the effect of depriving me of your services.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P.S. In respect to Colonel Walsh, I rather believe he is better off now than he would be as Commandant of Lisbon, which, after all, would be only a temporary situation. He is now town-major, and as many &c. &c. as he can hold, and amounting, I think, to 35 shillings per diem. He would be obliged to resign all this to be Commandant, and the first General officer who would come would supersede him.

180.] G. O. Coimbra, 29th May, 1809.

The Commander of the Forces is much concerned to be obliged again to complain of the conduct of the troops; not only have outrages been committed by whole corps, but there is no description of property of which the unfortunate inhabitants of Portugal have not been plundered by the British soldiers whom they have received into their houses, or by stragglers from the different regiments of the army. The Commander of the Forces apprehends that the interior discipline of the regiments is materially relaxed, and he therefore desires that the soldiers of every company, in each of the regiments, may be formed into as many squads as there are non-commissioned officers, each squad having in it one non-commissioned officer, who must be responsible for the conduct of the soldiers in his squad. The non-

commissioned officers must always be quartered with the men of their squads.

On halting days an officer of each company must visit the quarters of the men of his company four times each day, of which one must be at 8 o'clock in the evening. On marching days an officer of each company must visit the quarters twice after the men have got into them, of which once must be at 8 o'clock in the evening. An officer must also visit the quarters of the company before the soldiers march in the morning. The object of these visitings is to see that the soldiers conduct themselves regularly in their quarters; to ascertain whether there are any complaints by the landlords, and of whom; and that the men are in their quarters, instead of marauding in search of plunder. The officers of the companies, who will visit, must report to the Commanding officer that they have visited the quarters the number of times ordered, specifying the number.

The Commanding officer will report daily to the officer commanding the brigade, that these visitings have been made. The officers must be quartered in the immediate neighbourhood of their companies.

The Commander of the Forces calls the attention of the officers commanding brigades and regiments to the orders given out, and repeated, with a view to prevent the soldiers from straggling from their regiments on a march, which have hitherto been ineffectual. He desires that a report of absentees may be made after every march to the officer commanding the brigade; and the officer commanding the brigade will send this report, with a statement from what companies the men are absent, to the Commander of the Forces.

The use of carts to carry baggage of any description is again positively forbidden; and it is equally forbidden to have guards with any baggage.

The hospital bedding and stores heretofore carried under charge of regimental surgeons are to be sent into the hospital at Coimbra; there will be only one cart attached to each regiment, viz. that to carry men who may fall sick on a march: no guard whatever must be out of the ranks on a march, excepting those ordered by the General Orders.

No soldier must be employed to press carts or bullocks, for draught or food, excepting accompanied and directed by the assistant-commissary of the brigade, or his deputy or clerk,

except in cases of evident necessity; when the commanding officer of the brigade, in the absence of the assistant-commissary, may direct that carts or bullocks for draught or food may be pressed, in which case an officer must command the party; and the officer commanding the brigade must report the circumstance as soon as possible to head-quarters.

The circumstances which have occasioned these orders have given the Commander of the Forces the greatest concern; and he hopes, with the assistance of the officers of the army, to put an end to the disgraceful practices which have prevailed.

The people of Portugal deserve well of the army; they have in every instance treated the soldiers well; and there never was an army so well supplied, or which had so little excuse for plunder, if any excuse can in any case exist. But if the Commander of the Forces should not by these and other measures be enabled to get the better of these practices, he is determined to report to His Majesty, and send into garrison, those corps who shall continue them; as he prefers a small but disciplined and well ordered body of troops to a rabble, however numerous; and he is resolved not to be the instrument of inflicting upon the people of this country the miseries which result from the operations of such a body.

The regulations of these orders are to be understood as applicable to the dragoons and the artillery, as well as the infantry.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[181.] *To Colonel Gordon.*

SIR, Head-quarters, Coimbra, 30th May, 1809.

I have the honour to enclose some letters which I have received from Major-General Mackenzie respecting certain officers of the 45th regiment, who, having been accused of having committed a murder at Lisbon, were given over by direction of the late Commander of the Forces to the civil tribunals of Portugal to be tried.

The enclosed papers contain a certificate of their acquittal, and it does not appear possible that Captain Scott or Lieutenant Perse can be tried by any military tribunal for this offence. Assistant-Surgeon Chambers may, and, in my opinion, ought to

be tried by a General Court Martial for resisting and striking private Thomas Thomson, of the 45th regiment, in the execution of his duty. But as some strong circumstances are stated in the enclosed letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Gerard to Major-General Mackenzie, which circumstances appear to be supported by the evidence on the inquiry into the transaction, held on the day after it occurred, it is possible that the Commander-in-Chief and His Majesty may be of opinion that the conduct of those officers ought to be marked by some token of the displeasure of His Majesty. I have therefore thought it proper to delay ordering a Court-Martial on the conduct of Assistant-Surgeon Chambers, and to desire that he and Captain Scott and Lieutenant Perse should remain at Lisbon until further orders, that there may be time to receive the commands of the Commander-in-Chief upon this reference.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh. [182.]

MY LORD, Coimbra, 31st May, 1809.

I beg leave to request that your Lordship would not order any additional supply of spirits or salt meat to be sent out for the use of the army in Portugal until I shall make a further requisition for them, as there is at present a considerable quantity of each in store.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Coimbra, 31st May, 1809. [183.]

1. There being now 6000 pairs of shoes, the officers commanding brigades will direct the officers commanding regiments in their brigades to make a requisition to the assistant commissary attached to the brigade for the number of pairs of shoes they will require to complete the men; but no regiment is to require more than one pair of shoes for each man. These shoes are to be paid for at the rate of 6*s.* 6*d.* per pair.

2. The regiments are to make a requisition on the Quarter-

master-General for bill-hooks, in the proportion of one for every ten men; these bill-hooks are to be carried by the soldiers under the straps of the knapsack, outside. The troops will very soon experience the use of them, and must take the greatest care of them; they must be produced by the men at every inspection of necessaries. A return of them must be made to the Quarter-master-General once a month; and any deficiencies of the numbers not accounted for in a satisfactory manner must be made good by the companies to which the bill-hooks have been delivered.

3. Those regiments in want of camp kettles will make a requisition for them upon the Quartermaster-General; deficiencies must, however, be accounted for in a satisfactory manner: in future a return of camp kettles must be sent to the Quartermaster-General on the 1st of every month; likewise returns monthly of haversacks and canteens to him. The regiments will make a requisition for the numbers they now want to complete; a satisfactory account must be given of the deficiencies.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[184.*] G. O. Coimbra, 1st June, 1809.

1. The Commander of the Forces has been informed that the officers commanding companies, and other regimental officers, having been supplied with mules by the commissariat, by order of the late Commander of the Forces, for the carriage of camp kettles, of paymasters' books, and of the medicine chest, when the army took the field, have applied to have those mules exchanged.

The officers commanding companies, paymasters, and surgeons, must be aware that they receive an allowance from the public to furnish mules or horses for the carriage of camp kettles, books, or medicine chests; they are reminded by the orders of the 11th October, the 18th March, and 19th May, that these mules were given to them by the Commissariat only as an indulgence, and that they were to keep them up at their own charge; and under these circumstances it is impossible for the Commissary-General now to exchange them.

2. The mule attached to each regiment for the carriage of the intrenching tools, and placed by the orders of the 16th

March in charge of the quartermaster, belongs to the public, and he must be exchanged by the commissary, if the exchange should be necessary (which it ought not to be). It is clearly understood, that although the camp kettle mules, and those for the books and medicine chests, are to be kept up by the captains, paymaster, and surgeons respectively, they must not be used for any purpose excepting those for which they are exclusively allowed.

6. Although from circumstances it is at present impossible to supply the paymasters of regiments with money to the full amount of their estimates, and the captains of companies have not yet received the full amount of pay of their several companies for the last month, no reason exists why the accounts of the soldiers should not be settled to the 24th of the month of May, and the balances struck, which will be paid off as soon as the money shall come up.

8. An officer from the —, —, —, and — regiments to proceed forthwith by the road of Aveiro, Oporto, and Braga, to look for the men who have been allowed to straggle from those regiments, according to the return sent in to the Adjutant-General's office, copies of which they are to be furnished with by the officers commanding the corps.

The Commander of the Forces trusts that more attention will be paid by the officers commanding companies to prevent the soldiers from straggling in future.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Coimbra, 2nd June, 1809. [185.]

3. The Order No. 2, of the 30th May, has not been attended to, no regiment having yet sent to the Quartermaster-General any account of articles required from Lisbon. The earliest attention must be given to all orders. In this instance the regiments may feel the greatest inconvenience for want of those articles in store at Lisbon, which it was the intention of the orders of the 30th May to supply, and which articles they cannot get by any other means.

4. Whenever sick are left in hospital at any place, the strictest attention must be paid that officers and non-commissioned officers of each brigade are left in charge of them, according to

the proportion ordered in General Orders of the 19th May, for the hospital at Braga.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

H. R. H. the Duke of York to Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley.

MY DEAR SIR ARTHUR, Stable Yard, 2nd June, 1809.

I should not do justice to the sense which I entertain of your very kind attention to me if I were to delay thanking you for your obliging and interesting letter of the 13th of May, and the accompanying copy of your despatch to Lord Castlereagh. I do indeed feel most sincerely interested at the success of our gallant troops, and God forbid that any circumstances should ever weaken that interest. The honourable and brilliant operations which your despatch details have afforded me the highest gratification, and I congratulate you most cordially on the happy result of your able dispositions, which well deserved to be executed by officers and men whose gallantry has been so conspicuous.

I have also received great pleasure from your very favourable mention of the brigade of Guards, and I feel convinced that they will continue upon every occasion to merit your approbation. It has also been no small comfort to me to learn that our gallant friend Edward Paget is doing so well, notwithstanding the severe wound which he received, and which must be a subject of deep concern to all who knew him, and justly appreciate his disinterested worth.

With every wish for a continuation of your success, and for your personal welfare and safety,

I remain, my dear Sir Arthur,

Most sincerely yours,

FREDERICK.

[186.] G. O. Coimbra, 3rd June, 1809.

2. Whenever it is possible for the assistant commissaries of brigades to issue the quantity, cavalry must receive and carry three days' corn, and the infantry three days' bread.

3. The senior of the officers left in charge of the sick at the different hospitals must take the command of the whole, and correspond with head-quarters; no convalescents must be moved from any hospital station without orders from head-quarters.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Downing-street, 3rd June, 1809.

Your letters of the 15th, 18th, and 21st arrived yesterday. As this letter goes by a Spanish messenger, I have not time to answer them officially, but I write a line to say that we feel perfectly satisfied with your Northern operations; that not only everything possible has been done, but that much more has been effected than we had any right to expect could be accomplished against a French corps with such a river as the Duero in its front and its retreat open. Your return with such rapidity renders the movement more creditable, and I trust will give you an opportunity of striking a blow against Victor.

We are much disturbed by Cochrane Johnstone's impudence in sending for transports to send his sheep home to Cobbett, who is the consignee of his speculation; they will be dismantled as troop ships, and detained, God knows how long. I have written to the Admiralty forbidding their being detained on any account.

I conclude from your not mentioning him that Paget goes on well: of course, if he deserves it, you will feel yourself authorized to permit his return to England.

The horse artillery have embarked, and I hope they will sail with Craufurd, who has been waiting for a wind in the Downs since the 26th. We had a heavy gale of wind from the south-west two days since. I was afraid they must have suffered, but they escaped with the loss of a few anchors.

Tell Charles I have not a moment to write to him.

Notwithstanding your movement to the southward I have not altered the sailing orders of the reinforcements, viz., to call off Oporto, Aveiro, and Mondego in succession, presuming you will take your measures for ordering them.

I am, dear Wellesley,

Ever yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

To Viscount Castlereagh. [187.

MY LORD, Abrantes, 8th June, 1809.

I forgot to write to you yesterday to tell you that none of the regiments of this army have any spare arms and accoutrements; and if you should send out any recruits, it will be necessary to send arms and accoutrements. The latter of these ought to be supplied by the Colonels of regiments, but probably the best mode of supplying them would be for the Storekeeper to send them out; and pray let them be of buff.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY

[188.] G. O. Abrantes, 8th June, 1809.

1. The regiments will make a requisition upon the Commissary at Abrantes for a sufficient number of pairs of shoes to complete them to two good pairs each man; the period of the delivery of those shoes will be notified in General Orders; they will be paid for at the rate of 6*s.* 6*d.* per pair. The regiments not already completed with bill-hooks, canteens, haversacks, and camp kettles, according to the General Orders of the 31st ult., will make a requisition upon the Quartermaster-General at Abrantes for the same: the period of the delivery of those articles will likewise be notified in General Orders.

2. Various complaints having been made to the Commander of the Forces of the irregularity of the delivery of articles from the commissariat, the following rules are to be observed upon that subject in future:—

3. When articles are delivered to troops from a general store, the Commissary-General must, if possible, have two or more stores for the delivery of each article, viz., forage, corn, wood, meat, bread, and wine.

4. He must signify to the Assistant-Commissaries of brigades and regiments at which store, and where situated, troops in the brigade or regiment will receive their supplies, and in what order by brigades, and at what hour, the supplies will be delivered to the troops of each brigade or regiment at each store.

5. In general, however, it is better the troops of each brigade or regiment should receive their supplies at the brigade or regimental store.

6. When the army will halt, a commencement must be made to make the deliveries at the commissaries' stores at daylight, and the delivery must be continued without interruption, till the whole of the troops to receive their supplies at such store shall have received them. The soldiers of each brigade or regiment will attend to receive the supplies at the hour appointed for them precisely, and not before.

7. The meat for the troops must invariably be delivered to them from a brigade or regimental store, and should be killed on the preceding night, or at daylight in the morning, when the army halts. When it marches, the order of the 5th of May comes in force, and the meat should be killed, delivered, and cooked as soon as possible after the orders for marching are given out.

8. When the army marches, the Commissary-General should notify as soon as possible to the Assistant-Commissaries of brigades and regiments of cavalry where the store of each article of supply for the troops will be made to each brigade or regiment. The deliveries on marching days must commence as soon as possible after the troops reach their ground.

9. It is obvious, however, that on marching days it is still more important than it is on halting days that the delivery should be made from a brigade or regimental, rather than a general store.

10. The Assistant-Commissaries with regiments of cavalry and brigades must not be changed, unless the change is notified in General Orders.

11. The Assistant-Commissaries with brigades and regiments of cavalry must take care to obtain copies of all General Orders from the Brigade-Majors or Adjutants respectively. The Commissary-General is responsible that all other officers of the department, not attached to brigades or regiments of cavalry, have copies of the General Orders.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Right Hon. J. C. Villiers to Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Lisbon, 9th June, 1809.

I return you many thanks for the perusal of your letter to Sir David Dundas. I only hope that upon that and every other point the business will be finally settled in the way most agreeable to yourself. I am sure that you ought to have no trouble but that of beating the enemy.

I return your letters respecting Argenton. Mrs. P. writes me word that Wellesley has now some idea of sending Sydenham to see us here, and of proceeding to Cadiz himself. This, however, may very likely change.

In the mean time the Admiral and myself have a project of making you a short visit at Abrantes. We purpose, unless anything unforeseen occurs, setting out from hence on Monday and reaching Abrantes the next day.

I am the more desirous of doing this, as I much fear that otherwise I may see but little more of you; for as I have fully completed my original engagement, and as you have put this country in a state of such present security at least that there is no discredit in leaving it, I am extremely anxious to return home.

I have had so little occasion to use the corporal and four dragoons who were attached to me when the army marched, that I do not like the keeping them from their regiment. I purpose, therefore, letting them come with us to Abrantes and then leaving them at your disposal.

Dom Miguel Forjaz has desired me to communicate to you the names of the governors of the several provinces and places whom the Regency have just appointed. He purposed writing to you himself.

Enclosed is the account of the maps which Colonel Murray inquired after. He will find those sent to General Mackenzie with him, if they have not already been forwarded.

Believe me to be ever yours most truly,

J. C. VILLIERS.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Hao se nomer Gobernadores por as Provincias.

Minho—O Teniente General D. Rodrigo de Lencastre.
Porto—Miguel de Campo Bacelar.
Beira—O Marquis de Sabugora.
Setubal—D. Rodrigo de Lencastre, brigadeiro.

[189.] G. O. Abrantes, 10th June, 1809.

1. The baggage of the army is immediately to be disembarked from the transports in the Tagus, and to be placed in stores at Lisbon; each regiment will, as soon as possible, send to Lisbon an officer, or a careful non-commissioned officer, to superintend the removal of the baggage, belonging to the regiment, to the storehouse allotted to receive it; these officers and non-commissioned officers will report themselves, on their arrival at Lisbon, to the Assistant Quartermaster-General stationed there, and will receive his directions respecting the storehouse to be allotted for the baggage of the regiment, the means of removing it from the transports to the storehouse, and those for arranging it there.

2. After the baggage shall have been placed in the storehouses at Lisbon, it must be in charge of one non-commissioned officer or steady private soldier of each regiment, who is to be left there, and all the other officers and non-commissioned officers sent to Lisbon respecting baggage must return to join the army.

Memorandum. Should any regiment have officers or non-commissioned officers at Lisbon who can perform the duty relative to regimental baggage, officers commanding regiments will send instructions to them, agreeable to the General Orders, from hence, and there will be no occasion for regiments to detach persons for the above duty.

As the cisterns in the town of Abrantes are all sealed and closed up, with a view to the preservation of the water which

they contain, for the purpose of the fortification which is to be erected here, the soldiers must not touch them; several of the cisterns having been already broken open by the soldiers, notwithstanding that they were sealed and locked up. The officers commanding regiments are requested to visit the quarters occupied by their corps, to see that all the cisterns are again locked up and sealed, and a sentry must be placed over each.

The troops must bring from the river the water which they require.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke. [190.]

MY DEAR SHERBROOKE, Abrantes, 11th June, 1809.

I purposely avoided mentioning your quarters in the distribution of the army, meaning that you should come here or stay at Punhete, as you liked best.

This town is much crowded now, and will be more so to-morrow or next day, when Villiers and the Admiral are coming up. But I have ordered out two brigades to hut, which will make some room; and if you will come over here, I shall be glad to see you.

Stanhope arrived in England on the 23rd. We have accounts to the 26th. The Austrians are still entire. The French in possession of ienna, after a bombardment of four days.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh. [191.]

MY LORD, Abrantes, 11th June, 1809.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 25th ult., in which your Lordship conveys to me by His Majesty's command an authority to extend my operations in Spain beyond the provinces immediately adjacent to the Portuguese frontier. It does not appear to be quite certain that Marshal Victor has retired or has made any preparatory arrangements with a view to withdraw from the province of Estremadura, and the accounts which we receive of his movements are so contradictory that I am not enabled to give your

Lordship any positive opinion upon the subject, or any satisfactory statement of facts which might enable you to form your own.

Upon my arrival at Coimbra in the end of last month, I despatched Lieutenant-Colonel Bourke and Lieutenant-Colonel Cadogan to General Cuesta's head quarters to arrange with him a plan of co-operation for the British and Spanish armies with a view to attack Marshal Victor and to oblige him to retire from the menacing position which he had assumed in relation to the seat of government of Portugal and of Spain. I propose now to extend the objects of this co-operation, General Cuesta having expressed himself but little satisfied with the limits which I had assigned to it; but I fear that I must delay to make any movements whatever till the army shall receive a supply of money.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[192.] G. O. Abrantes, 11th June, 1809.

2. When the army is in cantonments, the following rules are to be observed in respect to quarters: the allotment of the quarters of any considerable corps of the army is to be made by the officer commanding it, through the Assistant Quartermaster-General attached to the corps, or, in his absence, through any other officer of his staff; no individual is to take quarters for himself, or change them, without the authority of the officer commanding in the cantonments. The staff and other unattached officers are to be quartered by the Assistant Quartermaster-General of the corps of the army to which they belong, or the officer acting for him. Regimental officers are to take their quarters in the street or district allotted to their respective corps; but when a regiment is placed in any public building which does not afford accommodation for officers, such as are not ordered to remain with the men will have quarters allotted to them. All regulations respecting quarters in the town or village where the head quarters of the army are established are to be made by the Commandant at head quarters.

3. All men able to march, whether convalescents from the hospital at Lisbon, or men lately arrived there from England,

who have arms and accoutrements, will be ordered to join their regiments.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Marshal Beresford to Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley.

SIR, Abrantes, 12th June, 1809.

I have been honoured with your Excellency's letter of the 7th June, annexing one from the Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Forces, dated the 13th of May, relative to the officers to be employed in the Portuguese service, and on which I would beg to state that it is with the utmost regret I learn that the officers who have been already attached to that service at my request, and by the permission of Sir John Cradock, are not to have the encouragement which they were led to expect, and I fear that what is now held out will not induce them to continue in the Portuguese service; and if the time when they were engaged in this service, and the then state of the army, and the position of the country are considered, they will be thought most deserving of one step of promotion, which has been granted to others in England since their appointment, and who succeed to their situations under very different circumstances to those officers. The extreme evil and unpleasant consequences that a change of officers in this service, and more particularly in the regiments in which they serve, will have, induces me most strenuously to recommend, and most earnestly to hope, that His Majesty's Commander in Chief will be pleased to recommend them as deserving in themselves, and what will be of infinite benefit to this country and the general cause, for the promotion they expected. It will be cruel I should be deprived of their assistance at the period when, by their knowledge of the service in which they have entered, of the disposition of the people and language, they begin to be really useful.

It will be necessary to have ascertained what is the distinction between the officers who have entered the Portuguese service with one step of British rank, and those who come with that step only in the Portuguese: the former have heretofore, from absolute necessity, received from this government an additional step of Portuguese rank to that granted in the British, but they have served on the pay of the British rank only; those that are now to come out are to have double pay, that of their British, which they retain, and that of the Portuguese rank which they obtain: how are these two to serve together with different pay, and to what government is to be charged the Portuguese pay to be given to the officers coming on the new principles? The officers receiving British pay have been paid by the paymaster appointed by his Excellency the Ambassador, and are not at all included in the Portuguese pay lists, and indeed in general they are supernumeraries on the regiments; and if they are put in effectives in all cases, it will much limit the promotion of Portuguese officers, which will not give satisfaction; and though I am unwilling to make any, I fear difficulties will arise.

There is another difficulty which has been stated, that of junior officers coming into the Portuguese service at an earlier period than others senior to them in the British, and having consequently in the additional Portuguese

step a prior date of commission in that service to those senior in the British, and doubting if they are to serve under the latter. I see no means of remedying this, as if officers do not take rank according to the dates of commissions in the service they act with, it will be a chaos of confusion, as the Portuguese officers with whom they act have only regard to the date of the commission, obeying him that is senior, and commanding those of junior date; and it is therefore impossible the latter can command the former who commands his superior.

I would hope that some means could be adopted to place all coming into the Portuguese service on the same footing, or as nearly as possible. It will tend much to the benefit of that service, and prevent jealousies and discontents, which we see, in spite of every effort, how easily and surely they arise.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. C. BERESFORD.

[193.] G. O. Abrantes, 13th June, 1809.

The senior officer in charge of the sick at Oporto and Coimbra will once a week send by the post to head quarters a return of the sick, specifying the number of recovered men able to march.

The commanding officers of those regiments of the army to the men of which clothing is due, will report to the Quarter-master-General whether the clothing is arrived at Lisbon, and where.

1. Whenever forty men at either hospital are sufficiently recovered to be able to march, an order and a route will be sent for their march by easy stages.

2. They are to take with them, at setting out, three days' bread in biscuit, which they are to keep by them as a reserve.

3. The Commissary-General will arrange that they shall be fed at the different halting places.

4. An officer must be sent in command of every detachment of forty men, and two officers if the number should amount to eighty, and so on; one officer for every forty in addition; one non-commissioned officer must be sent for every twenty sick; and the commanding officer at the hospital must make arrangements that other officers and non-commissioned officers should take charge of the remaining sick of the brigade, in charge of which such officer or non-commissioned officer has been left at the hospital.

5. The senior officer at the hospital will report to the Quarter-master-General the departure of the recovered men; and officers

commanding the party of recovered men must report their progress to head quarters by every opportunity.

6. * * * * * *

7. The Commander of the Forces requests that olive and other fruit trees may not be used by the troops in hutting, except in case of evident necessity.

8. If the country in the neighbourhood of the several cantonments should afford materials fit for hutting, the Commander of the Forces is desirous that the troops should be moved into huts as soon as possible; the officers commanding brigades will make arrangements accordingly. The tents will be delivered to the officers who have made requisitions for them, under the orders of the 24th May, as soon as they shall arrive from Lisbon.

9. All Commissariat and other persons who have Portuguese dragoons attached to them are to send the dragoons to Abrantes immediately, reporting to the Adjutant-General that they have done so.

10. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to have to announce to the army that private ——, of the 53rd regiment, has been wounded, and has probably died of the wounds he received from some peasants in the neighbourhood of Coimbra; and that corporal —— and private —— have probably met with the same fate: this is one of the consequences of the irregularities of which the soldiers have been guilty, which have had the effect of turning into enemies a people who were grateful for the benefits which they had received from the British nation, and manifested their gratitude by affording to the soldiers every comfort and assistance which was in their power.

The commanding officers of brigades and regiments are particularly requested to point out to the soldiers the consequences of their irregularities.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Chevalier de Souza Coutinho. [194.]

DEAR SIR, Abrantes, 14th June, 1809.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 1st of May, which was delivered to me by Mr. Gerard d'Oliviera two days ago, and I have, according to your desire, recommended that officer to Marshal Beresford. I trust that you will have been satisfied with what we have lately effected in Portugal.

Having now removed the enemy from the country, we have leisure to look about us, and to take measures, and form such an army as will give it effectual protection hereafter. I am highly flattered by the honour which His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has done me in noticing my services. I trust that I shall continue to deserve his favour, and the confidence which yourself and the government of this country are disposed to place in me.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[195.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Shrapnell, Woolwich.*

SIR, Abrantes, 16th June, 1809.

I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that the spherical case shot were used by the artillery with the army under my command last year in Portugal, and I have every reason to believe that they had the best effect in producing the defeat of the enemy at Vimeiro on the 21st August.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[196.*] G. O. Abrantes, 17th June, 1809.

1. The Commander of the Forces has been much concerned to receive reports of the misconduct of the soldiers left behind, in all the hospitals, particularly at Oporto; and he desires that in future, whenever an hospital is established, the following regulations will be observed:—

"When soldiers are dismissed from the hospital as convalescents, they are, if possible, to be quartered in the same building; if that should not be possible, they are to be quartered on the inhabitants of the house in which the hospital is established; in either case the officers in charge of the men left behind in hospital are to attend, and to put in execution the orders of the 29th ultimo relative to visiting the soldiers in their quarters.

"2. No convalescent must ever be permitted to appear out of his quarters in the streets of the town, excepting with his side arms, and dressed according to the orders of his regiment. As

soon as a sufficient number of convalescents are strong enough, a guard must be mounted daily, of which patrols under a non-commissioned officer must be sent during the night to take up all soldiers straggling from their quarters after hours. Convalescents must parade with their arms twice a day, once in the morning, and in the evening at sunset; all officers being present at each parade. After the evening parade the soldiers are to be marched to their quarters, and none are to be permitted to appear in the streets after that hour.

"3. All officers left in sick quarters, in any town where an hospital is established, are to be considered as belonging to the hospital until they shall have recovered, and are to do duty according to their respective ranks with the officers left in charge of the sick men in hospital, till they shall be ordered to join the army.

"4. The officer commanding at each of the hospitals, including that of Lisbon, will report to the Adjutant-General that these orders have been carried into execution, along with the weekly report ordered to be made by the General Order of the 13th June. Copies of these orders are to be sent to all the hospitals, and a copy to be left by the Adjutant-General wherever an hospital may be left in future.

"5. When the army, or any portion of it, in future requires green forage, commissaries, or, if there should be no commissary, the quartermaster of the regiment, under the orders of the general or commanding officer, will make a requisition upon the magistrate for it, and will point out to him the field or place from whence it can be provided; the magistrate is then to have it cut; forage is to be delivered to the troops by the commissary, in rations, according to the ordered proportions. A guard will be left in the field, in charge of the remainder of the forage, after the commissary has made his delivery. If there should be no magistrate, or if the magistrate should refuse to consent to deliver or cut the green forage, or if it should be necessary on any account the troops should cut it for themselves, the commissary of the brigade or regiment, accompanied by an officer of the Quartermaster-General's department, or if there should be none with that division of troops, by the quartermaster of a regiment, and if possible by the magistrate of the place, or the occupier of the ground, or by some inhabitant of the country, is to proceed to value the field, and to estimate the number of

rations of forage it contains. Having done this, the commissary is to allot the field in its due proportions to the quartermasters of the different regiments to be supplied with forage from it; parties of fatigue from those regiments, under the command of an officer, are to proceed and cut and carry away the forage thus allotted to them. For all green forage required, the usual receipts must be given.

"6. The commissary of each division, brigade, or regiment, on his arrival in any place near which he understands the troops to which he is attached are to halt more than one night, must take immediate and effectual measures to ascertain the number of ovens in the neighbourhood; and if they should be insufficient to supply the troops to which he is attached with bread, he will take care that a sufficient number are built forthwith.

"8. No man of the brigades in huts must be allowed to quit the lines of his regiment without being dressed with his side arms, according to the orders of his regiment."

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[197.] G. O. Abrantes, 18th June, 1809.

2. The Commander of the Forces is concerned, from reports which have been lately made to him of the practice of some of the regiments in the army, to be obliged to desire the Captains of companies to inspect the arms, ammunition, and flints, in possession of the soldiers of their companies at every parade with arms, and particularly on the march, which takes place on the morning of a march.

4. As the weather will now admit of the troops hutting, and they can therefore move together in large bodies, brigades are to be formed into divisions as follows:—

Guards	1st Division.
Brigadier-General Cameron's brigade ..	
Hanoverian Legion	
Major-General Hill's brigade	2nd Division.
Brigadier-General R. Stewart's ditto ..	
Major-General Mackenzie's brigade ..	3rd Division.
Colonel Donkin's ditto	
Brigadier-General A. Campbell's brigade	4th Di vision.
Colonel Peacocke's ditto	

Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke will take the command of the

1st division; the senior general officers of brigades will respectively take the command of the division in which their brigades are placed, till the other Lieutenant-Generals will join the army.

The brigades in divisions are to be formed from the right, as placed in this order:

The divisions will stand in one or more lines, in respect to each other, as will be ordered at the time.

An Assistant Adjutant-General will be attached to the officer commanding the division; an Assistant-Provost will also be attached to each division.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Carroll. [198.]

DEAR SIR, Abrantes, 19th June, 1809.

I have received your letter of the 11th, and its enclosures, and I am much obliged to you for the account you have given me of the success of the Spanish troops under the Conde de Neronha at St. Jago.

I had already received from the Minho, and had communicated to General Cuesta and the Junta at Seville, the accounts of the success of this body of troops.

After the operations against Marshal Soult were brought to a conclusion, I turned my attention to this quarter, in conformity with a request which I had received from General Cuesta and the Junta upon my arrival in Portugal, and with a promise which I had made them, and the British army has been for some days upon the Tagus. Marshal Victor, I conclude, upon hearing of our arrival in this quarter, withdrew his posts from Merida and the neighbourhood of Medellin on the 13th. Some of his divisions have crossed the Tagus at Almaraz, and I conceive that there is no doubt that he is retiring towards Madrid. I have not heard of Sebastiani's movements, but I conclude that he will retire likewise.

General Cuesta's head-quarters were on the 17th at Merida, and his advanced posts at Alcuescar and Albala; and he intended to follow the movements of the enemy, who, I imagine, has still a force concentrated at Truxillo.

I shall move in a day or two by Castello Branco and Coria towards Plasencia.

My opinion is that the enemy will be under the necessity of withdrawing his force from Galicia and the Asturias, in order to concentrate a force upon the Ebro sufficiently strong to oppose the united Spanish and British armies. However, a Portuguese corps is assembling in the northern provinces of Portugal, which will increase the means of checking the enemy in that quarter, if he should remain there, which I acknowledge that, for the general interests of Spain, I should consider a fortunate circumstance.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[199.] G. O. Abrantes, 19th June, 1809.

2. The Commissary-General will take care that all regimental baggage and stores lodged in the stores at Abrantes, for which he will give his receipt, are sent to Lisbon by water, and lodged in the regimental stores of the regiment to which it belongs; and his officers at Lisbon will take the receipt of the non-commissioned officer in charge of the regimental stores at Lisbon for it.

5. There are so many complaints and references respecting the mules attached to regiments, that it is necessary again to state in orders the principles on which they are given. Each regiment of infantry, consisting of ten companies, has fifteen mules, of which one for each company is allotted to carry the company's camp kettles, one to carry the surgeon's instruments, and one to carry the paymaster's books. Captains of companies, paymasters, and surgeons, each of whom has received 10*l.* bât money, are bound to keep up those mules which were originally given to them by the commissariat, as a matter of favour by the late Commander of the Forces. One mule is attached to each regiment of infantry to carry the intrenching tools, and is, by different orders, to be in charge of the quartermasters of regiments.

The Commander of the Forces desires that the commissaries in each brigade will see the intrenching tool mules in charge of

each brigade this afternoon, and that they will hereafter see them once a week.

The mules allotted for the carriage of intrenching tools are the public property, and must be kept up at the public charge.

Each regiment of cavalry has fourteen mules, eight for carrying camp kettles, one for the surgeon, one for the paymaster, respectively, having received bât money for, and liable to keep up; besides these, a regiment of cavalry has one mule for the veterinary surgeon, one for the serjeant armourer, one for the serjeant saddler, and one for the intrenching tools.

These last four are the property of the public, and must be kept up at the public expense; they must be taken care of by the persons for whose use they are provided, respectively; and the commanding officers of regiments will give directions that one of the quartermasters may take charge of the mule for the intrenching tools. The assistant-commissaries, with regiments of cavalry, will see these public mules attached to regiments of cavalry this afternoon; and in future they will inspect them once a week.

Commanding officers of regiments of cavalry and infantry are requested to give particular directions to the quartermasters, and others in charge of the public mules, to take the greatest care of them, and to see that they are applied to no other use than that for which they are allowed; as in many instances the commissary was under the necessity of supplying the regiments with hired mules to carry camp kettles, surgeons' chests, and paymasters' books, of which the public have been paying the hire ever since. The Commissary-General is requested, as soon as possible, to supply the officers with purchased instead of hired mules.

6. The captains, surgeons, and paymasters of regiments which have lately arrived or may hereafter arrive in Portugal, from Great Britain or Ireland, or the islands, and which have received the allowance called embarkation money, are to provide themselves with mules for the carriage of camp kettles, paymasters' books, or surgeons' chests, respectively; and the captains, paymasters, and surgeons of those regiments which arrived from Gibraltar, and have not received the allowance called embarkation money, will be allowed each 20*l.* to purchase a mule for their service.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[200.] G. O. Abrantes, 20th June, 1809.

1. When the troops march with a route, it must be invariably specified, in the route, where they are to get provisions; and they are to receive provisions according to what is stated in the route. The commissaries attached to brigades and regiments of cavalry must not issue provisions to troops marching with a route, unless it is specified in the route that they are to do so.

2. As the supply of cattle is not now plenty, all the troops in the huts and towns of Abrantes and Punhete, and the neighbouring cantonments, will be supplied with salt meat for a few days.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[201.] *To the Right Hon. J. C. Villiers.*

MY DEAR VILLIERS, Abrantes, 21st June, 1809.

I am obliged to you for the trouble you have taken respecting the opinions in England regarding our operations. In the present state of the public mind in England, I believe that it will be very difficult to satisfy people with anything; and the government are so weak, that they are afraid to take the lead and to guide the public opinion upon any subject. However, I am very indifferent what the opinion is of our operations. I shall do the best I can with the force given to me, and if the people of England are not satisfied, they must send somebody else who will do better.

I see that Mr. Whitbread accuses me of exaggeration, which is in other words lying!

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Right Hon. J. C. Villiers to Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Lisbon, 19th June, 1809.

I was just going to call your attention to the embarrassing situation in which I feared Beresford might find himself as to money with the Portuguese army, when their treasurer, Senhor Joachim da Costa, called upon me to state that embarrassment having actually taken place. We owe them now about 125,000*l.*, besides what you have borrowed of their provincial chests, and their own treasury is nearly, if not quite exhausted.

I have written to Canning to beg that in addition to what you have demanded, 200,000*l.* may be immediately sent out for the Portuguese, and

I think it extremely important that you should write to Huskisson immediately to the same effect.

It is also absolutely necessary that Mr. Murray should appoint some one here, the Consul-General for instance (if a proper person, as at Cadiz), or any one else he pleases, to be constantly employed in procuring money, or some very serious inconvenience will occur.

I send you back your proposal about the commissariat without troubling you with the proposal of any alteration, except of a few words, which I also got inserted in my instructions, to save myself from the plague of being a public accountant, and which do not at all affect your plan.

I think that justice has not been done in England either to you or to the service in which you have lately been engaged, and I know how much some people try to underrate and cry down everything, if their attempts are only not resisted and are tolerated in silence. I have thought fit to make the enclosed paragraph part of my despatch of this day, of which I hope you will approve.

Ever yours most truly,

J. C. VILLIERS.

Burghersh behaves as well as possible upon his disappointment. He is very sensible of your kindness, and will do whatever you advise.

No news yet of the *Donegal*.

To the Right Hon. J. C. Villiers. [202.]

MY DEAR VILLIERS, Abrantes, 22nd June, 1809.

The enclosed letter for Cadogan contains my despatches for Lord Castlereagh. If Cadogan should not arrive at Lisbon before the first vessel will sail, pray open the letter and forward the despatches enclosed in it.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere. [203.]

MY DEAR SIR, Abrantes, 22nd June, 1809.

In case you should not have received any late news from England, I inform you that it appears from the 10th French bulletin, published in the English newspapers of the 7th, that the Austrians under the Archduke Charles defeated the French under Bonaparte in an action fought on the Danube, below Vienna, on the 21st and 22nd. The French were obliged to retire into an island in the Danube in the course of the second night. Lannes was wounded, and 4 French generals killed.

The French must have lost all their cannon. I conceive, from their account of the action, that this is not acknowledged; and the loss is stated to be only 1100 killed and 3000 wounded.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[204.] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY LORD, Abrantes, 22nd June, 1809.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the enclosed memorial from Dr. Fergusson, Deputy-Inspector of hospitals, and Chief of the Medical department with the army in the field, which I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship's most favourable consideration, in order that, as head of that department, he may be placed, with regard to allowances, in some degree on a footing with that of the Commissariat and the other civil departments of the army.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P.S. I hope you will send the remount horses soon. I have given to the 14th and 16th light dragoons 95 horses from the Irish Commissariat, and I believe I shall give some to the other regiments. This arrangement and the draft from the 3rd hussars will keep up the regiments for a short time; but it is inconceivable how fast the horses of both cavalry and artillery fall off. When horses, as well as men, are new in war, I believe they are generally the sacrifice of their mutual inexperience. I hope we shall profit by the experience acquired in the expedition to the northward, and that we shall be able to keep up the regiments rather better in future.

[205.] *To Major-General Cotton.**

MY DEAR COTTON, Abrantes, 24th June, 1809.

I must recommend Hill to be Lieutenant-General at all events; and you likewise, if you wish it. As the services of

* Now Field-Marshal Viscount Combermere.

infantry and cavalry are so distinct, and as I can explain in my letter to England, and it will be perfectly understood here, why you are not likewise recommended, I advise you to remain as you are. But if you still wish to be recommended if Hill is, you shall be so; and I delay to make any communication respecting Hill's promotion till I shall hear again from you.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Abrantes, 24th June, 1809. [206.]

1. The frequent irregularities which occur on the march of detachments of convalescents or recruits to join their regiments with the army render it necessary to publish the following regulations:

2. All detachments must march by a route from the Quarter-master-General's department, in which they will be named, the places at which such detachments will receive provisions, and from whom.

3. The Commanding officer of each detachment on its march must take care to send forward notice to the person from whom the provisions are to be received, of the arrival of the detachment, and of its strength.

4. It is to be understood that when two or more days' provisions are issued to the troops, they are not to receive at the same time two or more days' wine. It has already been frequently explained in orders, that wine forms no part of the soldier's ration; it will be delivered to them when it can be procured, and when it cannot they must go without it.

5. When a detachment will move, the soldiers must be formed into divisions, and officers and non-commissioned officers must be posted to each division.

The orders of the 29th May must be particularly attended to by the officers posted to divisions; and they must exert themselves to prevent the repetition of the complaints which are so disgraceful to the army.

6. A detachment must universally march at daylight in the morning; the officers and non-commissioned officers must march with the divisions to which they are posted, and must prevent the soldiers falling out of the ranks and straggling. The de-

tachments must march at the rate of 2½ miles an hour; one halt must be made for five or ten minutes at the end of every hour and a half.

7. Officers commanding detachments are to report their progress to head quarters by every opportunity.

8. A communication between head quarters and all parts of Portugal is to be carried on through Lisbon: all officers having occasion to write must send their letters by post, under cover, unless specially ordered to do otherwise, to the town major, Lisbon, from whose office a courier will be despatched daily to head quarters.

9. Whenever an officer is sent from any of the hospitals, or Lisbon, in the command of a detachment of convalescents or recruits, he is to be furnished with a copy of these orders, and on his arrival at head quarters he will report specially that the orders in the 3rd, 5th, and 6th articles of this day's orders have been carried into effect.

10. The number of horses for which staff officers are allowed to draw forage having been increased by the orders of the 23rd inst., it is to be understood that they are to do all duties required from them by means of their own horses, unless when required to go and return from a place at a greater distance from their station than 20 miles.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[207.] *To Dom M. Forjaz.*

MONSIEUR, Abrantes, ce 25me Juin, 1809.

Je viens de recevoir la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 21 de ce mois. Je peux vous assurer, et je vous prie de faire sçavoir aux gouverneurs du royaume, que j'ai nulle prédilection pour la personne que j'ai nommé corregidor de Oporto; je l'ai nommé seulement parcequ'il falloit avoir quelqu'un pour en décharger les devoirs lorsque les troupes ont eu possession de la place; et tout ce que j'ai désiré sur le compte de cette personne étoit que le gouvernement lui fisse sçavoir sous peu de tems ses intentions sur son compte. Je répète que je ne m'intéresse d'aucune manière à son sort.

J'ai, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Abrantes, 25th June, 1809. [208.]

2. Paymasters of regiments at Abrantes and in the huts, and all officers of the army, or others to whom any money is due, whether on account of claims for losses, which claims have been before the Board of Claims, for horses shot for the glanders, or on any other account, are to call on the Paymaster-General this afternoon, where the former will receive payment for the subsistence of their respective regiments to the 24th June, and all the latter what may be due to them.

4. The accounts of the soldiers of the army to the 24th June must be settled and signed, and balances paid on this day and to-morrow, to those in camp; to those at a distance on the following days. General officers commanding brigades are requested to see this order carried into execution.

7. The troops in the huts are this day to apply to the Quarter-master-General for orders on the Commissary-General's stores for the camp kettles, canteens, haversacks, and bill hooks for which they have made requisitions under the orders of the 8th inst.; General Sherbrooke's division will receive the same articles as they will pass through Abrantes on the 27th; the same articles will be sent to General Cotton's brigade, and the infantry of Major-General Mackenzie's division.

8. The allowance of intrenching tools is to be only 5 spades, 5 shovels, 5 pickaxes, and 5 felling axes for each battalion of infantry; 8 spades, 8 shovels, 4 pickaxes, and 4 felling axes for each regiment of cavalry; and the requisitions will be corrected accordingly.

9. The Deputy-Inspector of Hospitals will give directions for the formation of the hospitals at Abrantes upon the principle that all the men likely to continue sick for any length of time are to go to a general hospital, which is to be formed under the care of a sufficient number of surgeons of each brigade.

10. The Commander of the Forces is under the necessity of again requesting the attention of all the officers of the army to the strict obedience of the orders issued, particularly to those respecting supplies of provisions, carts, boats, &c. It is again positively forbidden to any officer to stop supplies going to any part of the army, or to press boats or carriages excepting under the directions of a commissary. The commissariat drivers attached to the artillery at Abrantes, and all the other stations of the

army, must this day be delivered over to the Commissary-General or his assistants.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Marshal Victor to Joseph Buonaparte.

SIRE, À Calzada, ce 25 Juin, 1809.

Je peindrai difficilement la peine que j'éprouve. Ma position est affreuse. Je touche au moment de voir la dissolution du 1er corps d'armée. Les soldats tombent d'inanition. Je n'ai rien, absolument rien, à leur faire donner. Ils sont au désespoir. Je ne vois pas sans effroi les effets de cette détresse; ils seront funestes à notre gloire. Ils le seront à votre Majesté. Je n'y vois aucun remède que celui que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui proposer par ma lettre d'hier. Encore en l'adoptant sera-t-il trop tardif. Je suis forcé par cette circonstance de me replier sur Talavera la Reyna, où il n'y a pas plus de ressources qu'ici. Que devenir au milieu d'une telle calamité? Des secours prompts nous seront indispensables, mais où sont ils? Qui peut nous les fournir? Si votre Majesté m'abandonne dans le cas malheureux où je me trouve, honneur, service, tout est perdu pour moi. Je ne serai pas la cause du désastre qui menace mes troupes, néanmoins j'en porterai la peine. Je serai demain à Talavera de la Reine, où j'attendrai les ordres de votre Majesté.

LE MARÉCHAL VICTOR.

P.S. J'apprends que les ennemis ont avec eux un équipage de pont. S'ils veulent passer le Tage, ils en sont les maîtres. Il est impossible de laisser plus long tems ici le 1er corps. Jamais situation n'a été plus malheureuse que la sienne.

[209.] *To Major-General Cotton.*

MY DEAR COTTON, Abrantes, 26th June, 1809.

You have mistaken me entirely if you suppose that I have any wish not to recommend you for promotion which is not founded upon the apprehension that it may interfere with your own views upon the cavalry. I conceive that you have as fair a claim as any man in the army, and I recommend you for it this day. You will remain with your brigade till I shall receive an answer from England; and if anything should occur in the mean time to enable me to keep you as a Lieutenant-General with the cavalry, I will avail myself of it.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Abrantes, 26th June, 1809. [210.]

1. The Commander of the Forces desires that the troops should always march at daylight, in order that they may reach the ground at as early an hour as may be practicable; he is also desirous that they should hut every day; and it is to be understood that they are to hut invariably where there is wood conveniently situated in reference to water. This wood, however, must not be olive trees, or other valuable fruit trees.

2. The order (No. 5 of the 3rd May) in respect to men taken sick on the march, referring to the order (No. 11 of the 24th April) by the late Commander of the Forces, is countermanded; the Commander of the Forces being convinced that, from circumstances, it is impossible to carry it into execution.

3. In future the General officers commanding divisions and brigades will direct that men taken sick upon a march may be carried on till orders will be given for forming a general or brigade hospital.

4. The huts at present occupied by Major-General Tilson's brigade are to be occupied as hospitals by the sick of the different regiments to be left in brigade hospital.

5. The staff surgeons attached to divisions will make the distribution of the huts to the different brigades, and will order a sufficient number of surgeons from each brigade to remain in the huts to attend the sick. This order is not to prevent the surgeons of those brigades which have already got hospitals in the town of Abrantes from continuing to occupy them. Surgeons of regiments are to make requisitions on the purveyor's stores for bedding for the sick, in the proportion of a blanket for every patient in the huts.

6. A sufficient number of officers and non-commissioned officers from each brigade are to be left in charge of the sick at Abrantes, according to the orders of the 19th May and 2nd June.

7. The officers commanding companies are at all times to leave with the surgeons in charge of hospitals in which the men are left the amount of the hospital stoppages of 9*d. per diem* for each man left behind, from the day the men will enter the hospital to the following 24th of the month, as soon as possible after the 24th of every month. The surgeons in charge of hospitals are invariably to send to the paymasters of regiments,

by the mode of conveyance pointed out in the orders of the 24th inst., the account of stoppages for the men of each regiment who have been in the hospital under their charge since the 24th of the preceding month, according to the printed form. No accounts of stoppages must be sent to England in future.

8. A few tents having arrived, those officers who have made known their wishes to have them under the orders of the 24th May, No. 3, are to apply to the Quartermaster-General, who will give orders upon the Commissary-General for them.

9. Complaints having been made by the Lieutenant-General commanding the cavalry, by Brigadier-General Fane, and by Lieutenant-Colonel Lord E. Somerset, commanding the 4th dragoons, to which regiment Assistant-Commissary —— is attached, of his neglect of duty, of incapacity to perform his duty, and of his making false reports to Lieutenant-Colonel Lord E. Somerset; Assistant-Commissary —— is dismissed from his office as Assistant-Commissary. Mr. —— is to be released from arrest, and is to quit the army.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[211.] *To the Right Hon. J. C. Villiers.*

MY DEAR VILLIERS, Abrantes, 27th June, 1809.

The money having arrived, the army marches this morning towards Castello Branco and Plasencia. The French retired from the bridge of Almaraz on the 24th, and General Cuesta was about to cross the Tagus. I shall be much obliged to you if you will send me a couple of pounds of black tea by the first courier that comes. I shall also be obliged to you if you will endeavour to give me some general notion of the days of departure of the packets.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[212.] G. O. Abrantes, 27th June, 1809.

3. A guard of 1 serjeant and 6 dragoons from Brigadier-General Fane's brigade to be attached to the Paymaster-General's mules during the march; they are to report themselves and receive instructions from the Paymaster-General; 1

corporal and 2 private dragoons to be attached to the provost guard, which, with all the prisoners, will move with the head quarters of the army.

10. Assistant-Commissary —— having expressed his concern for the neglect of duty of which he has been guilty, and Lieutenant-General Payne having expressed a desire his conduct should be looked over upon this occasion, and that he should be reinstated in his office; the order of yesterday respecting him is countermanded, and he is to return to his duty as assistant-commissary attached to the ——.

The Commander of the Forces, however, hopes Mr. —— will show by his attention to his duty in future that he merits the indulgence of Lieutenant-General Payne; and he hopes that the example of the dismissal of Mr. —— for the neglect of duty will operate as an example to all the officers of the commissariat.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford. [213.]

MY DEAR BERESFORD, Castello Branco, 1st July, 1809.

I received your letter of the 28th June yesterday, and I think it probable that you received in that day a long letter from me in answer to all those which I had received from you. I think I am a little unreasonably pushed about an immediate decision respecting the rank of the officers who have come out from England. So much time has elapsed since the period at which they ought to have been sent out, that I don't think any great additional inconvenience can result to the Portuguese army or to your arrangements by delaying for a few days to appoint these officers to regiments, till I can receive from England an answer to a reference which I made on the 7th of June, which answer may, and most probably will, alter the principle on which the British officers are to serve in the Portuguese army. The few days for which I ask would indeed be necessary for these officers to prepare themselves to take the field.

Besides, there are points of importance to be settled even before you can make your arrangements, and can post these officers to battalions. One of these is, that the British government intend that the Portuguese government should defray the

charge of the Portuguese pay of the officers lent to them. Do the Portuguese government consent to defray this charge? or has the proposition ever been brought under their consideration in any shape?

All I can say upon the subject is this: make your arrangements if you please, and appoint your officers to regiments; but whatever the government at home will decide in consequence of my letter of the 7th of June must be carried into execution, whatever may be the result.

I wish that the strength of your army was collected somewhere. It would be a support in reality as well as in appearance to the different detachments you might think proper to place upon the frontier, as well under Silveira as at Villa Real and Guimaraens; and the enemy would certainly not venture to make a serious invasion of Portugal.

I shall be at Zarza la Mayor on the day after to-morrow, and afterwards on the road towards Plasencia.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P. S. I hear from Colonel Roche that Joseph Buonaparte came to Toledo on the 22nd with 5000 men, and that the whole French army of Victor, Sebastiani, and Joseph are joined at Talavera. This intelligence has induced Cuesta to recross the Tagus on the 29th.

I think it looks like a serious intention to make a stand, combined with the movements to the northward.

Pray get your troops together as soon as you can, and put yourself at their head.

[214.*] G. O. Castello Branco, 1st July, 1809.

2. Great care must be taken when rye is given to the horses that they are not watered two hours before, or two hours after they are fed; the same rule should be observed when they are fed with Indian corn or barley.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Zarza la Mayor, 4th July, 1809. [215.]

1. The Assistant-Adjutant-Generals and brigade majors of those divisions and brigades stationed in the neighbourhood of head quarters must attend at the Adjutant-General's office for orders at 10 o'clock precisely.

2. The brigade majors will attend at the Assistant-Adjutant-Generals of divisions to receive the division orders at half past 11 o'clock, and at 1 the brigade majors must give out the orders to the adjutants of regiments, which must be given out to troops and companies, and read to the soldiers at evening parades.

3. In case circumstances should prevent the brigade majors from issuing the General Orders to the adjutants of regiments before 3 o'clock on any halting day, they are to receive and issue on that day only the orders requiring immediate execution, of which the General officers commanding brigades are to make the selection, and on the following day the other orders of general regulations.

4. All orders received by the adjutants of regiments must at the first parade, or earlier if necessary, be read to the troops.

5. On marching days the Assistant-Adjutant-Generals and brigade majors stationed near head quarters will attend at the Adjutant-General's office for orders, as soon as the troops reach their ground.

6. All orders requiring immediate execution issued on marching days must be given to the adjutants, and read to the troops as soon as possible.

7. The General Orders will be sent from head quarters to divisions at a distance by the first opportunity; those requiring immediate execution must be issued and read to the troops as soon as received; the others, if not received by the General officer of the division before 2 P.M., are not to be issued till the following day.

8. The Assistant-Adjutant-Generals, or the brigade major of the division or brigade at a distance to which the General Orders will have been sent, must send to the Adjutant-General by the first opportunity a receipt for the orders received, specifying the numbers of each day.

9. When pass orders will be sent, directions will be written on the back of them, stating whether they are to be circulated by the person who will have carried them from head quarters,

or by the officers respectively to whom they will have been addressed.

10. Every officer to whom they are addressed must sign his name on the paper on receiving them, and insert the hour of the day at which they reached him.

11. As pass orders invariably must require immediate execution, they must be issued and read to the troops without loss of time.

12. The numberless mistakes which have occurred, and the many instances of neglect and disobedience of orders issued referring to the health, subsistence, or the convenience of the troops, render it necessary not only to observe the early circulation of orders, but if possible, obedience to them and their early and prompt execution.

13. The obedience to orders of general regulations must depend upon the attention of General officers commanding brigades, and Commanding officers of regiments, and their determination to enforce regularity and discipline, but obedience to them requiring execution can be secured by other means.

14. Accordingly the Commander of the Forces desires that officers commanding regiments shall report to the General officer commanding the brigade, that the General Orders requiring the performance of any duty, or the execution of any arrangement, have been obeyed.

15. The General officers commanding divisions and brigades will take care to notify to the troops to what day they have received bread upon every issue.

17. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of General officers commanding divisions and brigades to the General Orders of the 4th and 5th of March, by the late Commander of the Forces, relative to the use of the mules allowed for carrying camp kettles, in any service excepting the carriage of camp kettles.

18. The consequence of loading them with other baggage is, that they are unequal to carry the kettles which they are given to convey, and the loads are so ill put on that they fall from the mules, and the camp kettles do not arrive from the march till after the hour at which they ought to be used by the troops.

20. General, staff, and other officers are requested to put their names on the doors of the houses in which they are quartered.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Zarza la Mayor, 5th July, 1809. [216.]

1. The Commander of the Forces desires that it may be considered as a standing order, that the troops are not to quit their lines unless dressed according to the orders of their regiment, with their side arms; excepting when on fatigue duty, in which case they must be in charge of an officer, or non-commissioned officer, according to their numbers.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Plasencia, 9th July, 1809. [217.]

1. All the officers belonging to regiments which are in huts must be encamped with the men, excepting those whose health requires that they should remain in houses: applications for quarters for those officers must be made through the General officer commanding the brigade, to the officer of the Quartermaster-General's department with the division, or with head quarters.

2. The officer of the Quartermaster-General's department with divisions must quarter the General officers and their staff as near to their divisions and brigades as possible.

3. All officers, whether of the staff or regiments, requiring quarters at head quarters, must apply to Captain Kelly, of the Quartermaster-General's department; and all officers requiring quarters at the head quarters of any division must apply to the Quartermaster-General of the division. No officer, excepting those of the department of the Quartermaster-General, employed in this branch of the service, must apply for quarters to the magistrates.

4. As Commissaries have been appointed to supply all and every part of the army, to whom every individual entitled to provisions and forage can apply for what he requires, no application excepting by the Commissaries must be made by any officer or soldier, or other persons attached to the army, to the magistrates of the country for any article whatever.

5. A General Court Martial will assemble to-morrow morning,

at eleven o'clock, for the trial of such prisoners as will be brought before it.

Major-General Mackenzie, President.

	Field Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.
Major-General Mackenzie's brigade ..	1	2	1
Major-General Hill's division	2	1	2
Brigadier-General Campbell's ditto ..	1	3	1
Total	4	6	4

The name of the officer appointed to act as Deputy Judge-Advocate will be sent in the course of the day to the President.

All evidences to proceed immediately to head quarters who have been permitted to march with their divisions, and to report themselves to the Adjutant-General's office.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[218.] A. G. O. Plasencia, 9th July, 1809.

The Commander of the Forces having arranged with the magistrates of the different districts and towns in Spain that the officers, soldiers, and others belonging to the army, are to be furnished with what they require at the market prices of each place where they may be quartered, makes known to the troops, that the magistrates will cause to be put up, in the square or market place of each town or village, a list of the various articles of provisions, &c. &c., with their prices annexed to them; and in case any of the inhabitants should demand a higher price than that fixed, the soldiers are to complain to their officers, stating what inhabitants attempted to impose upon them, and the commanding officer of the regiment is to make known the soldier's complaint to the magistrates of the town, who will take proper measures on the occasion.

The soldiers are not, however, to attempt to take things by force, or on their own terms, under pretence that large prices have been demanded from them. Heads of departments and persons attached to head quarters, in addition to putting up their names on the doors of their quarters, will always, on their arrival in a new quarter, immediately send their addresses to the Adjutant-General, and to the Commandant at head quarters.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

J. H. Frere, Esq., to Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley.

DEAR SIR, Seville, 9th July, 1809.

According to the promise in my letter of yesterday of advising you instantly of any intelligence which might be received respecting the movements of the army of Galicia, I despatch a courier with the enclosed intercepted letters from Marshal Soult: they are infinitely curious in many respects; but as he seems to have been shut out from all intelligence and correspondence for some months past, it is very difficult to form any conjecture as to the plans which he may form in a state of things which must be entirely new to him; though I should conclude at any rate that his talk about an attempt on Portugal on the side of Braganza is a mere vapour to palliate his retreat.

I omitted to mention that I communicated your letter to Mr. Garay, for which he said he would return you his thanks. I gave him at the same time a little scolding for corresponding with you without communicating the subject of his letter to me, which would have saved you some trouble, as I should undoubtedly have made the same observations which you have been under the necessity of conveying in writing.

Believe me, my dear Sir,

Very sincerely, your faithful humble servant,

J. H. FRERE.

[ENCLOSURES.]

Le Maréchal Soult à Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne et des Indes.

SIRE, Puebla de Sanabria, ce 25 Juin, 1809.

J'ai l'honneur de rendre compte à Votre Majesté que le second corps d'armée est réuni depuis hier au soir à la Puebla de Sanabria, où je me propose de laisser reposer les troupes pendant quatre ou cinq jours, pour leur donner le temps de préparer pour quatre jours de subsistance, et ensuite je les dirigerai sur Zamora.

Le second de ce mois je partis de Lugo, ainsi que par ma lettre du 30 Mai j'ai eu l'honneur de l'annoncer à Votre Majesté, et je me dirigeai sur Monforte, où les divisions arrivaient le 4 et le 5. Le corps de La Romana y était passé deux jours auparavant, se rendant à Orense. Quelque diligence que je fisse, il ne me fut pas possible de joindre son arrière-garde: elle avait passé le Sil sur plusieurs points, et avait détruit les barques lorsque les détachements que j'envoyais arrivèrent aux barres de San Estevan de Gudin, de Paradella et de Forbes. Tous les habitants de l'arrondissement de Monforte avaient abandonné leurs maisons. Je restai en position jusqu'au 11, et pendant ce temps on fit plusieurs démonstrations de passage. J'annonçai une marche sur Orense; on prépara des subsistances. Je reçus un convoi de six pièces de montagne, des munitions, des souliers, et un bataillon de marche formé par une partie des hommes que j'avais laissés à Lugo. J'ai, en outre, laissé à Lugo 967 hommes malades, ou hors d'état de suivre, aux ordres de l'adjudant-commandant Desroches, qui doit, quand ils seront rétablis, les conduire à Zamora.

Le 11 je me remis en marche, me dirigeant sur le Val de Orres. Le Général de division Loison, ayant sous ses ordres la division Merle et la brigade de dragons commandée par le Général Lorge, rencontra des insurgés, au nombre

de 2000 à 3000, à l'entrée du Val de Quiroga, et les poussa vivement jusqu'à Monteferrado, où il les retrouva en position, couvrant le passage qui est sur le rocher au travers duquel le Sil passe. Le 4me. régiment d'infanterie légère, soutenu par le 15me. de ligne et le 13me. de dragons, les culbuta ; et le 12 au soir cette avant-garde prit position sur le plateau de Larounco, où un détachement du 13me. de dragons et un autre du 1er. de chasseurs provisoires eurent occasion de charger, et se signalèrent. Le 13 au matin le Général Loison eut ordre de s'emparer de Puente Bibey, de marcher sur Puebla de Tribes, de faire occuper le pont de la Havea, et de pousser son avant-garde vers El Burgo. Le pont sur la Bibey se trouva défendu par 4000 hommes qui s'étaient établis sur des rochers et dans les zigzags que fait la route pour gravir la côte presque à pic de la rive gauche ; les insurgés, auxquels s'était joint un détachement du corps de La Romana, avait en outre fait beaucoup de coupures, barricadé le pont ; et ils se préparaient à le couper, lorsque le 2me. régiment d'infanterie légère, soutenu par le 36me. de ligne aux ordres du Général Semet, se présentèrent : la charge eut aussitôt lieu, les obstacles furent surmontés, et l'ennemi fut mis en déroute ; on le poursuivit jusqu'au-delà de la Puente de Havea, où il se dispersa. Dans cette affaire, qui fait honneur aux troupes qui combattirent, les insurgés perdirent beaucoup ; nous n'avons à regretter que quatre absens, deux tués, et quinze blessés ; parmi ces derniers est le Sieur Courtade, capitaine de voltigeurs, qui eut la jambe cassée après avoir franchi la barricade du pont. Le Général Merle eut un cheval tué sous lui. La brigade du Général Lorge eut des dragons de blessés et des chevaux tués.

Pendant que ce mouvement s'opérait, le Général Franceschi avec sa division de cavalerie légère et le 47me. régiment de ligne, remontant la rive droite de la Bibey, prenait position en avant et à droite de Bollo, et envoyait ses reconnaissances par Viana sur la Gudina et vers Porto.

Le Général de Laborde, avec sa division et la brigade de dragons du Général Calincourt, s'établissait à la Rua, d'où il nettoyait d'ennemis tout le Val de Orres jusqu'au pont de Domingo Flores.

La division Mermet prenait position sur le plateau de Larounco, et celle du Général Heudelet, à laquelle s'était réuni la colonne aux ordres du Général Rouger venant de Lugo, était en marche sur Monteferrado, où elle n'arriva que le 15 au soir. La brigade de dragons du Général Marisi, commandée par le Général Houssaye, était attachée à la division Heudelet et aux ordres de ce général.

L'insurrection du Val de Orres se composait de la population du Val de Quiroga, de celle du Val de Orres, de la juridiction de Bollo, et des arrondissements de Puebla de Tribes, de San Claudio, de Castro de Caldela, de Coba et des montagnes de St. Mamer, formant ensemble 8000 à 9000 hommes, tous armés et dirigés par le curé de Casoyo, Don José Ramon Quiroga y Uria, que La Romana a nommé général ; par Don Juan Bernardo Quiroga y Uria, frère du précédent ; par les curés de Bendollo et de Barco ; par le juge de Bollo, nommé Carason ; et par l'avocat du village de Petin, près la Rua.

Après les affaires de Monteferrado, de Larounco, et de Puente Bibey, tous ces insurgents se dispersèrent dans les montagnes ; mais la partie qui resta à St. Clodio continua ses agressions, et profita de la position de ce village, qui est au bord du Sil vis-à-vis St. Martin de Quiroga, pour faire un feu continuel sur la colonne, qui était obligée de défiler à demi portée sur la rive droite, et lui fit éprouver des pertes. Lorsque la Havea fut passée, le Général Loison eut ordre d'envoyer un détachement à St. Clodio pour incendier le village, en punition de la conduite infâme de ses habitants ; il lui fut aussi ordonné d'envoyer un autre détachement à Castro de Caldela, pour y donner un pareil

exemple en punition de l'assassinat de 85 chasseurs du 15me. régiment à cheval, qui eut lieu le 2 Février dernier, et auxquels les populations de St. Clodio, de Puebla de Tribes, et de Coba prirent part. Les dépouilles de ces malheureux qu'on trouva furent réunies et mises à côté d'un écrit qui faisait connaître les motifs de cette juste vengeance. Le Général Loison fit grâce à la population de Puebla de Tribes, qui vint en masse se soumettre, protesta de son repentir, et promit de se mieux conduire.

Les démonstrations qui avaient été faites pour passer le Sil, et la marche du Général Loison par Puebla de Tribes, en suivant la route de la rive gauche qui conduit du Val de Orres à Orense, firent craindre au Marquis de la Romana, qui s'était arrêté et réuni dans cette dernière ville, d'y être attaqué avant qu'il eût pu joindre le corps de Carrera, qui était sur Vigo et Redondella : il partit avec précipitation ; et une forte reconnaissance que le Général Loison envoya le 16 en avant de Villarine lui apprit que son arrière-garde était déjà sur la Lima, vers Fiaso, se dirigeant par la route de Castillo sur la Gudina. Effectivement un parti, que le Général Franceschi envoya le 17 sur ce dernier endroit par Viana, y rencontra son avant-garde, et eut avec elle un engagement. Le 18 un détachement de 100 chevaux ennemis se porta en reconnaissance à la gauche de la position qu'occupait à Bollo le Général Franceschi. Nous apprîmes qu'un corps de 4000 à 5000 hommes, commandé par Chavarria, était arrivé au Porto, et les paysans soumis de la juridiction de Bollo vinrent déclarer qu'ils recevaient l'ordre à l'instant de préparer beaucoup de subsistances pour les troupes de La Romana.

Lorsque je fus instruit de ces détails, je présumai que La Romana était en marche pour se porter soit sur la Puebla de Sanabria et me fermer le passage, soit pour retourner par les montagnes de la Cabrera dans la vallée de Pontferrado et de Villafranca, où il paraît toujours exister des foments d'insurrection ; je donnai de suite l'ordre au corps d'armée de se diriger sur Viana, où le 19 l'avant-garde et la division Mermet prirent position. Les autres divisions y arrivèrent successivement dans la journée du 20.

Le détachement de cavalerie Espagnole qui avait été vu la veille sur la gauche du Bollo fut encore aperçue au moment où l'avant-garde se mettait en marche ; il fut poursuivi jusqu'à Viana sans pouvoir être atteint. L'ennemi avait 1800 hommes d'infanterie sur les hauteurs de Pinza, gardant le pont sur le Bibey, et par sa contenance paraissait disposé à le défendre. Les renseignements que nous obtînmes de quelques habitants qui étaient restés à Viana furent que l'on préparait des subsistances d'après les ordres de La Romana, qui la veille était venu dans cette ville, et que son projet était de nous attaquer ; qu'à cet effet le corps qui s'était porté sur Porto devait manœuvrer sur notre gauche pour pénétrer dans le Val de Orres, rétablir l'insurrection, et ensuite agir sur nos derrières, tandis que nous serions attaqués de front ; et annonçait aussi l'arrivée d'un renfort considérable d'Anglais et de Portugais, et enfin que son armée était sur les hauteurs entre la Gudina et Viana.

Il était trop tard pour attaquer le jour même le détachement ennemi qui était devant Viana ; mais les dispositions furent faites pour le chasser de sa position le 20 au matin, et ensuite pour reconnaître celle de l'armée, me proposant de la combattre, quelque fut sa force, si elle tenait position. A la pointe du jour on reconnut que les Espagnols s'étaient retirés ; des reconnaissances furent envoyées à leur poursuite, et on apprit qu'ils évacuaient également depuis minuit le Gudina, se dirigeant en toute hâte sur Monterey, et annonçaient l'intention de retourner à Orense ; il fut aussi rapporté qu'il y avait une grande défection parmi eux, beaucoup de malades, et qu'ils manquaient des choses les plus nécessaires, disposition que leur retraite précipitée ne pouvait encore qu'augmenter.

Dans toute autre circonstance je me fusse mis à la poursuite de La Romana quoique pour l'atteindre et le forcer à combattre il eût fallu manœuvrer longtemps; mais, ainsi que j'ai eu l'honneur de l'annoncer à Votre Majesté dans ma lettre du 30 Mai dernier, je considérai que depuis ma retraite du Portugal ma mission ne pourrait être de rester en Galice, où d'ailleurs je ne trouvais aucun moyen pour rétablir les troupes et les pourvoir des objets indispensables qui leur manquaient, ni une place pour faire déposer un grand nombre de malades qui sont à la suite des régiments, et que je dois faire emporter par les chevaux de la cavalerie (à moins d'aller à la Corogne ou au Ferrol). Je considérai aussi que l'armée Anglaise, qui lors de ma retraite poussa jusqu'à Finso et était subitement rentrée en Portugal, annonce le projet de marcher sur le Maréchal Victor, et de se porter sur Madrid, pouvait bien avoir fait l'un ou l'autre de ces mouvements (il n'en paraissait plus sur les frontières de Galice seulement un corps de 500 Portugais avait joint La Romana), et dans cette supposition qu'il était d'une importance majeure que je me dirigeasse sur Zamora, à couvrir à Madrid, soit en empêchant l'ennemi à prendre cette route ou direction, soit en manœuvrant sur son flanc ou sur ses derrières, si déjà il s'y était engagé. Je pensais aussi que je ne pouvais éviter de me rapprocher d'une place de dépôt où je pusse mettre mes malades, recevoir des secours et prendre quinze jours de repos, pour ensuite continuer les opérations et agir suivant les circonstances.

Telle était mon intention le 30 Mai, lorsque j'écrivis à Votre Majesté et que je convins, en conséquence de nos opérations, avec le Maréchal Ney; d'après cet arrangement le 6me. corps devait reprendre Vigo et diriger une colonne sur Orense pour se mettre en rapport avec moi; si ce mouvement eût eu lieu, le corps de La Romana était très-compromis; mais le Maréchal Ney m'a écrit de St. Iago Leso, qu'après avoir poursuivi l'ennemi jusqu'au pont de Sampayo, il l'avait trouvé retranché sur la rive gauche du Caldela, ayant coupé le pont, et montrant 10,000 à 12,000 hommes de troupes, dont 3000 à 4000 de ligne, et le restant paysans; le tout aux ordres du Général Noruña, qui se dit général-en-chef de l'armée du Minho, et des Généraux Morillo et Carrera; que les Anglais avaient deux vaisseaux et trois frégates dans la Baie de Vigo, dont les équipages étaient débarqués, et étaient chargés de défendre la place, ainsi que des retranchements qu'ils avaient faits à la pointe de Rande, et enfin que dans cette situation il n'avait pas jugé à propos de pousser son attaque, ni d'envoyer sur Orense la colonne dont nous étions convenus; qu'il se repliait sur St. Iago et plaçait ses avant-postes à El Padron, gardant les bords de la Cella, et m'engageait ensuite à rester en Galice, et me représentait qu'il pourrait résulter pour lui des fâcheuses conséquences si j'en sortais.

Cette proposition m'étonna, et il me parut que M. le Maréchal Ney se conduisait à m'obliger à rester en Galice, car certainement rien ne l'empêchait de manœuvrer sur Orense tandis que moi-même j'agissais contre La Romana; il eût pu ensuite, lorsque celui-ci se serait retiré, marcher sur les derrières de Carrera, prendre ses troupes, ou les obliger à s'embarquer précipitamment, mais il fit le contraire; ainsi dès ce moment je me crus encore plus obligé qu'auparavant à suivre mon premier projet et à continuer le mouvement dont nous étions convenus.

A cet effet, aussitôt que je fus instruit que le général ennemi précipitait sa retraite sur Monterey, et qu'une partie de son corps était en défection, je me portai en bataille sur la route de Castille, la droite à la Gudina et la gauche au cou de Lobian, ayant des avant-postes ou gardes sur divers débouchés qui mènent en Portugal.

Le 23 je fis marcher par la gauche sur la Puebla de Sanabria, d'où, à l'approche de la tête de la colonne conduite par le Général Loison, le corps de

Chavarria, formant 3000 hommes de divers détachements qui étaient revenus de Porto, se retira après avoir encloué douze pièces de gros calibre qu'il y a à la Puebla; le même jour ce corps se dispersa: une partie suivit par les montagnes les frontières de Portugal (on dit qu'il se porte sur Ciudad Rodrigo), et le restant est errant dans le pays; je ferai en sorte d'en ramasser si on peut en joindre.

Le 24 toutes les troupes du corps-d'armée furent réunies aux environs de la Puebla de Sanabria, où je me propose de les reposer trois ou quatre jours; pendant ce temps elles se prépareront des subsistances, on raccommodera la chaussure, les chevaux seront ferrés, et je menacerai de nouveau le Portugal; peut-être même que je ferai faire par un détachement une incursion vers Braganco, afin d'opérer une diversion qui ne peut manquer de produire quelque effet.

Ainsi je ne me remettrai en marche que le 29 ou le 30 de ce mois, et j'arriverai le 1er ou le 2 de Juillet à Zamora. Je désire bien vivement que Votre Majesté ait daigné m'y envoyer des ordres et les secours que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui demander par ma dépêche du 30 Mai dernier.

Je me permettrai, avant de terminer ce rapport, de présenter à Votre Majesté quelques observations sur la situation actuelle de Galice. Cette province est toujours en état de fermentation. Les menaces de mort et d'incendie qu'employe La Romana; les nombreux agents qui agissent en son nom; les exécutions qu'il fait; les dévastations qui ont inévitablement lieu par les fréquents mouvements des troupes; la ruine de la plupart des habitants; l'absence de toute autorité qui représente Votre Majesté; l'influence des prêtres, qui sont très-nombreux, et la grande majorité opposante; l'argent que les Anglais répandent; la détresse des généraux Français, qui, faute des moyens, ne peuvent souvent payer les émissaires qu'ils employent; toutes ces causes contribuent à augmenter de jour en jour le nombre des ennemis, et à rendre la guerre qu'on fait dans ce pays très-meurtrière, infiniment désagréable, et d'un résultat fort éloigné. On s'y battra encore longtemps avant que Votre Majesté en retire quelque avantage, à moins qu'elle n'adopte le système de faire fortifier sept à huit postes importants susceptibles de contenir chacun 5000 à 6000 hommes de garnison, un hôpital, et des vivres pour quatre mois, pour maintenir la population, fermer et garder les principaux débouchés dont l'ennemi ne pourrait plus profiter, et aussi pour offrir aux colonnes qui agiraient dans la province des appuis, quelque direction qu'elles suivissent. Ainsi elles pourraient recevoir des secours et déposer leurs malades. Cette dernière considération est très-puissante, et je ne dois pas dissimuler à Votre Majesté qu'elle fait beaucoup sur le moral des soldats, qui, dans l'état actuel des choses, sont exposés à périr de misère, ou sous les coups des paysans, s'ils ont le malheur d'être blessés, ou atteints de la fièvre, et de se trouver éloignés d'un lieu sûr pour y chercher des secours.

Je crois qu'avec une dépense d'un million on parviendrait à mettre en état de défense la Galice, et certes jamais argent n'aurait été mieux employé, d'autant plus que par la suite on pourrait diminuer le nombre des troupes qui pour le moment y sont nécessaires; dans cette persuasion j'ai engagé M. le Maréchal Ney à faire fortifier Lugo, et à ordonner la construction de trois blocus sur la ligne de Villa Franca; les places de Tuy, de Monterey, de Viana et de Puebla de Sanabria, qui toutes peuvent contenir des canons, ont une enceinte et un reste de fortification, pourraient aisément être rétablies et rempliraient parfaitement cet objet; et, s'il le fallait, il est encore d'autres postes qui par leur situation seraient à même de concourir à la défense sans que les frais fussent considérablement augmentés. Si cette mesure, que je considère comme urgente et d'un résultat assuré, n'est point adoptée, il deviendra

nécessaire que des renforts soient envoyés à M. le Maréchal Ney, ne fusse que pour remplacer ses pertes et maintenir libres les communications, quoique aujourd'hui il puisse être assez fort pour tenir tête au corps de La Romana et de Carrera réunis, s'ils se présentaient en ligne. Mais leur système étant d'harceler sans cesse et d'éviter une affaire générale, avec le temps ils auraient l'avance la plus forte, et ils finiraient, même sans combattre, par la détruire si elle n'était soutenue, et on ferait une perte d'hommes incalculable sans obtenir le résultat qu'on se propose.

Il est probable que je ne serai plus dans le cas d'entretenir Votre Majesté au sujet de la Galice ; ainsi, pour cette dernière fois, j'ai cru de mon devoir de lui rendre compte des observations que mon séjour dans cette partie de ses états et la connaissance que j'ai acquise du caractère de ses habitants m'ont mis à même de faire. J'ai donc l'honneur de supplier Votre Majesté de daigner excuser cette digression en faveur et en considération des motifs qui l'a dictée.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

MARÉCHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

Le Maréchal Soult à Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne et des Indes.

SIRE, Puebla de Sanabria, ce 25 Juin, 1809.

J'ai l'honneur de rendre compte à Votre Majesté que j'ai donné ordre au Général Franceschi de partir de Puebla de Sanabria avec la division de cavalerie légère qu'il commande, et de se rendre à Zamora, où il lui fera passer le Douro et l'établira sur la rive gauche sur la route qui conduit à Ciudad Rodrigo, et attendra de nouveaux ordres.

Lorsque le Général Franceschi aura pourvu à cet établissement il se rendra en poste près de Votre Majesté, à l'effet de lui remettre les dépêches dont je l'ai chargé, lui donner tous les détails sur ce corps d'armée et sur ses opérations qu'elle pourra désirer, et avoir l'honneur de prendre ses ordres.

Je supplie Votre Majesté d'accueillir avec bonté le Général Franceschi, de lui témoigner même qu'elle est satisfaite des services signalés qu'il a rendus pendant la campagne, et de vouloir bien me le renvoyer le plus tôt possible, sa présence étant nécessaire pour le rétablissement de la division dont le commandement lui est confié.

Le Capitaine Anthonius, mon aide-de-camp, part avec le Général Franceschi, et aura aussi l'honneur de prendre les ordres de Votre Majesté. Ce brave officier s'est conduit avec une grande distinction pendant la campagne, et je ne puis trop en faire l'éloge.

Je me fais précéder à Zamora, où je compte être rendu le 2 du mois prochain, par l'ordonnateur-en-chef du corps d'armée, le Sieur Lenoble, afin qu'il fasse préparer les subsistances nécessaires à la troupe, et l'hôpital qui doit recevoir les nombreux malades qui sont à la suite des régiments ; il doit aussi réclamer près M. l'intendant-général de l'armée les moyens en tout genre qui me manquent, tel que l'habillement, chaussure, ambulances, officiers de santé, administration, transports militaires, payeurs, argent pour solde et dépenses extraordinaires, postes, &c. J'ai l'honneur de supplier Votre Majesté de daigner donner des ordres pour qu'il soit fait droit à ses demandes ; mes besoins sont très-grands.

Je la supplie aussi de vouloir bien donner pareils ordres au général commandant l'artillerie de l'armée, pour que les demandes que le Général Delauloy (que pour cet effet j'envoie à Zamora) fera au sujet de son service soient

remplies. Le 1er de ce mois j'écrivis à M. le Maréchal Jourdan, pour le prier de solliciter l'autorisation de réunir à Zamora un équipage d'artillerie de campagne pour y être à ma disposition. Ma lettre doit lui être parvenue par M. le Général Bigarré, aide-de-camp de Votre Majesté.

J'ose encore demander à Votre Majesté qu'elle ait la bonté d'ordonner que tous les détachements appartenant au corps d'armée qui sont en Espagne, les dépôts et les transports quelconques d'habillement qui doivent être dans diverses places, me rejoignent à Zamora, à moins que Votre Majesté ne préférât les envoyer à Salamanque, dans le cas qu'il entrât dans ses dispositions de me faire diriger avec le corps d'armée sur ce point, pour être plus à portée de concourir aux opérations générales pendant même que je m'occuperais du rétablissement des troupes.

Votre Majesté est instruite qu'il y a plus de cinq mois que je n'ai reçu ni ordre, ni nouvelle, ni secours, par conséquent que je dois manquer de beaucoup de choses, et même ignorer les dispositions générales desquelles l'exécution doit avoir lieu. A ce sujet j'ai aussi l'honneur de la prier de vouloir bien ordonner qu'il me soit envoyé des duplicatas des ordres qui me manquent, et je m'y conformerai.

Dans ma dépêche du 30 Mai dernier j'ai rendu compte à Votre Majesté que je mettais à la disposition de M. le Maréchal Ney le Général de brigade Rouger; mais ce général, qui a beaucoup de zèle, étant-resté plusieurs jours à Lugo sans être employé, et pouvant l'utiliser, je l'ai amené; c'est lui qui a conduit le dernier détachement qui est venu de Lugo avec de l'artillerie de montagne.

Le Général de brigade Valannes était très-fatigué, et il prétexta, avant mon départ de Lugo, des maladies, que je ne crus pas aussi graves qu'il le prétendait; mais ayant remarqué en lui un affaiblissement moral, je lui ai donné ordre de se retirer près du major-général de Votre Majesté pour recevoir ses ordres.

A cette époque j'aurais aussi voulu pouvoir faire partir les Généraux Lahoussaye et Mermet, qui n'ont pas toujours fait ce qui était de leur pouvoir pour le succès des opérations; mais j'ai préféré attendre d'être arrivé à Zamora, afin de ne pas accréditer les bruits d'intrigues ou de conspirations qui eurent lieu en partant d'Oporto, auxquels ils n'ont certainement aucune part, et dont j'ai rendu compte à Votre Majesté. Ces bruits étant aujourd'hui entièrement tombés, je crois utile au bien du service de l'Empereur qu'il soit donné une autre destination à ces deux généraux, que pour le moment il n'est pas nécessaire de remplacer; la réduction de la cavalerie permet de supprimer le cadre d'une division de dragons, et le Général Loison, qui est sans division, ou le Général Terey, en faveur duquel j'ai demandé le grade de divisionnaire, peuvent très-bien remplacer le Général Mermet. A Zamora je prendrai des dispositions en conséquence. Je supplie Votre Majesté de l'approuver.

Il y aurait encore quelques changements à faire sur le placement des généraux. J'ai chargé le Général Franceschi d'avoir l'honneur d'en entretenir Votre Majesté. Le bien du service le commande, et ce motif est trop puissant pour que l'Empereur n'y donne pas son agrément; car dans le genre de guerre que nous faisons, et avec l'espèce d'ennemi qu'il y a à combattre, il importe beaucoup au succès des opérations que les chefs qui sont à la tête des troupes soient non-seulement impassibles, mais qu'ils aient une force d'âme qui les mette en toutes circonstances au-dessus des événements, même les plus fâcheux. J'ai l'honneur de prier Votre Majesté, qui elle-même en est persuadée, de daigner prendre en considération l'observation que je me per-

mets de lui faire, et qu'un zèle ardent pour le service de l'Empereur m'inspire.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

MARÉCHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

[219.] *To Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Plasencia, 15th July, 1809.

According to your recommendation I appointed Colónel ——— to reside at General Cuesta's camp, to send me intelligence of what was passing, when Lieutenant-Colonel Bourke came away; but I have since had some reason to believe that this appointment is not agreeable to persons in authority at Seville, to whom Colonel ——— had given disgust during his residence there last winter and spring. I think, therefore, that it would be desirable to remove Colonel ——— from this, and, indeed, from all employment in Spain; but I don't like to do so without your consent, and indeed I have no pretext for so doing. The only mode by which I can suggest to remove him from Spain would be for your Lordship to adopt the principle respecting the officers appointed to serve in the Portuguese service which I thought should be adopted, viz. that they should do duty with the Portuguese troops.

Let me know what I shall do upon this subject.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[220.] G. O. Plasencia, 15th July, 1809.

1. In consequence of the representations of the Lieutenant-General commanding the cavalry, of the insufficiency of the allowance of the veterinary surgeons and farriers of the regiments of dragoons, an additional allowance of 3*d.* for each horse per month to the former, and ½*d.* per day for each horse to the latter, will be given.

2. *Extract of a Letter from the Deputy-Inspector of Hospitals to His Excellency the Commander of the Forces.*

"Many men have lately been sent to the hospital, both here and elsewhere, in a state of the utmost filth, some with no shirts at all, and others with only one, that had not been washed for any discoverable length of time; greater attention to cleanliness and the state of the men's necessaries seems therefore called for in some brigades of the army, and bathing whenever practicable at an early hour in the morning, but at no other time, ought to be universally practised during the hot season. The worst species of contagious fever is infallibly generated among the troops by the neglect of personal cleanliness; new killed meat without salt is very prejudicial; and the mode of issuing and conducting the rations has been productive of much annoyance, exhaustion, and disappointment, and consequently of diseases to the soldiers."

3. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to state, that he has found those soldiers who were sent into hospitals in the shameful state reported by the Inspector of Hospitals, belonged to the 24th, 31st, and 45th regiments, and the German Light Dragoons; and he desires that more attention may be paid to the men's necessaries by the officers in future.

4. It is very desirable that the officers commanding companies should endeavour to procure salt in sufficient quantities for their men, and that the officers commanding regiments should, if possible, make some arrangement for supplying the men with breakfast.

7. The army will march on the 17th, and all the arrangements must be made in the course of this day and to-morrow for leaving in the general hospital such men as it will not be possible to move; subsistence to the 24th July must be left for such men as may be sent to general hospitals, and officers for the sick, in each brigade, according to the proportion in the General Order 18th May. Commanding officers of regiments will send this day to the Adjutant-General, before seven o'clock P.M., a return of carts attached to their regiments.

8. The Commissary-General will this day make his arrangements with the Assistant-Commissaries of brigades and regiments

to deliver to the troops at Plasencia, to-morrow, four days' bread, viz., 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th instant.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[221.] G. O. Plasencia, 16th July, 1809.

3. When the Commissary-General is unable to issue wine to the troops, either on account of the scarcity of the article or of the difficulty of issuing it, he must not interfere in any manner with the sale of wine where the troops may be quartered, or in the neighbourhood. The Provost-Marshal and his assistants will in that case take care that order is preserved in the wine-houses.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Notes by Mr. B. Frere relating to Sir A. Wellesley's co-operation with the Spanish Armies, his arrival at Plasencia, and his first complaints of want of Provisions, and difficulty of procuring means of Transport.

Lisbon, 24th April.—Sir Arthur announces his arrival to Mr. Frere, and his plan to attack Soult and return to co-operate with Cuesta against Victor.

Villa Franca, 29th April.—In letters to Mr. Frere, Mr. Garay, and General Cuesta, he announces his intention, as soon as the operation against Soult is performed, to return and collect "the whole of his army on the east frontier of Portugal, and to co-operate by all the means in his power with General Cuesta in an attack upon Victor."

Seville, 4th May.—Mr. Frere, after speaking of his attempts to obtain a diversion in La Mancha, says to Sir Arthur: "It was my object to obtain a diversion in La Mancha as the price of co-operation on your part, and the impression that they received from Colonel Alava's report was, that your intention was, after defeating or driving Soult into Galicia, to come down upon Estremadura to attack General Victor. I was under some disadvantage, inasmuch as they imagined that the point which I wanted to make a condition was already conceded. This morning, however, the Minister and Section of War showed me the enclosed letter from General Cuesta, which seemed to have brought them a little to reason, and will, I hope, have the same effect upon the gentlemen of the Junta above mentioned. They seemed disappointed; but I did not and shall not encourage them under the present circumstances to expect anything but that you will maintain a defensive system in the north of Portugal, exposed as you are to a force so much greater than you had reckoned upon, &c.

"When I speak above of an attack upon Victor as a condition which I

thought myself authorised to offer, I follow nearly the expression of your letter to me; but I did not by any means express an expectation or a wish that the British army under your command should compromise itself any further than by occupying a position on the north of the Tagus, together with Alcantara, a measure which would naturally oblige Victor to retreat," &c.

Seville, 3rd June.—M. Saavedra informs Mr. Frere that orders had been given to the Junta of Badajoz to collect the greatest possible quantity of mules, and place them at the disposition of the Commander-in-Chief of the British army.

Abrantes, 9th June.—Sir Arthur Wellesley sends the result of Colonel Bourke's mission to Cuesta up to that date, and prefers the plan of moving upon Plasencia.

11th.—Sir Arthur informs Colonel Bourke that he has received authority to extend his operations beyond the frontier provinces, and desires him in consequence to discuss with the Spanish Quartermaster-General their future operations after Victor should have been forced across the Tagus.

Zarza Mayor, 3rd July.—Sir Arthur encloses a letter from Mr. Garay urging him to move forward.

On the 8th Sir Arthur states his arrival at Plasencia with the advanced guard; the rest of the army was to arrive on the 9th and 10th.

Plasencia, 13th July.—Sir Arthur's interview with General Cuesta.

16th.—Sir Arthur sends a copy of his letter to General O'Donoju, stating his distress for means of transport and provisions.

To Colonel Gordon. [222.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Plasencia, 17th July, 1809.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Lieutenant Smyth, of the Royal Waggon Train, to which I request your attention. Lieutenant Smyth is one of the officers of the Irish commissariat drivers who volunteered their services when I left Ireland last year with the troops, and induced the drivers of that corps to extend the limit of their services without receiving any bounty.

They were transferred to the English commissariat as officers of the Waggon Train, and I conceive that it would have been fair and just towards them, as well as towards the officers of the corps, if they had been made to rank with each other according to the dates of their respective commissions, as officers of drivers of the English or of the Irish corps.

If this had been done, Mr. Smyth would now, I believe, have a troop.

But if you should not adopt this fair mode of proceeding, I contend for it that Mr. Smyth is entitled to Captain Taggart's troop according to another mode of stating his claim.

These troops left Ireland in July, and they ought from that period to have been removed from the Irish to the English Waggon Train; but, by some accident or mistake, they were not transferred till November or December. In the mean time Captain Taggart died in September, before the transfer and incorporation were made officially; and, of course, Lieutenant Smyth, as the senior Lieutenant of the Irish corps, had the official claim to the vacant troop.

When Captain Taggart died, Mrs. Taggart claimed a pension as a Captain's widow; which claim was opposed on the ground that Captain Taggart was not at the period of his death an officer in the Royal Waggon Train. If this argument be well founded, the Lieutenants in the Royal Waggon Train have no claim to promotion to the troop vacated by his death, and my reasoning in favour of Lieutenant Smyth cannot be opposed. If Lieutenant Smyth cannot have the troop on the last ground stated, Mrs. Taggart must have her pension, and Lieutenant Smyth ought to have the troop on the first ground I have advanced for him.

Pray let me have the Commander-in-Chief's decision on the letter I wrote to him on the 7th of June respecting the rank of officers in the Portuguese service.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[223.] G. O. Oropesa, 20th July, 1809.

The Commander of the Forces wishes that the corps should be as strong as possible, and that no man should be left with baggage whom it is not absolutely necessary to leave in care of it.

The men's arms to be particularly examined this afternoon by the officers; every man must have a good flint, and the dust must be well cleaned from the locks and touch-holes. The Commander of the Forces desires that the unmilitary practice of

firing in the neighbourhood of the lines may be discontinued by the troops.

The Commissaries must give receipts or pay for whatever they may receive from the inhabitants of the country. The time of the Commander of the Forces yesterday was occupied in hearing complaints of the Commissaries having taken different articles of provisions without giving receipts for them, and he trusts that he will have no further ground for noticing this disobedience of orders.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Oropesa, 21st July, 1809. [224.]

The army will march to-morrow morning; the regiments to be in the ranks as strong as possible.

The army will parade this evening, in marching order, at five o'clock, on the right of the high road from Oropesa towards Talavera de la Reyna, to be seen by General Cuesta; the infantry and artillery formed in one line from the left, in the following order:

The 4th division with its left at the point near Oropesa, pointed out by the Commander of the Forces.

Major-General Hill's division.

Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke's division.

Third division.

Lieutenant-General Payne will receive directions from the Commander of the Forces where to form the cavalry.

The troops will be at open ranks, and will present arms, and officers salute; drums and bands to play a march; each regiment by word of command from its own commanding officer, when the General will approach its left.

The Commander of the Forces desires that mules which will bring the provisions may be allowed to go away as soon as the provisions will be delivered, and those who bring them will have got their receipts; the most serious inconvenience has already resulted from the detention of those mules.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[225.] G. O. Talavera de la Reyna, 22nd July, 1809.

One-third of each regiment to remain accoutred in their lines, and the whole must be on the alert.

Officers commanding regiments are to keep their officers with their companies.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Benjamin Bathurst, Esq., to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD, Buda, 23rd July, 1809.

The suspension of intercourse between this country and England has prevented me from hearing sooner of your Lordship's embassy to Spain; apprised of this event, I seize the first opportunity of giving you the best account in my power of the present state of the Austrian war. I feel at a loss in fixing the period for retracing the late events, being ignorant how far the advices received from this country by your Lordship may extend.

I risk, however, dwelling on facts already familiar rather than present an incomplete view of the situation to which the affairs of Austria have been conducted, and the fabric which such vast materials were employed to erect crumbled to pieces by a series of errors, but principally by the shameful incapacity of the Archduke Charles.

The disasters occasioned by a plan of campaign originally defective, and marked at the opening by the signal defeat at Eckmühl and Landshut; the fall of Vienna, owing to the slow and circuitous march of the Archduke Charles; the recall of his brother from Italy, which led to the dispersion and defeat of his army; might have been repaired by the battle of Aspern, so decisively gained by the Austrians that a more enterprising commander would have terminated the war at that period: by an unaccountable conduct, which every officer of distinction and capacity agrees in reprobating, the Archduke neglected this occasion.

The junction of the army of Italy and of the Saxon troops under M. Bernadotte reinstated Bonaparte's army. A variety of operations during the month of June were directed against Hungary, the insurrection defeated, and Raab captured; while the Archduke Charles, strengthened by reinforcements which augmented his army to 140,000 men, remained a passive witness of these operations, and of the works of the French in the island of Lobau, without an effort to counteract them, amidst the murmurs and discontent of his army, animated not less by their late victory than disappointed at their subsequent inaction.

From the 1st to the 5th instant Bonaparte was occupied in transporting his army across the Danube, through the Lobau. The action commenced on the 5th; during the whole of that day the Austrians were successful. A manœuvre of the French cavalry on the 6th succeeded in breaking their left wing under Prince Rosenburg, the more exposed, as the corps of the Archduke John expected to reinforce that part of the army from Presburg did not arrive: on this reverse, the Archduke Charles,

whose right wing and centre had pushed their successes to the Lobau, and occupied the bridges of the French, ordered a retreat. The left wing, by the direction in which he retreated, was separated from him, pursued and attacked continually till the 12th, at which period he signed the armistice, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy.

The Emperor had left the army of the Archduke after the battle of the 6th to give activity to the Hungarian army assembling at Komorn; upon the arrival of Prince John Lichtenstein, several councils were held, in which every voice was unanimous in deciding on the necessity of acquiescing in the armistice, as Bonaparte had repassed the Danube, and was prepared to fall upon the Hungarian army yet unformed.

Prince J. Lichtenstein was sent to the French head-quarters to sound the intentions of Bonaparte concerning peace, a step which the Emperor has sent me the most positive assurances is only taken to gain time. The Archduke Charles has been removed from the command of the army, which (with the exception of a corps left to cover Bohemia, under the command of the Archduke Ferdinand) is filing by the Jablonika towards Hungary; and unless Bonaparte recommences hostilities previous to the expiration of the armistice, at that term the different corps will be assembled round Komorn. Prince J. Lichtenstein and General Bellegarde are invested with the command under the Emperor, who acts as Generalissimo.

This is the situation of affairs at the moment I write. The French army consists of 90,000 men, chiefly troops of the Confederation. The means of the Austrians are much superior, though at present dispersed; the destitution of the Archduke Charles promises a better direction of their resources. I fear the remedy is applied too late; the spirit of the country is broken, and the enthusiasm for the war declined, otherwise the materials are still sufficient if there existed a mind to animate them.

I regret, my Lord, that the immediate departure of M. de Bardaxi's courier prevents me from completing my review of these incidents as fully as I could wish. I will neglect, however, no opportunity of continuing to inform your Lordship of the progress of affairs.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, my Lord,

Your most obedient humble servant,

BENJAMIN BATHURST.

G. O. Talavera de la Reyna, 29th July, 1809. [226.]

1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the officers and troops for their gallant conduct in the two trying days of yesterday and the day before, in which they had been engaged with, and beaten off, the repeated attacks of an army infinitely superior in number. He has particularly to request that Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke will accept his thanks for the assistance he has received from him, as well as for the manner in which he led on the infantry under his command to the charge

of the bayonet. Major-General Hill and Brigadier-General A. Campbell are likewise entitled in a particular manner to the acknowledgments of the Commander of the Forces, for the gallantry and ability with which they maintained their posts against the attacks made upon them by the enemy.

The Commander of the Forces has likewise to acknowledge the ability with which the late Major-General Mackenzie (whose subsequent loss the Commander of the Forces laments) withdrew the division under his command from the out-posts, in front of the enemy's army, on the 27th instant; as well as to Colonel Donkin for his conduct on that occasion.

The Commander of the Forces likewise considers Lieutenant-General Payne and the cavalry, particularly Brigadier-General Anson and his brigade, who was principally engaged with the enemy, to be entitled to his acknowledgments; as well as Brigadier-General Howorth and his artillery, Major-General Tilson, Brigadier-General R. Stewart, Brigadier-General Cameron, and the brigades under their commands respectively. He had opportunities of noticing the gallantry and discipline of the 5th battalion 60th, and the 45th, on the 27th, and of the 29th and 1st battalion 48th on that night, and on the 28th, of the 7th and 53rd; and he requests their commanding officers, Major Davy, Colonel Guard, Colonel White, Colonel Donellan, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir William Myers, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bingham, to accept his particular thanks.

The charge made by the brigade of Guards under the command of Brigadier-General H. Campbell, on the enemy's attacking column, was a most gallant one; and the mode in which it was afterwards covered by the 1st battalion 48th was most highly creditable to that most excellent corps and to their commanding officer, Major Middlemore. The Commander of the Forces requests Colonel Fletcher, the chief engineer, Brigadier-General the Honourable C. Stewart, Adjutant-General, Colonel Murray, Quartermaster-General, and the officers of those departments respectively, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bathurst and those of his personal staff, will accept his thanks for the assistance he received from them throughout these trying days.

2. The bakers of the different brigades, who have already been employed by the Commissary-General, will be sent immediately to his stores to receive his directions under a non-commissioned officer of Brigadier-General Cameron's brigade, to

parade at the Commander of the Forces, to receive instructions from Major Campbell, Assistant Adjutant-General.

3. Two camp kettles to be immediately sent from every regiment for the wounded men in the general hospital at Talavera.

4. Commanding officers of regiments and brigades will direct that all arms collected in the field of battle may be sent in by a proper escort to such artillery stores as Brigadier-General Howorth shall point out.

In the return of killed, wounded, and missing, directed to be sent in yesterday, attention must be paid to specify the same in two distinct returns, one of the 27th, and one of the 28th; as also to state the names of the officers killed, wounded, and missing, mentioning whether slightly or severely.

All prisoners and deserters to be sent to the Provost-Marshal.

The names of the general and staff officers killed, wounded, and missing, to be specified in the returns called for; these returns must be sent in to the Adjutant-General's office before eight o'clock to-morrow morning at the latest.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. P. O. Talavera de la Reyna, 29th July, 1809. [227.]

The Commander of the Forces calls the attention of officers commanding brigades and regiments to prevent the practice of the soldiers firing off their muskets in camp; such men whose arms cannot be drawn must be regularly paraded, and their firelocks discharged at the same time.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Talavera de la Reyna, 30th July, 1809. [228.]

2. The Commissary-General is to attend to the requisitions of the Inspector of Hospitals for provisions and other articles for the sick and wounded. The brigades to appoint officers and non-commissioned officers to take charge of the sick and wounded in general hospital, in proportion to their numbers, according to the General Orders.

3. These officers and non-commissioned officers are to be selected from those who have slight wounds which are likely to

detain them at Talavera, at the same time that they are not likely to be confined to their houses for any length of time.

A field officer to be appointed to superintend the military arrangements of the general hospital; he will report to the Adjutant-General what sentries will be necessary, and what guards will be required to furnish them. The 1st division to furnish the field officer.

4. General officers commanding brigades are desired to attend to the early and precise execution of all orders relating to the care of the sick and wounded, and to have reports made upon them according to the General Order 4th July.

5. General officers commanding divisions and brigades are desired this day to see that all the soldiers are supplied with ammunition and flints, &c. It is recommended to officers commanding regiments to have the accoutrements of the killed and wounded men collected which are lying about the ground. They will report to the Quartermaster-General the numbers collected, in order that arrangements may be made to procure storehouses for them at Talavera.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[229.] G. O. Talavera de la Reyna, 2nd Aug., 1809.

2. The soldiers plunder the inhabitants bringing in provisions, notwithstanding the repeated orders given upon the subject, and the knowledge which they all have that this practice must tend to their own distress.

3. The Commander of the Forces desires that particular attention may be paid to former orders, requiring that no soldier should quit his lines, excepting on fatigue, in charge of an officer or non-commissioned officer, unless he is dressed according to the standing orders of his regiment with side-arms.

The rolls must be called in camp every two hours, and commanding officers of brigades will give directions what proportion of officers of each regiment are to be present. The Provost and his assistants must patrol the neighbourhood of the camp constantly, and the assistants must relieve each other.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Sir R. Wilson. [230.]

My dear Sir Robert, Peraleda de Garbin, 5th Aug., 1809.

It is difficult for me to instruct you when every letter I receive from you informs me that you are farther from me, and are carrying into execution a plan of your own. The last instructions I gave you were to communicate with, and of course follow the motions of, the Spanish army. The day before yesterday General Cuesta abandoned Talavera, and arrived on the morning of the 4th at Oropesa, on the ground that Soult and Ney, joined, had come through Plasencia, that I was not strong enough for them, and, moreover, that he was threatened on his left flank and in his front. Soult was then at Navalmoral, and the bridge at Almaraz was taken up. In my opinion there remained for us but one line to adopt, General Cuesta's intelligence being correct, and that was to withdraw across the bridge of Arzobispo, and re-establish as soon as possible our communication with Seville and with Lisbon. I have done so. The General is, I understand, still at Arzobispo, having drawn in his advanced guard from Talavera. You will do well to march, directly that you will receive this, by Calera to Arzobispo, and there cross the river and send word to General Cuesta that you are coming there, that he may not break the bridge before you arrive. I doubt whether you would find your way through the mountains of the Vera at present.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

P.S. You should have followed the movements of Cuesta here.

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*To the Marquess Wellesley.** [231.]

My dear Wellesley, Deleytosa, 8th Aug., 1809.

I send you my despatches of this date by Mr. Blachford, a gentleman who was with me during the last campaign in Portugal, and who has come out to me since Parliament was prorogued, and has been lately with me. He will let you know how things are going on, and I beg leave to recommend him to your attentions and kindness.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

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* Lord Wellesley was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary to the Supreme Junta at Seville in April, 1809, but a sudden and severe illness prevented his leaving England until the 24th July.

[232.] MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL MURRAY, Q.M.G.

Deleytosa, 8th Aug., 1809.

1. Orders to be sent to the Commissary-General, as soon as possible, to send from Lisbon to the army the articles stated in the margin.*

2. These articles must be forwarded by the way of Badajoz in one or separate convoys, according as may be most convenient, care being taken that the whole should come; and that a list of the articles leaving Lisbon, arriving at Badajoz, and leaving Badajoz, with each convoy, is sent to the army.

3. Mr. Villiers to be applied to, to interfere with the Portuguese government to have the articles in question transported to Badajoz, in the manner, by the route, at the time, and by the stages, most convenient to them and to the people of the country.

4. Applications to the same purport to be made to Señor Lozano de Torres in respect to the movement of the stores from Badajoz to the army.

5. As soon as the plan of carriage, &c., shall be arranged, and the intelligence shall be received that the convoys have commenced their march from Lisbon, a Commissary to be sent to Badajoz to superintend their receipt, and their further transport from thence in co-operation with the Junta of Badajoz.

6. Orders concerning this memorandum to be sent to all the departments concerned.

Arthur Wellesley.

N.B. I'll send to Mr. Villiers respecting the business which will be required to be done by the government.

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* 30,000 pairs of shoes.
3,000 stands of arms.
3,000 sets of accoutrements. (Either come or coming in the *Hannah*.)
Linen to make 30,000 shirts. (Must be purchased by the Commissary at Lisbon; ready made shirts would answer better.)
5000 haversacks.
5000 canteens.
500 billhooks.
500 camp kettles.
1,000,000 musket ball cartridges.
Ammunition for 6 pounders in proportion.

G. O. Deleytosa, 9th Aug., 1809. [233.]

1. As the troops composing the army in Spain have not received their rations regularly since the 22nd July, it is not just that the full price of the ration should be stopped from the soldier's pay: from the 23rd July, therefore, the stoppage from the soldier's pay, on account of his rations, is to be only 3*d.*, until the supplies are such as it will be possible to make regular deliveries of provisions. The Commander of the Forces will hereafter give notice of the period at which the full price of the rations is to be charged to the men: this order is applicable to the troops composing General R. Craufurd's brigade, only from the 30th July inclusive, and to the troops of Horse Artillery only from the 3rd August.

2. The Commander of the Forces desires that the roll may be called in camp every two hours, and the officers commanding divisions will give directions what proportion of officers are to attend.

3. The soldiers themselves render the difficulties of the moment greater than they would otherwise be by their irregularity, as they seize and plunder the mules coming in with provisions, by which the good and regular soldiers of the army are deprived of their just share of them.

4. The Provost-Marshal will ascertain by what roads provisions are coming in; he will take care that his assistants patrol those roads constantly, and any man caught in the act of plundering provisions coming to the army is to be punished on the spot, as such a heinous offence deserves.

5. Soldiers must not quit their lines unless dressed with their side-arms, excepting when on fatigue; all soldiers on fatigue must be under the command of an officer or non-commissioned officer.

6. The practice of taking roots and vegetables without paying for them must be entirely discontinued; if roots or vegetables are required, they must be taken by regular parties formed under the command of an officer, who must take care and is responsible the owner of the ground is paid for what is taken.

Arthur Wellesley.

[234.] A. G. O. Jamaicejo, 12th Aug., 1809.

Commanding officers of regiments are to report immediately to the Adjutant-General the names of all officers who have absented themselves, without leave, since the 25th of last month, in order that their names may be published in the Orders of the Army, and that they may be ordered to the army in arrest.

Arthur Wellesley.

Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Sir, Seville, 13th Aug., 1809.

1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your several despatches noted in the margin; and Mr. Frere's correspondence with me, including copies of your letters addressed to him, has afforded me the necessary information respecting the general situation of affairs in Spain, and the operations and condition of the British and Spanish armies.

2. Immediately after my arrival at this place, and even before I had been admitted to an audience by the Supreme Junta, I employed every endeavour to induce the government to adopt the measures and arrangements suggested in your letter of the 8th of August.

3. For this purpose I yesterday presented a note to the Secretary of State, of which the enclosed is a copy; and last night I received an answer, of which I also enclose a copy for your information.

4. The orders to the Duque del Parque were transmitted to you by an express courier this evening, and I am inclined to believe that this government is disposed to make every effort compatible with its powers, with the state of the country, and with the inveterate defects of the military department in Spain.

5. You are, however, sufficiently aware of the impossibility of relying upon such efforts unless a regular system can be established under such authorities as may secure its efficiency and seasonable operation; and although you may be assured that I will omit no endeavour to contribute to the establishment of such a system, I cannot entertain a confident expectation of success.

6. It is evident that, in order to secure to your army the articles which you require, supplies must be drawn from remote sources to such points as may be properly calculated for the establishment of magazines, and that your means of transport and of movement cannot now be furnished from the countries in which your army is acting. I have, therefore, advised this government to call forth every resource of the southern provinces of Spain, and to convey the requisite articles in the first instance to Santa Elolia, a place in the rear of Monasterio, where, I understand, a magazine might be formed with advantage.

7. From this magazine you might draw forward your supplies to any other points which you might think fit to indicate; but the efficiency of the whole arrangement must depend in a great degree upon the proper

selection and control of the agents for the collection and conveyance of the several articles required for your use.

8. Under a serious and painful impression of the difficulties of your situation, and of the sufferings of your army, I feel the indispensable necessity of communicating with you on the most minute details of the subject of your distress; and I therefore forward this despatch to you, under the care of Brigadier-General Doyle and of Major Armstrong, to whom I request you to state all the circumstances of your situation, and every point connected with the means of relieving your wants and of securing you against similar inconvenience if you should think it practicable or advisable to remain in Spain.

9. As soon as these officers shall be fully apprised of your wishes and intentions, I request that you will direct them to return to me with your despatches. In the meanwhile I shall not fail to use every exertion to accelerate the efforts of this government for your relief.

10. You may be assured that I shall take a proper opportunity of representing to this government the defects of the Spanish army which you describe in your despatch of the 8th of August.

11. I shall also recommend to this government the defensive plan of operations which you advise for the future conduct of the Spanish armies.

12. I have informed Don Martin de Garay of the absolute necessity of communicating solely and exclusively with the British ambassador, and he has assured me that he will hereafter adhere without deviation to the rule established in that respect by His Majesty's commands. I have already acquainted you with the representations which I have addressed to this government on the subject of the distress of your army, and of the answer which I have received.

13. Under the discretionary power which you were pleased to leave to me, I have sent your second letter on the subject of the rank of Captain-General in the Spanish army to Don Martin de Garay. If it should be His Majesty's pleasure that you should not permanently hold that rank, the mode which you have adopted in that letter affords a sufficient opportunity for the operation of His Majesty's commands; and I am satisfied that this course of proceeding will be more agreeable to this government than that which was proposed in your first letter. I have forwarded to Don Martin de Garay your letter respecting the horses presented to you by the Junta, and also concerning the pay of Captain-General.

14. I have read with great concern the description contained in these letters of the distress of your army and of the perverse conduct of General Cuesta. This government is disposed to remove General Cuesta from his command whenever it shall have received from you or from the British ambassador a regular and detailed statement of his misconduct. It is my intention to present to the Secretary of State a recital of the several facts stated in your despatches respecting General Cuesta, but in my judgment it would not appear to be proper that I should directly insist upon his removal. As far as I can collect your sentiments upon this point, they appear to coincide with mine. It is not to be supposed that this government will continue to employ General Cuesta in the chief command of the army after having received full notice of the several facts which you have stated; and I am satisfied that his removal would be made with more

cheerfulness and alacrity, and with less danger of unpopularity, if it should appear to be rather the necessary consequence of his own conduct than the result of the interference of the British ambassador.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient and faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

[235.]* G. O. Jaraicejo, 16th Aug., 1809.

1. The soldiers are again positively prohibited to plunder bee-hives; any man found with a bee-hive in his possession will be punished.

2. The rolls to be called in camp every two hours: the officers commanding divisions will settle what number of officers of each regiment are to attend.

3. The Provost must patrol in the neighbourhood of the camp, and every man found out of his lines without his accoutrements, and not dressed as a soldier ought to be, is to be punished.

Men sent on fatigue will be under the command of an officer or non-commissioned officer.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[236.] *To General Eguia.*

SIR, Jaraicejo, 18th Aug., 1809.

In addition to the letters which I had the honour to deliver to you yesterday, I beg now to transmit another complaint which I have received from Major-General Hill respecting the impediments thrown in our way when attempting to procure forage.

I have, &c.,
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[237.]* G. O. Truxillo, 20th Aug., 1809.

4. Officers commanding corps will give particular directions that the men having charge of cars are not to load them above 600 pounds weight, the utmost they can carry; the consequence must be, if this order is not complied with, that cars must break down, and cannot now be replaced.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley.

SIR, Seville, 20th Aug., 1809.

1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatches noted in the margin, to which I hope to be able to reply to-morrow.

2. Brigadier-General Doyle and Major Armstrong arrived here last night.

3. I have the honour to enclose copies of two notes which I have received from M. de Garay. That under date the 19th contains information which it must be material to you to receive, although I conclude that it must have reached you before this time.

4. Since my arrival at this place I have received from M. de Garay repeated applications of the same nature as that which forms the conclusion of both these notes. The repetition of such applications while the troops under your Excellency's command remain destitute of the means of movement, and distressed for the most important articles of supply, is at least superfluous. It is also useless to distract your attention by proposing plans of operation which, if advantageous, must already have occurred to your own judgment. I have not omitted to represent these sentiments to M. de Garay. The orders of the Junta, however, compel him to repeat to me in the course of every day the same exhortations expressed nearly in the same words.

5. I shall have the honour in the course of to-morrow of stating to your Excellency the proceeding of this government on the subject of supplying your army.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

WELLESLEY.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, London, 20th Aug., 1809.

I congratulate you most sincerely on your most brilliant and decisive victory. The feelings of your friends on the occasion you will easily conceive, and I can assure you that ample justice is done to you by all descriptions of persons in this country. It is universally felt that you have raised the British military character in the eyes of all Europe to a height which it has certainly not attained since the war of the Duke of Marlborough; and even those who look with most despondency to the result of the struggle in Spain are ready to admit that your victory has added strength and security to the country at home, and, however dearly it may have been purchased by the loss of brave officers and men, you were placed in a situation in which you had no alternative, and in which your firmness and decision have proved completely triumphant. I trust you will be satisfied with the large discretionary powers which have been recently sent to Lord Wellesley and yourself. *You* on the spot can alone duly estimate the ultimate chances of success in Spain; we know you will estimate them dispassionately; and it is therefore properly left to your

discretion to follow up your advantages or to extricate yourselves from your difficulties, as the aspect of affairs in the Peninsula may appear to render most prudent and advisable.

The intelligence received yesterday from Germany is most important: there is every reason to believe that the armistice between the Austrians and French is at an end. The Archduke Charles, who was certainly the cause of the armistice, has resigned the command of the armies, and Prince John Lichtenstein has been appointed to succeed him. There can be little doubt therefore of the renewal of hostilities, with what prospect of success it would be presumptuous, after all we have seen, to attempt to pronounce; but it is certain that the French armies have suffered in this last campaign in Germany what they have never suffered in any campaign since Bonaparte has commanded them, and that the Austrian armies are still numerous, and so little discouraged by anything which has lately passed that they are anxious to be again led against their enemies. The renewal of the war in Germany, whatever may be its result, will be a most fortunate circumstance with a view to the operations of your army and those of our allies in Spain and Portugal.

You will receive by the messenger who carries these letters the extraordinary Gazette containing the account of the surrender of Flushing and final reduction of the whole of the island of Walcheren. It is a most important service in itself, and has been very well executed. Whether the ulterior objects of the expedition, the destruction of the French fleet and arsenal at Antwerp, will prove equally successful, is certainly more doubtful. If the war is renewed on the Continent, and the operations are pressed with vigour, I see no reason to despair; and if we should under these circumstances ultimately fail in the ulterior object, we may have at least the consolation of reflecting that the attempt will have operated as a considerable diversion in favour of our allies. At all events we have made a great effort in their behalf, and for an object most important to British interests, and the greater part of the army which has been employed on this service could not with any degree of prudence have been sent to a considerable distance from home.

I am sure you will be glad to hear that the accounts from Ireland are upon the whole very favourable. The country is as quiet, I believe, as it has been at any time during the last thirty years.

I was happy to hear a few days ago from Broadstairs so good an account of the health of Lady Wellesley and of that of your children. When it is no longer convenient or agreeable to her to remain there, and she returns to the neighbourhood of London, she knows how happy we shall be to receive her and the children at Coombe whenever it may suit her to come to us. We do not expect to be able to go to Walmer this autumn, except for a very short time, as the castle is undergoing a thorough repair.

I have just had the satisfaction of receiving directions to prepare the warrant for your creation as a Viscount and Baron. It shall be forwarded for the King's signature as soon as I hear from Pole that the titles are settled.

Believe me to be, my dear Wellesley,

Very sincerely yours,

Liverpool.

The Duke of Portland to Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley.

MY DEAR SIR ARTHUR, London, Tuesday, 22nd Aug., 1809.

To congratulate you on your victories would be so feebly to express my sense of your services that I must indulge in the first instance the gratitude which I feel to be due to you, and request your acceptance of my best thanks for the credit as well as the service you have done to your country; which I trust and believe will make all the impression which it ought to do on the minds of all descriptions of persons in this kingdom. Nothing could be more gracious than the King's acceptance of your services, or more immediate and decisive than his approbation of the suggestion of creating you a Viscount. Long may you enjoy that honour, and be placed for the advantage and honour of your country in those situations which may enable you to add to your own.

Believe me always, my dear Sir Arthur,

Most sincerely and gratefully yours, &c.,

PORTLAND.

Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley.

SIR, Seville, 22nd Aug., 1809.

1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch noted in the margin, which I communicated to M. de Garay immediately after it had reached me; and yesterday evening I presented the note of which a copy is enclosed in this despatch.

2. Although M. de Garay and this government must have been prepared to expect the early notification of your return to Portugal from every communication which I had made since my arrival at Seville, and especially from your recent despatches (which I had regularly put into M. de Garay's hands), most violent emotions of alarm and consternation seemed to be excited by the near approach of an event so long foreseen.

3. M. de Garay declared to me, with expressions of the deepest sorrow and terror, that if your army should quit Spain at this critical moment, inevitable and immediate ruin must ensue to this government, to whatever provinces remained under its authority, to the cause of Spain itself, and to every interest connected with the alliance so happily established between Great Britain and the Spanish nation.

4. These expressions were mixed with the most cordial sentiments of personal respect and gratitude for your great and splendid services in the cause of Spain, and with the highest admiration of the character and conduct of the British troops under your command.

5. M. de Garay proceeded to express the affliction of this government for the sufferings of your gallant army; he protested that great efforts had been made for your supply; that this government was ready to adopt any plan with that object which you or the British ambassador would suggest; that at this moment the most active exertions were actually in progress for the purpose of furnishing you with provisions and the means of transport; that all the resources of these provinces were called forth for that sole end; and that he trusted the exigencies of this moment were not so irresistible as not

to admit of your remaining within the Spanish frontier until you had ascertained the result of the efforts which this government had made for your supply since the period of my arrival at Seville.

6. The enclosed notes contain the substance of the observations which I offered in reply to M. de Garay's earnest solicitations. I found, however, that no argument which occurred to me produced the effect of diminishing the urgency of his entreaties; and I have ascertained that his sensations are in no degree more powerful than those of the government and of every description of the people of Spain within this city and its vicinity. I am also informed that the rumour of the return of the British army to Portugal had reached Cadiz some days ago, and had occasioned an equal degree of alarm in that quarter.

7. I am aware that these painful occurrences have not been unexpected in your views of the consequences of your retreat into Portugal, and that the absolute necessity of the case is the sole cause of a movement so entirely contrary to your inclination.

8. I am also fully sensible not only of the indelicacy, but of the inutility of attempting to offer to you any opinion of mine on a situation where your own judgment must be your best guide, and where no useful suggestion could arise in my mind which must not already have been anticipated by your own experience, comprehensive knowledge, and ardent zeal for the public welfare.

9. Viewing, however, so nearly the painful consequences of your immediate retreat into Portugal, I have deemed it to be my duty to submit to your consideration the possibility of adopting an intermediate plan, which might combine some of the advantages of your return into Portugal without occasioning alarm in Spain, and without endangering the foundations of the alliance between this country and Great Britain.

10. Under this impression I have delivered the note (No. 3) to M. de Garay, and I request your favourable attention to that note, and to the enclosures which it contains.

11. I am inclined to hope that this government will adopt the plan proposed for the improvement of the supply and means of transport of your army; and that in the meanwhile every possible effort will be made to diminish the pressure of your present distress until the principles of the proposed plan can be brought into full operation.

It is to be hoped that in the position proposed for your army the supplies which you have provided in Portugal would be within your reach.

12. But it would be vain to urge these considerations beyond the extent to which they may be approved by your judgment. It will be sufficient for me to receive an early intimation of your opinion, and to be enabled to state it distinctly to this government, which looks to your decision on the present occasion as the final determination of its fate, and of the existence of the Spanish nation.

13. That decision I am persuaded will be founded on the same principles of wisdom, justice, and public spirit, which have already obtained the respect, esteem, and confidence of the Spanish nation; and it will be my duty to endeavour to satisfy this government (whatever may be the exigency of the crisis) that no change has taken place in the sentiments or

motives of action which have so cordially engaged their affection and admiration.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

WELLESLEY.

G. O. Medellin, 23rd Aug., 1809. [238.]

1. Officers commanding divisions and brigades will be pleased to take measures to prevent the women and followers of the army buying up the bread which is prepared for the soldiers' rations: this practice, carried on in an irregular manner as it is at present, must ultimately prejudice the soldiers, and prevent the regular supply of bread.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. P. O. Medellin, 23rd Aug., 1809. [239.]

The women of the army must be prevented from purchasing bread in the villages within 2 leagues of the station of any division of the army; when any woman wants to purchase bread, she must ask the officer of the company to which she belongs for a passport, which must be countersigned by the Commanding officer of the regiment. Any woman found with bread in her possession, purchased at any place nearer than 2 leagues, will be deprived of the bread by the Provost or his assistants; as will any woman who goes out of camp to purchase bread without a passport. Women who will have been discovered disobeying this order will not be allowed to receive rations.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Merida, 25th Aug., 1809. [240.]

3. The army must not take forage for themselves, but must get it from the Commissary according to the usual mode, by sending in returns of the number of animals for which forage is required, and receiving from him the regular rations; or if forage cannot be provided in that mode, and it is necessary it should be taken from the fields, it must be taken according to the General Orders of the 17th June, 1809.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[241.] G. O. Merida, 27th Aug., 1809.

4. The Commander of the Forces begs to call the attention of the officers of the army to the orders of the 29th May, 1809. General officers commanding divisions and brigades are requested to have the orderly books of those regiments examined which arrived in Portugal since the 1st May last, and they will have inserted in them, and read to the soldiers, all orders of regulations, if any there be, which have not been issued to them.

8. Commanding officers of regiments are referred to the General Orders (No. 3, of the 31st May) requiring them to send in returns of bill-hooks, camp kettles, &c.

9. As shirts and shoes for the army are on the road from Lisbon, Commanding officers of regiments are requested, as soon as possible, to send in returns to the Quartermaster-General of the number of shirts and pairs of shoes they will require to complete each man with two good shirts and two good pairs of shoes.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[242.] *To the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Merida, 28th Aug., 1809.

I send the despatch of this date by Colonel Stopford, who commands the brigade of Guards, whom I beg leave to recommend to you, as well as Lord Tweeddale, who accompanies him. They are anxious to see Seville and Cadiz, and I shall be obliged to you for any kindness you may be able to show them.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

I have a report from the French camp that peace was concluded with Austria on the 5th of this month. The terms not stated. But it is currently reported there that Joseph Bonaparte is to have a kingdom in Germany, and that Ferdinand is to be restored to Spain. The same story is likewise reported among the Spanish officers, and it is not impossible that it may have gone from the one to the other.

I don't know whether this would not be the wisest arrangement for Bonaparte to make; and it would certainly give him the resources of Spain at an earlier period than he could acquire them by persisting in completing the conquest, and in the mean

time his army would be free for other objects, to which he must look in the south and east of Europe.

I find by a letter from Lord Castlereagh of the 4th that they did not expect to be able to do more than take the island of Walcheren, which I think they can't hold, and, at all events, they will not get the fleet.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Seville, 29th Aug., 1809.

It is impossible to resist the reasons stated in your letters of the 24th against the resumption of offensive operations; and it is also perfectly clear that, in the present state of the Spanish troops, it is not safe, and it is scarcely practicable, to co-operate with them. I have been aware from the first moment of the real state of our engagements, and I agree with you that we are not only under no engagement to co-operate with the Spanish troops, but that the presumption, from your instructions and from the whole state of the case, would rather incline in the contrary direction. But the actual state of this government, the temper of this country, and the absolute necessity of not allowing the spirit of our alliance to evaporate, nor the chance of a future effort against France to be wholly precluded, render the management of the decision (which I agree you must adopt) rather difficult for me, and I have accordingly delayed my official answer to you, while I have been endeavouring to frame some plan for announcing your intentions to this government without occasioning more mischief than already exists.

In the meanwhile I send these few lines to inform you that the longer you can delay your actually passing the Portuguese frontier the less will be the ill-temper and alarm in this quarter; that, if you can take up your position within the Spanish frontier, it will be more satisfactory here; that I shall explain distinctly that it is your intention to retire to the Portuguese frontier, and *within it*, if you should think fit; and that I shall add the impossibility of your resuming offensive operations. I shall also advise the Spaniards to adopt a defensive system, and shall say nothing of the possibility of your acting again in Spain on any defensive plan. Perhaps this might answer without any positive declaration that you never mean to co-operate again with them. This might be offensive, and perhaps is not *yet* necessary. In this state I conclude that you will move towards Portugal without any hurry. The Spaniards will not allow their troops to remain on the Tagus; I believe they will bring them to Monasterio.

Let me know whether you have yet received any of the supplies which M. de Garay vows to have sent you.

I enclose two papers for your inspection. I conclude that, under your present view of the subject, you could not accept the command proposed to you. I mean to employ expressions to that effect in my answer to M. de Garay, which is written, but not yet copied fairly.

I shall write to you again to-morrow or the next day.

Ever yours most affectionately,

WELLESLEY.

[243.] *To the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Merida, 30th Aug., 1809.

I enclose you two letters just received from Colonel Roche. That dated 11 A.M. ought, I think, to be 11 P.M., and you will see is evidently the second.

The intelligence contained in these letters is very extraordinary. If the French were not stated to be marching by the road of Guadalaxara, I should imagine they were about to attack Ciudad Rodrigo; an enterprise which I see that Soult had in contemplation (by a draft which I have received of the purport of a letter written by him, supposed to have been intercepted), and it was recommended by a council of war which was assembled some time ago at Salamanca. Indeed, notwithstanding the superiority of their force, this is the only enterprise the French could now undertake with any prospect of success; and I don't think they would succeed in this if I should be able to move at an early period after my arrival in Portugal.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURES.]

Colonel Roche to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

SIR, Spanish Head-Quarters, Truxillo, 30th Aug., 1809.

I do myself the honour to acquaint you the Spanish head-quarters left Deleytosa at 4 o'clock yesterday evening, and arrived at this place last night.

You are no doubt already acquainted with the nature and object of this movement, which is, that this army should unite with that under Venegas in La Mancha, with the exception of 12,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, left under the command, at present, of General Bernuz, a little man who, you possibly may recollect, commanded the Carabineros Reales. This corps is to occupy the whole position from the Puerto de San Vicente to six leagues below Almaraz, being an extent of 26 leagues. The main body of the army would have moved on to Miajados this day, but an express arrived last night from General Venegas, with the intelligence that the French army was evacuating La Mancha, and had commenced their march back to Toledo.

In consequence of this information, which General Eguia immediately despatched by a courier to Seville, he has suspended the march of the army, and proposes to halt here until he receives further orders from the Junta.

Among the reports which circulate in the army, it is said that the Duke of Albuŕquerque is to command this corps left at Almaraz, &c.

General O'Donoju got leave of absence from the government, but a more recent order has arrived desiring that he should remain in consequence of a process which is instituted against him; the former intendente of the army having preferred accusations against him.

General Eguia, it is said, will resign his present command very shortly.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

K. Roche.

P.S. A report has just reached this place that the French have evacuated Madrid, and taken the route by Guadalaxara; but I don't know that it is entitled to any credit. The Spaniards, however, are so elated, that they say the French are leaving Spain.

Colonel Roche to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Sir, Truxillo, 30th Aug., 1809, 11 o'clock A.M.

Intelligence has this moment reached this, that the enemy have evacuated the bridge and town of Arzobispo and retired to Oropesa, from whence they were continuing their march to Talavera. The whole of their posts in that neighbourhood were following the same route, and those at Talavera had marched off to Madrid. I have seen several letters from Madrid, and the copies of various proclamations, all of which say and indicate the intention of the French to evacuate Madrid immediately. They commenced their march from thence on the 18th and 19th instant; and it appears that the movements of the French from La Mancha and the opposite side of the Tagus are general.

I am strongly of opinion that the letters I have just seen are entitled to the fullest credit. The whole of the garrison of Toledo has marched to Madrid, to make room for those who arrive.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

K. Roche.

I have already mentioned the enemy have taken the road to Guadalaxara.

Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley.

Sir, Seville, 30th Aug., 1809.

1. I now have the honour of replying to your despatch (No. 14) of the 24th instant.* I have received your despatch (No. 15) dated 28th August.

2. In submitting to your consideration the plan proposed for occupying a position on the line of the river Guadiana, I did not intend to suggest that position as a permanent station of defence against the enemy. I entertained a hope that under all the circumstances of the actual situation of

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. v., p. 76.

the enemy's force the position suggested might be safe for a sufficient time to enable you to try the result of the plan of supply for your army which I had offered to this government, and that the supplies which were provided in Portugal would at the same time be within your reach.

3. The resumption of offensive operations certainly appeared to me to be highly desirable whenever it might become practicable within the line drawn by your instructions from Lord Castlereagh of the 25th of May, but I was sufficiently apprised by the intelligence which I had already received from you that some time must elapse before your troops could recover the effects of the severe distress which they had suffered.

4. My opinion entirely coincides with that which you have stated, that no engagement exists either in the treaty between His Majesty and the Spanish government, or in the spirit of the alliance, or in any assurance authorised by you, to entitle the Spanish government to demand the aid of a British army in Spain.

5. Your entrance into Spain was a favour conferred upon the Spanish government entirely beyond the conditions of the treaty and the general obligations of the alliance; and you were justified in confining the extent of your operations within such limits as you might deem most advisable consistently with the tenor of your instructions.

6. From the junction of your army with the Spanish troops, a species of implied engagement certainly arose, under which it would not have been proper to have separated your army from that of Spain without an absolute necessity founded either in the obligation of your instructions (which had been previously explained to the Spanish government), or in such an exigency of the case as must evidently have rendered further concert and co-operation with the Spanish army impracticable. Under the first consideration the defence of Portugal must have formed the invariable object of your attention, and must have directed and limited the line of your operations. Under the second consideration, the failure of the Spanish government either in providing you with the necessary supplies and means of movement, or in affording to you the effectual co-operation of such a Spanish force as might enable you to oppose the enemy with a chance of success, must have dissolved any implied engagement for the continuance of your army in Spain.

7. In my judgment all these considerations now concur to release you from any such engagement. The mismanagement of the Spanish government, added to the misconduct of the Spanish Generals and troops, exposes your army to certain destruction if you should attempt to remain in Spain. This case, indeed, does not appear to have been contemplated in your instructions; but it evidently involves every consideration which can be supposed to affect the safety of Portugal. For it must be evident that the defence of Portugal would be entirely abandoned by any act which should expose your army to risk without any reasonable prospect of advantage to the common cause.

8. The inexpediency of contracting any new engagement to co-operate with the Spanish forces is proved by the same considerations which have left you free to exercise your judgment upon that question.

9. When I forwarded to your Excellency the suggestion contained in my note of the 21st instant, I relied on this government that the plan for

improving the means of supply and movement of the army contained in the paper marked (A) would have been carried into immediate effect. I also hoped that the exertions (which I was assured had already been made by this government) would have afforded you some degree of intermediate relief. Without these hopes and expectations I should not have attempted to induce you to hazard any further delay in Spain. But I have been entirely disappointed by the conduct of this government. By your despatch (No. 13) dated 22nd August it appears that you have received no intermediate aid. No plan for the improvement of your supplies has been yet adopted. The foundation, therefore, of my propositions of the 22nd of August has failed.

10. Until I received your despatch of the 24th instant I had entertained a less unfavourable opinion of the Spanish army than you have stated, but I was convinced that it was vain to expect co-operation from any body of Spanish troops which should not be placed effectually under your command. If your army could have recovered its efficiency, if a proper system for your future supply could have been established, and if an adequate Spanish force could have been placed under your orders, I entertained a hope that offensive operations might have been resumed within a reasonable time with a prospect of success; and that the success of such a combined force under your command, and the manifest advantages of an improved plan of subsistence and transport, might have formed an example from which useful and practical principles might have been derived for the amelioration of every branch of the Spanish government, and especially of the military department. Reviewing, however, the events which have passed under my observation, the facts which you have stated, the condition of your army, of the Spanish armies and government, and the relative strength and position of the enemy's force, I am reluctantly compelled to declare that it would not be advisable to attempt to resume offensive operations in Spain at the present moment, or within any period of time which can now be calculated.

11. Your despatch (No. 14) has satisfied me that the defence of Andalusia and of these provinces may be aided as effectually by the position of your army on the frontier of Portugal as by any other station which such a force could now occupy.

12. I have not therefore encouraged this government to expect either that you should remain within the Spanish frontier, or that you should return within any stated time for the purpose of co-operating with the Spanish army in any plan even of a defensive nature. My note of this date to Mr. Garay contains the only communication which I have made to the government on this question.

13. In this state of affairs it is a matter of some delicacy to attempt to recommend to the Spanish government the most eligible position for their army. This point must be left to their own discretion. As far as I have been enabled to collect the opinions of this government, they do not accord with yours; and it is not to be expected that the Spaniards should be inclined to relax any of their prejudices in the moment of the retirement of our army to the frontier of Portugal.

14. Although it is evident that the retirement of the British army to Portugal is a measure of absolute necessity, created by the mismanagemen

of the Spanish government, by the misconduct of the Spanish Generals and troops, and by circumstances in the state of the country which cannot in any degree be attributed to us, it is to be expected that the most unfavourable impression will be produced by this movement upon the minds of the government and people of Spain.

15. Impressions of this description are not governed by strict principles of reason or justice; but it is necessary to consider the influence and consequences of such prejudices in forming an estimate of the probable result of any course of public action.

16. It would therefore have been highly desirable to have been enabled to alleviate the force of these unfavourable circumstances by any promise or hope of the future co-operation of a considerable British force in Spain, under the condition that proper remedies should be applied by the Spanish government to those evils which have compelled your Excellency to forfeit the advantage of the glorious successes obtained by His Majesty's forces under your command. But it would be unwarrantable to encourage any definite expectation of such assistance; and I am apprehensive that the general terms in which any suggestions of this description must be expressed will not be sufficient to induce the Spanish government to commence with spirit and ardour those systematic efforts which would be required for the purpose of drawing forth the military resources of the country, and of applying them with vigour and effect against the hostile power of France.

17. It would certainly diminish the alarm and ill-temper of the present moment in Spain if it were even possible to assure this government that your army would remain on the frontier of Portugal, and would be ready to act against the enemy in any case of necessity; but I am aware of the danger of entering into such an engagement, and I shall therefore abstain from any expressions which may warrant that conclusion in the minds of the Spanish ministers.

18. The consternation which prevailed on the first rumour of your movement towards Portugal has abated in some degree by your continuance at Merida, and by the apparent dispersion and inaction of the enemy's force.

19. It is to be hoped that the dreadful apprehensions entertained by this government at the time when I wrote my despatch of the 22nd of August may not be realised so soon as to preclude us from considering the means of affording aid to the Spanish cause under such conditions and arrangements as may render our assistance useful to Spain without involving injury or danger to the interests of Great Britain.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

WELLESLEY.

[244.] *To the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Merida, 1st Sept., 1809.

This letter will be presented to you by Mr. Ponsonby, Lord

Bessborough's son, who is going to Seville, and I beg leave to recommend him to you.

Ever yours most affectionately,
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Lady Anne Culling Smith to Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley.

MY DEAREST WELLESLEY,

You will confer a great obligation upon me by showing any civility and attention in your power to the bearer of this note (Mr. William Ponsonby) if you should happen to meet with him. He is Lord Bessborough's youngest son; and Lady Bessborough is excessively anxious that he should be protected by you. He is going to travel through Spain out of curiosity. If you recollect, I mentioned this young man to you before you left England.

You will find him pleasing, gentlemanlike, and amiable in his manners; and I am told he is very clever.

Believe me, my dearest Wellesley,
Ever yours most affectionately,
ANNE CULLING SMITH.

To Lord Burghersh. [245.]

MY DEAR BURGHERSH, Merida, 1st Sept., 1809.

I received last night your letter of the 26th. I lament as much as any man can the necessity of separating from the Spanish armies; but I was at last compelled to go, and I believe that there was not an officer in the army who did not think I stayed too long.

I don't understand what ——— means by my having departed from the old principles of war. The fault I committed consisted in trusting at all to the Spaniards, who I have since found were entirely unworthy of confidence; but even admitting that I knew they were so, which I think I prove I did not, unless it is asserted that I had and could have no communication with Portugal excepting through Plasencia, I do not see how I departed from any old principle of war. Now, I say, I had established, before Soult came in by Plasencia, and I have now, a shorter and better communication with Lisbon than that by Plasencia. So far for ———'s criticisms.

In respect to yourself, I think you will do well, and I should be glad, if you would journey through Granada, Murcia, and Valencia, and send me accounts how they are going on there; what forces they have; whether they are raising any; what numbers they consider necessary and are determined to keep for their own defence; and what numbers they consider applicable to the general purposes of the country.

I shall have the British army upon the frontiers of Portugal and Spain, with my head quarters either at Badajoz or at Elvas. I move to-morrow.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[246.] G. O. Badajoz, 3rd Sept., 1809.

As the Commander of the Forces proposes that the troops shall remain in the stations in which they are now or will shortly be placed as long as circumstances will permit, he desires that the officers commanding regiments will send to Lisbon, as soon as possible, an officer belonging to the regiment under their command respectively, in order to get from the regimental stores such articles of clothing, accoutrements, and necessaries as the soldiers require. The names of the officers sent upon this duty are to be sent in to the Quartermaster-General; these officers, on their arrival at Lisbon, are to report themselves to the Assistant-Quartermaster-General stationed there, and are to give him a list of the articles which they will have been directed to send up to their regiments, specifying the weight of the whole, and, as far as possible, of each article. They will likewise report to him the day on which the articles required will be ready to quit Lisbon, and they will obey such directions as they will receive from this officer respecting the transport of the baggage, whether by land or by water. The Assistant-Quartermaster-General at Lisbon, having received from the officers before mentioned the returns of the baggage required for their regiments and the weight, will make requisitions upon the Commissary for boats, and carts to transport it to the army, taking care to allow no more to be put on each cart, drawn by two bullocks, than 600 lbs. weight. The officer in command of the

troops at Lisbon will give such assistance of fatigue parties to the officers going down for baggage as they may have occasion for.

Such sick men as cannot march must be sent to the hospital at Elvas.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Marshal-General Sir A. Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Lisbon, 3rd Sept., 1809.

I arrived here on the 1st, and it was between Niza and Abrantes, on the 30th, that I received your letter of the 26th, and yesterday that of the 30th August.

In regard to the plan you propose, in the first, for a chosen part of the British officers in this service, I certainly consider that, had such a plan been considered in the beginning, and had the Horse Guards been inclined to make the selection from merit alone, or, perhaps, rather, had the Commander-in-Chief been willing to spare officers of the description you mention, it would have been a most efficient measure in addition to regimental officers: then the selection must have been made from officers of a certain rank, Colonels or Lieutenant-Colonels, as well in regard to the feelings of the British officers that would serve regimentally, as to those of the Portuguese officers.

If we had regard to the discipline (field) only of these troops, and that we had sufficient leisure to proceed regularly on that; that is, that we could remain undisturbed twelve or eighteen months, then a general superintendence might suffice; but, unfortunately, we have had more to do than to make good; we have had and yet have to correct bad habits of every description; and nothing but British officers being incorporated in their regiments would enable me to get the better of it; and, in many very material things, I should not otherwise have got even a knowledge of many habits and tricks that it has been necessary to get the better of, and particularly a knowledge of the characters and conduct of the officers; and British officers being attached to regiments, and thus continually eye-witnesses to the sentiments and behaviour of the Portuguese, is, I find, an amazing check over them. Besides these, perhaps, minor considerations, I consider it most necessary to have British officers interspersed in the Portuguese regiments to inspire confidence before the enemy, as well in the other officers as in the soldiers, as we know what the example in these cases even of a few can sometimes do, and there is no doubt that the Portuguese soldier has, in every respect, more confidence in the British officer than in his own. Under these several considerations, thinking it absolutely necessary to have British officers in the regiments at a time when discipline, and what will conduce to the greater health of the troops, must be speedily enforced and forced forward, I would much fear that to make a selection of officers, except we could take them from the seniors, would

create such an additional general dissatisfaction in those that were not of the select, that we must inevitably lose their services; and there are many who, though not capable of the situation of general inspectors of discipline, are very useful in the subordinate situations in which they are regimentally placed. But my Brigadiers ought to answer the purpose intended, as under them will be the whole army in its divisions: those, it is true, I am obliged to take as they are sent to me; and, though I can never comprehend the principle upon which officers who had quitted the service should be selected for an object where the very greatest zeal and most indefatigable exertions were necessary, yet among those that are sent we may find many that may better our expectations, only I fear theirs will be very much disappointed on finding the very arduous task they have undertaken. One (Brigadier-General M'Leroth) who, as a British officer, I have had the very highest character of from Sir John Hope and others, is quite tired of his employment, and, not setting his mind to the business, will be of very little use to us. He has asked me, under other pretences, to return to England, which, of course, I paid no attention to; but I do not think his staying will be beneficial. There are now arrived, besides Coleman, Brigadier-Generals Miller and Madden. The latter is a cavalry officer entirely, and I find speaks a little of the language, having been in this country with the 12th Dragoons.

It must be unnecessary to represent, considering, as I do, English officers necessary in the regiments, that I have by no means a sufficiency, few regiments having that proportion I could wish, and many none at all.

The complaints of the several classes of English officers in this service I was ever aware were not founded on absolutely just grounds; but I fear that on such rigid principles human nature will seldom be led, and that to have the best possible effect from the services of any given number of people, we must, whilst we insist on their exertions, take a little into consideration their prejudices or feelings. In respect to Blunt and Campbell, I told you what their feelings were, which were communicated to me privately; but they had resolved to continue on in the service. Campbell is really a most precious officer for this service: he has the principles necessary, he makes himself both feared and loved, and he is a very excellent disciplinarian.

Colonel Campbell clearly may be hurt, but cannot have any pretence for leaving the service, though certainly on accepting of the terms he could have no idea of the conditions.

Have you had any answer yet relative to the mode of paying the officers that are to have the pay of the two ranks? We are in this going into the greatest possible confusion. It is absolutely necessary to advance them money to prevent their starving; but against whom to charge, either their English or Portuguese pay, I really know not. Those that have got rank and only receive British pay there is no difficulty about, nor about the English pay of those that belong to your army; but for the English pay of those that have come out belonging to British regiments, and the Portuguese pay of all those that receive it, I am most anxious to have some determination on. I consider the best way will be to pay both English and Portuguese pay to the British officers entitled to receive each, entirely separate from the Portuguese Treasury, and in the same manner

and by the same person who now pays the British allowance and pay to the officers who only receive British pay. Being on the subject of pay, I wish to ask you if the Brigadier-Generals now arrived within so short a time of the expiration of the period of 200 bât and forage will be entitled to it?

On the subjects of your letter of the 30th, I have sent orders to complete a bridge across the river at Villa Velha as soon as possible, and it is by no means unlikely that the French will attempt Ciudad Rodrigo, lying now so immediately between the communications of Soult and Ney, and they may spare sufficient troops for it, as they may consider they are left quiet. If, however, they make their preparations so as to have their battering-train in readiness the instant they make their movement that way, I fear we should not be in time to save it; for with a small battering-train it would be taken in a few days, and I do not even think it very secure against a very resolute coup de main. Its escarp wall is entirely uncovered from top to bottom; and though, to make a breach, they must have heavy guns, yet there is no occasion to open trenches, as it is commanded, I think, at about the distance of 600 yards. It would be certainly a very serious loss in many points of view, but, perhaps, in none more than that it would furnish them with every means for the attack of Almeida; and from that and Ciudad Rodrigo being so little capable of defence, its having such a train of very fine battering-guns is rather, I think, to be regretted for the common cause, and it would be very desirable that some arrangement should be made, that, at the last extremity of the place, those guns should be rendered unfit for use; but even then the quantity of heavy shot the enemy would there find would much facilitate any enterprise against Almeida, the loss of which would go near indeed to shut us out of Castille.

You will see that I continued to act on the plan you approved of for the refitment, &c., of the Portuguese army. I had made arrangements for Sir Robert Wilson's covering our front, as, situated as Soult was, we wanted an active and intelligent officer in that quarter: it was only, however, under the consideration you would not wish any more mouths added to you. He marched yesterday towards you, and Colonel Wilson takes his post and duty; and, being desirous of getting the troops of the line in cantonments for the objects I have in view, I have sent to Cortiçadas and Sobreira Formosa two regiments of militia to be at hand, in addition to what Colonel Wilson would fall back with, to occupy the pass of Talhades till I could get up with reinforcements. There is at Perdigoa one regiment of militia, and Brigadier-General Craufurd of course takes care of Villa Velha.

When I asked you if you could spare officers of cavalry, it was only asking it generally, as I had no particular application from any one, and I think the Portuguese officers of cavalry are better than those of infantry in proportion. In my letter, asking if you had had any answer relative to Generals Hamilton and Spencer, I rather think for the name of the latter I put down St. Leger. I am now very much at a loss for a General officer to take the general inspection of the cavalry, for Baron Carove is not only much too old, and naturally wedded to that system he has been ever used to, but is very desirous of retiring, and I cannot even much longer retain him.

There is an officer, Captain White, of the 27th, whom you long since gave me, and who has been posted to a regiment; but it appears he has never been put in orders, and cannot, consequently, leave his regiment. Will you have the goodness to give orders about him?

Believe me yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

P.S.—Since writing the foregoing I have received yours of the 31st August. My line of cavalry will be in the rear of my infantry, and Golegão on one side and Salvaterra on the other of the Tagus will be the farthest they will be advanced. The report you wish of the regulars and militia I will make out as soon as I have ascertained something of what may be expected from the cavalry, and that the returns of the army for the 1st of this month are got in, and I will send it to you. I want besides to ascertain what the Regency will do in regard to the refitment, &c., of the army, and what steps will be taken to prevent desertion and get recruits. I am now going to the Regency on these and other subjects respecting the army.

[247.] G. O. Badajoz, 4th Sept., 1809.

4. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the General officers commanding divisions and brigades to the General Orders of the 4th July, respecting the early obedience to orders.

10. The soldiers in the hospitals must not be allowed to straggle about the towns in which the hospitals are stationed, and all men found at the distance of one street from the hospital must be tried and punished for disobedience of orders. The rolls of the hospital must be called once every hour, in the presence of an officer, or such number of officers as the Commanding officer at the hospital will appoint to attend to the roll calling.

11. All men absent from roll calling to be tried and punished for disobedience of orders.

12. The soldiers in hospital, or convalescent at the station where the hospital is, and victualled by the Commissary, or on the route to join their regiments, are not to receive wine unless directions in writing should be given by the medical officer that they are to receive it; and the medical officer is particularly desired not to give those directions unless in cases in which it may have appeared to him that the soldiers have conducted themselves as they ought in the hospital, and in such a manner as to secure their early recovery.

13. As comforts for the sick can now be got, the regimental hospitals are to be established upon the plan ordered by His Majesty's regulations, and the soldiers are to be under the usual stoppage while in hospital.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. A. O. Badajoz, 4th Sept., 1809. [248.]

The Commander of the Forces is concerned to hear that last night several soldiers came into the town of Badajoz, and plundered a bakery and the houses of several individuals of bread. This continued misbehaviour of the soldiers gives the Commander of the Forces the greatest concern; and he is determined, however difficult it may be, to put a stop to it. The rolls are to be called in the different corps of the 4th division every hour till further orders; and the Commander of the Forces desires that no soldier whatever may be allowed to quit his lines on any account excepting in charge of an officer.

The Provost must punish all those found disobeying this order. A guard must be placed at the gate of the town of Badajoz, and all soldiers attempting to pass in are to be made prisoners, and sent to the Provost guard. The Provost will forthwith turn out of the town all soldiers who may be in it.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley.

SIR, Seville, 4th Sept., 1809.

1. I have the honour to forward to you, by Mr. Wellesley, the copy of a despatch which I have just now received from Mr. Secretary Canning, under date the 12th of August.

2. This despatch contains so full and clear a view of the points to which it relates, and so completely embraces the important questions which have lately been discussed with this government, that it is unnecessary for me to add any observations upon those subjects.

3. The copy of Mr. Canning's despatch has been made with a view to obtaining the general purport of your Excellency's sentiments with the least practicable delay; and I should esteem it as a particular favour if you would return that copy, with such remarks as you may think fit to insert in the margin, by an express courier.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Mr. Secretary Canning to the Marquess Wellesley.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, 12th Aug., 1809.

The question which first arises is, whether the state of things in Spain be such as that a British army of 30,000 men, acting in co-operation with the Spanish armies or in conjunction with them, could be reasonably expected either to effect the deliverance of the whole Peninsula by the expulsion of the French armies now in Spain, or to make head against the augmented force which Buonaparte may now be enabled to direct against that country?

Upon this question your Excellency will receive the opinion of Sir Arthur Wellesley, to whom a copy of this despatch is transmitted, and who is instructed to lose no time in communicating with your Excellency upon it.

If the opinion of Sir Arthur Wellesley shall be that, with so limited a force as 30,000 men, offensive operations in Spain on an extended scale could not prudently be attempted; if he shall conceive that the utmost object to which such an army would be adequate is the separate defence of Portugal, and that Portugal will be best defended by confining his operations within the limits of his present instructions, your Excellency will then only have to state to the Spanish government, if questioned by them upon the subject, the nature of the instructions under which Sir Arthur Wellesley now acts, and the impracticability of going beyond them.

You will observe that, after the refusal of the Junta to admit a British garrison into Cadiz, the attention of the British government was more particularly and exclusively turned to the security of Portugal; and that to that object we consider ourselves as bound, by the confidence which the Portuguese government has reposed in us, especially to direct our efforts in the Peninsula.

That the security of Portugal does not necessarily confine the British army within the frontier of that kingdom, nor preclude its co-operation with the Spanish armies, so long as the course of that co-operation is not such as to lead to the leaving Portugal uncovered, the recent co-operation of Sir Arthur Wellesley with General Cuesta is a sufficient proof.

But this species of occasional concert your Excellency will state to be the utmost extent of the aid which, under the circumstances here described, Spain is to expect from a British army.

If, on the other hand, Sir Arthur Wellesley shall entertain the opinion that with an effective British army of 30,000 men, combined with the Spanish and Portuguese armies, it might be possible either to expel the French from Spain, or to resist even their augmented numbers, with a reasonable prospect of success; if he shall think that Portugal itself would be best defended, in the end, by making the defence of that kingdom a part of a system of general operations throughout the Peninsula; the next question which will then arise, and upon which your Excellency will also receive the opinion of Sir Arthur Wellesley, is, as to the conditions which it may be necessary that your Excellency should obtain from the Spanish government as preliminary to entering upon any concerted system of joint military operations.

Such preliminary arrangements would be most highly desirable, were it only with a view to prevent the recurrence of those inconveniences which were experienced in the last campaign, and of the complaints and recriminations which arose from them. But the reports received from Sir Arthur Wellesley of what has taken place between him and General Cuesta, and of

the state of the country through which he has passed; the want of any settled plan of any arrangement either for moving or for provisioning an army, render it absolutely indispensable.

Upon all these points, at least, a clear, distinct understanding must be established; and the Spanish government must be distinctly pledged to furnish the means of moving the army, and of supplying it regularly with provisions.

This is not intended to be done at the expense of the Spanish government (though, so far as the means of moving go, that might perhaps be reasonably expected): but that the provisions and means of transport should be forthcoming on the demand and at the expense of the British army is so essential, that unless arrangements to this effect are not only promised, but actually made by the Junta, to the satisfaction of your Excellency and of Sir Arthur Wellesley, there is an end at once of any question of co-operation, and Sir Arthur Wellesley will be instructed to withdraw his army to Portugal.

In addition to this indispensable preliminary, which admits of no doubt or qualification, are two, with respect to the requiring of which your Excellency will be guided by Sir Arthur Wellesley's opinion.

The first of these conditions is that which was proposed to the Spanish government before the disastrous events in Galicia, and at the time when it was intended to transfer the services of Sir John Moore's army to the south of Spain; viz. the occupation of Cadiz by a British garrison.

The object of this demand was, as well to provide for the security of the British army in case of their being compelled to retreat before an overpowering superiority of numbers, as to ensure the Spanish and French ships in the harbour of Cadiz from falling into the hands of the enemy.

The second condition is one which has never yet been proposed to the Spaniards, but which they themselves authorized one of their officers to propose to General Moore, viz. the confiding the command of the Spanish army to the commander of the British army.

Sir Arthur Wellesley will report to your Excellency his opinion how far, under the present circumstances, and with a view to such a plan of operations as he might think it expedient to carry on, the occupation of Cadiz would be essentially important to the safety of a British army engaged in general operations in Spain; or how far the possession of the Tagus, and the present improved military state of Portugal, may make it less necessary to press this condition upon the Spanish government, supposing them to continue to manifest the same repugnance to it as before.

In the event of Sir Arthur Wellesley's being of opinion that the occupation of Cadiz is essentially important to the safety of the British army, your Excellency is to describe it to the Spanish government as a condition *sine quâ non* of the employment of the British army in Spain.

But if Sir Arthur Wellesley's opinion should be that this measure is not necessary in a military point of view, then, although the other object which was in contemplation when the demand was originally made, viz. the safety of the Spanish and French ships in the harbour of Cadiz, is one of such magnitude that your Excellency is never to lose sight of it, and is to employ every effort of reasoning and of persuasion to induce the Junta to adopt such measures with respect to those fleets as may, in the worst extremity, disappoint the designs of the enemy, yet your Excellency is not on this ground alone to make the admission of a British garrison into Cadiz a condition *sine quâ non* of the employment of a British army in Spain.

With respect to the second condition, the Spaniards offered the supreme command of their armies to Sir John Moore. Mr. Stuart was present when this offer was made by Mr. Caro to the British General, and was declined.

But with respect to this condition, your Excellency will be so far guided by the opinion of Sir Arthur Wellesley as not to press it, if Sir Arthur Wellesley, from reasons which his local knowledge and experience of the conduct of Spanish armies may suggest, should think it not advisable. Your Excellency will, nevertheless, even in that case, take care to leave the question, so far open, that if, in the course of his co-operation with the Spanish Generals, Sir Arthur Wellesley should find reason subsequently to change his opinion upon the subject, there may be no difficulty in making the demand hereafter.

If, on the other hand, Sir Arthur Wellesley deems this arrangement to be highly desirable, your Excellency is to make it a condition *sine quâ non*.

If the command is not to be in the British General, your Excellency is to press with redoubled earnestness for the appointment of a Generalissimo to the Spanish armies; the mischiefs arising from divided and independent commands becoming every day more apparent.

It is to be understood distinctly, at the same time, that in no case is the British commander to place himself under the orders of the Spanish Generalissimo, much less of any Spanish General commanding a separate army.

Independently of the other obvious considerations arising out of the past experience of the conduct of the Spanish commanders, which would of themselves preclude such an arrangement, the nature of the engagements with Portugal would make it entirely impracticable. When the government of Portugal placed their armies under British command, it certainly was not with any expectation that the British General himself should act in subordination to another commander.

The result of these instructions is,—

First. That if Sir Arthur Wellesley's opinion shall be against the engaging a British army of 30,000 men in a campaign in Spain on any conditions whatever, your Excellency should take an opportunity of putting an end to any expectation of such an aid which may be entertained by the Supreme Junta.

Secondly. That if, on the contrary, Sir Arthur Wellesley shall give an opinion favourable to the employment in Spain of a British army of 30,000 men, on all or any of the conditions hereinbefore described, your Excellency shall immediately proceed to require of the Spanish government that the most effectual measures shall be taken for placing at the disposal of the British General such means of transport as he may describe to your Excellency to be necessary for the movement of his army, and for securing to him a constant and regular supply of provisions; and your Excellency will take care to have satisfactory evidence that these measures are actually put in train before any joint operation is commenced.

With respect to the other two conditions, if Sir Arthur Wellesley thinks either or both of them indispensable, your Excellency will require both or either of them accordingly. If, on the other hand, Sir Arthur Wellesley should not deem it necessary to insist upon the admission into Cadiz as matter of precaution for the safety of the British army, your Excellency is not to make that admission a condition *sine quâ non* of British military co-operation.

If Sir Arthur Wellesley's decision shall be against requiring the supreme command of the Spanish armies, your Excellency is not in that case to make the demand.

I have only to add that your Excellency is not to enter into any pledge as to the duration of the service of the British army in Spain; and with respect to the Portuguese army, your Excellency is not to undertake, as matter of course, that they shall act with the British army in Spain, but merely that

the good offices of the British government shall be used with the Portuguese Regency to induce them to agree to such an employment of their forces.

Sir Arthur Wellesley will be instructed to write to your Excellency without delay on all the points of this despatch, and your Excellency will lose no time in informing me of the result of his report, and (in the event of its being favourable to the employment of the British army in Spain) of the steps which your Excellency may have taken upon it, and of the disposition which the Spanish government may show to adopt whatever conditions your Excellency may have had to propose to them.

Your Excellency shall hear from me again as soon as we have the means of judging more precisely of the amount of force which will be actually disposable for the reinforcement of the army in the Peninsula; but it appeared not expedient to wait for that more precise information before your Excellency was put in possession of those considerations, and directed eventually to take those steps on the result of which it would depend whether the services of a British army should, under any circumstances, be extended to Spain.

G. O. Badajoz, 7th Sept., 1809. [249.]

1. Notwithstanding the repeated orders given out upon the subject, the soldiers of the 4th division of infantry plundered bee-hives, in the neighbourhood of Badajoz, on the day before the division marched from that place: it is impossible these outrages can be committed daily, and that this last outrage in particular could have been committed, without the officers obtaining some knowledge of it. The officers with the army do not appear to be aware how much they suffer in the disgraceful and unmilitary practices of the soldiers, in marauding and plundering every thing they lay their hands upon. The consequence is, the people of the country fly their habitations, no market is opened, and the officers, as well as the soldiers, suffer in the privation of every comfort and every necessary, excepting their ration, from the neglect of the former, and the criminal misconduct of the latter. The Commander of the Forces has done, and will continue to do, every thing in his power to put an end to these disgraceful practices; but it is obvious that all his efforts must be fruitless unless the officers of the army, generally and individually, exert themselves for the same object.

2. The practice of seizing and detaining carts has been prohibited by the General Orders of the army; but it still continues to such an extent as to render it difficult, if not impossible, to supply the troops with what they require, and if persevered in will again cut off the communications with the sources of supply.

Commanding officers of divisions, brigades, and regiments are referred to the General Orders of the 25th June, No. 10.

3. All carts now with any department, regiment, or individual to which a driver is attached (whether drawn by mules or bullocks) are to be forthwith allowed to return to their homes, the Commissary paying them their hire for the time they have been employed.

4. Regiments or departments which have carts without drivers are to retain them.

5. Commanding officers of regiments are to report to the officers commanding brigades what number of carts with drivers each will have sent away, and what number of carts without drivers each will have retained, under these orders. Commanding officers of brigades will transmit these reports, in the usual channel, to the Quartermaster-General. Heads of departments are to make a similar report to the Quartermaster-General. These orders are not intended to apply to the covered carts drawn by mules lately sent from Seville, nor to any carts actually engaged in the performance of any service, until that service shall have been completed. In future, when carts are required by regiments or departments, application is to be made for them to the Commissary-General, according to the orders of the 25th June, No. 10.

6. The Commander of the Forces has observed that camp kettles are, in some instances, carried upon carts, a practice which is positively contrary to orders, and must be exceedingly inconvenient and prejudicial to the troops. He begs that the officers commanding brigades and regiments will see that regiments are properly provided with the means of carrying camp kettles without loss of time.

7. The officer in command of the hospital at Elvas, and the officer commanding at Lisbon, will take care that every soldier joining the army from either of those places is supplied with two good shirts and two good pairs of shoes, which will be supplied by the Commissary upon his requisition. The officer or non-commissioned officer in charge of the hospital of the soldier requiring the necessaries, will make the requisition, specifying in it the soldier's name, the regiment and company to which he belongs, and the number of shirts and pairs of shoes he requires: this must be given in in duplicate; one copy of which must be sent to the regiment, and the other delivered to the Commissary.

The officer or non-commissioned officer in charge of the soldier requiring the necessaries is to sign the receipt for the necessaries at the bottom of both copies of the requisition, when he will have received them from the Commissary.

8. When officers may be in such a state of health as to render it necessary that they should quit the army, they must send to head quarters a certificate that the state of their health requires removing; this certificate will be sent to the Inspector of Hospitals, and a board of medical officers will be ordered to assemble to consider of the necessity of this removal; and unless this board should certify that removal is necessary, it will not in any case be permitted. In the same manner, if the medical attendant on any officer, either with the army or at out-quarter, should think his return to England necessary, he will certify it to the board ordered to consider of the case.

9. The Commander of the Forces cannot avoid taking this opportunity of observing that when an officer is separated from his regiment in the performance of his duty, or by unavoidable circumstances, it is his first duty to endeavour to join when the duty shall have been performed, or the circumstances shall no longer exist, which occasioned his separation from his regiment; this is peculiarly his duty, and most probably would be an object to every officer in this army, at a moment when the army might be supposed to be involved in difficulties. From the excellent character which Lieutenant —— bears, and from his former services and good conduct, the Commander of the Forces believes with the Court Martial that he was desirous of joining his regiment. That which has occurred to him, however, and the fact which is notorious to the whole army, if any effort had been made to join it, it must have been successful, should be a warning to all officers in the situation in which Lieutenant —— found himself, not to listen to the senseless reports which invariably prevail on the flank and rear of all armies, but to endeavour seriously to join their regiments; at all events, not to go farther to the rear till the necessity for so doing will have become evident and urgent.

10. It is directed that particular attention may be paid by the regiments of the army to sending in their weekly states and monthly returns correct. There have been of late so many mistakes and alterations in men and horses unaccounted for, that almost invariably the states have been returned to the regi-

ments prior to the possibility of making out the general state of the army. This occasions not only trouble, but considerable delay. In addition to the due examination of the returns by the Commanding officer previous to his signature, and his comparing them with the former to see that they correspond, brigade majors and assistant adjutant generals of divisions must strictly compare and examine all states sent in; the latter will be held particularly responsible for forwarding correct states.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[250.] G. O. Badajoz, 8th Sept., 1809.

The Commander of the Forces has heard with much concern that persons employed at Lisbon in landing stores for the army have landed goods liable to pay duty, under pretence that they were for the use of the troops. The Commander of the Forces is determined to disgrace and punish those who shall be found out to have been concerned in those scandalous transactions; and in order to prevent them in future, he desires that when any articles are to be landed from any ship in the Tagus for the use of the troops, the officer at the head of the department for whose service they are to be landed is to give one day's previous notice to the officer commanding at Lisbon of this intention, stating particularly the ship from which in the river, and the place to which on shore, the articles are to be taken, and, as far as may be possible, the denominations and quantities of the articles to be landed.

The Commanding officer at Lisbon is immediately to convey this notice to His Majesty's ambassador at Lisbon, in order that he may make such communications on the subject to the government as he may think proper. In case the government may think proper to order it, customhouse officers are to be allowed to attend in the ship, in the boats conveying the articles from the ship to the shore, and in the store house, in order to see that the goods are conveyed to their destination according to notice given.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Marshal-General Sir A. Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Lisbon, 8th Sept., 1809.

You will, I make no doubt, be a good deal surprised to learn that after all my ineffectual attempts to get the army of Romana towards the borders of Castille on the northern frontier of Portugal, where his presence might have been so useful, it is now on its march by Tras os Montes for Ciudad Rodrigo, in a force of about 16,000 men. Romana himself arrived on the 2nd inst. at Almeida, went to Ciudad Rodrigo on the 3rd, was to return to the former place on the 4th in his way to Seville, the Duque del Parque being to succeed to the command of his army and that of Castille joined. Under the circumstances of my having retired, and his not having entered into any combination with you, and the positions of the French armies, in the centre of which he places himself, this is the most extraordinary of all his movements; and as Ciudad Rodrigo cannot contain his army, and nowhere under it could it be protected from the guns of the enemy, he would have no option, in case of being attacked or the enemy threatening him, than again falling back into Portugal, and in the mean time he intrudes into the very places whose provisions ought to have been husbanded, and will eat everything up; and should you wish an advance towards Ciudad Rodrigo, I fear you will be distressed for provisions. Fortunately he has not much cavalry. General Silveira has arranged his passage through Portugal without ever communicating either with me or the government, and the first intelligence I got of it was from Cox at Almeida. Such has been the uniform conduct of General Silveira, whose party I find is crying and puffing him up in all sorts of publications, and whose object I really do not understand.

It appears Romana rather now regrets this movement of his, and wishes the troops to retire, but I fear they must hence get to Almeida.

You will have heard of the almost certainty that hostilities are recommenced in Germany, and perhaps that may account for the retreat of the French from La Mancha, and the provisions collecting at Talavera may be intended for Soult and Mortier, or the troops on this side of that place in their retreat towards Madrid. I mention this because it is a little corroborated by the information I have received from Brigadier Cox, who states that he understands Salamanca to be again evacuated, and Ney to have retired to Valladolid, where there is an English officer at the head of a regiment. I can seldom even under the most favourable circumstances depend upon any accuracy. In addition to the regiments mentioned in this return, the 10th infantry is at Thomar, and the 5th Caçadores at Castello Branco; the former about 1000, the latter 500 strong.

You will judge by this what we shall have on your left, and what you would wish to have at Abrantes. I hope in a short time to get four regiments of cavalry between Golegão, Salvaterra, and their neighbourhoods, each regiment about 500.

It is most singular we hear nothing from England about the several appointments we wrote for, and I am now much distressed in not knowing if General Spencer will be sent or not, because in the latter case I would make other arrangements, and which being made would be extremely awkward to have to undo. I have only the Conde de Sampayo

to place as inspector of cavalry, and being once placed it would be very unpleasant to propose his removal; and I am now almost forced to a decision, as the Baron Carove, who has ever demanded his leave to retire, begins to be extremely impatient and will not longer stay, and indeed I am not desirous he should, as besides all other considerations he is greatly too old for the active superintendence now required.

Believe me to be yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Marshal-General Sir A. Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Lisbon, 8th Sept., 1809.

After your despatching me your letter of the 4th you will have received mine that treated of Ciudad Rodrigo; and that the French did not long since, when they had less cause to fear interruption, attack that place is very singular. Had they had any battering-guns, it would not have cost them either much time or trouble. I annex for you a state of the army I had in the field, and of which, with the exception of the 3rd and 15th regiments, the whole is between Leiria and Thomar, and at Coimbra and on the Tagus. The Chasseur corps, on account of your having called Sir Robert Wilson to you, remained on the frontiers; but now that you have directed Sir Robert to remain north of the Tagus, orders have been sent to those corps to fall back to Punhete and Tancos, and it is very necessary for them, as they are much in want of refitment.

You will see that I had only a small portion of the regiments Nos. 6 and 18 with me: they were such as had escaped from Oporto and the Minho on the entrance of Soult; and I had only one battalion of the 9th, the other having been dispersed on the same occasion. I have ordered the whole of those three regiments to assemble at Coimbra, the remainder having been pretty well collected at Oporto, and we estimate those three corps at 3000; but as they will want considerable refitment and arrangement, I have sent Brigadier Campbell to take the command there. The 3rd and 15th are at present at Lamego, that they may be à porter to where they are recruited from (Oporto and the Minho), and there is water communication to furnish them with what they may want of appointments. I have ordered the 20th regiment, which is pretty complete, from the Alentejo to this place, that I may have a look at it and get it brushed up. I suppose on leaving its quarters it will have much desertion. In Abrantes at present are three regiments of militia of 600 each, and there are three near the Pass of Talhades, and one at Perdigoa: these I am thinking of assembling at Castello Branco for the object of sending an officer to superintend their discipline; but whilst there is any prospect of your marching that way, I will defer it.

The troops returned lately being much in want of every refitment, they will not be for some short time in a very good state for marching.

Such is our state and position in regard to numbers, but I cannot be very exact till the corps have been a little settled in their cantonments. I think it odd that Ney should abandon unnecessarily Salamanca before Soult had retired by one route or other from Plasencia. We have, which perhaps you

will have had also, rumours from Madrid that orders are come for many troops from Spain to retire into France: however, these are rumours; nor does Cox appear to write as positive that Ney has left Salamanca; but it is right you should be informed, that, combining the information with what you may further know, you may judge of its probability.

Yours most truly,

W. C. BERESFORD.

G. O. Badajoz, 9th Sept., 1809. [251.]

1. Staff Surgeons of divisions, Surgeons of brigades, regimental Surgeons, and Assistant-Surgeons, having charge of regimental sick, are directed to pay particular attention to the General Orders respecting the hospital department. The Inspector of Hospitals has not been able to obtain correct returns of the regimental medical staff and of the sick, from the circumstance of the orders of the 13th August not having been obeyed.

2. Weekly returns of sick are to be transmitted every Sunday morning to the Inspector of Hospitals, and monthly returns every 20th, in which will be specified the names of regimental surgeons and assistant-surgeons, whether present or absent, and how employed; also hospital mates, who may be attached to regiments, must be included in the returns; the general and regimental hospital staff will transmit to the Inspector of Hospitals' head quarters their names, and dates of their commissions from the time of their entrance into the service.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR WELLINGTON, London, 9th Sept., 1809.

As the Cabinet are not easily collected at this season of the year, I shall detain Lord Arthur Somerset till Wednesday for my official letters: in the mean time I avail myself of Lord William's departure to intimate to you that you may expect the cordial approbation of government of your late movements. However we hoped for a different result, we feel that the disappointment has arisen out of causes not within your power to control, and that you have made the most of a difficult situation.

In my last letter I alluded to the parliamentary provision I was persuaded the King would be disposed to recommend to Parliament to attach to your Peerage. In *these times* I thought it desirable that His Majesty's pleasure should be taken, and that some memorandum should exist, which might be in your hands. The Duke of Portland lost no time

in executing this object, I believe on the day following that on which my last letter was dated; and I now send you a copy of his note to me, meaning to keep the original or to give it to Pole, that it may establish your claim to a fulfilment of the King's assurance under any circumstances.

Ever, my dear Wellington, yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Duke of Portland to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR LORD, Burlington House, 23rd Aug., 1809.

I return you herewith the paper of remarks you put into my hands at the Queen's Palace, and have the satisfaction of accompanying it with the information of the King's approbation of Sir Arthur's title, and His Majesty's opinion that application should be made to Parliament at its meeting for as beneficial a pecuniary grant to Sir Arthur as the circumstances of the case will admit, and precedent will warrant.

Ever, my dear Lord, most sincerely yours, &c.,

PORTLAND.

[252.] *To the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Badajoz, 10th Sept., 1809.

I enclose a letter which I received from Pole yesterday, which explains all that has passed since the arrival of the intelligence of the victory at Talavera. It appears to me that Pole could not do otherwise than he has done. It would have been impossible to give me your title, and equally so to force the King to give me the title of Talavera against the opinion of those who thought that it could not be done without the consent of the Spanish government.

Pray return the enclosed papers, and

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Marshal-General Sir A. Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Lisbon, 11th Sept., 1809.

I trust this will be the last time I shall have to address you by that name, for though not officially, yet I believe it is not to be doubted that you are now a Viscount of Great Britain, of which give me leave most sincerely to congratulate you, as one who as much as most of your friends rejoices in your well-earned honours.

I received yesterday your letter respecting the roads from Castello Branco towards Ciudad Rodrigo. By Guarda is not only out of the way,

but quite unnecessary to go; and there are several roads that you may take, even with guns, that will bring you from Castello Branco to Ciudad Rodrigo. By Sabugal is, I believe, as direct as any, and by which I sent a brigade of guns. I will, however, having had made the reconnaissance of all that country, send to you the report respecting the roads. Respecting the magazines that belonged to you at Villa Velha and Castello Branco, I will give the directions you desire, though I fear at the former little has been left, as from thence I was under the necessity of ordering the greatest part of the biscuit to Cortiçada as a reserve in case we had had or should have the Pass of Talhades to defend, not being able to depend upon the resources of the immediate country beyond the Pass, and still less upon my Commissariat, who could not even collect where there was abundance. I gave orders to keep it as a reserve, except in case of absolute necessity, and the Commissary has not yet reported to me what quantity is or remains there. I did not find there was any difficulty in procuring sufficient provisions in the neighbourhood of Castello Branco, when we paid, and proper measures were taken; for, in spite of the continual assertion to the contrary of the magistrates, that country is pretty abundant; the greatest want is that of transport. Of the assistant commissaries and clerks that you gave me before, what can you now spare me? I fear I shall be ever miserably off in this line. The Portuguese really have not sufficient exertion in them; they will not work. The only answer I can ever get from them, and which they imagine quite unanswerable, is, "I wrote," or "I gave the orders;" never thinking it necessary to see or enforce their execution. I do not much like this protracted negotiation in Germany, which, by not hearing of the rupture of the armistice, is to be feared is going on. The next packet must bring, I think, something decisive.

Believe me yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

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*To the Right Hon. J. C. Villiers.** [253.]

MY DEAR VILLIERS, Badajoz, 12th Sept., 1809.

Pole has been very much embarrassed about a title for me. He could not take Lord Wellesley's without his leave, nor Talavera without the consent of the government of Spain; and I fancy he has taken his chance.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Marshal-General Sir A. Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Lisbon, 12th Sept., 1809.

I have received your letter of the 8th from Badajoz, in which you renew the subject of the mode of employment of British officers in this service,

* British Ambassador at Lisbon.

and particularize some instances where undoubtedly they might be of extreme advantage; and not only the instances of the two generals you have mentioned, but with every other Portuguese general; and I conclude at least as much at Elvas as anywhere else, where there are now two regular regiments of the line, and I fear their discipline gets on but slowly: the others have had no other troops with them lately but militia, which, however, if the struggle is to be on Portuguese ground, it will be well to pay some attention to, and they are by much the finest men we have, but their officers are so miserably bad that it will indeed be an up-hill work. However, it must not altogether be neglected; but I have so few officers to spare from the line that it will puzzle me a little to send any from it. In respect to discipline, everything, I believe, with every other nation as well as this, depends upon the officers: where they are willing to attend to their duty and determined to command, the soldiers will not neglect theirs, and will ever obey; but here long habits of disregard to duty and of consequent laziness make it not only difficult but almost impossible to induce the senior officers of the service to enter into any regular and continued attention to the duties of their situations, and really I have seen that neither reward nor punishment will induce them to bear up against fatigue. There are, undoubtedly, exceptions, and, as I am fast getting rid of the most ancient, and placing young men in their posts, who enter the service with the knowledge that much will be required of them, those exceptions become more numerous; but you are aware that a regeneration of this nature cannot here be made but by degrees, and that not in a few months; and I regret to say that measure which would give me the greatest assistance has not been adopted—the augmentation of the pay of the officers, which at present is by no means an inducement for any of them to remain in the service.

In respect to the position for my cavalry, I had no other military object in it than placing them where they would have room for exercise and provender, and getting the officers out of this town, where, whilst they remain, I fear they will neither be induced nor forced to do their duty as they ought. The stables at Belem are kept for you; if you choose to give them to me, I may there place a brigade, and leave Golegão or occupy it with infantry only. In fact, I cannot be altogether aware of your objects; but tell me what you desire, and of course I will observe it, and will delay till I hear from you sending any cavalry from here. Had I not come down, my cavalry would have been for a length of time unfit for anything; the two first regiments that were long since ordered to be first completed, after my inspecting them, and only discharging such horses as were absolutely incapable of anything, wanting, of 1000 horses, 300 to complete. As was usual, they had gone on giving a little to every regiment, and having nothing complete. In sending Hamilton, it is very curious we are not informed if Spencer is or is not coming to us: it leaves me in a very awkward predicament. Of the last clothing sent, ten-elevenths is again white cloth; and 10,000 grey jackets, with red cuff and cape, are sent out, for what object I know not. I have seen one, and I think it would about fit a man of five feet; they are made of the cloth of which our English great-coats are made. I have sent to see if there are different sizes; but the whole may as well go home again. The trousers, of the

same stuff, if large enough, might very well answer; but I fear they will all prove such as the one I saw.

I wrote to you officially as to the mode that the officers were to be paid, and I send again a copy of my letter. I cannot express to you how much confusion and trouble the want of some fixed plan on this subject occasions.

You desired me to make inquiry relative to some French officer. I cannot immediately lay my hands on your letter, which is either mixed with other papers, or that I have torn in mistake. I have answered the other parts, and will request of you to again inform me of the name of the officer. If you have any communication or exchange with the French, I wish you would ask for the Quartermaster of the 88th, Collins, who was left sick and taken prisoner. He may be considered as a non-combatant. His absence, the commanding officer writes me, will put the regimental clothing accounts, &c., in great confusion.

Believe me yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

G. O. Badajoz, 14th Sept., 1809. [254.]

1. The orders of the 12th inst. respecting the plunder of beehives by the troops of the 4th division are countermanded; the plunderers having been discovered and ordered for trial.

2. The Commander of the Forces is always concerned when he is obliged to order any measure of severity towards the troops; he is concerned that the disorders of which frequent complaints are made are committed by a few; but unless the good soldiers, and the officers and non-commissioned officers in particular, exert themselves to prevent these outrages, and discover the perpetrators when they are known to them, the whole army must suffer in character, as well as the privations which are the invariable consequence of plunder by the troops.

3. The cavalry have been distributed in their present quarters principally with a view to their being fed with facility, and in order that the horses might recover their condition. To insure this object, it is desirable that they may not be used as orderlies to carry letters, and the Commander of the Forces prefers infinitely paying messengers for the use of the cavalry in this manner. If it should be necessary, however, at any time to send a dragoon with a letter, in consequence of the impossibility of procuring a messenger, the Commander of the Forces desires that his rate may be confined to the walk of his horse,

unless in a case of very urgent necessity, which may require the early delivery of the letter.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Assistant Commissary-Gen. W. Gauntlett to Lieut.-Gen. Sherbrooke.

SIR, Talavera de Real, 15th Sept., 1809.

I beg leave to report to you that the greatest part of our supplies of bread are stopped. A person is come in from Almandral who was to have brought bread, and who reports that the Spanish detachments in that place and the neighbouring villages have declared that if the inhabitants send out any more bread the place shall be sacked; and from eighteen villages only one has sent part of its quota this day. They have broken the stone of the mill of this place: consequently, having no flour, they say they cannot bake bread, and have not sent a loaf this day.

The Alcalde sent six casks for 8000 rations of biscuit yesterday to the Junta at Badajoz. He assured me they would return by 12 o'clock this day, and, as he has never forfeited his word, I depended on it; but they are not yet arrived.

I sent Mr. Melville to Badajoz this morning to report the circumstance to Mr. Deputy Commissary-General Dalrymple. Mr. Petten is gone to the different villages. I cannot conceive from whence the reluctance to bring in supplies can arise, as every article that has been received here I have either paid for in ready money or seen it done by the others of the department.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient, humble servant,
W. GAUNTLETT, Assist. Com. Gen.

P.S.—I have issued to all the troops half a pound of bread per man this evening, excepting the Brigade of Guards and 42nd Regiment, who were absent. The 83rd, as they were going to march, had a full ration.

Since closing my report I have received the enclosed letter from Mr. Deputy Commissary-General Dalrymple (not one in answer to mine), which I have the honour to transmit herewith.

[253.] G. O. Badajoz, 16th Sept., 1809.

1. The Commander of the Forces cannot avoid taking this opportunity of calling upon the field officers of the regiments in particular, and all the officers in general, to support and assist their Commanding officer in the maintenance of discipline, and in the preservation of order and regularity in their corps.

2. The officers of the army are much mistaken if they suppose that their duty is done when they have attended to the drill of

their men, and to the parade duties of the regiment: the order and regularity of the troops in camp and quarters, the subsistence and comfort of the soldiers, the general subordination and obedience of the corps, afford constant subjects for the attention of the field officers in particular, in which, by their conduct in the assistance they will give their Commanding officer, they can manifest their zeal for the service, their ability and their fitness for promotion to the higher ranks, at least as much as by an attention to the drill and parade discipline of the corps.

3. The Commander of the Forces desires that the principle of the order of the 29th May, given out at Coimbra, which requires that officers should be quartered near the companies, may be applied to the encampments, that the tents of the officers may be placed near those of the men under their command, and that the situations of the field officers may be pitched upon by the quartermaster of the battalion.

4. The Commander of the Forces desires that all officers and soldiers of the army will understand that the Spanish and Portuguese soldiers are entrusted with the performance of duties when sentry, equally with British soldiers in the same situation; and that any resistance to a Spanish or Portuguese sentry, and particularly any violence committed upon him, upon any assumed superiority of character, by any British officer or soldier, will be punished as such a breach of military discipline shall deserve.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Badajoz, 17th Sept., 1809. [256.]

3. Officers who require quarters at any of the stations of the army, or at head quarters, are to apply to the officer of the Quartermaster-General's department at such stations, or to Captain Kelly at head quarters, for billets, and are not on any account to apply themselves to the magistrates. Captain Kelly at head quarters, and the officers of the Quartermaster-General's department at the other stations of the army, will keep a register of the names of the officers for whom they procure billets, stating the name of the owner of the house on whom the billet is procured, so that it may always be known what officers have been quartered in each house.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Gen. Kellermann to Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley.

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL, Valladolid, le 17 Sept., 1809.

M. de Turenne, mon aide-de-camp, que j'envoyais avec des dépêches à M. le Maréchal Duc d'Elchingen à Salamanque, a été pris par un parti d'insurgés aux environs de Tordesillas. Je me flatte qu'il n'aura point été assassiné, et qu'il aura été conduit à Ciudad Rodrigo.

Dans cet espoir je me suis déterminé à vous écrire, et à vous prier de me le renvoyer. Ce serait la faveur la plus grande que vous pourriez me faire, et je vous en aurais une obligation proportionnée au vif intérêt que je porte à ce jeune homme, dont le sort me touche et m'inquiète au plus haut degré. Vous en jugerez par la démarche irrégulière que je fais envers vous, malgré les désagrémens qui peuvent en résulter pour moi puisque je me suis déterminé à vous envoyer un de vos officiers prisonniers en échange de mon aide-de-camp après lui avoir fait signer l'engagement de revenir se constituer prisonnier s'il ne réussit pas dans l'objet de sa mission, qui est de me faire rendre mon aide-de-camp.

Le caractère connu de V. E. et les relations que j'ai eu l'avantage d'avoir avec vous me donnent le plus grand espoir que vous ferez tout ce qui dépendra de vous pour accéder à ma demande, qui vous procure également l'avantage de rendre à la liberté un de vos officiers.

J'ai l'honneur de vous offrir, M. le Général, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Le Général de Division,

KELLERMANN.

Si je ne puis obtenir que mon aide-de-camp me soit rendu, veuillez en faire prendre soin et lui faire donner de l'argent? J'ai fait ici donner 60 livres sterling au premier officier qui me passe.

Value of Officers in Men for Exchange during the Peninsular War.

	Men.
Captain-General, Field-Marshal, General Commanding ..	60
General or General of Division	40
Lieutenant-General or General of Brigade	30
Major-General or inferior to above	20
Brigadier-General, or Colonel, or Adjutant-General ..	15
Lieutenant-Colonel, or Major, or Chief of Battalion ..	8
Captain	6
Lieutenant	4
Ensign	3
Non-Commissioned Officers down to Corporal inclusive ..	2

JOURNAL OF MILITARY OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE BATTLE OF TALAVERA.

Journal of CAPT. WHITTINGHAM.

29*th July.*—The French effected their retreat across the Alberche before day-light. Lord Wellington requested General Cuesta would advance a

part of his force to harass the enemy in his retreat, but General Cuesta did not think proper so to do.

This was the third day that the English army had been without bread, wine, or spirits.

Brigadier-General Craufurd, with the Light Brigade, joined the army.

30*th July*.—The French halted at Cazalegas, distant from Talavera two leagues.

31*st July*.—The French began their retreat towards Madrid; the impossibility of subsisting the troops, from the total want of the means of transport, prevented the English army from advancing.

Information was received that General Venegas had crossed the Tagus, and was advancing towards Madrid.

1*st August*.—Lord Wellington received advices that Marshal Soult was advancing from Plasencia, having forced the pass of the Puerto de Baños at the head of 25,000 men.

Lord Wellington proposed to General Cuesta, either that the British army should direct its march against Marshal Soult whilst the Spanish army should maintain the position of Talavera, or that the Spanish army should march and the English maintain the position.

General Cuesta chose to remain in his position, and promised to defend it!

Lord Wellington recommended to him to construct two redoubts, one on the height on the left flank, and another on the rising ground in the centre of the line; to fortify his whole line by a strong abattis, and to put the church on the high road at the entrance of the town in a state of defence.

The importance of this advice, which would have made the position almost impregnable, was felt by all the superior officers of the Spanish army, but nothing was done.

2*nd August*.—Lord Wellington, with the whole of the British army, and a Spanish division of 4000 men under Major-General Bassecourt, began his march to Oropesa at day-light.

Between eleven and twelve o'clock (A.M.) General Cuesta received a letter by the hands of a friar, secretary to the Governor of Avila, which appeared to be written by Joseph Buonaparte to Marshal Soult.

The Marshal was ordered to attack the rear of the position of Talavera, whilst Joseph Buonaparte should turn the left flank by crossing the Alberche at Escalona.

Without any other reason than the contents of this letter, notwithstanding his patrols were that day pushed as far as Santa Olallà, six leagues in front of his position, and from their reports everything appeared perfectly quiet on the part of the enemy; notwithstanding he was aware that Sir Robert Wilson occupied Escalona, and a detachment of his own army the ford of San Roman, so as to secure his left from all possibility of surprise, General Cuesta determined, without any previous communication with Lord Wellington, to abandon immediately the position at Talavera, and to fall back upon the English army, thus exposing the combined armies to be attacked front and rear, sacrificing upwards of 2000 sick and wounded, who could not be removed from Talavera, and destroying in a moment all the advantages of the victory of the 28th.

3*rd August*.—The Spanish army abandoned the position at Talavera,

and joined the British at Oropesa early in the morning. Distance six leagues. A rear guard was left at Talavera to observe the enemy's movements, by the particular desire of the Duke of Alburquerque.

Marshal Soult was at Navalmoral, four leagues from Oropesa, and it was understood to have been Lord Wellington's intention to have attacked him the next morning; but in consequence of General Cuesta's totally unexpected arrival, by which he was exposed to be surrounded without the possibility of retreat in case of defeat, his Lordship determined to cross the Tagus immediately.

The army crossed the Tagus in the course of the day at the Puente de Arzobispo.

The Duke of Alburquerque pushed his patrols as far as Santa Olalla, and from their reports it appeared that there was no movement on the part of the enemy.

At five o'clock in the evening the Duke received orders from General Cuesta to retire immediately upon the bridge of Arzobispo.

4th August.—The English army began its retreat towards Deleytosa, over the Mesa de Ibor.

The Spanish army crossed the Tagus at Puente de Arzobispo, and took up a position on the left bank of the river.

5th August.—Head-quarters of the Spanish army were removed to Peraleda de Garbin, distant three leagues from Puente de Arzobispo.

Lord Wellington's head-quarters were at Deleytosa. A detachment of his army occupied the bridge of Almaraz.

6th August.—A trifling affair between the Spaniards and the French took place in the town and at the bridge of Arzobispo.

7th August.—800 French cavalry from the army of Victor entered Talavera. No French troops had made their appearance, even to reconnoitre the position of the Spanish army at Talavera, from the 3rd up to the 7th.

8th August.—At half-past one o'clock (P.M.) Marshal Soult attacked and surprised the bridge of Arzobispo. The Spanish division of infantry under Major-General Bassecourt made little or no resistance; the gallant conduct of the cavalry under the Duke of Alburquerque, though unable to recover the fortune of the day, secured the retreat of the infantry.

General Cuesta, upon receiving the information of the loss of the bridge, retreated to the Mesa de Ibor in such extreme confusion, that, had the French followed up the advantage they had obtained, he must have lost the whole of his artillery, and the dispersion of his army would have been complete.

Lord Wellington had written to him on the 6th, to point out the extreme difficulties of the road to the Mesa de Ibor, and to request he would begin to retire his heavy artillery and baggage, but no attention was paid to this important advice.

9th August.—Spanish head-quarters at Mesa de Ibor. English head-quarters at Deleytosa.

10th August.—Lord Wellington rode to the Mesa de Ibor to communicate to General Cuesta his ideas upon the best mode of occupying that strong position.

11th August.—British head-quarters were removed to Jaraicejo.

Sir Robert Wilson, with a battalion of Portuguese and two battalions of Spanish troops, after his retreat from Escalona attempted to occupy the Puerto de Baños, but a division of the army of Marshal Soult attacked and defeated him.

The troops dispersed into the mountains, and Sir Robert owed his safety to the fleetness of his horse.

On the 11th August General Venegas was attacked by the French army under General Sebastiani at Almonacid in La Mancha.

The French army amounted to 25,000 men, the Spanish army to 27,000 men.

The battle lasted nine hours, and ended in the defeat of the Spaniards, who fell back upon the Sierra Morena, where they occupied their former position at the Carolina, Santa Helena, and Santa Cruz.

COLONEL ROCHE, *Head-Quarters, Spanish Army, Deleytosa.*

18th August.—Marshal Mortier, with 10,000 men, occupied Talavera, Oropesa, and Puente del Arzobispo.

Two divisions of Marshal Victor's army had joined General Sebastiani in La Mancha.

Marshal Victor, with the main body of his army, had fallen back upon Madrid.

Marshal Ney had gone to Salamanca, and Marshal Soult had established his head-quarters at Plasencia.

23rd August.—The British head-quarters moved on the 22nd to Miajadas.

24th August.—General Eguia, who had succeeded General Cuesta in the command of the army of Estremadura, received orders to fall back behind the Guadiana, and to begin his retreat on the 27th.

27th August.—The number of sick had increased very considerably, and the cavalry in general was in a most deplorable state.

COLONEL ROCHE, *Head-Quarters, Truxillo.*

30th August.—General Eguia marched on the 29th from Deleytosa to effect a junction with the army of General Venegas in La Mancha, having left a corps of 12,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry to occupy the position from the Puerto San Vicente to 6 leagues below the Puente de Almaraz, an extent of 26 leagues. Information of the enemy's movements induced General Eguia to wait at Truxillo for further orders.

30th August.—The French evacuated the Puente de Arzobispo and retired to Oropesa.

Mr. IZNARDI, *Head-Quarters of General Venegas, Carolina.*

3rd Sept.—The Spanish army of La Mancha occupied Valdepeñas, Infantes, Despeña Perros, Viso, and La Calzada.

The left wing of the cavalry, Manzanares.

The right wing of the cavalry, La Solana and Mundrilla.

Total Force—

Infantry	24,000
Cavalry	3,000
Artillery (pieces)	30

COLONEL ROCHE, *Truxillo.*

4th Sept.—Return of the Force of the Army of Estremadura—

Infantry	27,000
Cavalry	6,800
Artillerymen	1,400
Artillery (pieces)	38

An Italian medical officer deserted from the French, and communicated to General Eguia the following intelligence:—

Return of the French Force in Spain, as given by Dr. MAURICIO CHERESELE, M.D., *at Head-quarters of the Army of Estremadura, 4th Sept.*, 1809.

Generals Commanding.	Cantonments.	Effective Force.
		Men.
General Dessolles	Madrid	12,000
General Sebastiani	Guadalaxara	16,000
Marshal Victor	Toledo	10,000
Marshal Mortier	Talavera	8,000
Marshal Soult	Plasencia	17,000
Marshal Ney	Salamanca	8,000
Marshal Kellermann	Burgos	8,000
Total of effective Force, including 10,000 cavalry	.. ..	79,000
To this must be added the number of sick and wounded in the General Hospitals at Madrid	.. ..	12,000
Original Force in Catalonia	.. ..	40,000
General Total	.. ..	131,000

Note.—When Marshal Soult advanced against Lord Wellington, he brought with him nearly the whole of the division of Marshal Kellermann, whose present force was drawn from Aragon. The remainder of the force in Aragon was sent to Catalonia.

The advanced guard of an army of 45,000 men coming from France to reinforce the army in Spain had advanced to Montmarsan, distant 25 leagues from Bayonne. They received the counter order of march to return towards Holland on or about the 20th July.

Dr. Cheresele further stated that at a Council of War held at Madrid it had been determined that the French army should maintain the positions it then occupied, and that no offensive operations should be undertaken till the arrival of reinforcements.

The French army was much distressed for want of the necessary means of transport. Large orders for the purchase of mules had been given by the French Generals, but they had not been able to carry them into execution to any extent.

(N.B. To each French division of 6000 men there should be attached 100 carts of the large description.

Mules are seldom employed by them for the transport of provisions. They prefer the carts, as the number of mules wanted for carriage is greater than that required to draw the same quantity of provisions in carts.)

The report had been spread, and generally believed in the French army, that the English had retreated towards Lisbon, having given up the cause of Spain altogether.

COLONEL ROCHE, *Truxillo.*

14*th Sept.*—The main body of the Army of Estremadura, under General Eguia, received orders to march on the 15th to effect a junction with the army of La Mancha at Ciudad Real.

A corps of 10,000 men were directed to be left in Estremadura to occupy the Mesa de Ibor.

The reason given by General Eguia to Colonel Roche for this movement was the total impossibility of subsisting the troops in Estremadura.

The French advanced posts, under General Franceschi, were cantoned, according to the last reports, as follows:—

	Infantry.
Chincon	1200
Colmenar	600
Perales	500
Arjanda	800
Valdelecha	500
Campo Real	300
Alcala de Henares (Head-Quarters)	800
Total	4700

Artillery, 5 light guns and 2 howitzers.

Return of the Army lately commanded by the MARQUES DE LA ROMANA, *with the Cantonments it occupied on the 11th Sept.*

	Head Quarters.
Vanguard	Martin del Rio.
1st Division	San Felices de los Gallegos.
2nd Division	Villar de Ciexvo.
3rd Division	San Felices el Chico.

	Men.
Infantry armed	16,000
Infantry unarmed	4,000
Cavalry	500
Total	20,500

Artillery, 24 field pieces.

GENERAL BALLESTEROS.

Return of the Army of Asturias, 26th August, commanded by General Ballesteros.

Head-Quarters, Cabezon, in the mountains of Santander.

	Men.
Force	10,000
With General Mahy	5,000
Total	15,000

General Ballesteros had surprised a French regiment of infantry on the 23rd or 24th, and was on the point of attacking a body of 3000 French at Torre de la Vega on the 27th.

DUQUE DEL PARQUE.

The garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo consisted of 9000 men, but this division, commanded by the Duque del Parque, was reinforced by the whole of the force before under the command of the Marques de la Romana, and was waiting the junction of four regiments of cavalry from Estremadura.

COLONEL ROCHE, *Head-Quarters, Villa Nueva de la Serena.*

18*th Sept.*—The main body of the Army of Estremadura, commanded by General Eguia, had arrived at Villa Nueva de la Serena, on its march to Ciudad Real, in La Mancha.

Ten thousand men had been left in Estremadura to occupy the position of the Mesa de Ibor.

Four regiments of cavalry had begun their march by the route of Caceres and Abrantes to Ciudad Rodrigo, to reinforce the armies of Castille and Galicia.

A corps of 10,000 French occupied Toledo, having their advanced posts as stated in the report of the 14th September.

[257.] G. O. Badajoz, 19th Sept., 1809.

4. The Commander of the Forces cannot avoid taking this opportunity of drawing the attention of the army to the unworthy conduct of these soldiers, who have plundered the stores on their way to the army, for the use of their comrades, over which they were placed as a guard.

WELLINGTON.

Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Seville, 19th Sept., 1809.

I send you two of my despatches for Canning, which will show you my opinions and conduct. I shall send you an official copy of my official note of the 8th September to M. de Garay. I recommend it to your attention: it will show you that I have not neglected your cause here. You will find the note in No. 5 to Canning.

This country is on the verge of total ruin. I am worked like a galley slave, and I can effect nothing. I cannot even obtain an answer to any of your various objects, nor induce them to act with common spirit, honesty, or decency on any occasion. I have used every effort to detain a sufficient force in Estremadura, but it will, I am afraid, be vain. In this case I shall recommend it to you officially to quit Spain altogether, and to look to your own safety. They have appointed the Duke of Alburquerque

to Estremadura, and in my conscience I believe that appointment to be the sole cause of the reduction of the force in that division of their rabble.

I can obtain no good intelligence from any quarter, but I believe from various circumstances that the French are not likely to act offensively before their reinforcements shall arrive. For the last two days I have been employed in endeavouring to save the necks of these caitiffs from the just fury and indignation of the people and soldiery; and I have succeeded. A regular plot was formed to seize them (and I believe to hang them) all; they well deserve it; but I could not suffer such outrages under my nose; so I interfered, and saved the curs from the rope. They were all gratitude *for an hour;* but *now* that they think themselves secure, they have begun to cheat me again; and I really believe that I must return to England very soon. About ten days ago they were in a very just alarm for their throats, and they sent for the Wallons to protect them; the Wallons were discovered the day before yesterday to be concerned in this plot; so last night the poltroons have sent them away; "they have need of other guards to protect them against their own." I told Garay this evening that I would not trust the protection of a favourite dog to the whole Spanish army. It is some satisfaction to abuse such miscreants, if you cannot reform them; and at least England shall know the truth, which you and I and *none else* have told.

Ever yours most affectionately,

WELLESLEY.

G. O. Badajoz, 21st Sept., 1809. [258.]

1. When regimental hospitals are to be established in any division of the army, they must be formed in the manner pointed out in His Majesty's regulations; and the soldiers who go into regimental hospitals must be under a stoppage of 9*d.* *per diem*, which must be paid to the regimental surgeon, or other person in charge of the hospital, and accounted for in conformity with those regulations.

2. This stoppage is intended to enable the surgeon to subsist the soldier in regimental hospital, as well as to provide him with those comforts which his situation will require; but as it may happen that the divisions may be placed in situations in which there is no market, and the surgeons of regiments would find it impracticable to purchase food for the soldiers in hospital, General officers commanding divisions are in such case requested to order the commissaries attached to their divisions to supply the regimental surgeons with such proportion of a ration for each man in hospital as they may think proper, for which regimental surgeons will make a daily requisition on the commissary; and the regimental surgeons are to pay for each of

these rations such proportion of 6*d.* as that they will receive will bear to the whole ration of the soldier.

3. These sums are to be paid to the commissary, and the account closed by the regimental surgeons, on the 25th of every month, for all that he will have received from the 25th of the preceding month to the 24th of the current month.

4. The soldiers are to pay 6*s.* for each pair of shoes received from the Commissary-General, and 6*s.* 7*d.* for each shirt. The Commissary-General will make known to the Paymaster-General as soon as possible what number of each have been delivered to each regiment, in order that the price may be stopped from the regiment, and the soldiers may pay for them in the muster ending on the 24th inst.

WELLINGTON.

[259.] *To the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY LORD, Badajoz, 22nd Sept., 1809.

I enclose a letter from Sir Robert Wilson respecting the promotion of certain cadets in the battalion of Seville to be Ensigns.

The battalions of Seville and of Merida were detached by General Cuesta from his army with Sir Robert Wilson when he marched from the Tietar in July, and they have continued with him ever since, and are now in Portugal.

I have sent to General Eguia to desire to have his directions respecting the disposal of these battalions, but have received no answer, probably because he thought it necessary to refer to the government; and if the government will decide upon the subject, I shall be obliged to your Excellency if you will convey to me their wishes.

In the mean time the battalions are in want of pay and clothing, accoutrements, arms, ammunition, and necessaries.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[260.] G. O. Badajoz, 22nd Sept., 1809.

3. The Commander of the Forces cannot avoid expressing his regret upon losing the services of the two battalions of de-

tachments, which are about to join their corps in England. He will not flatter them by saying that he has not had, upon several occasions, reasons to be dissatisfied with their conduct, in their quarters, their camps, and on their marches; but they have uniformly sustained, in an exemplary manner, the character of the regiments to which they belong, and of British soldiers, in the field against the enemy; and he trusts that the few, of whose conduct he cannot but complain, even upon this occasion, will discontinue and forget their bad practices and habits upon their return to their regiments; and that they will endeavour to become an example of orderly and regular conduct in their quarters, as they must ever be of gallantry and discipline in the field.

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Badajoz, 24th Sept., 1809. [261.]

1. The mistakes made in the returns and states sent from many of the regiments of the army are so frequent and so glaring, that the Commander of the Forces apprehends that the proper mode of keeping an account of their men is neglected or is not known in those regiments. The foundation of all states and returns is the roll, and morning and evening states of the troop or company, in which every man absent ought to be accounted for by name, including casualties, till struck off the strength by order of the Commanding officer of the regiment.

The weekly and other states called for from regiments are made up of the totals of the states of each troop or company, which totals should be entered in the regimental weekly or monthly state book; and at the bottom the names of all men making any alteration from the preceding state should be entered by companies.

2. No state should be ever sent in without being made to tally with the last state sent in; and it may be certain that if the second state, whether weekly or monthly, does not account for every man returned in the first, there has been an error, which ought to be investigated, and rectified before the state is sent in.

4. The Commander of the Forces is convinced that either those regiments have never known the proper mode of making

out a return, or that their interior economy has been lately entirely neglected.

5. He requests the General officers commanding brigades to inspect accurately the books of the regiments of their brigades, and to see in what manner they make out their states, whether the absent men of each troop or company are accurately accounted for by name on the rolls, and on the morning and evening states at every parade, and that they will look particularly into the interior economy of the regiments under their command.

6. The Commander of the Forces wishes the commanding and other officers of the regiments, particularly the field officers, to recollect that there is a great deal to do to keep their regiments in order upon service besides attending to the parades and drills of the men.

7. The Commander of the Forces desires that Colonel Peacocke will pay attention to the state of discipline (meaning by that word habits of obedience to orders, subordination, regularity, and interior economy) of the 2nd battalion 83rd regiment, and 2nd battalion 87th regiment, lately ordered to Lisbon, as well as to their parade discipline and drill.

8. The Commander of the Forces deems it but justice to the two battalions of Guards to state that their returns have in every respect been as accurate as the conduct of these excellent corps has been regular and exemplary in every other respect. The returns of the Legion and of the regiments of cavalry are also very accurate.

WELLINGTON.

Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Seville, 24th Sept., 1809.

Colonel Stopford will deliver this letter to you. I have waited over this day in hopes that the Junta might take some effectual steps on some of the points which I have stated to them. In the meanwhile they continue to assault me with silly plans of operation, and with such nonsense as I enclose. You of course will look to the safety of your own army after what has passed. I shall advise this officially. The paper enclosed will show that the D. A. is such a person as you describe. I think it might be proper to state fully the discussion with Malespina, if my note to M. de Garay of the 21st of August should not appear to you to be sufficient. I am inclined to believe that it affords ample proof of the whole case respecting a position on the Guadiana. I never proposed such a plan,

excepting to *you*, subject entirely to *your* discretion. The conditions under which I said that I would even propose the plan to you have never been performed. In fact, however, you have substantially done all that I ever desired or hoped. You have occupied a position which enables you to cover Portugal and Seville, to draw your supplies from Portugal, and to afford to Spain the opportunity of proving whether she will or can supply you: this is the substance of all that I ever proposed.

Stopford will tell you that the force in Estremadura does not exceed 8000 infantry and 900 cavalry: 4000 cavalry are sent to the Duque del Parque. The head quarters of Eguia were at Ciudad Real the day before yesterday. I think they will not venture to push forward the army of La Mancha, although they have vapoured like Don Quixote on that subject. The French are said (by Roche, whom I stopped in time) to have evacuated all posts in La Mancha and Toledo, and to have assembled at Talavera. By accounts arrived from Gibraltar (to the 7th of September in London) it appears that the expedition had returned, having failed with respect to the ships, but leaving 10,000 men in Walcheren. The armistice renewed to the 9th of September; no peace yet between France and Austria.

Ever yours most affectionately,

WELLESLEY.

I have received your despatches in return to those by Guy the messenger.

[ENCLOSURES.]

Don Murtin de Garay to the Ambassador of England.

SIR, Seville, 23rd Sept., 1809.

The Secretary of the War Office has transmitted to me an official note from the Duque de Alburquerque under the date of yesterday, of which the enclosed is a copy, relative to the movement which he considers it necessary for the allied army to make; and the Supreme Central Junta of government in the kingdom commands me to lay it before your Excellency as I now do, in order that your Excellency, being acquainted with its contents, may be pleased to make the necessary arrangements for the execution of the said movement, since, when the advance of the enemy towards Talavera is attentively considered, it is of great importance to the common cause, which we are defending, that General Sir Arthur Wellesley should advance with his army towards Merida or the Vera of Plasencia as he may judge most expedient, not only with the view to check the enemy who might attempt to cross the Tagus, but likewise to prevent Soult from reinforcing Ney, and by these means to enable the Duque del Parque with his force of 20,000 infantry and more than 2000 cavalry to make front against Ney and Kellermann.

His Majesty hopes that your Excellency, from your decided attachment towards Spain, and your well-known adhesion to the just cause which she defends, will promote her wishes in this respect, and giving this new proof of the sentiments you have often expressed.

I have the honour to be,

MARTIN DE GARAY.

The Duke of Alburquerque to Don Antonio Cornel.

SIR, 22nd Sept., 1809.

In consequence of the honour which His Majesty has conferred upon me by the election to the command of the corps of army now remaining in Estremadura, and in consideration of the impossibility that it should maintain the position which it at present occupies, with the few forces of which it actually consists, without the assurance that the British army under the command of the General-in-Chief Sir Arthur Wellesley can immediately engage to support it, I think it my duty to make this communication to your Excellency in order that you may be pleased to inform the government how indispensable it appears to me to forward this proposal to the said General, to the intent that our troops may not be exposed; but if the said General should not think fit to pledge himself in the event of his assistance being wanted, he will at the least be able to approach the banks of the Guadiana, in which line we should cover one of his flanks. I am emboldened to lay this before you by information that the same proposal has been made to the Supreme Junta by the Ambassador, Marquess Wellesley, who would perhaps consider it equally expedient at the present moment as I do; since, if neither the former nor the latter plan is executed, the probable result will be that the enemy, being informed of the small force of our army, will attack it with very superior forces as he may easily do, and will rout and destroy it on the spot; and this corps of army, which might in a short time augment its forces and become respectable, if it be left to itself without the aid of the British troops it will be totally lost, and these well founded hopes will be frustrated. It is not necessary that the British army should engage to protect our small force for a long time, for in twenty-five or thirty days it may be placed in a condition to sustain itself alone and to operate actively in the same manner, although it would doubtless gain incomparable advantages if both armies were to operate in conjunction. I flatter myself that allies so faithful and true will not refuse to afford this new proof that they are so; in which case there will necessarily result the formation of a new army, which may prove of so much importance in opposing the common enemy. I doubt whether the support and the formation of the proposed army, which the Supreme Junta, aware of my anxious wishes to meet with opportunities of fighting the enemy in the closest union with the British arms, has done me the honour to confide to my hands, can in any other manner be effected; of those wishes I have the satisfaction of having given to General Wellesley as far as was in my power proofs by no means equivocal, who I do not doubt is well convinced of this truth. Lastly, Sir, without an assurance of this nature I shall not be able to take charge of the command with which I have been so much honoured by His Majesty without considerable apprehension of risking the entire army, and perhaps my imprudent conduct in not mentioning it in time would cause me to become instrumental in the trial which it might undergo of some fatal reverse.

DUQUE DE ALBURQUERQUE.

*To Sir David Dundas.** [262.]

SIR, Badajoz, 26th Sept., 1809.

I have the honour to transmit a representation from the Adjutant and Quartermaster General of the army under my command, on behalf of their Deputy Assistants, respecting the allowance of bât and forage money; and I beg leave to recommend it to your favourable consideration, in order that they may be placed upon the same footing as Aides-de-camp and Brigade Majors, particularly as the situation of a Deputy Assistant is rather looked upon as a promotion from the other situations, and can only be held by officers of the rank of captain.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Captain Whittingham to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD, Seville, 26th Sept., 1809.

I have the honour to enclose the Duke of Alburquerque's papers, with their translation.

I have to apologise at the same time for the badness of the translation; but as I imagined your Lordship might wish to peruse the papers previous to seeing the Duke, I have ventured to submit them to your inspection in their present state.

I have the honour to be, my Lord, with the highest respect,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

S. WHITTINGHAM.

[ENCLOSURE.]

On the 26 of July last, the army being posted at Sta. Olalla, its vanguard was attacked by superior forces; and when, notwithstanding the endeavours of its worthy chief, the Brigadier-General José Zayas, it was retiring in the greatest hurry, the enemies being already near that village, from whence the army at the first notice began to fall back, on account it was not thought proper to engage in that position, I marched with my division of two thousand horses, and separating myself at the right from the way the enemies were coming, I did fall upon their left flank, and by this means and a very hot fire drove them back, and gave room that the vanguard, composed of four thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, recovered, and that the main army could retire with the greatest tranquillity to the river Alberche.

The next day, after having repassed the Alberche on going to Talavera la Reyna, all the advanced post were attacked about in the afternoon, and then I went out immediately with my division to occupy the left, as the more proper ground for the cavalry in order to hinder the enemy should introduce itself

* Then Commander-in-Chief of the Army in England.

by that way; and really, in a few moments after I had taken this step, I saw the French were coming to attack me in considerable force, and having sent an account of it to the General in Chief, he ordered me to retire to the position agreed upon, and, notwithstanding, on seeing the approach of part of the English infantry, which was to pass over the ground which I occupied, and which was disadvantageous for them, being very considerably open, I did delay a little; and the English General who commanded those troops having asked through Brigadier-General Whittingham not to move till his infantry had passed to the position which he was to occupy, I maintained myself near hour's time, suffering in the mean while the brisk fire from the enemy's artillery, which mine could hardly answer; and posting myself afterwards in my position behind the lines of the English infantry, I maintained myself under arms all the while during the obstinate attack that the enemies made in the night against the aforesaid English lines.

The next day, the 28, always upon the same ground, though advancing more to the left of it, I followed all the movements of the English cavalry, playing the artillery of my division along with its own, to the same point, and to others to which I destinated them in order to cross my fire with theirs upon the enemies. It is well known that this point was the main object, and quite incessantly attacked, and also notorious the particular praise given by General Wellesley to the conduct of my division, and how much his Excellency was satisfied of my opportunity in requesting from the General in Chief one division of infantry, and the manner I placed it upon an high ground which flanked our lines, and which was not taken by the enemies on account of the brisk fire of the said division, which was the 5th under the command of Major-General Bassecourt.

The 8 of the present month of August, very far from not having done its duty, my division of cavalry in the plains near the bridge of the Arbishop, it may be said it has been the occasion where the good order, valour, and constancy of the regiments who composed it were more conspicuous, stimulated by the enthusiasm and bravery of their worthy chiefs and well-deserving officers.

It was put to my charge, and only that, to protect the infantry when it should be obliged to abandon the bridge, whose defence and that of other points it covered was privately to its care, and by a particular order from the General in Chief neither that infantry nor its General was under my command; and the charges the latter laid upon me his own mouth that the cavalry was not saddled, that it came late, and did not attack as it ought, are very unjust; for on account of an advice I received from the skirmishes, I had advanced at my right at *Aldea Nueva;* when I was at *Azutan*, after having passed the ford of Las Herencias, I ordered to saddle, and consequently the horses were ready when the General Commander of the said infantry gave me the first and only advice, of which note I received afterwards I enclose a copy, and by it it may be seen the little urgency he showed in the manner of asking the assistance of my division, and the very material circumstance that it was at one o'clock and a half in the afternoon when he wrote me it. I say very material, for, finding myself at three quarters of league from the bridge, and notwithstanding the necessary time employed by the orderly man to come with Bassecourt's letter, the division already was marching full trot at two o'clock in the afternoon, as though the words of the note did not convey any idea of being so urgent the necessity of my aid, and though I could never imagine that the enemies could so easily become master of the bridge, whose towers and immediate retrenchments are inaccessible to cavalry, notwithstanding, I marched with the greatest precipitation on account that from the tower of the village where I was, I received advice that

the enemy passed the ford which is near the bridge. At first I could not truly believe it, for I knew that for the defence of that ford there were works which flanked it, and I could not imagine that some infantry should not have been sent to defend them, inasmuch that the river was between them, and that I knew that the Brigadier Zayas, when he commanded that point, had troops destinated (as he has assured me) that, at the least warning of movements of the enemy, they could repair to defend the said ford and whatsoever other ford near the bridge. Lastly, the cavalry arrived at such an opportunity that only 500 French horses had passed, which, on seeing that I was marching against them, formed in battle, without daring none of them come near the bridge; and the regiment of Sevilla alone, which I led against them, was sufficient to rebuke the enemy, obliging them to fall back close the river, killing them great many people, and my Edecan, Don José de Urbina, Lieutenant of dragoons of Pavia, took prisoner an officer. But as the French had already not only occupied the bridge, its towers, and retrenchments, but even all the artillery which garrisoned them, and I remarked that our infantry had passed the plain without halting in the wood, I thought that my duty of protecting the infantry in the plain was discharged, since it had saved itself with precipitation; and from other side, the enemy, protected already by the same retrenchments of the bridge, send freely, and without I could be able to put a stop to it with my cavalry, another strong column of its own followed by its artillery and infantry. In such a situation, I thought I could not, nor I ought to do nothing else than to march with all my division to the immediations of the woods, and leaving at my front all the plain to hinder the enemy's infantry should pursue ours, and lest the French should occupy the wood, and by these means should shut me entirely the defiles through which I was to retire, or from which I was to attack its cavalry if it endeavoured to proceed further. In such a position I maintained myself near two hours, to give room that our infantry should gain distance and ground, and I suffered in the mean time all the fire of the artillery of the enemy, and even of our which was posted at the bridge, and which the French turned against us, and certifies all that the loss of some of our field officers, subalterns, and soldiers that suffered my division; and I was pursued till sunset by the advanced detachments of French infantry and cavalry, for on account of the ruggedness of the country they could not bring artillery with any advantage for them, and rightly, since of five guns I had only one could reach to Valdelacasa with its carriage broken, and as the carriages of the other four were broken the guns were spiked, and only the horses were saved, which was the only thing that could be done.

I arrived with all my division to Peraleda de Garbin, where had already arrived the infantry; and being together with the first division of the cavalry of the army and the vanguard, we agree all the chiefs of those troops to retire to the Mesas, according to the order of the Commander in Chief, who the next morning received me in the manner I have the honour to lay to your Majesty's consideration in another paper of this date. Merida, 25 of August, 1809.

Gen. T. O'Donoju to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Head Quarters at Daimiel, 27th Sept., 1809.

I have the honour of congratulating your Lordship on its elevation to the peerage.

The troops that left Estremadura for La Mancha arrived at Ciudad Real

on the 23rd, and found there General Venegas' head-quarters, who gave up the command to General Eguia. On the 25th we proceeded to this town, and the junction of the armies having taken place, the whole of them, consisting of more than 35,000 infantry * and 6,600 cavalry,* with a very considerable train of artillery, are distributed to-day between Puerto la Picé (*vulgo* La Piche), Madridejos, Consuegra, Herencia, Villatta, Villarubia, Arenas, Malagon, Manzanares, La Membrilla y La Solana.

The vanguard, composed of several corps of infantry (amongst them 2000 grenadiers, under Colonel Hore), and the division of cavalry under Brigadier-General Ribas, is at Puerto la Pice, commanded by Major-General Don José de Zayas. Brigadier-General Lacy is at Herencia with his division, &c.

This province abounding in forage and good water for horses, we hope to see in a few days in the best order those lately come from Estremadura. The cavalry of the army of La Mancha look mighty well: the men are in good health and well clothed; subsistences are here in abundance; and, indeed, the whole of the army look better than that your Lordship saw at Almaraz.

I am sorry not to have it in my power to give your Lordship any details concerning the enemy more than that by the latest accounts there are none on the left bank of the Tagus, and that Sebastiani's division that had gone as far as Siguenza in order to disperse the troops at Molina de Aragon and chastise the inhabitants, as it is supposed, retreated suddenly on the 18th towards Toledo, according to reports, which add that Sebastiani had like to have been killed at Madrid by somebody that fired on him from a window, and keeps his bed ever since. There are reports likewise, but I don't know how far they can be depended upon, of Napoleon having ordered 500 artillerymen to be sent to him immediately; and 80 pieces of cannon to have left Madrid on the road to Old Castille, &c. We have deserters here every day from the Spanish corps under King Joseph's pay.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration and respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most humble and most obedient servant,

Thos. O'Donoju.

[263.] *To the Right Hon. J. C. Villiers.*

My dear Villiers, Badajoz, 1st Oct., 1809.

You will have heard that Stewart † has been very ill; and as accounts of his illness when he was at the worst, about the 15th of last month, were sent home, he thinks it not improbable that Lady Catherine will come out. If she should come, he is rather anxious about her being conveyed up here, as he is still too weak to be moved.

I believe the best arrangement will be to settle that she shall

* Fighting-men.

† Succeeded his brother Lord Castlereagh as Marquess of Londonderry.

sleep the first night halfway between Aldea Gallega and Elvas, and the second night at Elvas; by which means a pair of mules six or seven leagues from Aldea Gallega, and another pair sent six or seven leagues from Elvas, will be sufficient. I can easily post the last, after I shall be informed of her arrival; if you will prevail upon the government to post the first, and will settle where she shall sleep the first night.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Badajoz, 1st Oct., 1809. [264.]

1. The Commander of the Forces observes that the women of the regiments have come up from Lisbon along with the clothing, to the great inconvenience of the army, and to their own detriment; and as they travel on the cars, they delay and render uncertain the arrival of the regimental clothing for the troops, and defeat all the arrangements for bringing it up to the army.

2. The Commander of the Forces desires that Colonel Peacocke will prevent the women from leaving Lisbon with the clothing and regimental baggage; and the officers and non-commissioned officers coming up from Lisbon in charge of clothing are desired to prevent the women from travelling on the cars.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. J. C. Villiers to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Lisbon, 2nd Oct., 1809.

In acquainting you with my having obtained leave to return to England, I have the greatest pleasure in telling you that I have received an official communication of your brother Henry being appointed to succeed me. I heartily hope that the appointment will be as agreeable to him as I am sure it will be satisfactory to all who may have anything to do with him.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset will tell you the strange political and personal events which it seems have been taking place in England. Pray take care that Wellesley has the last newspaper sent him, which I have promised him in my letter.

I cannot conceive what has ever been misunderstood of my sentiments or powers respecting the augmentation of Portuguese pay. I have uni-

formly said that I have no powers whatever to take the augmentation upon myself without authority from England; that I have repeatedly applied for instructions upon the subject, to which applications I have not yet received an answer; and that business must consequently wait, as the Portuguese government had certainly not the means, nor perhaps the inclination, to make the augmentation desired. I revived the subject again upon your request, and hope that they will consent to make their payments in money instead of half and two-thirds paper (the pay is now made in money to the men); in which case we should pay our share in the same way, which would be in itself a very great assistance and relief.

Pray let me know if we have any chance of seeing you here soon.

Believe me to be yours most truly,

J. C. Villiers.

You would be pleased if you knew how steady Lord F. Somerset was to his duty, and how anxious not to lose a moment in joining you, even though he knew it was possible you might be coming hither.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Marshal-General Viscount Wellington.

My dear Lord, Lisbon, 2nd Oct., 1809.

I have every reason to suppose that the news brought from Rio de Janeiro will bring you here, and the more so as you previously had an intention of it. I did not immediately learn the nature of the changes that were to take place; indeed I was over at Setuval on an inspection when the vessel arrived, and what I have since learnt is from Villiers, the government here not having communicated anything to me on the subject; and from the Brazils I have not had a syllable, and I believe my name is scarcely mentioned, which, however little may have been my merits, is not very flattering; and I should almost think my remaining would scarcely be wished in the Brazils, for however wise and good the arrangements made are, and no one will more than myself concur in the wisdom, yet common civility or attention might have induced the Prince's ministers to have said something—in short, to have thought one worth their notice. I will, however, speak to you more fully when we meet, and will act much (in what regards myself) according to what your opinion may be.

So much for the individual; and I find that for the officer, everything that concerns me depends upon you, that is the authority or power I am hereafter to exercise. I must admit I have long wished that an authority such as given to you should be placed in some one's hands who will be free from the feelings, and prejudices, and intrigues inseparable from any of the great persons of this kingdom; and I need not say that in my opinion the person could not have been better chosen. Until, however, I am something informed of your objects, intentions, and wishes, many things very necessary to be decided with as little delay as possible must stand still, as I conclude the Regency, should I as usual refer them to it, would decline without your participation coming to any decision;

and I really think your presence now most absolutely necessary in this town.

This instant comes the unpleasant news of the disunion in the ministry; you will, however, have it all by Lord FitzRoy Somerset.

Believe me yours most truly,

W. C. Beresford.

To the Marquess Wellesley. [265.]

My Lord, Badajoz, 3rd Oct., 1809.

I received yesterday a letter of the 29th September from Almeida, and one of the 30th from Castello Branco, from which I learn that only a very small detachment of the enemy's cavalry entered San Felices, and that the main body of the enemy had returned towards Salamanca upon hearing of the retreat of the corps under the command of the Duque del Parque.

I have, &c.,

Wellington.

To Marshal Beresford. [266.]

My dear Beresford, Badajoz, 3rd Oct., 1809.

I have received your letters respecting Lieut. ———, of the — Dragoons. Before we proceed seriously against him, it is desirable that we should ascertain the ground upon which we stand: accordingly, I wish to have answers to the following queries:—

1. By whose orders and leave did he come to Portugal to serve with the Portuguese army?
2. When did he arrive?
3. To what corps was he appointed?
4. Did he join the corps?
5. By whose leave did he quit it?

All that I know of him is, that he was with this army for some time, I believe volunteering with one of the regiments of cavalry, and he was with other idlers, including Colonel ———, at Talavera. He there sent me a memorial praying for promotion in the British service, which I sent to England in the common course, and the promotion was refused; and I rather think that he then stated to me verbally that he had come to

Portugal to be employed with the Portuguese army, but that as he could not get the situation he liked, he intended to go home.

He went to Seville from this army, and he has since applied to me for a recommendation to Lord Wellesley to have him appointed a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Spanish service, which I refused; and I believe that he is now at Cadiz, to which place I have sent him an order to return into Portugal forthwith.

I never knew that he belonged to the Portuguese army in any way, but thought that he was a volunteer in this country upon leave of absence, seeking for adventures.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[267.] *To the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Badajoz, 5th Oct., 1809.

The newspapers which I enclose, and probably the letters which will be delivered to you by the bearer of this letter, will convey to you intelligence of the most extraordinary event that has ever occurred.

I conclude that that which first occasioned the breach between Canning and Castlereagh was the desire of the former that you should fill the situation of the latter; and I understand that Castlereagh was not acquainted with any of the arrangements which had been in discussion with a view to that object till the moment at which the expedition returned from Zealand, when Canning claimed the performance of the engagement which had been made to him.

The immediate cause of the duel I don't know. But it appears that the Duke of Portland resigned his situation at the moment the Cabinet were in the difficulty respecting Castlereagh's situation, and that Canning immediately laid in his claim to be First Minister, and resigned his office because his colleagues declined to acquiesce in it. Whether the duel arose out of the discussions upon this claim and resignation, or out of the discussions on Lord Castlereagh's unfitness for the office of Secretary in the War Department, I cannot tell.

I think your situation is difficult in all this, principally, however, because the motives and even the actions of a man like

you are never either truly represented or fairly appreciated by people in England in transactions of this description.

Canning has claims upon your friendship, because he was willing to sacrifice his own situation in order to bring you into power; but it is a question deserving your consideration whether you alone of all his friends and colleagues are to support his pretensions to be *the First Minister*, and are bound to sacrifice yourself to attain that object.

I consider it clear that the Ministers who continue in office (I believe they all continue except Canning and the Duke of Portland) have not now any intention of carrying into execution the arrangement respecting you settled with Canning, as Lord William Bentinck has been stopped, and it is obvious that they propose that you should remain some time longer at least at Seville.

I acknowledge that I think it fortunate that you were out of England at the time all these transactions were going on, and that whatever may be their result, and whatever may be your determination in future respecting the line you will take in regard to Canning, I would recommend you not to be in a hurry to quit your present situation.

I wish much to have an opportunity of talking over with you all these matters. I must go to Lisbon, and shall set off in a day or two; and I will go to Seville, or the neighbourhood of Seville, as soon as I shall return from Lisbon, which will be in about ten days.

Ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Sir John Anstruther.** [268.]

MY DEAR SIR JOHN, Badajoz, 6th Oct., 1809.

I am very much obliged to you for your kind letter of the 2nd September, which I received the day before yesterday. We had certainly a most fierce contest at Talavera, and the victory which we gained, although from circumstances it has not been followed by all the good consequences which we might have expected from it, has at least added to the military reputation of the country, and has convinced the French that their title to

* Formerly a Judge of the Supreme Court of Calcutta.

be called the first military nation in Europe will be disputed, not unsuccessfully.

Nothing has occurred in this country deserving notice since the battle of Talavera; and I believe that although the French are even in numbers stronger than the allies upon the Peninsula, they find they can do nothing without having another battle with us, which would be fatal to their operations, in the same manner as their strength, efficiency, and position must prevent us from succeeding in any offensive operation undertaken against them.

I fear that Lord Wellesley will not be able to do much with the Spaniards. Their government is a miserable one, deficient in every quality which a government ought to possess in these days. Their military establishment is very defective, and they have neither general nor inferior officers of any talents, nor sufficient numbers of troops; and these last appear to me to be worse as soldiers than their general officers are as Generals. The troops have neither arms, clothing, accoutrements, discipline, nor efficiency: there are no magazines, and no means of collecting from the country the supplies which all armies require. There is no plan of a campaign, either for carrying on the war, or for continuing the contest; and the efforts of the rulers appear to be directed, in the first instance, to keeping their own situations, and, in the second, to exciting and keeping up in the country a kind of false enthusiasm by which it is supposed that everything can be effected; and they endeavour to effect both these objects by the undertaking of little operations with little means, by the circulation of false intelligence, by the exaggeration of little successes and the concealment of great disasters. In this consists the secret of the government.

As to the enthusiasm, about which so much noise has been made even in our own country, I am convinced the world has entirely mistaken its effects. I believe that it only creates confusion where order ought to prevail, and disobedience of orders and indiscipline among the troops upon system, instead of obedience and discipline; and I fancy that, upon reflection, it will be discovered that what was deemed enthusiasm among the French, which enabled them successfully to resist all Europe at the commencement of the revolution, was force acting through the medium of popular societies and assuming the name of enthusiasm, and that force, in a different shape, has completed the conquest of Europe and keeps the continent in subjection.

Really, when a Spaniard has cried out *vivat* and has put everything in confusion in his district or village, he sits down quietly and thinks he has done his duty till the first French patrol arrives, when he shows his activity in packing up his goods and running away, and there is no authority either to set them or keep them right. At the same time they are cordial haters of the French, and I think that whatever may be the result of the military contest in the Peninsula, much time will elapse before the French can establish a government in Spain, and still more time before they will derive such advantage from their influence in that country as they did before they invaded it.

Pray remember me most kindly to Lady Anstruther, and

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Chevalier de Souza Coutinho. [269.]

DEAR SIR, Badajoz, 6th Oct., 1809.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 21st of August, for which I am much obliged to you, and I am highly flattered by your approbation.

I shall always have great satisfaction in the employment of the Portuguese troops, and hereafter I hope that they will be in such a state of discipline as to use a considerable detachment of them in the composition of the army.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Badajoz, 7th Oct., 1809. [270.]

1. A Board of Claims is to be assembled at Campo Maior, consisting of * * * * *, for the consideration and decision of all claims of officers and soldiers of the army for losses sustained up to the 1st October.

The claims sent to the military secretary will be referred to this board for their consideration and decision.

2. The principles on which such claims are to be considered and decided are as follows: no claim for a loss can be allowed

which has been occasioned by a disobedience of orders or by neglect or omission in the party claiming for the loss, or his servant or bât men.

No claim can be allowed for a loss sustained by the ordinary occurrences of the service, such as deaths of horses or mules of fatigue, occasioned by the ordinary marches of the army, the loss of accoutrements and necessaries in hospital, or by the breaking down of carts, fatigue of oxen, &c. &c.

3. As the principle on which the compensation for losses by the public is founded, is that the claimant may replace his loss, and the public may not lose his services, claims for losses on behalf of officers or soldiers who are dead cannot be admitted.

4. As the officers of the army have been restricted in the amount of their baggage by different orders by the late and by the present Commander of the Forces, it would be inconsistent with every principle on which compensation for losses is granted, and with the practice of former boards of claims, if the full amount of the value of the whole of an officer's baggage (as allowed by His Majesty's regulations) was granted to replace the baggage allowed to be carried, or actually carried by any officer on the service, in Spain or Portugal.

5. The value of the whole and of the different proportions of officers' baggage lost is to be rated at two-thirds of the sum allowed by His Majesty's regulations.

6. The claims for regimental baggage, accoutrements, and horse appointments lost are likewise to be considered as decided upon by the board upon the same principles.

7. But it is to be observed that clothing, accoutrements, and horse appointments lost can be paid for according to the practice of the service, only when they shall be replaced by new, and then only three-fourths of the price.

8. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to be obliged to notice that, notwithstanding repeated orders upon the subject, and particularly the General Orders of the 4th May, the officers of the army continue to give receipts for articles of provisions and forage, although other arrangements are made for their supply.

9. Those officers marching up from Lisbon, in particular, either alone or with detachments, have taken up articles of provisions and forage upon their own receipts, contrary to the orders given them in their routes, and notwithstanding that

there is a commissary at every stage, at which it is specified in their route that they are to receive the provisions and forage for themselves and their detachments.

10. This repeated disobedience of all order defeats every arrangement which can be made for the regular supply of the troops, and gives the Commander of the Forces the greatest concern. He is determined to carry into execution his order of the 4th May, and he gives notice that every officer who shall make a requisition, and give a receipt for any article of supply, will be called upon to account for his having done so; and if his act should have been in disobedience of orders, or unnecessary, such officer will have to pay for the supplies for which he will have given a receipt.

11. In case any officer or non-commissioned officer should have occasion to make a requisition and sign a receipt for any article of supply delivered by any of the magistrates of the country, the requisition and receipt must be made out according to the following form, and can always be procured in print from any of the commissaries.

FORM.

Return of
for
from the to the 18

	No. of Persons.	No. of Horses.	No. of Mules.	No. of Oxen.
Total				

REMARKS.

Received from , at

In Figures.

— lbs. of bread .. .. ..
— lbs. of meat .. .. ..
— pints of wine .. .. ..
— lbs. of barley .. .. ..
— lbs. of Indian corn ..
— lbs. of straw .. .. ..
— lbs. of wood .. .. ..

(*N.B. The quantities to be written in words at length; no erasure or interlineation to be allowed.*)

For which I have signed triplicate receipts. * * * *

(Signature of the officer Comm^r.)

WELLINGTON.

[271.] *To the Right Hon. J. C. Villiers.*

My dear Villiers, Montemor Novo, 10th Oct., 1809, 6 A.M.

Your note of yesterday arrived here about two hours ago, and I am just setting off; but I fear that it will be impossible for me to arrive at Aldea Gallega between one and two o'clock, or at Lisbon before it is dark. I therefore write to request that you will urge the government to order the troops into their barracks, and to postpone all ceremony to a future occasion.

I have nobody with me but Bathurst and Mr. Sodré, the Portuguese interpreter, and we will dine with you with great pleasure.

I send to Aldea Gallega to desire that the boats will wait there as long as the tide will allow them, and then will go to Montijo; so that I shall certainly be over this night.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

The Right Hon. J. C. Villiers to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

My dear Lord, Lisbon, Monday morning, 9th Oct., 1809.

I am happy to think that we are likely to see you here so soon. You will find either horses or carriages (I am not yet sure which) for you at Pegoes, and likewise the boats at Aldea Gallega, where you should arrive between one and two o'clock. It is the universal wish to receive you handsomely. The Portuguese troops will be drawn out, and will be under arms at three o'clock in the Commercial Square, at which place you had consequently better land. As the troops will be out, I will send a horse for you to the stairs, and likewise horses for two aides-de-camp, and a carriage for the rest of your party, to bring all to my house (which, by the by, is now at the Marquis of Pombal's, Janellas Verdas), where I hope you will all dine. Pray invite all you bring with you, and any one else you please; only let somebody acquaint my servant with the number, that they may find chairs and dinner provided.

If you disapprove the enclosed public letter to yourself, you may destroy it. I am satisfied myself that it is a right measure which I propose, and, if you are of that opinion, I wish you to make my letter public to the army with as little delay as possible.

Ever yours most truly,

J. C. Villiers.

[Enclosure.]

The Right Hon. J. C. Villiers to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

My Lord, Lisbon, 6th Oct., 1809.

The battle of Talavera, besides the splendid conduct of the whole, has afforded so many distinguished traits of courage and ability, that it would

be much to be regretted if our country were to lose the advantage and satisfaction of their interesting recital.

Both the army and your Lordship are more likely to be employed in adding to such traits than in recording what is passed. I purpose, therefore, with your Lordship's approbation, to collect and publish such authentic particulars as may be communicated to me, for the honour of the corps and persons concerned, for the example of the army, and for the gratification of the numbers in Great Britain by whom such a publication will be read with pride and satisfaction.

I shall be obliged to your Lordship if you will make this intention public to the army.

I wish to receive communications as well respecting the men as respecting officers, or corps, or general movements. Whatever is not signed I wish to receive through the channel of the Adjutant-General, that such accounts may have the sanction of having been so transmitted; and I purpose that the book shall be sold for the benefit of the wounded.

I have the honour to be, with great regard and esteem,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's faithful and obedient servant,

J. C. Villiers.

Colonel Roche to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

Spanish Head-quarters of the Army of La Mancha,
Santa Cruz de Mudela, 10th Oct., 1809.

My Lord,

It was not until yesterday that I had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter of the 19th September. I cannot account for the delay, and I greatly fear that many of the letters I had the honour to address to your Lordship (however difficult it is to suppose it) have been intercepted. Among the shades in the Spanish character there is an invincible jealousy and suspicion of some concealed motive to injure them.

Your Lordship is, no doubt, already acquainted with the fact of the enemy having concentrated a force of 60,000 men between Talavera and Fuentidueña; he has posts from his right at La Calzada, Oropesa, and the bridges of Arzobispo and Montalban. His advanced posts in front have not been pushed beyond Mora, Tembleque, &c., and an equal distance on the right and front from Toledo. We are told here he has withdrawn everything from Coria, Plasencia, and Almaraz.

It is natural to conceive that the réunion of this French force arose from the apprehension on their part of some plan of general offensive operations being intended, and therefore a necessary measure of precaution against any attack which may be meditated. It seems to be the opinion of those best informed here that the enemy will very soon advance into La Mancha for the double object of collecting all the grain now, at the harvest time, getting in in the rich country in our front, and of driving from it beyond the Sierra to Carolina the Spanish army, in which case they would find it very difficult to subsist, and our cavalry must, in that event, go to Cordova.

A serjeant of the 61st arrived here yesterday who escaped from Segovia; he says that a reinforcement of 8000 men has joined Ney at Salamanca from France. It is supposed he has at present about 16,000 men, or rather the officer next in command, as Ney himself is gone to France.

I wish I had anything of an agreeable nature to communicate to your Lordship from this army. Those corps belonging to the original army of La Mancha are certainly in every respect superior to those of Estremadura; and, from everything I can learn, none of those abuses which were to be lamented in the army of Estremadura existed here, or at least in a much less degree under Venegas. I think his removal from the army is very much to be lamented, particularly as far as respects the British.

We only wait, I believe, for the first intelligence of the approach of the enemy to move off. Nothing can exceed the general discontent, dissatisfaction, and demoralization of the mass of the people and the army. It is a fact, my Lord, beyond contradiction that the eyes and hopes of every good Spaniard and of the nation are turned towards Lord Wellesley, towards you and England, as the only means of salvation from the French, and from the stupid folly and corruption of their government.

With this last I do not pretend to have anything to do; but I cannot shut my ears to what I hear repeated a thousand times a day, and which it is nothing but my duty to acquaint your Lordship with; besides, how is it possible that anybody who has the faculty of reason or thinking can separate the inefficiency, intrigue, bad organisation, and consequent disasters of the army, from the source of all these evils in the Junta?

If it had not been for their infamous conduct, your Lordship would probably be at this hour in Madrid, not a Frenchman in the country, and most probably the Junta not in existence; so, to a certainty, they have averted their own fate.

The scene acting in the army is perfectly ridiculous, and, if it did not involve consequences of too serious a nature, would be a subject for laughter. There is not a man of the least reflection who, as things are constituted, has a hope of success; and this state of things is the more melancholy as just as inveterate in their resentment and abhorrence of the French are the mass of the people at this moment as at the first hour of the revolution.

The truth is, the confidence of the nation since the battle of Talavera is unbounded in your Lordship, notwithstanding the silly efforts of a party to diminish it; and if your Lordship had the command of the Spanish army with 60,000 British, I would stake my existence if there is anything that you and Lord Wellesley may not do. As things are, the prospect is gloomy in the extreme.

I don't hear of any successor to General Eguia. A new staff is appointed to the army (a copy of which I enclose), which includes the whole of General Eguia's recommendations, and excludes the whole of Venegas'.

General O'Donoju is yet here, and no charges preferred against him, nor does he hear any are intended. He has requested of me to make known his wishes that your Lordship would apply for his being permitted to reside for a short time at your head-quarters. He desires me to express that he would be very grateful for this act of kindness, and that he would

endeavour to manifest it by being of all the use he could in giving you information, which I certainly am convinced nobody in the country is more capable of doing.

It would be great presumption in me to offer any opinion upon the subject, but if I dare, it would be, notwithstanding what has passed, if a British army remains in the country, to accept his offer.

The French have got almost every other man of talent and local knowledge at their side. He certainly was not friendly to me when your Lordship first sent me to Cuesta; but, notwithstanding this, I cannot help thinking and saying in justice what I do.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

K. Roche.

[Enclosure.]

Names of Officers commanding the undermentioned respective Divisions of the Spanish Army of La Mancha.

Head-quarters, Santa Cruz de Mudela,
10th Oct., 1809.

Commander-in-Chief, Lieut.-Gen. Don Francisco Eguia.

Infantry.

Vanguardia	Maj.-General Josef Lazes.
1st Division	Brigadier Luis Lacey.
2nd „	Brigadier Gasper Vigodet.
3rd „	Maj.-Gen. Pedro Aug. Giron.
4th „	Maj.-Gen. Francisco Gonzales de Castrejon.
5th „	Maj.-Gen. Tomas Zeruin.
6th „	Maj.-Gen. Pelegrino Hacome.
7th „	Brigadier Francisco Copons.

Cavalry.

1st Division	Brigadier Antonio Zambrono.
2nd „	Josef Ribas.
3rd „	Miguel March.

A corps under the command of Dr. V. Osorio.
Major-General Frazli commands the whole cavalry.

Total of infantry	35,000
„ of cavalry	6,500
	41,500

G. O. Lisbon, 11th Oct., 1809. [272.]

1. The Commander of the Forces is apprehensive that his orders respecting the returning of carts in the possession of the regiments of the army have not been understood, as they have

not been obeyed; he now desires that upon the receipt of this order the officers commanding regiments will send to the commissary of the brigade or division, in which the regiment is placed, all carts in possession of the regiments to which native drivers are attached.

2. In future, if any regiment should retain a cart after it shall have performed the special service for which it has been supplied to the regiment, the hire of such cart for the number of days it will be so detained will be charged against the subsistence of the regiment.

3. The officers commanding brigades will report to the Quartermaster-General, on the 18th inst., whether this order has been obeyed.

4. The carts with oxen or mules without native drivers are to be retained in the service of the regiments which have them, and these regiments are to send to the Quartermaster-General a monthly return of them on the 1st of every month.

5. The officer commanding the cavalry will take care that each detached squadron of the cavalry receives and carries into execution this order.

6. The clothing and other regimental stores received by the different regiments of the army are to be delivered out to the soldiers as soon as possible after they shall be received, as it will be impossible to provide carriages to remove them in case any movement should be made.

7. The officers commanding brigades will report to the Quartermaster-General that this order has been obeyed on the fifth day after each regiment shall have received clothing or stores.

Wellington.

Gen. Bassecourt to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

Monsieur le Général, A Deleytosa, ce 11 Octobre, 1809.

En réponse à votre lettre du 6 de ce mois, par laquelle vous me demandez la situation dans laquelle je me trouve actuellement, et si Votre Excellence peut m'être utile en quelque chose, je dirai à Votre Excellence que ce corps d'armée dans ce moment se compose de 7000 hommes d'infanterie, 600 chevaux. J'attends un renfort de 3000 hommes fantassins, mais mal armés, quoique de fort bonnes troupes, et de même une augmentation de quelques chevaux; et si j'avais eu ces jours passés, c'est-à-dire avant l'arrivée du Capitaine Gordon, 1000 chevaux de plus, l'arrière-garde du

Maréchal Soult se serait rappelée de son passage par Almaraz, Navalmoral, &c.: cependant un petit détachement de cavalerie, d'infanterie, et deux pièces d'artillerie que je fis passer par Almaraz à la droite du Tajo, lui a occasionné de l'inquiétude et l'a détenu dans sa marche, renforçant aussi son arrière-garde.

Actuellement Soult a son quartier-général à Oropesa, au pont de l'Arzobispo; environ 6000 hommes: il occupe aussi quelques villages vis-à-vis notre avant-garde, mais aujourd'hui n'a aucune troupe à Velbis de Monroy ni Almaraz. Talavera est occupée par le Maréchal Mortier, qui a des troupes, avec quelque renfort de Victor, aux environs du dit Talavera.

Ma ligne s'étend depuis Almaraz jusqu'à Fresnedora, Avellaneda, et même Castañar de Ybor, où j'ai une patrouille de cavalerie.

Les parties de guerrillas de mon avant-garde occupent la Peraleda de Garbin, et font leurs découvertes au-delà de Las Casas de la Oliva, où j'ai fait quelques prisonniers.

J'ai aussi une grande-garde de l'autre côté d'Almaraz, mais que je serai obligé de retirer bientôt, si les pluies continuent.

Quant au moyen de notre communication, Monsieur le Général, elle est toute simple; mon courrier passe tous les jours par Mérida, où je dirige cette lettre au premier chef de troupes Anglaises; et quand Votre Excellence aura quelqu'avis à me communiquer, en laissant à la maison de poste de Mérida vos ordres, le courrier journalier de Sevilla les recevra en passant.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec la plus haute considération,

Monsieur le Général,

Votre très-humble serviteur,

Louis Alexandre de Bassecourt.

Gen. Bassecourt to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

Au quartier-général de l'armée d'Estremadura, 11 Octobre, 1809.

Monsieur le Général,

Aussitôt que le Capitaine Jourdan s'est présenté en mon quartier avec la commission de Votre Excellence pour reconduire le parlementaire Français, le Capitaine Revenin, à son armée, en vertu des circonstances avec lesquelles je me trouve ici à l'égard de Revenin, je dépêchai un courrier extraordinaire à la cour en exposant les réclamations de Votre Excellence.

Cette nuit passée le Ministre de la Guerre, en réponse à mon rapport, me prévint que Sa Majesté m'ordonne d'exposer à Votre Excellence que l'officier Français passa la rivière à la nage sans observer les formalités de coutume à tout parlementaire, et que depuis son séjour ici il peut connaître nos positions, et par conséquent il ne paraît pas prudent qu'il retourne à son armée.

M. Jourdan, instruit de cet ordre, est parti aujourd'hui vers le midi pour porter les lettres de Votre Excellence au Maréchal Mortier, ainsi que des secours pécuniaires à vos prisonniers qui sont à Talavera; et j'ai ajouté, Monsieur le Général, à ces secours celui d'une arrobe de quinquina,

la moitié en poudre et l'autre en écorce, avec une demi-livre d'opium, ayant su par un capitaine Anglais, il y a quatre jours, à son passage par ici, que vos prisonniers blessés à Talavera manquaient de ces deux qualités de médicaments, faute desquels plusieurs malades périssaient.

Les deux lettres ci-jointes sont des Capitaines Jourdan et Revenin, qui m'ont chargé de les faire parvenir à Votre Excellence.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur le Général,

Votre très-obéissant serviteur,

Louis Alexandre de Bassecourt.

The Right Hon. J. C. Villiers to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

My dear Lord, Lisbon, 12th Oct., 1809.

Your having formed a decided, and as I conceive very just opinion, that however gloriously and essentially we may contribute our assistance, the contest (of Spain at least, if not of Portugal likewise) must be maintained by the power and exertions of the Peninsula itself, I conceive that you could hardly render a greater service than by detailing your precise ideas of the best mode of calling forth and employing that power and those exertions.

It is in vain to hope that without the assistance of such advice the means which are available will be used to advantage, and we are now too deeply implicated in the question to satisfy ourselves with nobly acting our own part, and leaving to others the responsibility of theirs. We cannot confine to them the effects of any misconduct, but must ourselves participate, not only politically, but immediately, in our nearest and dearest military interests, in the consequences of every error.

These ideas have led me to the suggestion of a confederacy, of which Great Britain might direct the operations; of a British Commander-in-Chief being employed (independently of the British army) to command the Spanish troops; and of other ideas, of all which the great and main object is only to provide some probability of the best advice being given to the government on the Peninsula, and of its force being fairly employed.

Nothing, I conceive, would more directly contribute to this object than your entering into a detailed statement of the course you would pursue if you were yourself now a Spanish or a Portuguese subject, thinking only what your country could best do against such an enemy as she has to contend with.

I have in my own mind some notions of what I would suggest upon that principle; and I am sure that persons whose opinions are of more consequence looking at the subject in that view is the only way of our having a chance of producing rational and effectual exertions instead of idle reproaches and criminations, or of our ascertaining distinctly that such exertions are perfectly unattainable.

If I can engage you to the consideration of this subject in detail, I am persuaded that I shall have rendered a most important service to our country and to Europe.

The enclosed paper upon the finances of this country furnished me by Mr. Freire will probably be interesting to you to peruse. If you mean to enter to-morrow at the Regency into the subject of the revenue, I would advise you first to have some conversation with Mr. Freire upon the subject. The enclosed paper is by no means accurate: I rather fear that it is too favourable a statement; at least I think some of the military charges were underrated in his detail.

It may be material that you should send home your ideas upon this important subject. If either in representing them at home, or in forming them here, I can render you any assistance, you know, I trust, the satisfaction with which (independent of any sense of duty) I should endeavour to do so. If you have a mind, I will propose to Mr. Freire to meet you here to-morrow morning at 9 o'clock. I only say this, supposing that you wish to undertake the task of becoming master of the subject; and it is not very easy perhaps to examine even the first question which must necessarily come before you, of provisioning their army, without having looked deeply into the real state of their finances and of the resources which are available.

Believe me to be ever yours,

J. C. VILLIERS.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Statement of the Finance of Portugal.

June, 1809.

The income of the Royal Treasury of Portugal, calculated for the following year, by the experience of the last eight months and probability of future revenue, may be estimated at 4,500,000 000 Rs.

Expenditure.

	Rs.
Royal Household, salaries, stables, &c.	101,000 000
Civil List, comprising the pay to all tribunals, public offices, persons employed under government in all the kingdom, public works, prisons, hospitals, city illuminations, &c. ..	1,095,000 000
	1,196,000 000
Army Expenses, 60,000 men, and all military expenses, pensions, half-pay, &c.	8,126,400 000
Navy and Squadron against the Algerines	900,000 000
	9,026,400 000
Total	10,222,400 000
Deficit	5,722,400 000
One-third of the army or 20,000 men paid by England	2,400,000 000
Deficiency	3,322,400 000

		£.
In Sterling.		
Revenue		1,265,625
Expenditure.		
Royal household, &c.	£28,405	
Civil list, &c.	307,969	
	336,374	
Army	2,285,550	
	253,125	
	2,538,675	2,875,049
Deficit		1,609,424
One-third for England		675,000
Deficiency		£934,424

Commissary-Gen. John Murray to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

My Lord, Badajóz, 12th Oct., 1809.

Having learned since your Lordship's departure from hence that several of the original receipts for supplies to the troops, the copies of which have been before you, are indorsed by the parties with the view of transferring their claim for the convenience of payment at Lisbon or elsewhere, I request your Lordship will be pleased to instruct me if I may consider such indorsement as an authority to issue the amount to the bearer of the voucher, or if I must in all cases require the discharge of the original party, conformably to my instructions. The former mode of payment would undoubtedly facilitate the settlement of claims of this nature with persons resident in the extreme part of Portugal, and at a considerable distance from the military chest, if in your Lordship's opinion it may for that reason be advisable to adopt it.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

John Murray, Commissary-General.

Answer.—The objection to allowing payment to be made to others excepting the parties who supplied the articles for which payment is required is, that it is probable that the vouchers have been sold; and the consequence of this system must be to raise the price of all articles upon the public; that I am, therefore, very averse to encourage the practice of the purchase and sale of vouchers for the supply of articles for the British army; although I am well aware of the convenience which would result as well to the parties as to the service if the agents and assignees of

the parties could be paid for the supplies at Lisbon, instead of on the spot where the supplies were furnished.

That I am, therefore, disposed to adopt his recommendation, and will authorize the payment for supplies to the assignees of the party who has furnished them, in every case in which it will appear to him that the transaction is a fair one, that the assignee is the real agent of the party claiming the debt, and not the purchaser of a voucher or vouchers at a low price from the person who furnished the supplies.

There is one mode in which he will be able to form a judgment upon this subject, and that is by the party having only a few or many debts assigned to him. If only one or a few, it is probable that he is a real agent; if many debts, he is certainly a purchaser of vouchers.

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. J. C. Villiers. [273.]

SIR, Lisbon, 13th Oct., 1809.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th; and as I am convinced of the necessity of having an additional piece of ground at Lisbon for the burial of the dead, I will give directions that the expense of the ground you mention may be paid, till I shall hear from your Excellency that other arrangements have been made for paying for it.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Viscount Castlereagh. [274.]

MY DEAR LORD, Lisbon, 14th Oct., 1809.

I have come down here to arrange finally for the defence of Portugal. I have received your private letter of the 23rd, and we have papers from England of the 29th of September. Your brother Charles has likewise communicated to me Cooke's letter and other papers relating to the late unfortunate transactions in England, and I cannot express to you what I feel upon them.

It would appear that your friendship for me, or what I believe in the instance referred to I ought more properly to call your sense of what was just to me and others, was the original cause

of the dissatisfaction of your colleague; and yet I must say that in the unfortunate circumstances in which I was placed last year, the conduct and expressions of Mr. Canning were as kind as those of any other of the Ministers. I recollect perfectly to have gone with him to Blackheath, immediately after my return from Portugal, purposely that he might hear the circumstances under which my name had appeared to the Armistice, and I do not recollect that he expressed any disapprobation of the motives which had induced me to sign that instrument; and certainly nothing passed which could lead to a belief that the opinions he entertained upon that transaction were so strong as that he differed from his colleagues, and conceived that that colleague under whose immediate superintendence and direction the measures for investigating that subject were carrying on ought to be removed from his office.

I have experienced many acts of friendship and kindness from you. If I had been your brother you could not have been more careful of my interests than you have been in late instances, and on every occasion it has always appeared to me that you sought for opportunities to oblige me and to mark your friendship for me; of all which I assure you that I am not forgetful. But if ever there was a case in which I wished to stand separate from the government, and in which I believed I stood alone, it was that of the Convention in Portugal; and I declare that till I heard of the objection made to you for the part taken by government on that subject, as well previous to as during the session of Parliament, I conceived that with every friendly wish towards me both by yourself and all the other members of the government, what was done was thought necessary by them all, and was satisfactory to them all, excepting indeed Lord Chatham, who thought that I was responsible for signing the Armistice, for which act I ought to be tried.

I recollect perfectly to have had a conversation with you previous to the discussion of the question in the House of Commons, in which, after inquiring what line government would take, I stated that the line which I should take might be different from theirs, and I never imagined that the line taken by government upon that occasion could be imputed as a crime to you as calculated to screen me.

It is impossible to read the accounts of what has passed without indignation at the manner in which you have been treated; and though I regret the duel, and consider it as a fatal

event, I must admit that your feelings could not have been otherwise satisfied.

Affairs are in a strange state, and it appears that inordinate ambition, want of judgment, and vanity, will place the King and his government in the hands of the opposition.

I have no news for you whatever. Your brother Charles is better, and gone to Cintra; but I think he is determined to go home in a few days.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Col. R. Fletcher to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Lisbon, 15th Oct., 1809.

In obedience to your Lordship's commands, I have (accompanied by Captain Chapman) examined the ground between Belem and Fort St. Julian's, with a view to discover the most proper situation for an entrenched position to cover the embarkation of an army.

The general figure of the country near the coast, within this extent, is unfavourable for such an object; it does not offer what appears to be essential, viz. a short line, that could be well defended by a moderate rear-guard, and which would effectually cover the main body.

A position might be taken to cover Paço d'Arcos on the line of hills from the Observatory to the eastward of Coebras as its right, and Fort St. Julian's as its left; or to lessen its extent, it might be closed by the valley of Oeyras. It would protect the bay of Paço d'Arcos, but would require to be of the above-mentioned length to secure the beach from an enfilading fire.

This position is, however, I think, not proper for the case in question, as it includes an extent of more than five miles.

The works to occupy the most commanding features of it would require about 6000 men and 80 pieces of artillery, exclusive of those that might be placed in Fort St. Julian's and the hills in front of it. Were this number given for their defence, they would still be, of themselves, quite inadequate to the protection of the position. Many of them would receive no mutual support from musketry. The ground is in general unfavourable for placing them so near each other as to admit of a defence by small arms; and even were it otherwise, their number would become very considerable; they would require more troops to occupy them, and strong reserves would still be necessary to support them, and defend the intervals. For the purpose of covering an embarkation, therefore, they would not, I fear, on such an extent apply.

The works marked on the accompanying sketch can only be considered as strengthening the position to be occupied by the troops, and not as fortifying it in such a manner as to render a considerable force, to defend the spaces between them, unnecessary; and as the circumstances against which this position is intended to provide presuppose an enemy in very

superior force, it could only be considered as an entrenched field of battle, every part of which must be equally defended. In this view it would be very extensive even for the whole army, and, for any part of it that could be considered as a rear guard, totally untenable. Even were the works marked on the sketch, or any others, constructed, I conceive they should be of such a description as not to be easily carried by assault; and they should therefore be strengthened by palisades, fraises, or abattis, which are not to be found on the spot, and of which a very abundant supply would become indispensably necessary. On the whole, I am of opinion it would not be possible to cover the bay of Paço d'Arcos so as to answer the purpose intended.

There is a bay about 400 yards broad to the eastward of, and immediately adjoining, Fort St. Julian's. This appears favourable for beaching boats, and I should imagine there would never be much surf, unless with a strong wind from about S.S.W. to S. In this bay, and on the ground directly above it, a body of men might be covered from the view of an enemy were the hill commanding the fort occupied by a strong field-work. The ground is very favourable for this purpose; it is not at all commanded within about a mile; two of its branches might receive great protection from the fire of the fort; its rear should have a weak profile to prevent an enemy from finding immediate cover against artillery, should he succeed in carrying it. Its front should, I think, be of a regular figure. I would connect this work with the fort by a covered communication, as marked in the sketch. It should be rendered as respectable as possible by palisading the ditch, placing impediments in its front which could not be removed but under fire, and giving it a high and thick profile. The soil of the hill is hard, stony, and in some places even rocky; the execution would therefore probably be attended with much labour and difficulty, and it is impossible to calculate the time required for it. It would be well occupied by 1200 or 1500 men; and if sufficient time and the proper means be given for its construction, it would be extremely difficult to carry it by assault. I would place in it some guns of position and heavy howitzers, to keep the enemy at as great a distance as possible.

As long as this work could be held, its fire, aided by that of the fort, would render it impracticable for an enemy to attack the troops assembled for embarkation, though they might suffer from the effects of a distant cannonade. The principal objection to this ground seems to be the confined space on which the army must remain while waiting to embark; and as they would necessarily be in masses, some loss, as was before observed, must be sustained from the fire of the enemy's artillery, should it not be altogether kept in check by that of the fort and the work. Should the army be detained here from untoward circumstances, and not be able to embark immediately, the field-work might probably be taken. The bay itself may be considered by naval officers as objectionable, and I am aware that the situation is not by any means all that could be wished. It appears to me, however, to be the only one in which 1500 or 2000 men could attempt to cover the mass of the army against a superior force with any probability of success.

The field-work might be gradually evacuated by means of the covered communication leading towards the fort. The fort itself would naturally be occupied by 300 or 400 men and a detachment of artillery, the greater part of whom would probably be able to retire. The guns on the sea

defence should be dismounted or rendered useless, and those towards the land and in the field-work should be spiked if they could not be withdrawn, which would render it impossible to employ them against the shipping or boats for some hours.

The occupation or dismantling of the tower of Bugio would, I should imagine, fall within any arrangement for the embarkation of an army.

I venture to offer the above ideas with the utmost deference for your Lordship's consideration.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

RICHARD FLETCHER,
Lieut.-Col., Royal Engineers.

G. O. Badajoz, 16th Oct., 1809. [275.]

The Commander of the Forces cannot avoid drawing the attention of the army in particular to the circumstances of Captain ——'s case, and to urge them to avoid misfortunes similar to those he has met with, by avoiding the places in which they originate. The Commander of the Forces will not aggravate the distress which Captain —— must feel, by entering into further particulars; but in pursuance of the sentence of the General Court Martial, he hereby reprimands him for his conduct at Lisbon on the night of the 3rd March, 1809.

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Badajoz, 17th Oct., 1809. [276.]

8. ———, having been tried by a General Court Martial, is to be released from his close arrest, but is to continue at Lisbon in arrest at large till further orders, and is to show himself daily at the Town Major's office.

The Commander of the Forces is always concerned when he is obliged to place an officer in close arrest; but if officers break their arrest and conceal themselves, and quit the situation pointed out for their residence, they must expect that the Commander of the Forces will use the power which he has to compel them to conduct themselves as British officers ought.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Burghersh to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, Granada, 18th Oct., 1809.

I have not written earlier to congratulate you upon the honours you have received, because I thought you would be pestered with such sort

of letters, and I hoped you would (even without one from me) believe that no person would feel more sincerely gratified at any reward or honour that you might receive than I should, and that no person was more persuaded of how greatly they were deserved.

Since I have left you, I am sorry to say I have seen nothing military to be remarked upon. In this province there is positively nothing: one squadron of dragoons is forming, and one battalion of foreign infantry is doing duty in the town; but beyond that there is not a soldier, no depôt of recruits, no provision of any sort for keeping up the armies at their present force, or in any way for carrying on the war. All seems at rest. The hordes of deserters which are known to be about are not meddled with, and indeed the encouragement by that means given to deserters is so great that I cannot wonder at what I know to be the case, that numbers of families are sending for their sons from the armies, assuring them they will not be punished. The original evil has been in the execution of the conscription: in the great towns the rich, or some of them, have by means of bribery saved their sons, and the remainder, upon whom the lot fell, refused to march if the others did not; and by these means scarcely any person was sent from such a town as Malaga. The weight fell upon the poor of the neighbouring villages: these know and feel the injustice, and therefore are not very willing soldiers; the first opportunity they escape; and as there are no proper means for apprehending them, it is no wonder that they amount to the great number of several thousands, at which the deserters are stated. With respect to the defence of the province, it appears to me of the greatest interest. The mountains, from Gibraltar across the Peninsula, cover Granada, Malaga, and Murcia; the passes are extremely defensible; and therefore if the French were already in Seville, I think the most difficult task would be yet to come for them in gaining possession of this country. To defend Granada from Seville and La Mancha, the posts of Laja, Alcala Real, Castillo de Arenas, and Cambril are the most interesting; indeed they cover every approach for any sort of carriage, and are extremely strong; 30,000 men, 2000 of which cavalry, would perfectly defend these approaches; and from the east a corps of 6000 or 7000 in the advanced positions of Huescar and Velez Rubio, or the nearer one of Liesma, would defend all approach to this city. I cannot help thinking that the seat of government should be here; for if the Sierra Morena should be forced, the Spanish army could by no movement cover Seville, at least in no very favourable position: on the contrary, if they retire upon Jaen, which is now fortified, and from thence to the positions in the mountains of Granada, they will have a better position to defend than before, and their force would be concentrated in a much smaller space.

The people here are in perfect darkness as to every true fact which relates to them either at home or abroad; every thing is misrepresented to them; and they are humbled and tyrannized by a Junta of 35 or more persons who equal or exceed in tyranny the Central: no word is spoken but in dread, and the actions of every individual are watched and reported to the Junta. Before my arrival I had heard that the Junta of Granada was at variance with the Central: it is no such thing; for to support the usurped power of themselves they must hold up that of the Central, and this feeling will be clear when the paper of the Fiscal Sampère (ordered to be published as the sentiment of the Junta) appears: not only in that

paper is the Central Junta supported, but, as I understand, an attempt is made against the prerogative of election to the Cortes. But what is most singular and most wicked is the conduct of the persons in power here about England. A member of the Central Junta, now at this place, declares, and continues to do so, that England had never made any representation against the government of the Junta, but on the contrary, that she was most satisfied and wished it to remain, so that the people who feel the usurpation of the Central as well as of all the Juntas are almost detesting England as one of the supporters of a tyranny that no people ever suffered before, while the other class of intriguers with better ground see England with the greatest jealousy, because they know her sentiments are contrary to this infamous usurpation. This being the case, no sacrifice or exertion of England can make her popular in Spain, for it is the usurped authority they hold that the Juntas seek to support, and it must be by keeping England at a distance both from themselves and the Spanish people that they can hope to succeed. For this reason every sort of representation is made in this place against England; and as an instance, the Fiscal Sampère, a man of the greatest weight in this Junta, declared at Malaga, to a corps of officers of a regiment who went to wait upon him, that the greatest circumspection was necessary with regard to England; that her views were dangerous; and notwithstanding her apparent exertions for Spain, that her policy was to be dreaded. This was said not in private society, but to the body of officers of the Malaga regiment of the line, and therefore in some degree to be considered as official. But the whole conduct of the Junta of this place is of the same texture, and indeed it is natural it should. They dread the appearance of an Englishman when likely to hear the true state of their government; and they also dread him amongst the people they govern, because he is the only person who can speak freely with respect to their conduct. There is one fact of which I am now persuaded: Spain (that is the governing Juntas) is not employed in the *defence of their* country; they have *forgotten it*, or think it secure; but they are defending their usurped authority; all their measures tend towards that point, and nothing but that now interests them. One of these measures is to encourage a distrust of England: to serve that purpose and carry it on as much as possible, they have spread every sort of ridiculous report both as to our armies and our line of policy, and to these measures I am convinced may be traced all the apparent coldness of Spain towards England. To remove this I believe the effectual and only remedy would be to let the people know what England has done and is doing. A manifesto to the people would have that effect; not one containing more than the views of England and the sacrifices she has made. Such a paper might rouse a fresh spirit in the people, might give them hopes of rising from the tyranny they now suffer, and might give Spain a chance of success. As it now is, it is impossible. If one action is fought, there are no men to fill up vacancies,* . . . and the governments are not thinking of defence.

Ever yours most affectionately,

Burghersh.

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* Copy torn.

[277.] *To Marshal Beresford.*

My dear Beresford, Badajoz, 20th Oct., 1809.

I enclose a letter from the magistrate at Ceclavin, with the copy of a receipt given for shirts by an officer of the Legion. I shall be obliged to you if you will take measures to have the money paid for these shirts, which I conclude has been stopped from the men. I believe that the money had better be paid to our Commissary-General at Lisbon.

Areyzaga has been brought to a stand in La Mancha: he marched to Dos Barrios on the 9th, about a league from Ocaña. I believe he lost two pieces of cannon in an attack he made upon a French corps at Ocaña. He remained at Dos Barrios three days, and marched on the 13th to his right towards Zarza. The government have begun to take the alarm, and have ordered the Duque del Parque,* who was still at Bejar on the 10th, to pass the mountains into Estremadura, in a letter of the 16th from Seville, and to join the Duque d'Alburquerque at Talavera, who is likewise ordered to cross the Tagus. At Talavera these united armies are to create a diversion for Areyzaga. He was in danger on the 13th: they may arrive at the place in which they may draw the enemy's attention on the 26th or 27th!!!

* Seville, 20th Oct., 1809.

The Duque del Parque, before he came to his title by the death of his father, was very little known. His attachment to the Prince of Peace was, however, decided. He was one of the Grandees appointed to go to Bayonne, where he manifested such an attachment to the new government of Buonaparte, that on his return into Spain he was offered, and he accepted with every appearance of satisfaction, the commission of Captain of the Life Guards of King Joseph Buonaparte. This employment he held and exercised publicly till after the battle of Baylen, when the intruder fled, and the Duque del Parque remained at Madrid.

When the army of General Castaños arrived at Madrid, the Duque was talked of for the command of a division; but the people of Madrid declared their opinion so openly and so decidedly against placing the command of a division in the hands of a Grandee of Spain who had willingly debased himself to such a point as to become Captain of the Life Guards of Joseph, that it was not thought prudent to attempt to employ the Duque in any way.

The Duque del Parque remained at Madrid till the 4th of December last, when he retired.

It would be happy for the Spanish nation that he should be removed from a command for which he is in no way fitted, and which he only obtained through the overbearing influence of Cuesta; and it is particularly to be desired that this change should take place before the very existence of the army be endangered by one of those fatal mistakes to which he is daily exposed by his want of military experience, or by one of those wilful errors of judgment to which his little affection to the good cause may lead him.

The French in the mean time are collecting all their force in New Castille and Estremadura to fall upon Areyzaga, and they have besides 36,000 men in Old Castille, with which they had overpowered the Duque del Parque and had obliged him to retire to Bejar. The Duque del Parque and the Duque d'Alburquerque, therefore, when they will arrive in Estremadura, as they will certainly be followed by the enemy from Old Castille, will be precisely in the situation in which I was in the beginning of August, and must retire if they can. They will have the troops of the left of the French army in their front, and those of the right in their rear, and ten to one they are lost. This will be the case if Areyzaga should be defeated between the 13th or 26th, or even if the state of the Tagus in this season of the year, and the destruction of the bridges by the enemy, should stop him, or if he should by any cause be thrown upon the defensive. Nothing can save the two corps but a victory and the possession of Madrid by Areyzaga, which is the most improbable of events.

Thus you see how matters stand in Spain. The government had literally no plan excepting to urge or allow Areyzaga *buscar enemigo;* and then when they found he was in a scrape, they go near to lose all, that they may say they endeavoured to save him.

They have written to me to desire I will move. But they have no means prepared for me to cross the Tagus; no means of subsistence forward from hence; no magazine formed or preparation made of any description. I would try to save the destruction of everything if there were any means of subsistence forward; but there are none, and I should only add to their distress by the additional consumption of provisions.

In whatever way these circumstances turn, whether the Duque del Parque will be destroyed or will effect his retreat across the Tagus, it is very obvious that we shall be much affected by them in Portugal. It is probable that as soon as the Duque's corps will be disposed of, the enemy will turn his attention to Ciudad Rodrigo and the frontiers of Portugal. I intend, therefore, in a few days, that is to say, as soon as I can disembarrass the advanced divisions of the army of their sick, which I have begun, to put the army in march to cross the Tagus. I think I shall leave one division upon the Tagus; for if the Duques del Parque and d'Alburquerque are destroyed (which is not unlikely, and indeed is pretty certain unless the enemy should enter Estremadura by the Puerto del Pico instead of by the Puerto de

Baños), we must expect that the enemy will immediately cross the Tagus, and we must make our arrangements for the defence of Portugal, according to the plan we settled when I was at Lisbon, to be adopted when the enemy's reinforcements should arrive in Spain. In respect to the remainder of the army, I should put the right in Guarda and the left towards Viseu, and your troops might be in second line behind us.

Murray will write to D'Urban more fully, as well upon this disposition as upon the route which the army will take, which it probably might be necessary to clear a little for us.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Pray make Villiers acquainted with the contents of this letter.

[278.*] G. O. Badajoz, 20th Oct., 1809.

1. Complaints having been made of the irregularity and difficulties which exist in quartering officers in Lisbon, owing to the disobedience of the General Orders of the late Commander of the Forces, of the 14th March last, these Orders are again published, and the attention of the officers of the army is again called to them.

2. Officers now quartered in Lisbon are forthwith to return to the Assistant-Quartermaster-General at Lisbon their names, stating where they are quartered; and the Assistant-Quartermaster-General will make out a general list of the officers and their quarters, and will deliver it to the superintendent of the police.

3. Officers who will omit to give their names and places of abode to the Assistant-Quartermaster-General, according to this order, will be considered as having quitted the house in which they were billeted, others will be billeted on the house, and the officer who will be guilty of this omission will be obliged to hire a lodging.

4. In future all officers moving from one place to another, in Portugal or Spain, are to have a route from the Quartermaster-General's department, which is to specify where the officer is to halt each day.

5. The officers of the Quartermaster-General's department who will grant these routes upon application for them, will keep copies of them; and the officers who will receive them will send

them to the Quartermaster-General on their arrival at their destination.

6. Officers applying for a route to quit Lisbon are to return their billets to the Assistant-Quartermaster-General, who will forthwith send them to the superintendent of the police.

WELLINGTON.

"G. O. "Lisbon, 14th March, 1809.

"Representations having been made to the Commander of the Forces on the subject of the inconvenience sustained, both by the inhabitants and officers of the army, from want of better arrangements regarding billets, his Excellency finds it necessary to establish the following regulations:

"1. All General officers and heads of departments will apply, and receive their billets, from the Deputy-Quartermaster-General.

"2. All other officers are to receive their billets from the Town Major.

"3. No officer quitting Lisbon is to retain his quarters, but he must give back his billet to the department from which he has received it, whether the Deputy-Quartermaster-General or Town Major.

"4. No officer is on any account to select any particular house, nor to choose his own quarters; all that they can expect is, that each shall be provided with a quarter suitable to his rank.

"5. Colonels will be entitled to four rooms, Field officers three, Captains two, Subalterns one room for each. Staff officers will have quarters allotted them according to the comparative rank they hold in their several departments, civil or military.

"6. No officer under the rank of a General officer is to require more than two servants' beds at the most.

"7. No officer is on any account to deliver over his billet to another.

"8. No billet is to be exchanged for any officer of any rank without previous application to the Deputy-Quartermaster-General. If the officer applying be under the rank of a General officer, he is to apply through the Town Major, who will presently explain to the Deputy-Quartermaster-General the cause of the application.

"9. No officer whatever has any pretensions to look for or require any thing more than his lodgings, where he is billeted.

"10. The Town Major, in applying to the Intendant-General for billets, is to specify the several ranks for which they are required; and if they are for Staff officers, he will indicate the comparative rank held by them.

"All officers whatever who have got into houses without regular billets are to send in their names to the Deputy-Quarter-master-General, that billets may be either made out for the present quarters they now occupy, or other quarters allotted to them."

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

Dear Lord Wellington, Charles Street, 20th Oct., 1809.

Lord Castlereagh having resigned the seals, the correspondence of his office is in my hands till the new arrangements can be completed. I trust this additional burden will not be imposed upon me long, and that Dundas will be the person to relieve me. There are, however, some difficulties in the way of this arrangement, and it will not be possible for some days to form a judgment how far they are likely to be overcome. In the mean time we have received accounts of peace having been signed on the 3rd inst. between France and Austria. We know nothing as yet of the terms, but there can be very little ground to doubt of the fact, and we may presume that the conditions are as humiliating to Austria as Bonaparte could venture to make them. This event must have a powerful influence upon our situation and policy in other quarters, and especially in the Peninsula of Spain and Portugal. The whole military efforts of France will probably in a short time be directed against Spain, and the questions which under these circumstances arise appear to be the following:—

First, What is the chance of these efforts proving successful (I mean their leading with partial exceptions to the complete subjugation of the country)? This consideration is most important; for notwithstanding all the efforts which the French have already made, they have never at any one period since the first rising of the people been in military possession of more than one half of the country.

Secondly, Would the French be likely to make a serious attack upon Portugal before they had acquired a tolerably quiet possession of every part of Spain north of the Sierra Morena? I conceive they could hardly look to such an attack with any prospect of success with an army that was not at least double the amount of the British army in Portugal, could they spare an army to that amount for this purpose before the north and centre of Spain were subdued.

Thirdly, If a serious attack is made by the French upon Portugal, what is at present the prospect of successful resistance?

Fourthly, If resistance is not likely to prove ultimately successful, how far would our army be endangered, and its embarkation prevented, by

delaying to withdraw it till the French had penetrated in force into Portugal?

Our attention is necessarily directed at this time to a consideration of these different questions, and we should be glad to receive from you at your leisure the best opinion you may be able to form upon them. It would neither be just nor politic to abandon Portugal before such a measure was absolutely necessary. On the other hand we should not be justified from want of timely precaution in sacrificing that army which forms the far greater part of our disposable force. All that can be done at the present moment is to provide you with transports sufficient for the embarkation of your army in case of necessity: that necessity is not, however, likely to occur for some time, and the interval furnishes us at least with the opportunity of obtaining the fullest information on every part of the subject. I should add to my other questions—

What is the present effective strength of the British army in Portugal?

Whether any and what reinforcements would be necessary to keep it up to its present amount?

I know you have heard from Pole, and probably from others, all the distressing circumstances which have led to Castlereagh's and Canning's resignation and to the present state of the Administration. It is painful to reflect that a government which had nothing serious to apprehend from its enemies should be brought to the point of dissolution by the divisions of its friends. Whatever may be the state of personal feelings on some parts of these transactions, or the public difficulties in which they may have involved us, the line of duty I consider as plain. We accepted the government two years ago to protect the King against an unwarranted attempt to surprise his conscience on a subject on which he was known to have the strongest scruples:* having done so, I feel that we are bound not to desert him. We may be defeated in the struggle when Parliament meets, but even in that event we shall at least have the satisfaction of keeping a respectable party together, which may be able to afford some protection to the King, and I trust some security to the country. In these sentiments all our remaining colleagues most cordially agree. I hope Lord Wellesley will not decline the offer which has been made to him: the part Pole has taken, and the opinion which I know your brother Henry entertains, will, I trust, have due influence with him.

I have heard within these few days a very favourable account of Lady Wellington and your children. I trust your health has not materially suffered by the fatigue and anxiety which you must have gone through since the commencement of the campaign. I find that some of my friends who are in your army have been suffering with the same complaint which has made such dreadful ravages in Walcheren.

Believe me to be, with the most sincere regard,

Dear Lord Wellington, yours very faithfully,

LIVERPOOL.

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* See Preface to Volume of *Civil Correspondence*—Ireland, 1807-9.

Colonel Roche to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

My Lord, La Carolina, 21st Oct., 1809.

Lieut.-General Areyzaga, who lately came from Catalonia, is appointed to command the army in the room of General Eguia, who is, at length, removed, to the great satisfaction of almost everybody. I had the honour to write to Lord Wellesley on the 14th inst., when I requested him to acquaint your Lordship of the retreat of the Spanish army to the Sierra Morena. It was at that time given out by those officers about the General that the French were advancing in very great force; and as the General says he had orders to risk nothing, he very scrupulously adhered to his instructions, and quietly gave up one of the richest and most abundant provinces in Spain without firing a shot.

From the best information to be obtained (which is at all times very bad, owing to their paying for intelligence by *Pisettes*), the number of French who have upon this occasion been pushed into La Mancha does not exceed 12,000 to 15,000 men; and under the circumstances of the day and of the country, no movement they ever made was more advantageous to them or more disastrous to the Spaniards.

The enemy have now possession, at the expense of 1 man killed and 12 or 14 prisoners, of all the fertile and productive country about Ciudad Real, Almagro, Daymiel, &c., upon which they not only can feed the troops upon the spot, but from the superabundance supply their army upon the Tagus and in Madrid.

All that they have gained we have lost; and besides the diminution of food, great numbers of the young men belonging to that country (as is always the case) remain behind and disperse to their own homes. At the very time this retreat took place the *quintas* (conscription) was being called out for the army, and all of course lost.

The French have their advanced posts a little at this side of Valdepeñas; and from the slow and cautious manner they have come on, it is evident, I think, they have no views *for the present* beyond the object they have gained.

The situation of the Spaniards is now very embarrassing, as they will probably choose one of two evils: either the new General Areyzaga will advance again into the open country in our front and fight the enemy, in which case he must inevitably be beat, or he will be compelled to remain upon these mountains half starved for want of provisions.

Necessity, I should hope, will induce them to pursue a plan so successfully followed in Galicia by a partisan warfare; and if in this way they detached three or four corps of 5000 men each, under active officers, round by the right and left flank of the enemy, they would distract, harass, and injure him much more than by fighting.

If the whole army remains in its present position, the cavalry must soon be compelled to go to Cordova for subsistence. Cabada is here at 50 reals the fanega, and in Daymiel it was at 15.

The effective force at present may be stated at 35,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry. In fact there has been little alteration lately in the strength

of the army, as the place of those who remained behind in La Mancha has been supplied by recruits from other quarters.

The returns to government make the army 51,000, but these are always exaggerated; and if the number of *serviceable muskets only* were to be reckoned, the account would be wofully diminished.

Abstracted from all the other evils attending the late retreat, it has created dreadful demoralization in the towns of La Mancha and in the army.

Nothing could be more wretched or deplorable than the scenes in the different towns we fell back upon; the inhabitants all abandoning their houses and property, and flying to the mountains. I am told the number of people who have died from various diseases contracted in this way has been immense. The abhorrence of the great mass of the people to the French is undiminished, and seems to increase with their sufferings.

It is lamentable to see how little this is understood in England, where, if one may judge from the public prints, they confound the criminal supineness and want of energy in the Spanish government *with the people*.

Nothing was ever so bad as the first, or greater than the last; and if a man of enterprise and talents were at the head of the Spanish people, it would never be too late to save them from the power of France.

The Junta have written to say that Blake will be directed to take the command of this army, and that Areyzaga is only *pro tempore*.

Blake too is fond of fighting general battles, but he is confessedly allowed by them all to be the only man now among them who has any idea of commanding an army.

It is very much suspected that some reinforcements have arrived from France. General O'D. thinks they will come when Bonaparte can spare them by the pass of Canfranc from Pau, and will thus be enabled to relieve the troops in Navarre and Aragon, who will in their turn relieve those upon the Tagus. He treats the idea of the Spaniards defending the passes of the Sierra Morena as ridiculous, and imagines that Bonaparte's plan will be to steal the French into the country with as little noise as possible.

It is said that Joseph Bonaparte declared he would make his public entrance into Seville by this day month. About that period the rainy season commences, so that if he is reinforced he certainly should not lose a day. There is and has been, however, a sort of destiny attending the fate of this country, that when its condition looked most gloomy, affairs suddenly assumed a brighter prospect.

Everybody seems impressed with an idea that some great change in the government is at hand, and people always believe what they wish. Without this the Spaniards themselves believe that not even the interposition of the Virgin herself can save them.

I am convinced some very tragical scene will take place at Seville at last, and that many of the Junta will fall an unlamented sacrifice to the disappointed hopes and fury of the people.

A *vocal* and several dependants of the Junta are here. They say, if *you* drive the French out of Madrid, a new government will be immediately established.

As soon as General Areyzaga is fully settled in his command, I mean to

propose to him establishing a *direct* communication with the British head-quarters, if it meets your Lordship's approbation.

I have the honour to be, my Lord, with the highest respect,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

K. Roche.

[279.] *To the Right Hon. the Secretary at War.*

Sir, Lisbon, 26th Oct., 1809.

I have the honour to submit for your consideration an application which I have received from the 5th battalion 60th regiment for a remuneration to the men for the extraordinary expense they have been at in repairing their clothing, in consequence of the unusual delay which has occurred in sending out clothing which has been due to them for a long while. I have, therefore, to request your decision upon this claim.

I have, &c.,

Wellington.

[280.] G. A. O. Badajoz, 31st Oct., 1809.

3. The Commander of the Forces requests the officers commanding divisions will make their divisions march a distance of not less than 3 leagues in marching order twice a week, besides the formations which the nature of the ground may induce them to make in the course of the march. The officers commanding the cavalry and artillery will also, by frequent exercise, prevent the horses from losing the habit of marching.

5. The Commander of the Forces desires that the officers commanding brigades of artillery will distinctly understand that he holds them responsible for the condition of the artillery horses attached to their brigades, and they will take measures that the officers and men of the gunner drivers do their duty by taking proper care of them.

Wellington.

WEEKLY STATE of the ROYAL BRITISH and GERMAN ARTILLERY, DRIVERS, ROYAL ENGINEERS, &c.

Head Quarters, Badajoz, 1st Nov., 1809.

	Officers.					Staff Serjeants.	Serjeants.					Drummers.					Rank and File.						Horses.	Mules.	Alterations since last Return.										Civil Branch.			
								Sick.					Sick.					Sick.							Men.							Horses.							
	Lieut.-Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Staff.		Present.	Present.	Absent.	On Command.	Missing.	Present.	Present.	Absent.	On Command.	Missing.	Present.	Present.	Absent.	On Command.	Missing.	Total.			Joined.	Dead.	Discharged.	Deserted.	Transferred.	Promoted.	Reduced.	Recruited.	Dead.	Cast.	Transferred.	Commissary and Paymasters.	Clerks of Stores.	Conductors of Stores.	Artificers.
Royal British—																																				
Horse Artillery	..	..	4	6	1	..	5	1	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	118	22	25	..	..	165	..	..	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Do. Drivers .	..	..	..	..	..	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	90	10	14	..	..	114	262	16	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	24	12	..	..	..	..	..	..
Foot Artillery .	3	..	7	12	4	..	9	1	..	4	1	4	1	..	4	1	325	29	38	205	..	597	..	..	..	9	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	3	8	15	47
Do. Drivers .	..	..	2	6	1	4	11	..	..	4	..	2	..	..	4	..	297	52	36	143	1	529	513	63	..	7	1	..	..	..	..	..	18	..	..	..	..	..	..
Royal German—																																					
Horse Artillery	..	1	5	12	1	..	7	1	..	3	..	3	1	1	1	..	148	47	15	84	..	294	..	..	1	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Do. Drivers .	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	129	26	5	5	..	165	176	53	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	4	..	..	..	..	..	..
Engineers . . .	1	..	9	7	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	17	2	2	..	2	23	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Waggon Train.	..	1	2	6	2	2	21	..	2	1	1	2	..	..	..	..	250	3	15	10	2	280	111	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Total . .	4	2	29	49	9	10	56	3	3	12	2	12	3	1	9	1	1374	191	150	447	5	2167	1062	132	1	27	1	..	..	1	..	28	30	..	..	3	8	15	47

WEEKLY STATE of the FORCES in SPAIN and PORTUGAL under the

General Officers Commanding Divisions.	General Officers Commanding Brigades.	Regiments.	Stations.	Officers.							Serjeants.				
				Colonels.	Lieut.-Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Quartermasters of Cavalry.	Present.	Sick. Present.	Sick. Absent.	On Command.	Missing.
		Cavalry.														
Lieut.-Gen. Payne and Lieut.-Gen. Cotton.	Col. Sir G. Calcroft.	3rd Dragoon Guards	Merida	..	1	1	3	8	4	3	4	20	11	1	5	..
		4th Dragoons	Ditto	..	2	2	9	11	3	5	5	26	4	3	6	..
	Brig.-Gen. Slade.	1st or Royal Regt. of Drags.	Belem	..	1	2	8	10	1	6	7	27	4	..	1	..
		14th Light Dragoons	Villa Viçosa	..	2	1	5	12	3	5	6	29	2	3	4	..
	Brig.-Gen. Anson.	16th Light Dragoons	Ditto	..	..	2	6	11	2	4	6	32	2	2	2	..
		1st ditto, K. G. L.	Valverde	..	1	1	6	6	8	3	6	30	1	2	1	..
		1st Division.														
Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. C. Sherbrooke	Lieut.-Col. Hulse.	1st Bat. Coldstream Gds.	Badajoz	..	4	..	7	1	9	3	..	43	8	15	6	..
		1st Bat. 3rd Guards	Ditto	..	3	..	4	..	4	3	..	44	11	10	6	..
		1 Comp. 5th Bat. 60th.	Ditto	..	..	..	1	..	1	..	..	4	..	..	1	..
	Brig.-Gen. Cameron.	24th Foot, 2nd Bat.	Lobon	..	..	1	5	10	7	3	..	22	9	17	2	..
		42nd ditto, 2nd ditto	Ditto	..	1	1	8	4	8	5	..	28	2	1	1	..
		61st ditto, 1st ditto	Ditto	..	..	2	8	17	4	4	..	31	4	9	1	..
		1 Comp. 5th Bat. 60th.	Ditto	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	5	..	..	..	..
	Brig.-Gen. Low.	5th Line Bat., K. G. L.	Talavera la Real	..	..	..	5	10	8	3	..	27	3	9	2	..
		7th ditto ditto	Ditto	..	..	2	4	8	4	3	..	26	4	10	2	..
		2nd ditto ditto	Ditto	..	..	2	5	10	6	4	..	31	4	6	1	..
		1st ditto ditto	Ditto	..	..	2	7	12	3	5	..	22	5	10	1	..
		1st and 2nd Light Bat. do.	Ditto	..	..	..	2	3	2	..	..	6	..	1	1	..
		2nd Division.														
Lieut.-Gen. R. Hill.	Major-Gen. Tilson.	3rd Foot or Buffs	Montijo	..	1	1	7	14	4	4	..	34	1	9	6	..
		31st ditto 1st Bat.	Ditto	..	..	1	4	10	6	4	..	20	8	9	6	..
		48th ditto 2nd do.	Ditto	..	1	..	4	15	7	3	..	29	2	4	5	..
		66th ditto 2nd do.	Ditto	..	..	..	5	8	10	4	..	20	1	9	4	..
		1 Comp. 5th Bat. 60th	Ditto	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	5	..	..	..	..
	Brig.-Gen. R. Stewart.	29th Foot, 1st Bat.	Puebla de la Calzada	..	1	1	9	11	7	2	..	22	4	7	4	..
		48th ditto, 1st do.	Ditto	..	..	..	6	18	2	2	..	36	9	6	1	..
		57th ditto, 1st do.	Ditto	..	1	1	7	14	2	5	..	38	1	..	1	..
	Brig. Gen. C. Craufurd.	24th Foot, 2nd Bat.	Montijo	..	1	2	6	17	9	5	..	45	3	2	2	..
		34th ditto, 2nd do.	Torre Mayor	..	1	1	6	13	10	5	..	43	4	4	1	..
		39th ditto, 2nd do.	Ditto	..	1	2	9	12	9	5	..	30	3	4	1	..
		3rd Division.														
Brig.-Gen. R. Craufurd.	Brig.-Gen. R. Craufurd.	95th Foot, 1st Bat.	Campo Mayor	..	1	2	10	25	6	5	..	50	8	..	2	..
		52nd ditto, 1st do.	Ditto	..	1	2	7	20	5	4	..	53	2	2	3	..
		43rd ditto, 1st do.	Ditto	..	1	1	8	18	5	5	..	51	..	3	3	..
	Col. Donkin.	45th Foot, 1st Bat.	Ditto	..	..	1	8	10	5	4	..	32	4	6	..	6
		88th ditto, 1st do.	Ditto	..	1	1	9	22	..	6	..	33	2	12	..	..
		5 Comps. 5th Bat. 60th.	Ditto	..	..	2	4	7	6	6	..	20	3	..	3	1
		4th Division.														
Major-Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.	Major-Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.	7th Foot, 2nd Bat.	Olivenza	..	1	..	5	17	..	4	..	28	8	5	1	..
		11th ditto, 1st do.	Ditto	..	..	2	9	21	..	5	..	46	3	1	2	..
		53rd ditto, 2nd do.	Ditto	..	1	1	4	7	7	3	..	25	2	7	2	..
		1 Comp. 5th Bat. 60th.	Ditto	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	3	..	..	..	..
	Col. Kemmis.	27th Foot, 3rd Bat.	Badajoz	..	1	2	3	12	11	2	..	40	4	15	1	..
		40th ditto, 1st do.	Ditto	..	..	2	4	20	4	5	..	42	5	4	3	..
		97th ditto	Olivenza	..	1	2	5	8	6	3	..	28	9	8	3	1
		1 Comp. 5th Bat. 60th.	Ditto	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	4	..	..	..	..
	Major Dundas.	Royal Staff Corps	Badajoz	..	..	2	..	2	..	..	..	3	..	..	..	..
	Lieut.-Col. the Earl of Portarlington	23rd Light Dragoons	Villa Viçosa	..	1	1	4	12	..	4	4	26	2	..	2	7
	Major-Gen. Lightburne.	5th Foot, 2nd Bat.	Abrantes	..	1	2	8	10	8	6	..	39	3	4	..	..
	Major Napier.	58th ditto, 2nd do.	Ditto	..	..	1	8	8	5	4	..	35	3	2	1	..
	Major Gough.	88rd ditto, 2nd do.	Lisbon	..	..	1	5	12	8	2	..	23	1	17	6	..
	Capt. Plate.	87th ditto, 2nd do.	Ditto	..	..	1	5	18	10	6	..	37	3	13	3	..
		Indep. Garr. Comp., K. G. L.	Santarem	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	2	..
			Total	..	32	54	264	517	230	172	38	1387	172	247	111	15

Command of LIEUTENANT-GENERAL LORD VISCOUNT WELLINGTON, K.B.

Head Quarters, Badajoz, 1st Nov., 1809.

Drummers.					Rank and File.						Horses.				Alterations since last Return.										Effective Rank and File in each	
	Sick.					Sick.									Men.							Horses.				
Present.	Present.	Absent.	On Command.	Missing.	Present.	Present.	Absent.	On Command.	Missing.	Total.	Present.	Sick.	On Command.	Missing.	Joined.	Dead.	Discharged.	Deserted.	Transferred	Promoted.	Reduced.	Recruited.	Dead.	Cast.	Transferred	Brigade.	Division.
4	2	1	..	..	392	86	59	84	2	623	416	43	55	1	14	34	1	..	..	..	..	19	9	..	..	836	2542
8	..	..	..	..	445	95	19	99	..	658	420	46	69	..	7	10	..	..	..	1	..	9	16	..	..		
7	..	..	..	..	571	57	..	2	..	630	581	23	2	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	931	
7	..	..	..	..	456	86	52	47	1	642	350	73	8	..	1	17	..	..	7	..	..	2	6	4	..		
7	..	1	..	..	511	45	45	49	..	654	375	72	18	3	..	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	6	..	..		
6	..	2	..	..	462	36	44	10	8	560	400	33	5	..	2	2	..	3	..	..	..	1	3	..	..	775	
14	1	4	..	..	601	122	282	29	..	1034	..	..	..	..	1	35	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1255	4157
13	6	1	..	..	611	123	260	25	..	1019	..	..	..	..	..	27	..	..	..	3	..	..	..	..	..		
..	..	..	..	..	43	5	7	1	..	56	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
15	..	6	..	..	364	45	335	9	4	757	..	..	..	..	8	30	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..		
17	2	2	..	..	452	62	144	3	1	662	..	..	..	..	..	12	..	..	..	2	1	..	..	..	..	1286	
11	4	3	..	..	424	69	256	9	7	765	..	..	..	..	..	47	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..		
1	..	..	..	..	46	3	4	4	1	58	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
10	2	..	..	..	389	61	193	11	30	684	..	..	..	..	5	8	..	1	..	2	..	..	..	..	..		
12	1	3	..	..	342	81	162	23	37	645	..	..	..	..	2	9	..	..	1	3	..	..	..	..	..		
9	2	3	..	..	404	49	198	18	15	684	..	..	..	..	..	9	..	..	..	8	..	..	..	..	..	1616	
11	2	1	..	..	404	66	194	8	5	677	..	..	..	..	19	10	..	2	..	1	..	..	..	..	..		
1	..	..	..	..	77	14	32	4	2	129	..	..	..	..	2	2	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
20	..	1	..	..	625	54	165	18	..	862	..	..	..	..	..	17	1	..	5	1	1	..	..	..	..		5307
9	3	8	..	..	275	110	269	18	2	674	..	..	..	..	4	88	..	1	..	3	..	..	..	..	..		
12	..	4	..	..	441	62	113	11	..	627	..	..	..	..	..	26	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
11	2	3	..	..	423	59	103	16	..	601	..	..	..	..	2	25	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1809	
1	..	..	..	..	45	..	4	2	6	57	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
14	1	2	..	..	439	111	179	7	..	736	..	..	..	..	..	17	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
15	4	1	..	..	589	88	174	4	..	855	..	..	..	..	..	14	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1646	
18	2	1	..	..	618	62	63	9	..	752	..	..	..	..	..	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
21	..	2	..	..	593	47	122	2	..	764	..	..	..	..	1	10	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
17	..	2	..	..	735	156	75	29	..	995	..	..	..	..	4	16	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1852	
15	1	5	..	..	524	83	118	3	..	728	..	..	..	..	..	19	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
12	3	..	..	..	863	84	57	4	13	1021	..	..	..	..	1	11	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	2633	3909
18	..	1	..	..	932	40	76	11	8	1087	..	..	..	..	..	11	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
23	..	1	..	..	818	123	102	4	10	1057	..	..	..	..	..	25	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
19	2	1	..	..	533	131	132	5	65	866	..	..	..	..	..	20	..	..	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	1276	
15	1	4	..	..	496	82	176	2	..	756	..	..	..	..	1	23	..	2	..	..	1	..	..	..	..		
5	1	1	2	1	247	13	23	5	18	306	..	..	..	..	1	2	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
12	1	..	..	..	451	122	132	15	..	720	..	..	..	..	1	20	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1696	3572
18	1	2	5	..	763	49	89	6	..	907	..	..	..	..	1	12	1	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..		
13	2	2	..	..	430	63	146	7	..	646	..	..	..	..	3	27	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
2	..	..	..	..	52	2	12	..	1	67	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
17	1	4	..	..	756	17	245	1	..	1019	..	..	..	..	..	6	..	..	3	4	1	..	..	..	..		
17	1	3	..	..	748	56	111	12	..	927	..	..	..	..	3	7	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1876	
18	3	..	..	..	335	152	99	7	20	613	..	..	..	..	1	10	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
..	..	..	..	..	37	6	3	2	8	56	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
2	..	..	..	..	36	16	22	12	..	85	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
7	..	..	..	2	313	41	6	21	124	505	223	58	2	..	1	2	..	..	..	..	..	7	2	7	..		
19	1	1	..	..	582	44	64	8	2	700	..	..	..	..	3	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1034	
18	3	1	..	..	452	60	53	8	..	573	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	..		
12	1	6	..	..	299	34	408	37	8	786	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
13	2	2	..	..	367	96	216	27	..	706	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
1	..	..	..	..	20	2	..	3	..	45	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
562	58	85	7	3	21,851	3173	5843	771	398	32,036	2765	848	159	4	89	678	3	18	17	40	7	38	42	11	..		

RANK AND FILE.

	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Effective.	Sick. Present.	Sick. Absent.	On Command.	Missing.	Total.
State, 15th October, 1809				22,719	2,357	6,303	933	295	32,667
Add.									
Joined	4	..	85						
Reduced	..	..	7						
				..	..	..	..	..	92
									32,759
Deduct.									
Dead	17	6	655						
Discharged	1	..	2						
Deserted	1	..	17						
Transferred	1	..	16						
Promoted	7	..	33						
Reduced	6	1	..						
				..	..	..	..	..	723
State of the Army in Spain and Portugal, 1st November, 1809 ..				21,851	3,173	5,843	771	398	32,036

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, London, 1st Nov., 1809.

Since I wrote to you last our arrangements have taken a different shape. Dundas, for private reasons (with which it is not necessary to trouble you), has declined the office of Secretary of State for War and Colonies, and he has become again President of the Board of Control. Ryder has taken my office, the Home Department, and I am now settled in Castlereagh's.* I feel very strongly the additional weight of anxiety this change will bring upon me; but I could not, under the circumstances, refuse it, and I think I may be, perhaps, of more use to you in your command in Portugal than any other person who could be placed in the same situation. Let me know your wants and your wishes as to the General officers who are to serve under you, and I will do my best for you, though I cannot promise I shall always succeed. I may have more facilities in this respect than many others. My brother goes with me to the War Department; Cooke † retires from choice; Colonel Bunbury ‡ is to be the other Under Secretary. I hope Lord Wellesley will accept the Foreign Office,§ which Bathurst now holds for him. It is the office which he appeared always to prefer, and for which I think his talents are best qualified. I think we may then do very well. It may certainly happen to us to be beat in Parliament; but, if we go out in consequence, we shall go out a strong party, and prove some protection to the King. I regret Castlereagh and all he has suffered. I am satisfied, however, that he has gained in public opinion since his misfortune, and I think he will continue to gain daily if he does but conduct himself with prudence.

I wrote to you ten days ago on your military situation, and when I get the answers to the questions which I put to you and the report which I understand you are likely soon to send over on the defences of Portugal you shall receive a regular official instruction on the whole subject.

In the mean time you are aware that it must be our policy to remain in Portugal as long as we can remain there without risking our army. But we must secure the return of the army if a serious attack is made by the French upon the country. The delicate question will be as to the time of embarkation, and this must be left in a great measure to the discretion of the officer commanding, who must decide it on the spot according to all the circumstances which may be then known to him.

Believe me to be, dear Lord Wellington,
Very faithfully yours,
LIVERPOOL

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* The Secretary of State for the Colonies was, until recently, also the Minister for the War Department.

† Secretary to Lord Castlereagh.

‡ Afterwards Sir Henry Bunbury.

§ Lord Wellesley was then in Spain, and returned to England at the desire of the Prince Regent. He accepted a seat in the Cabinet and became Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 6th December, 1809.

The Military Secretary to Col. Wilson.

SIR, Seville, 4th Nov., 1809.

I am directed by Lord Wellington to desire that you will be pleased to cause the Spanish battalions of Seville and Merida to march forthwith in succession from Castello Branco to Badajoz, for the purpose of receiving the orders of the Duque d'Alburquerque.

You will be pleased to report their route to head-quarters at Badajoz, and take care that arrangements are made for them to receive provisions on their march; and they must send notice of their movements to the Spanish commandant at Badajoz, in order that arrangements may be made for their reception in Estremadura.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

JAMES BATHURST.

[281.] *To the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Seville, 10th Nov., 1809.

I don't send you my newspapers, as I judge from Sydenham's letter that you must have received your own.

Accounts of the peace have been published at Madrid, which state that it was signed on the 14th of October. At the same time Frere has the 'Moniteur' to the 18th, in which no mention is made of the peace. They must have had at Paris on the 18th accounts of its signature on the 14th by telegraph from Strasburgh.

I suspect there is no peace; that the report has been published at Amsterdam for good reasons; and that reasons of a similar description have induced Joseph to copy the report from Amsterdam, giving to the peace only a different date.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[282.] *To the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, Badajoz, 16th Nov., 1809.

Lest you should not have received the account through any other channel, I enclose two accounts which I have received of a naval success in the Mediterranean. I have received several other accounts of the same success, which I believe was achieved by Admiral G. Martin; and I have also reason to believe that

the two ships stated by Mr. Frere to have escaped were chased and destroyed by the fleet off Marseilles. I have not seen Captain Jenkinson since he was ill, but I understand that he is much better, and I purpose to send him to Lisbon for his recovery.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Badajoz, 16th Nov., 1809. [283.]

8. The Commander of the Forces requests the officers commanding regiments will take care that the officers who have lately joined this army are made acquainted with all the General Orders which have at different times been given out.

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool. [284.]

MY DEAR LORD, Badajoz, 19th Nov., 1809.

I write you an official letter this day in answer to one from Lord Castlereagh of the 14th September, which will probably satisfy you upon all the points referred to by your Lordship in your private letter of the 20th October. However, as the arrangement of the questions contained in that letter may be more convenient to you than those in Lord Castlereagh's despatch, to which mine is an answer, which are of a more general nature, and as every consideration of this interesting subject is desirable, I proceed to give you answers to the questions contained in your letter.

In answer to the first question, my opinion is, that if the Spaniards are commonly prudent, if they do not adventure themselves too far forward to obtain possession of the capital before the enemy will receive his reinforcements, and to gain a momentary popularity for the cause, it must be a very large reinforcement indeed which would give the enemy the military possession, much larger which would lead to the complete subjugation, of the country.

In answer to your second question, my opinion is, that the enemy ought to make the possession of Portugal their first object when their reinforcements will arrive in Spain. I do not think they will succeed with an army of seventy or even of

eighty thousand men if they do not make the attack for two or three months, which I believe is now impossible. I conceive not only that they may, but that they will, make the attack before they will subdue the north of Spain. The centre of Spain, or Old Castille, is already subdued; and indeed that country at all times, in all wars, has been in the possession of the army that was strongest, particularly in cavalry.

In answer to your third question, my opinion is, that the enemy have neither the means nor the intention of attacking Portugal at present, and that they would be successfully resisted.

You will find a complete answer to your fourth question in my despatch of this date. I am convinced we could embark after defeat.

I enclose the last weekly state of the army,* which will show you its strength. Included in the sick abstract are the wounded at Talavera, about 1500 in number, and about 1700 convalescents at Lisbon and Elvas, which will reduce the number of sick to about 6000 men upon an army of about 30,000. We are now, as I believe the whole world is, very sickly; but in all times and places the sick list amounts to at least ten men in the hundred, or 3000 upon 30,000 men. In order therefore to give us an efficient operating army of 30,000 men, you should send us 3000 men soon. We ought also to have 1000 men to occupy the Castle of Lisbon, and another 1000 to make up for the deficiency in the return which will be occasioned by the departure of the 23rd dragoons, and probable losses by death between this time and the period in which we shall have the contest, making in the whole 35,000 rank and file, besides the prisoners at Talavera still upon the return.

I would besides recommend a further relief of our bad second battalions. There are really many in the army that are quite unfit for service in respect to composition and discipline; and they as well as the old regiments are made worse by the constant change of the officers. At this moment there are not less than sixty officers quitting the battalions in this army, with which they have served and have acquired some experience, to join other battalions of the same regiments in some other part of the world. The worst of this arrangement is, that the officers who go are the oldest, and probably the best, of their respective ranks; and they are replaced by others without experience,

* See pp. 417-20.

who have no knowledge of the men or of their duty, or of the orders and regulations of this army; and the whole must be taught to them; and it is not less expensive to the public than it is prejudicial to the service, as the travelling expenses of each of these gentlemen to and from their battalions are paid by the public.

It is besides very necessary that some effectual means should be taken to increase the medical staff, not with gentlemen of rank, but with hospital mates. The duty of the general hospitals in every active army ought to be done by the general medical staff; and the regiments ought to have their surgeons and assistants entirely disengaged for any extraordinary event or sickness that may occur. We have not now one surgeon or assistant with each regiment instead of three, the others being employed in the hospitals instead of hospital mates, and we have always been equally deficient.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool. [285.*]

MY LORD, Badajoz, 20th Nov., 1809.

As the issue of blankets to the troops for the winter season leaves very few in store, I have to request that your Lordship will be pleased to order an additional supply of 35,000 to be sent out to Lisbon for the use of the army under my command.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Marshal-General Viscount Wellington.**

MY DEAR LORD, Lisbon, 24th Nov., 1809.

The news by the packet you will learn by your own papers and letters, and I am not yet informed of what the exact news is; only they say the terms stated in the papers to have been conceded to Austria are very bad, which, from the course of events and the mode of announcing the peace, I cannot believe.

I have just received a letter from Cox of the 19th, in which he states

* Lord Wellington held the supreme command of the Portuguese army under the title of Marshal-General.

that the force of the enemy at Salamanca is increased to 6000, but yet without guns; that at Zamora there are 3000 or 4000, in Toro 1000, in Alba de Tormes 2000, and about 500 in Ledesma, which latter advanced on the 16th to Vertegudino and the neighbouring villages, and carried off some cattle and plundered the inhabitants. The Duque del Parque, by his last accounts, was still at Bexar. From Silveira, in a letter of the 17th, he, only as information, says he understands the enemy again to have possessed themselves of Benavente, and that Garcia is retired to Astorga.

Cox informs me that the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo still detains M. de Farincourt, and that the Portuguese officer who went with him is there himself in very great danger. This is a conduct that I really think cannot be tolerated. Surely, as allies, we cannot be debarred communicating with the common enemy, nor ought that communication to be in the slightest impeded, as the delay in communication might be of serious consequence to us. You will, however, judge what is best to be said on it to the Central Junta, and I write, if possible to avoid accidents, to the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, and a strong letter, and I think the Portuguese government had better complain on the subject also. It is a most abominable and may be a most prejudicial proceeding.

I desire to be sent to Bathurst a memorial of Blunt's to be appointed (as I believe those from England have all been) a British Brigadier to serve with the Portuguese army, as he is now a Colonel. I acknowledge I cannot see the use of it, as it gains him no one advantage, and will only give him a posterior date of rank, as, of course, his rank of Brigadier is from his appointment by the Prince Regent. As he has desired, I send it to you.

I hope you will have received some answer from England on the subject of the clothing and appointments we have asked for. I find that orders for the disposal of a part of the clothing we object to have come, as Villiers has written to me to send 1000 suits to Colonel Carroll, who, I believe, will want 3000, and, as they have disposed of part, I trust our wants will be attended to.

Believe me yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Marshal-General Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Lisbon, 27th Nov., 1809.

I have just learnt the defeat of the Spanish army of La Mancha, and which seems to be the total destruction of it, for I conclude that such men as will have escaped have thrown away arms, clothing, &c. It may be now of sufficient consequence to you to know, to send it by express, that I have this day learnt from Brigadier Cox that the head-quarters of the Duque del Parque were, on the 21st, at Alba de Tormes, and part of his force had again entered Salamanca, which the French had evacuated on the 19th, retiring by Babila Fuente towards Valladolid. I cannot guess what has induced the Duque del Parque to make this movement after the order you told me the Junta had sent him to proceed to Talavera.

Cox does not tell me if he has sent you this information; and, by your letter to Mr. Villiers, you would like to know it.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

G. O. Badajoz, 29th Nov., 1809. [286.]

1. As some doubts have been entertained respecting the order of the late Commander of the Forces of the 16th March, respecting the hire of native servants instead of bât men from the ranks, it is published again for general information.

2. *Extracts from the General Order by Lieutenant-General Sir J. Cradock, K.B., dated 16th March*, 1809.

"The Commander of the Forces being desirous of rendering the army in the field as effective as possible, directs that no soldier whatever acting as a servant to an officer shall appear in any other dress than his uniform; and on a march he is to carry his arms and accoutrements.

"The servants of regimental officers to be in the ranks on the march, and the Commander of the Forces calls on the General and other officers in command strictly to enforce this order.

"With a view to diminish as much as possible requisitions on regiments for soldiers as servants, Lieutenant-General Sir J. Cradock authorises any officer who is entitled by the usage of the service to appear mounted, and keep a horse, to hire a servant as bât man, in lieu of a soldier, for which he will be allowed at the rate of one dollar per week and a ration; but it is to be distinctly understood that this allowance is not to be extended to any persons attached to this army who by the custom of the service are not usually entitled to soldiers to wait on them; and whenever it is drawn, an effective soldier is to be thereby restored to the army.

"The following will be the scale for the number allowed to each rank:—

	Number of bât men or servants each.
"Commander of the Forces	4
Lieutenant-General	3
Major and Brigadier-Generals, and heads of departments	2
All other officers, regimental and staff	1

"These men will be paid by the Deputy Commissary-General monthly, on regular pay lists being transmitted every 25th

certified by the Paymasters of corps, and approved by commanding officers of battalions.

"The returns for the General Staff officers to be made out by departments, and to be certified by the heads of each. Those of General officers and their families to be certified by the General officers: a form may be had of the Deputy Commissary-General.

"The Commander of the Forces most strongly recommends it to all the General officers of the army to return immediately any bât men they may have to their corps, and to direct their Staff to do the same; at all events, no officer of any rank is to employ more than one soldier of this army to attend upon him, whether he acts as his personal servant or bât man."

3. The officers of the army will observe that the intention of this order was, to allow the hire of a native servant instead of a bât man, or servant from the ranks, to the officers entitled, by the custom of the service, to have bât men and servants from the ranks.

4. Field officers of regiments are entitled each to a servant and bât man; and of course to draw the allowance for each, if they should not have the service of them.

5. The captains each a servant, and a bât man for their company. Subaltern officers, adjutant, quartermaster, paymaster, surgeon, and assistant-surgeon, each a servant; and the surgeon a bât man for the medicine chest mule; the paymaster one for the mule to carry his books, and the quartermaster one for the mule carrying the intrenching tools.

6. The General and other officers on the Staff who have not bât men from the regiments are to draw the allowances allotted to each.

7. It has never been the custom of the service to allow soldiers from the ranks to attend upon the officers of the Commissariat or the medical Staff; and the orders of the 16th March cannot be considered as relating to them.

8. The Commander of the Forces requests that particular attention may be paid to the form of the account which must be sent in, claiming payment for these bât men, and that the General officers, heads of departments, and commanding officers of regiments, who are to certify these bills, will not certify them for any officer who has a servant from the ranks to attend upon him.

9. The allowance of wood for the troops in camp or cantonments is to be as follows:—

Daily to each non-commissioned officer and private soldier	3 lbs.
„ to each subaltern and regimental staff	12 lbs.
„ to each Captain	21 lbs.
„ to each Field Officer	30 lbs.

The officers upon the Staff are to draw according to their rank in the army. The officers of the Commissariat and medical Staff are to draw each the proportion of wood allotted to the officer of corresponding rank in the army.

As the General officers have Staff, &c. attached to them, their allowance of wood is unlimited; but as the supply of wood in this country is very small, and it is very difficult to be procured, the Commander of the Forces requests the General officers of the army will observe the utmost economy in the expenditure of wood, and that they will take measures that the quantities of that article supplied for their use are applied solely for that purpose, and not stolen or applied to the use of the owner of the house in which they are quartered.

WELLINGTON.

G. A. O. Badajoz, 29th Nov., 1809. [287.]

1. Officers commanding brigades of artillery are requested to give directions that when the horses attached to their guns are sent to water, or to exercise, they may be marched regularly under the command of an officer of the gunner drivers; an officer of the gunner drivers should likewise attend all horse parades.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests the officers commanding regiments to explain to both officers and soldiers of the battalions under their command, that it is equally criminal to resist a Spanish or Portuguese sentry or guard, as it is to resist either belonging to the British army.

A guard or sentry must be understood at all times to be charged with the execution of the orders of a competent authority at the place in which either may be stationed, or may be found, and must not be resisted on any account.

Guards or sentries may mistake their orders, or may execute

them improperly, and in these cases complaints must be made; but on no account must they be resisted.

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Col. G. B. Fisher to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

My Lord, Lisbon, 1st Dec., 1809.

Pursuant to your Lordship's orders, I have the honour to report to you that I have made further trial of Mr. Parr's perforated shot, the result of which has not been at all favourable to the invention.

Out of twelve that were fired, three only burst. The number of pieces of the shot we could not ascertain, but apparently they were very few. One that was fired on the water we had an opportunity of seeing, and it divided into five pieces.

Supposing, however, that Mr. Parr could bring his shot to a greater certainty of bursting, I confess I am at a loss to discover the utility of his invention. It is, after all, nothing but a substitution for a common shot, and can never stand the smallest competition with the spherical case-shot, invented by Colonel Shrapnell.

From the account given by Colonel Robe, I do not discover any difference between the present invention and the one he saw, except in the superior method he describes of fixing the fuze in the latter; and I cannot conceive that Mr. Parr can claim the merit of originality in an invention, the merits of which, I believe I may venture to assure your Lordship, have been canvassed and discussed before a board of field officers at Woolwich.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
G. B. Fisher,
Lt.-Col. Royal Artillery.

[288.] *To Major R. Barclay.*

My dear Barclay, Badajoz, 3rd Dec., 1809.

I will not send away the letters which I have been writing to Malcolm and others without giving you a few lines to assure you of my constant remembrance and friendship. I have seen with concern the accounts of transactions at Madras; but it has given me unfeigned pleasure to find that your name has not been mixed up in any of them. I should have been vexed if anybody so nearly connected officially and in friendship with me while I was in India had been concerned in such folly.

I don't pretend to give you an account of affairs here. We have had hard work, and shall have still harder; but I don't despair. I have an *unanimous* army; I agree well with all the authorities in Portugal and Spain; and I believe I have the good wishes of the whole world.

The battle of Talavera was the hardest fought of modern times. The fire at Assye was heavier while it lasted; but the battle of Talavera lasted for two days and a night. Each party engaged lost a fourth of their numbers!!! Pray remember me to all friends, particularly to Symonds.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

P.S. Pray how does Salabut Khan get on? Though he did call me a —— because I would not allow him to eat pork, I cannot avoid being anxious about him.

G. O. Badajoz, 5th Dec., 1809. [289.]

The conduct of Lieutenant ———, the officer of the barrack guard of the —— regiment, in interfering with his guard between Lieutenant ——— and the Spanish guard, was still more improper than the conduct of Lieutenant ———; and its indiscretion was equally manifested with its impropriety, as he was very shortly obliged to withdraw from all interference, by the superior numbers of the Spanish guard.

The officers and troops in Badajoz are to understand that they are quartered in this town only because it is a convenient station in the line of cantonments occupied by the army; but they are no part of the garrison of the fort, and have nothing to do with its duties.

The guards which are mounted by the British troops are solely for regimental or brigade purposes, and for the security of the stores of the army over which they are placed: they have nothing to say to the safety of the place or its police, as connected with its security.

The Commander of the Forces adopts this mode of expressing his disapprobation of the conduct of Lieutenants ——— and ———, of the —— regiment. He desires, however, that these officers may be released from their arrest, as he hopes that what

he has above stated will prevent them as well as others from being guilty of such conduct in future.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Burghersh to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, Valencia, 5th Dec., 1809.

I received two days ago a letter from Frere by the *parté* from Seville of the 27th, in which he tells me that he had sent me several letters, and particularly one from you about a week before, all directed to Granada. I have not received any of them, and though quite at a loss to explain it, I confess I am extremely distressed, for your letter may be a desire for my return, and by the delay in receiving it I may not be aware of it sufficiently in time. Frere tells me he has no news: this, therefore, makes me more easy, as, if you had the intention of moving, he would have let me know it; and besides, the complete defeat of the Spanish army of La Mancha must stop any intention of advance. I shall, however, leave this to-night for Alicante, and I hope at that place I shall receive your letter.

I would write you a great deal of the state and intrigues of this place, but all would end in the same opinion as the one I expressed to you in my former letter. Nothing, I fear, can be expected from Spain; all is egoism: the *patriot* wants money, and hopes to succeed by dint of *screaming patriotism*; the tyrant wants power and fortune, and seeks to find them by intrigue and crime. This is a fine province, and I should be able to do great things; but the people who govern, although they cry themselves the first in Spain for effort, yet, in reality, do nothing. Caro, who commands, and has been risen by a popular commotion, endeavours to have all the power in his hands, and indeed to effect it a few hints have been given, that *murders*, &c., were easy. The Junta are at this moment working against him, and I am sure I do not know what will be the end. General O'Donoju, brother to Cuesta's friend, is at this place, after having escaped from Pamplona: he was made prisoner at Maria, and most severely wounded; he is a clever man, and has displayed, as indeed he bears the marks, most distinguished courage. I have received from him a great deal of information, and particularly about Blake's campaign and the battle of Alcaniz, where I find that far from the Spaniards behaving well, they displayed their usual conduct, that only a brigade of artillery remained firm with two battalions, and that the French, who were not able to carry the guns in front, lost so many men that they retired.

I have sent to Granada about Franceschi, and when I pass that place I will see him and tell him what you desire.

I am most happy that Lord Wellesley has accepted the Foreign Department. I hope most sincerely that his abilities will secure him the lead in the administration, without which I fear nothing will be done.

The state of Catalonia is very curious. Blake's army of about 10,000 or 12,000 bad troops is perishing for want, although in the middle of so fine a province. The Juntas have lately offered to raise 40,000 regulars, and

50,000 peasants; but upon the attempt to enforce the conscription, a vast number of the towns have been left by the people on whom it would fall, and many of them have gone to the French at Barcelona. The Catalans will be soldiers in their own way, or rather have the right to rob when they can, and at other times, do nothing. As I set off to-night for Alicante, I shall hope to get your letter there.

Believe me ever your affectionate,

BURGHERSH.

B. Frere, Esq., to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Seville, 6th Dec., 1809.

The last accounts which we have received from the Duque del Parque are of the 30th ultimo from Miranda del Castañar; and though your Excellency will probably have received more direct and particular accounts from Colonel Carroll, I will not lose the opportunity which offers of communicating to you what is known here. It appears that in consequence of his orders from hence he began his retreat from Fresno, and reached Alba de Tormes, where he was attacked; and his cavalry giving way when they were at a very short distance from the enemy, the right flank of his first division was exposed, and very much cut up. The second division formed a square, and, though summoned to surrender, maintained themselves and retreated in good order. This action took place on the 27th. On the next day they pursued their retreat towards Ciudad Rodrigo. On the 29th, when at the distance of about two leagues from Tamames, the appearance of about thirty dragoons of the enemy caused an alarm and dispersion of the army, which, however, as there was no enemy's corps to take advantage of it, has not had the fatal consequences which might have been expected. The troops were collecting again on the following day, and occupying a line from Mayllo to Miranda del Castañar.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord,

Your Excellency's most obedient humble servant,

B. FRERE.

G. O. Badajoz, 8th Dec., 1809. [290.]

5. The Commander of the Forces requests that on the march which the army is about to make, the officers will attend to the orders of the 4th May, Nos. 5 and 6, and to the General Orders of the 7th October, Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11, relating to the mode of making requisitions upon the country. In addition to these orders, the Commander of the Forces desires that when any officer finds himself in the situation to be obliged to take articles of provisions or forage from the country upon his own receipts,

he will report to his commanding officer that he has done so, specifying particularly the date, the place, and the articles for which he has given his receipt. The commanding officer will send this report to the Assistant-Commissary attached to the brigade, regiment, or division of the army to which the officer belongs.

WELLINGTON.

[291.] *To Benjamin Sydenham, Esq.*

MY DEAR SYDENHAM, Badajoz, 9th Dec., 1809.

I send you the history of the campaign in Spain, which you will find very interesting.* Show it to Lord Wellesley, and let Pole have a copy of it; and you may also show it to Anstruther. But I don't wish any body else to see it.

If it is desired to publish anything upon the subject, founded upon the enclosed, pray let it be so disguised that it cannot be supposed to come from me. I think, however, that a publication might be of some use.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Marshal Beresford to Marshal-General Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Leiria, 12th Dec., 1809.

Having now again joined the main road, I will give you my observations on what I have seen since leaving Lisbon in regard to the defence of that part of the country which I have passed over, and which, in case of an attack of this country from the northward, is certainly of very principal importance.

The enemy who now enters this country, having the British and Portuguese armies to oppose, must, of course, bring a corresponding force to that object, acting, as it does, in a country determinedly hostile to him. This force will consequently be so great that in a country not very abundant, and already much exhausted, he will have great difficulty in supplying the daily consumption of provisions for his army, and which it will be nearly impracticable he should bring with him; or after having entered a certain distance into an hostile country, that he should get supplies from his rear. Our object will therefore be to delay his march by every nature of obstruction that circumstances will furnish us with, and to narrow his line of operations, and, according to your plan, to keep him together or in a body. Delaying him will oblige him to consume his provisions;

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. v., p. 347: Memorandum, dated 9th December, 1809.

detaining him within a given boundary will prevent his recruiting his resources. These two objects attained, the next will be to throw him upon that point you desire at the place you finally determine to make your stand, and dispute the farther advance of the enemy. This latter object will be attained, and the two former greatly, if we can prevent his entering in force to the right of the great road from this to Lisbon, and which, I think, will not be difficult; and I think that except he passes that way a strong column, he can be easily prevented from foraging in it to any extent; but to prevent this latter England must send more arms; nor ought less than 30,000 stand to be sent, as that number is wanted for the militia. I will begin by retiring from this place, the importance of which you are so well acquainted with, that I need only say that, from the examination I have made of it, with scarcely any trouble, and, of course, with little expense, the Castle is so situated and circumstanced as to be made tenable for any length of time we please; it wants little more than guns and provisions. I have not yet got the report of how it is to be supplied with water. The Bishop's Palace is within its lower walls, and retaining the castle, the enemy can never enter that part of the town to the southward of the parade, which would, of course, remain with us whilst we held the Castle. I cannot speak very certainly as to what roads, or their nature, that pass between this and the sea; by my information, none that would serve the enemy's turn: however, that part of the country, as all on both sides of what I have passed over, I will order to be most minutely inspected. There is a road that leads over the hills to Batalha, but which I am told to be very bad, and can be easily destroyed, as I should suppose would any roads between this and the sea. This being granted, and that this place is put into a respectable state of defence, the enemy will be at once thrown on Ourem, or even to Thomar; but either will secure to us all the country on the right of the Camina Nova to Lisbon, and will, besides, give great delay to the enemy. Supposing, however, that finally this place is lost, or that the enemy passes it to the right or left (which must lose him much time to do), you are well acquainted with the road leading hence by Alcobaça, Caldas, Obidos, to Torres Vedras; between this and the first of those places there are many places on the road favourable to obstructing the enemy's advance by breaking it up; and the road leading up the hill from Alcobaça may be rendered totally impassable; and there are very many places between this latter place and Caldas where, by filling or breaking up the road, great destruction and loss of time may be caused; and having in this country a corps of light and irregular troops of 3000 or 4000, would, with the natural and made obstructions, make the advance of an enemy so tedious as to fully answer our object. Such a corps ought, of course, to be under the command of an active and intelligent officer. Obidos, you know, is walled, and the walls would require some battering, and it is so situated that I would certainly occupy it; there is no road goes between it and the sea; the only one I believe on its right that will again bring you into the road of Borissa and Torres Vedras is the one that Ferguson's column took, and of which there were branches beyond the town; and I think the occupation of this for three or four days only would be worth the loss of a regiment of militia. It is in fact only the loss of so many arms, which, if we were

fortunate, could easily be replaced, and if not it would not much signify, and clearly within walled places or strong grounds is the best for this description of troops. Between this and Borissa there is nothing, and you are pretty well acquainted with that place, where, of course, the corps that had been all along acting in the enemy's front might make some stand. It is, I must acknowledge, one of the strongest positions I ever saw. Between this place and Torres Vedras I did not go, having gone from the latter directly to Peniche. This latter place can have nothing whatever to do with the defence of this part of the country, more than as a depôt to supply the troops acting in it. I need not mention anything of the strength of Peniche, but it will be necessary to determine either to defend or to dismantle it. For the former a good deal is wanting, as the left of the place is at present open to an assault. Guns there are there in abundance, and the best mounted I have seen in Portugal; they must not be left for the enemy. Torres Vedras will be a very strong position, but I fear that the enemy having arrived there may pass it by its right, skirting by their left the plain below your old position, and the road, by turning to the left very much on leaving Torres Vedras for Montachique, favours his making an easy communication with it by his left. However, the enemy would scarcely do it, leaving in his rear such a force as would be there, and entering to Montachique, one of the worst and most difficult roads I have seen in Portugal, every step of which may be disputed by light troops, and almost without risk.

I find there is plenty of water within the Castle of Leiria.

Thomar, 14th.

I arrived here last night, and having gone over the road from Leiria to this place, I need not hesitate in declaring it to be most easily made impassable. I have got a very terrible head-ach, and cannot write.

I remain your Lordship's most sincerely,

W. C. Beresford.

P. S. I cannot close this without again requesting you would press the British government to send 30,000 stand of arms as soon as possible to this country. The whole of the provinces north of the Douro, in case of the enemy entering Upper or Lower Beira, will be left to what protection the militia of those provinces can afford, of which at present those of Tras os Montes are not more than half armed, and those of the Minho and Oporto not more than one-fifth; and you know it will be impossible to fritter away the army, for the purpose of leaving any protection from it to those provinces. Few regiments of militia throughout the kingdom are complete in arms, and we have not even enough for the regulars when completed.

[292.] A. G. O. Badajoz, 13th Dec., 1809.

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to notice the continued and repeated disobedience of orders by the officers of the army, in pressing mules and carts, and in taking articles

from the country upon their own informal receipts. He is concerned to be obliged to resort to measures to enforce obedience to his orders, and he now directs that Captain ———, of the —— regiment, may be put in arrest by the commanding officer of the hospital at Elvas, for taking away mules belonging to the Commissariat at Badajoz, contrary to orders; his crime will be sent to him by the Adjutant-General, and he is to proceed forthwith to Badajoz.

2. The Commander of the Forces calls the attention of the officers of the army to the following order, by the late Commander of the Forces in Portugal :—

Extract from General Orders by Lieutenant-General Sir J. Cradock.

"The army is referred to the Orders of the 14th March on the subject of quarters, which General officers are requested to impress on the troops under their command; and it is to be clearly understood that cover is all that any officer has a right to expect, and he has no pretensions to ask for either bed or furniture; when such articles are supplied, it is a matter of civility on the part of the owner, and must be received as a favour, and not as a right."

This principle has been before laid down in General Orders, and must be extended throughout this kingdom.

WELLINGTON.

G. A. O. Badajoz, 14th Dec., 1809. [293.]

The Commander of the Forces is happy to find that the circumstances respecting the conduct of Captain ———, —— regiment, did not occur as they were represented to him by the officer of the Commissariat department, Mr. ———; and that he is therefore enabled to release that officer from his arrest, notwithstanding that an irregularity was committed by the soldiers under his command. Captain ——— is therefore released from his arrest, and is to join his regiment.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Charles Street, 15th Dec., 1809.

I trust my public despatch of this day, and the private letter explanatory of it, will prove satisfactory to you. We have done all in our power to reinforce and support you, and the result will, I hope, accord with your wishes and our own.

Unfortunately since writing these letters we have heard of Areyzaga's defeat. When will the Spaniards be cured of fighting battles under circumstances where nothing but disaster can be expected?

It is understood here from a messenger of Starhemberg, who has passed through France, that 80,000 men have been ordered to march to Bayonne. If Bonaparte cannot send a larger force, I should not feel much alarmed at the prospect. I think we may, however, rely that he will make every possible exertion to subdue Spain, and that his first great efforts will be directed against the British army. All our measures should be calculated on this view of the subject. It is a great satisfaction to us to find by your correspondence that you entertain a just notion of the eventual difficulties to which you may be exposed, and that you have not undervalued them on the one hand, or exaggerated them on the other.

Lord Wellesley is installed, and we are going on very smoothly. It is impossible to form any calculation yet of our strength in Parliament. We have some awkward questions to manage at the outset (particularly that of Walcheren), which must put us under considerable difficulties. I trust, however, that by prudence and temper we shall get through them.

I have sent you a parcel by the messenger from Lady Wellington. I am happy to find your little boys are recovering from the hooping cough. As Arthur is the more delicate, we were principally apprehensive for him, but as you will learn from Lady Wellington he is getting quite well.

With respect to the officers who are with you, and are members of Parliament, send over only those you can spare, and not even them, if they are unwilling to go, or if you expect to be soon engaged in active operations. I shall endeavour to send you a reinforcement of Major-Generals, of which you seem to be much in want. I am anxious, however, only to send you those who will be really of service to you.

Believe me to be, with sincere regard,

My dear Lord, yours very faithfully,

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing Street, 15th Dec., 1809.

Your despatch of the 14th November has been received and laid before the King.*

The opinion which your Lordship finds yourself enabled to give respecting the defence of Portugal, after a thorough examination of the subject in all its bearings, has afforded His Majesty great satisfaction.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. v., p. 274.

His Majesty feels the strongest inducement, from attachment to his ancient ally and from every motive of sound policy, to persevere in the contest in the Peninsula as long as it can be maintained with a reasonable expectation of success. He cannot, however, avoid noticing how large a proportion of the disposable force of this country is at present employed in the Peninsula, and how essential the return of that army must be to the security of his own dominions in the event of Spain and Portugal falling entirely under the dominion of France. I have been commanded to direct your attention to this circumstance, not for the purpose of imposing any new or unusual limit on that discretion which, from your situation as Commander of a British army and from the experience of your past conduct, His Majesty is disposed to confide in you, but in order that you may never lose sight of so important a consideration in the progress of any of the operations in which you may be engaged.

You represent the state of the British army necessary to be employed in Portugal, in aid of the whole military establishment of that country, to be 30,000 effective men. By the returns of the 8th of November, I perceive that the British army under your command consists of somewhat more than 33,000 rank and file, exclusive of the artillery, amounting to 2161; that there were, however, at that time (including the wounded left at Talavera, which were about 1500, and the convalescents at Lisbon, which were 1700) about 9100 sick. As the army was becoming more healthy, it is to be hoped that a considerable proportion of these may soon be enabled to join their respective regiments. But in order to provide for casualties which must be expected to arise, and to keep up your force to the amount which you consider necessary, His Majesty has directed that a reinforcement of 5000 infantry and one regiment of dragoons should be sent to Lisbon. Some delay will unavoidably arise in supplying the whole of this force, in consequence of the sickness of the army which has returned from Walcheren, but every exertion will be made for the purpose of providing it as expeditiously as possible.

The extent of the whole military establishment of Portugal you state to consist of 45,000 men, independent of the militia: 3000 artillery, 3000 cavalry, 36,000 regular infantry, 3000 chasseurs.

With respect to the aid now furnished by His Majesty to the Portuguese government, there appears to be some ambiguity in your statement. You represent, in the first instance, Great Britain as incurring an expense of about 600,000*l.* per annum for 20,000 Portuguese troops and the pay of the British officers employed in the Portuguese army; but, in a subsequent part of your despatch, after stating the revenue and the expenses, civil and military, of the Portuguese government, you add, "The assistance afforded by Great Britain amounts to about 500,000*l.* per annum; and the remainder, about 900,000*l.*, is a deficiency which cannot be made good in Portugal."

It at first occurred that this 500,000*l.* must have been meant by you to be exclusive of the 600,000*l.* already stated to be paid for 20,000 Portuguese troops; but upon referring to the context, by which it appears that this is the whole aid stated by you to be afforded by Great Britain towards defraying the expense of the civil and military establishments of Portugal, and adverting to the circumstance that no authority appears ever to have

been given for any sum exceeding the 600,000*l.*, and, in point of fact, no bills have been drawn upon the Treasury for sums to a larger amount which can be traced as applicable to any such service—it is conceived, therefore, that these two sums were intended to be the same; and if there has not been an error in copying your despatch, the difference may perhaps be explained by the 100,000*l.* being the amount, or nearly the amount, of the pay of British officers attached to the Portuguese army, and other incidental expenses, and not having been therefore considered by you as constituting part of the subsidy paid for the Portuguese force.

Assuming, therefore, 600,000*l.* to be the whole of the sum now paid for 20,000 Portuguese troops, you propose that a sum should be supplied of 130,000*l.* per annum for the purpose of enabling the Portuguese government to increase the pay of the officers of their army, and that a sum of 300,000*l.* per annum should, in addition to this increase of the pay of the officers, be given to the government for the purpose of enabling them to defray the expense of forming and maintaining magazines for the support of the Portuguese army, or that the British government should engage to maintain 10,000 additional troops, which would cost about 250,000*l.* per annum, leaving the expense of the magazines upon the government.

I am commanded by His Majesty to inform you that, under the circumstances you have stated, he will consent to furnish the proposed aid for increasing the pay of the Portuguese officers. With respect to the additional sum for forming magazines or for maintaining 10,000 additional troops, His Majesty approves of the latter alternative, as he conceives by adopting it he will be best able to ascertain that the money is expended in the way in which it was intended, and that the magazines may very probably be supplied at a smaller expense by the Portuguese government than if they were maintained by His Majesty. His Majesty will, therefore, consent to give this further aid to the 600,000*l.* already paid by him. He will consent to furnish in aid of Portugal, in the whole, the sum of 980,000*l.*, that is:

600,000*l.* for 20,000 Portuguese troops already in his pay.
130,000*l.* for increased pay to officers.
250,000*l.* for 10,000 additional troops.

His Majesty must observe, however, that as you state at present a deficiency in the Portuguese revenue to the amount of 900,000*l.*, this additional aid will still leave a deficiency of 600,000*l.*

In the present state of the expenditure of this country, and with the large British military force which His Majesty has consented to maintain in the Peninsula, in addition to the pecuniary succour afforded in aid of the Portuguese government, His Majesty cannot be expected to exceed the sum which has been already stated, and it will be absolutely necessary that some vigorous and effective measures should be adopted by the Portuguese government for increasing their revenue, or that they should reduce the expense of their civil establishment.

As His Majesty has, however, engaged to take into his pay a Portuguese force of 30,000 men, amounting to two-thirds of the proposed army, he confidently relies that the Portuguese government will take the necessary measures for maintaining the remaining 15,000 men and their militia in a state which you shall judge in all respects to be efficient; and if the Por-

tuguese government shall be found deficient in making the most effectual exertions for this purpose, His Majesty must be considered as reserving to himself the full right of withdrawing, in the whole or in part, the military and pecuniary succours which he has engaged to furnish.

With respect to the embarkation of the British army in case of necessity, it is perfectly clear that the maintaining transports for the embarkation of the cavalry would cost more money than the far greater part of the horses would be worth. It therefore appears to be very desirable that it should be understood that, with the exception of a very small proportion of the best, there should be no intention of bringing away the horses of the cavalry and artillery, in case of an embarkation effected in consequence of the pressure of the enemy. The whole question respecting transports is at present under consideration. The number of transports at Lisbon, by the last returns, is considerable, and I should be glad that you would furnish me with your opinion respecting them: how far they appear to be in a serviceable state, and what proportion of your army, in case of necessity, they would be able to carry away, and what other means of transport can be provided from the ports of Portugal.

With this information His Majesty's government would be able to form a judgment what further arrangement would be most advisable for this branch of the public service.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

LIVERPOOL.

Extract of a Private Letter from the Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Wellington, dated Downing-street, 15th Dec., 1809.

"The arrangement for the Portuguese military establishment will, I hope, be satisfactory to you.

"The expenditure of this country has become enormous, and if the war is to continue, we must look to economy. I do not believe so great a continued effort has ever been made by this country, combining the military and pecuniary aid together, as His Majesty is making for Portugal and Spain. The respective governments of these countries should be made sensible of the truth of this position, and should feel the necessity of making extraordinary exertions for their own support.

"I think it material to draw your attention to the mode of defraying the expense which it has been agreed to incur for the Portuguese army. We are naturally anxious to know, with some certainty, that we have our money's worth for our money.

"It is very desirable, therefore, that the sums advanced by Great Britain for the Portuguese force should be applied directly to defraying the expenses of that force, and should not pass circuitously through the hands of the Portuguese government, by which we might not be certain that it was not diverted to other purposes. I conceive the relation in which you now stand to the Portuguese government will enable you to make an arrangement for this purpose which will prove effectual, and will be at the same time satisfactory to their feelings."

RETURN of the ARMY under the Command of Lieutenant-General LORD VISCOUNT WELLINGTON, K.B., showing its Strength at the under-mentioned periods.

	Serjeants.	Trumpeters and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Serjeants.	Trumpeters and Drummers.	Rank and File.
Between the 29th April and 15th August, 1809.						
Strength of the Army on the 29th April, 1809	..	..	..	1,238	451	22,173
Reinforcements received from England at different periods ..	902	359	15,231	..	..	..
Joined, promoted, and reduced	6	1	2,093	908	360	17,324
				2,146	811	39,497
Regiments sent out of the country	149	57	2,432	..	..	..
Discharged, transferred, deserted, promoted, and reduced	36	..	420	185	57	2,852
				1,961	754	36,645
Between the 15th August and 15th December, 1809.						
Strength of the Army on the 15th August, 1809	..	..	..	1,972	750	35,566
Reinforcements received from England at different periods ..	39	9	993	..	..	..
Joined, promoted, and reduced	328	48	2,787	367	57	3,680
				2,339	807	39,246
Regiments sent out of the country	134	31	2,343	..	..	..
Discharged, transferred, deserted, promoted, and reduced	89	11	643	223	42	2,986
				2,116	765	36,260
Strength of the Army on the 15th December, 1809	..	..	..	1,985	723	32,824

E. M. PAKENHAM, Col., A. A. G.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field-Marshal Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Thomar, 16th Dec., 1809.

I received last night your letter of the 11th from Badajoz relative to making some arrangement for our future operations, to which I lose no time in making my answer. Relative to the mode of employment of the Portuguese troops, the opinion you give, that the greatest advantage will be derived from their being conjunctively employed with the British troops, has ever been my decided opinion, and of which I think there cannot exist a doubt; nor have I one that acting with and under the countenance of British troops they will do very good service and gain credit. And being upon this subject, I will add, that your intention relative to the mode of their acting has rendered unnecessary what otherwise I must have represented, that this army should not again be paraded in expectation of meeting the enemy and be disappointed; or if so, that it should be at least in company with the British army, and that it should have the same chance as it, for what, at least, it declares itself anxious—the meeting the enemy. Your arrangement secures all this, and will certainly give satisfaction to the Portuguese army.

In regard to myself, I think it must be obvious that I must be where the principal force of the Portuguese army is, and which I know both the government and the army will expect; and therefore I shall be with that part which will act conjointly with your army, and the whole of which will be under your personal command.

With the exception of the division-of infantry to be left on the Tagus to act in conjunction with a British division for the defence of the Alentejo, it is not so easy for me to make arrangements, as you have only spoken of the several arms generally, without stating what number of Portuguese cavalry or brigades of artillery you propose I should join to the Alentejo corps. The division of infantry would be composed of the brigade of Algarve (2nd and 14th) and that of the 13th and 20th. The two latter are at present separated, but I propose making them meet as soon as I am informed of your arrangements for the cavalry, that is when I see what places are vacant, or that I can with convenience put them into; and, if you wish, to this corps may be added the 5th caçadores, now at Elvas; but that corps will require a smart English Lieutenant-Colonel, and I wish you could persuade any active Major to take it. I have on purpose kept it vacant, and an English officer acquainted with the movement of light troops would in a month make it fit to act.

The 8th regiment, now at Fundão getting recruited, I propose either to move to meet the 22nd, now at Setuval, or the latter to it. These regiments will yet require some time to be fit to take the field; and in case of moving them northward, I propose placing them in Almeida, removing thence to the army of operations the 12th and 24th, which must be now in very good order. In the case of moving them to Setuval, they would be ready either to go to Lisbon, or, if time should permit their getting into order, to replace one of the brigades now put down for the division

of Alentejo, and which would of course be added to the principal corps of the Portuguese army under my orders. Lisbon, I should think, might, whilst the armies are covering it, be left to its militia, which are numerous, and the police; nor do I think all its militia would be necessary whilst you hold the castle. If you think differently, then the two regiments, 8th and 22nd, may be definitively put down for it, or one of them.

I should propose finally for Almeida but one regiment of the line complete; two or three regiments of militia, according to their strength; with its three companies of artillery that it now has, and some ordenanza that we would throw in, and which will be practised to the gun exercise, making between 3000 and 4000 men for that garrison. The companion regiment of the line to that placed in Almeida I would send to Valença, and form its garrison nearly similarly to the former. For the garrison of Elvas I would leave the two regiments that are at present there, the 5th and 17th, which I have every reason to think will be now immediately recruited and completed, with the regiments of cavalry Nos. 2 and 3, which, by the means promised to be taken by D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz, will be soon completed in men and horses. There is in this place also a regiment of artillery, and I think its garrison and the adjacent forts must, with militia, be completed to at least 8000 men.

Perhaps it may be thought wise to leave, besides the regular regiment in Valença, another in Oporto, to move with the militia beyond the Douro, and to encourage them, though I fear it would be a lost regiment, as I fear the provinces of Porto and Minho, and even Tras os Montes, will be troublesome if left to themselves; and it is impossible to give them anything adequate to be of use, without too much dividing our force, and losing it by piecemeal. I then propose to form the principal corps of the brigades:

Regiments.	Brigadiers.
4, 10	Col. Campbell, now commanding as senior officer.
1, 16	Vacant.
6, 18	Brig.-Gen. Campbell.
7, 19	Brig.-Gen. Blunt.
11, 23	Brig.-Gen. Coleman.
12, 24	Now Cox, but if removed from Almeida would be vacant.
9, 21	Vacant.

Light Troops.

Battalions.	
1, 2	Baron Eben.
4, 6	Baron Leires.
3	Lieut.-Col. Elder.

The cavalry and artillery will depend upon what proportion you wish to have left with the corps in Alentejo. Of the former I have only at present four brigades, and one of those, the 2nd and 11th regiments, I do not consider as effectives; for the latter, though complete in horses, are in no way fit for duty, and they are now merely doing that of escorts. The 2nd regiment has neither men nor horses. I have, however, four squadrons of the 6th and 9th at Chamansque, and pretty well mounted, but all appointments, as they are generally through the cavalry, bad. Of artillery I have at Golegão and Santarem eight brigades, and in pretty good order. What proportion you do not design for the Alentejo corps will be employed with the army or in reserve.

You will observe that I have left the brigade, regiments Nos. 3 and 15, undisposed of, that in case the 8th and 22nd do not go north, it may replace the garrison of Almeida, or be employed in the Minho and Porto. The two battalions of the Legion are now at Castello Branco, where I propose they should remain; and to unite to them the neighbouring militia regiments, to oppose any force in that quarter. Some cavalry must of course be sent; a squadron, I think, would be enough, and a few light guns. This corps, if pressed, would of course fall back on Abrantes, and join the Alentejo corps, or communicate with it. For Abrantes, I would for the present bring the 8th regiment to it, or have that or the 22nd ready to move into it if they are not thought necessary for Lisbon, which I do not myself think. As all the corps of Alentejo and Beira Baxa will fall back on this place, it is not so necessary determinedly to fix its garrison.

It would certainly be most desirable that I should now, without delay, move all my troops, so as to make everything ready in a moment to execute these arrangements; but they are so totally destitute of all things necessary to preserve them from the inclemency of the season, that I am really afraid of it; for though they are equally badly off where stationed, yet in their respective places they have been settled and arranged everything to make themselves as little badly off as possible; and when you get into your quarters, it will make it difficult to extricate the two regiments at Almeida and get others there.

You will see that the army has been long classed in brigades, as I annex the classification; but how to get General officers for them I am really at a loss. You see there will be three brigades of the army of Beira without commanders, and I really cannot get Portuguese officers of that rank capable of either disciplining or conducting a brigade. There is one German Brigadier, rather a clever man, and would perhaps conduct a brigade better than he would discipline one. I shall take advantage of him, and in a separate letter I shall propose others to you.

I will send you shortly a detailed account of the disposal of the militia, but as I before mentioned, in the distribution of this force I am much puzzled from the want of arms. I have sent to you by the present courier the monthly returns of the army, and I also send the last return of the militia, to which last I direct to be added the number of arms in possession of each corps, that you may have a full view of our means.

If you think it better that another brigade should be applied to local defence, then I would leave the 1st and 16th for Valença and north of the Douro, send the 3rd and 15th to relieve the 12th and 24th at Almeida, and leave the 8th and 22nd disposable for Abrantes and Castello Branco; and if, when the 3rd and 15th regiments shall be more effective, one regiment will suffice for each of the places Almeida and Valença, then the 1st and 16th may be called to the army of operations. I will of course leave everything as it is until I hear from you, and when you tell me the proportion of cavalry and artillery you desire from the Portuguese army for the corps d'armée in Alentejo, I will make the consequent necessary arrangements.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,

Yours most truly,

W. C. BERESFORD.

[294.] G. O. Badajoz, 17th Dec., 1809.

1. The officer commanding the general hospitals at Elvas, Estremoz, and Villa Viçosa, is to appoint a board of officers at each of those places to examine the arms, accoutrements, clothing, &c. belonging to soldiers now in hospital, or who have been discharged from the hospital, or have died, which articles may be in the possession of the Purveyor-General at the present moment.

This board is to make a register of these articles by regiments, inserting in the register the marks or names on each article. Of this register one copy must be given to the Purveyor-General, and one copy forwarded to the Adjutant-General's office, to be communicated to the several regiments.

2. The Assistant-Quartermaster-General at Elvas must be one of the members of this board.

3. The Purveyor-General must be particularly careful in keeping the register of arms, &c. brought by the soldiers to the general hospital in future, in obedience to His Majesty's regulations of the 31st March, 1800.

4. In order to enable the Purveyor-General or his deputy to obey this order, the officers commanding regiments are invariably to send with a soldier to the hospital, whether general, brigade, detachment, or regimental, a ticket made out in the following form :—

To the Purveyor of His Majesty's hospital at

SIR,

Please to receive into the hospital the following men of the

Dated the day of 18 .

FRONT.

Men's Names.	Troop or Company.	Disease, and how long ill.	N.B. This must be signed by one commanding officer, besides the surgeon or his mate, as underneath.
			Capt. ——
			Lieut. ——
			Cornet ——
			Ensign ——
			Surgeon ——
			Surg. Mate ——

RETURN of Arms, Accoutrements, and Necessaries, sent with him or them.

REAR.

Men's Names.	Troop or Company.	Necessaries.										Clothing.					Arms and Accoutrements.									
		Shirts.	Shoes.	Stockings.	Brushes.	Black balls.	Combs.	Great coat straps.	Stock and clasp.	Gaiters.	Knapsack.	Cap and tuft.	Coat.	Waistcoat.	Breeches.	Great coat.	Fusil or halbert.	No. or mark on ditto.	Musket.	No. or mark on ditto.	Bayonet and scabbard.	Sling.	Bayonet belt.	Pouch belt and pouch.	Haversack.	Canteen and strap.
	TOTAL .																									

5. When men are sent to a general or detachment hospital by any regiment, the officer commanding must report to the General officer commanding the brigade whether this order has been obeyed.

6. The Purveyor-General or the medical officer in charge of the arms, accoutrements, &c. in any hospital, must report immediately any instance in which obedience to this order may have been neglected, otherwise he will be considered responsible for all loss and damage of arms and accoutrements of soldiers in hospital.

7. The officer commanding at Lisbon will give directions that these orders, respecting the formation of the registry, &c. may be carried into execution at the general hospital at Lisbon.

WELLINGTON.

[295.] G. O. Badajoz, 18th Dec., 1809.

1. In order to prevent the inconvenience which the army would suffer from the absence of the officers of the Staff, the Commander of the Forces has determined that all officers belonging to the departments of the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General of the army in Spain and Portugal, who shall be absent from the Peninsula on any account except that of having been wounded, shall cease to receive their Staff pay and allowance in two months from the period of their embarkation, although they will continue on the list of their respective departments, and will return to their duties in them, when they will rejoin the army.

The Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General will attend to this order in making up the abstracts of their several departments.

WELLINGTON.

Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

(Translation.)

MY LORD, Lisbon, 18th Dec., 1809.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th inst., by which, after your Excellency having communicated to the Governors of the kingdom the causes and reasons that have induced and determined your Excellency to move the British army from the frontiers of Alentejo into the province of Beira, has, at the same time, represented and called the attention of the Governors of the kingdom on the necessity that exists of employing the most prompt and vigorous exertions in order to able us to repel with success those that the common enemy will, in all probability, make in a little time to invade and subject the kingdom, in order that, with the assistance and exertions that the British army is to afford, may be obtained, as your Excellency expects, from the opinion that has formed of the Portuguese nation, that the assistance and succours afforded by Great Britain, and the particular interest that His Britannic Majesty has and takes in our national welfare, may not be frustrated or afforded in vain; and in order, therefore, to promote in our part

the happy end in view, your Excellency particularly recommends to complete immediately the number of our regular army of the line and militia, and observes the urgent necessity of knowing individually all the means existent of land and water transports on the rivers Tagus, Mondego, and Douro, in order that, in case of invasion in that part of the frontiers left unprotected, on account of its situation, to the inroads of the enemy, and not possible to defend, they may be deprived not only of the means of the same transports, but from all the valuable articles and provisions to be removed on the same from the parts of the frontiers left indefensible; and ultimately your Excellency likewise recommends to the Governors to inquire into the general state of the collection of the taxes, particularly into that recently laid on the property, in the collecting of which your Excellency supposes that there has been some negligence, and suggests, as a proper way of punishment, to expose to the public the name of those individuals that, though being rich and able, have delayed and omitted to pay their due proportion of this tax, and proved by their conduct their want of patriotism. The Governors of the kingdom, whom I made acquainted with your reflections, have ordered me to assure you that they will not omit their utmost exertions in discharging the first and the most conspicuous part of their duty and responsibility towards His Royal Highness, and which they consider to be to procure and to endeavour to defend, with all the means they possess, his dominions from suffering a new invasion that a cruel enemy prepares for them. Trusting in the protection of the Divine Providence, that it will be pleased to bless the exertions and efforts of a nation that only pretends to maintain its rights and independency so unjustly attacked, they likewise trust and expect that His Britannic Majesty will continue to support a cause of so great importance for one of his most ancient and faithful allies, the Prince Regent of Portugal. Being likewise assured of the loyal sentiments of patriotism of the nation, the Governors will never lose their courage whilst supported by so great motives of hopes; they have, at the same time, the happiness of finding the defence of the kingdom committed to the valour, talents, and activity of a General of the so many distinguished and eminent qualifications of your Excellency, and that reunites to all them the particular interest that takes in the happiness of a nation that tributes to your Excellency friendship and the correspondent acknowledgment for the glorious deeds and important services that your Excellency has already rendered and will continue to render, with the most acknowledged advantage, not only to this country but to the common cause, which we are defending with so much justice and reason.

In order to complete the regular establishment of the army, government has to hope that the decrees that have been recently published, and of which I have enclosed copies, will answer the purpose of not only completing the army in men, but the remounting of the cavalry. However, the Governors are obliged to observe that this measure will be of no use in case we don't obtain the necessary arms, as we have not them. Such is the want of them that the militia of the kingdom, in their complete state amounting to 52,000 men, only 25,000 of them are armed, and that, even to arm completely the troops of the line, it will be indispensable to receive the arms that we have requested from Great Britain.

By the enclosed model, or copies of the returns, your Excellency will see that orders have been already given to form a list and-register in each district of the means of transports that they possess within their limits; and, at the same time, orders have been issued that the said returns should be sent to the Corregidores of each district, and by them a general recapitulation to the Intendent-General of the police of the kingdom, to whom the general direction of the transports in the kingdom had been committed, as it will appear to your Excellency from the enclosed printed instructions; and, in the like manner, orders have been issued to form a general register of the boats existents upon the river; but, as the object for which your Excellency designs this inquiry will always depend of the military movements, and which cannot be entrusted to the magistrates to send the force it seems to be advisable, if your Excellency approves of it, to order the same magistrates to send the above lists to the Generals of the provinces, and these Generals may establish a sub-division in the different districts, intrusted to able officers, charged with the execution of the orders and movements that your Excellency may have antecedently ordained to the same Generals or Governors of the provinces. The likewise to be observed in regard to the boats upon the rivers, and, as their course is through different provinces, it appears that it would be convenient to appoint officers who might superintend the whole movement of the boats within a given or establish length, or part of the same rivers; as, for instance, the Governor of Abrantes from Villa Velha down to Tancos, and the Governor of Santarem from Tancos to Vallada, and another officer, stationed at Villa Franca, from Vallada down to the village of Alhandra; and, lastly, one at Lisbon, and who can be appointed an officer of the marine; and, in the mean time, orders have been given to number the boats, and entered the names of their owners and their district in the general register, as your Excellency recommends. It is, however, requested, at the same time, that your Excellency will have the goodness to acquaint me with his opinion upon the divisions that the said boats ought to form, and the officers to whom they are to be intrusted, agreeable to the above exposition on this subject.

The article of the taxes has been taken into consideration, and the most vigorous orders will be issued to render effective its collection.

I avail myself of this opportunity to assure your Excellency of the high esteem, &c.

DOM MIGUEL PEREIRA FORJAZ.

[296.] *To Benjamin Sydenham, Esq.*

MY DEAR SYDENHAM, Badajoz, 19th Dec., 1809.

I have received a letter from Lord Liverpool, in which he has desired me to send him a narrative of the operations of the last campaign, with the causes of each, &c., &c.; in short, very much the kind of paper which I sent you for Pole and Lord Wellesley. I have told him that I had sent you this paper, and that I would desire you to give him a copy of it; and

accordingly I shall be very much obliged to you if you will have a copy made for him and send it to him.*

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Gen. Hill to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Assumar, 19th Dec., 1809.

I have just had the honour to receive your letter of yesterday's date,† and beg leave to express my best thanks for your kind offer of a separate command, and which I will most gladly accept, although I shall feel considerable reluctance at being detached from the army under your Lordship's immediate command. I propose going to Portalegre to-day, where I shall remain till Thursday, and then proceed to Abrantes by Crato, should I not receive directions to the contrary.

I have only to add that I feel extremely obliged to your Lordship for consulting my wishes on this occasion, and have the honour to remain, my dear Lord,

Your very faithful and obliged servant,

R. HILL, Lieut.-General.

Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Torres Vedras,‡ 25th Dec., 1809.

I came to this place on the 23rd instant on my way to Castanheira, after having examined the country about Mafra, on which I shall now have the honour of submitting my observations.

I beg, however, first to mention, that as to the plan of defence for the plain near Castanheira, I was certainly influenced by what I understood to be the bias of your Lordship's opinion, to which it is no less my inclination than my duty to pay every attention. I shall ever feel gratified in the recollection of the general expressions of approbation contained in your Lordship's letter of the 13th instant.

The position of Mafra is undoubtedly very important, and, were it possible to approach it only by the road from Torres Vedras, would be exceedingly strong; but this strength will naturally induce an enemy to attempt the flanks, and, including our whole line of defence from the Tagus to the sea, these are, I fear, our most vulnerable points. The country in this part of Portugal, though chiefly composed of a succession of strong hills, is not of that decidedly mountainous character but that infantry may pass with ease almost anywhere. The importance of the different positions to be taken up is very much increased or lessened by the difficulty or facility of

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. v., p. 347: Memorandum dated 9th Dec., 1809.

† See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. v., p. 373.

‡ Torres Vedras Lines were occupied 10th October, 1810.

turning them with artillery, and these very much depend on the season of the year.

In approaching Mafra by the direct road from Torres Vedras, an enemy would have much strong ground to contend with in his front. First, at the village of Serra de Viila. The hill on which this is situated affords very favourable points for enfilading the road (a part of which might be destroyed), to the distance of 1000 or 1200 yards. On each flank of this position is a deep ravine, which renders it a tolerably good post for 3000 or 4000 men. At this place a road turns off for Sobral d'Albeheira and Encarnação, and leads to Ericiera.

The next defensible point on the road is at the town of Trocifal. From the hill on which it is situated the road may be nearly enfiladed for about 800 yards. The principal church would be a strong post for infantry, and there are a small chapel and some other buildings which might be occupied to advantage. The villages of Azuira, Leviomento, and Bandalhoira might be disputed. About 1200 yards south of the latter is a favourable height for commanding the road for 700 or 800 yards, at the bottom of which is a stone bridge of one arch, across a gully, which might be destroyed. There is, about 800 yards beyond this, a range of heights lying west of the road, called the Serra de Chipre. This is excessively strong ground, and about 1 mile in length, but extending obliquely from the road. Here what may be termed the Pass of Mafra may be said to commence. On a knoll connected with the Serra the Governor of Mafra has constructed a small redoubt with six embrasures; but as it would be very difficult to withdraw guns from it, I would prefer placing them at a mill on the right of the Serra itself, which is a good situation, and in which they would be more secure. At this mill I would place two guns to command the road, and at another mill to the westward of it I would have a good redoubt for 400 men and two guns, to cover the left and rear by commanding the approach from the other parts of the Serra. This would be more effectually done by the addition of two other redoubts, were it not multiplying works too much.

On the east of the road near this place part of the park wall of the palace at Mafra runs nearly at right angles to the road, and it would seem proper to occupy the most flanking and commanding points by infantry; two guns might also be placed behind to fire over it and command the road, and they could retire through the park. The guns placed on the Serra would retreat by a road now requiring some repairs, leading through the village of Cadoçal into the main road.

The heights on each side of the road in rear of this village are very good situations both for light troops and artillery, and they extend to the village of Mongiera. If defended by about 3000 men, it would be so difficult to force them in front, that an enemy would naturally endeavour to turn them either by one or both flanks, and thus, by compelling those who defend the pass to retire, to open the main road for his artillery.

In turning our left (having forced the Serra de Chipre, or turned it by Sobral d'Albeheira) he would have to pass a deep ravine, with an inconsiderable stream in its bottom; having done which, he would fall into the road leading from Ribamar and Morvoa. In advancing along this ground he might be checked by two redoubts for 300 men and one gun each, by forming a pine wood into an abattis and by occupying some houses with

infantry, thus endeavouring to command the ground from this ravine to another running to the sea in rear of the villages of Cazoes and Junqueiro: the distance across is about 800 or 900 yards. An enemy might still, however, get into our rear by passing the second ravine.

But it seems perhaps more probable that he would attempt to turn our right flank, by which he might double the head of the ravine in rear of Cadoçal, and fall into the road from Montachique to Mafra, and would leave the Lisbon road by Cheleiros open to him, from which he might cut us off, or attack our rear.

To protect our right as far as possible, and to command the Montachique road, it might be desirable to have a redoubt for about 400 men and two guns on the hill marked Cabeça de Mongiera, and another on the opposite side of the road for the same force. On a knoll in front of the first of these there might be a small work for 100 men and one gun, and on a high commanding hill, in front of the second, another of the same description. The road from the village of Abunheira would thus be well commanded, and immediately in front of the works, where it crosses a deep gully, it might be destroyed so as not to be repaired while these works were held. There is another rising ground, about 700 yards from the junction of the Montachique and Lisbon roads, on which a redoubt for 300 men and three field pieces might greatly facilitate the retreat of the troops defending the pass, should they be compelled to fall back; but infantry might still gain our rear by a wider movement, passing between Abunheira and Malvera, if some part of this extensive line were not forced in front.

On the whole, to occupy the pass in the way I have mentioned, including the troops for the protection of its flanks, to watch the rear, and to command the Montachique road, there should not perhaps be less than the following strength:—

	Men.	Field-pieces.
For three redoubts on the Serra de Chipre, and to command and enfilade the road	1200	6
In the small redoubt now existing	100	1
In the park behind the wall, to occupy the flanking and most commanding points	600	2
To occupy the strong ground on each side of the road in rear of the ravine, passing from Cadoçal to the sea, and to assist in supporting the flanks and rear, independent of the men and guns supposed to retreat from the Serra de Chipre and front of the park	1500	4
For the two redoubts covering the left	600	2
For the two redoubts and two small works in their front, covering the right, and commanding the road from Montachique to Mafra	1000	6
Making a total of	5000	21

Of which six might be howitzers.

Between Mongiera and the road to Ericiera there is a point at which the ravine, passing by Cazaes, crosses the great road. Here it would be easily destroyed; but an enemy could avoid it by forcing his way through the park, in which there are several roads leading to Mafra.

Should the troops from Torres Vedras have fallen back for Montachique, or should the enemy, from any cause, take the Mafra road in force, perhaps the strength I have mentioned may not be deemed adequate to the defence of the position; and with great deference I venture to submit my ideas for your Lordship's consideration. As was before observed, our rear would still be open to infantry by a circuitous movement.

Should works not be approved of, or should it (from the variety of other services) be impossible to execute them, the pass would still, I imagine, be occupied by light troops and a proportion of well-appointed field artillery, paying due attention to the flanks and rear, as far as the number of men that could be allotted for this ground would admit.

Finding that there is a direct road from Ericiera to Cintra, I thought it my duty to visit the former place, the inhabitants of which say that this communication is used by them at all seasons of the year, and that it is not bad for cars.

The river between Ericiera and Carvoira is crossed by a stone bridge of two arches; but it appears now to be perfectly fordable. The road leading down to the river is cut out of the side of a very steep rocky height, and might be destroyed so as to render the repair of it a work of very considerable labour, even if not interrupted. The ground on this side of the river is the most commanding; but still a battery might be tolerably well armed to defend the part of the road broken up, and the communication up the hill on the left bank might also be cut through.

But the importance of Ericiera is much increased by the roads which lead to it from the northward, some of which would turn all our positions. I took that by St. Isidiro and Encarnação to Ponte de Rol, and thence to Torres Vedras. Some part of this must be decidedly impassable for artillery during a wet winter, and indeed is now very nearly so. This road continues from Contada to Vimeiro, and is used by the country people with their cars, I understand, at all times. The Governor of Mafra, who appears to know the country tolerably well, seems to be of opinion that with the means always possessed by an army, any of these roads would be easily passed with light artillery, unless after continued heavy rains.

On the road from Montachique to Mafra there are communications that lead to Loures, and even on to Bellas and Tuduy, without joining the great road. That from Malvera appears to be commonly used, and not to present a sufficient degree of difficulty to cars to induce the peasants to follow the great road by Montachique or Mafra. On the north of the above road (from Montachique to Mafra) several others also fall in, as from Povoa de Gallega, Tituario, Enxara dos Cavalleiros, and Enxara do Bispo, and they appear to be much used. They would naturally all turn the pass of Montachique and the position of Mafra. I will not fail as far as I can, consistently with due attention to the works, to examine these communications; but from what I can learn I do not doubt that in tolerably dry weather they are in general, with little repair at particular points, practicable to artillery.

I have examined the ground of the position of Montachique. Between the summit of the Cabeça and the road is an excellent emplacement for guns to act on the latter, into which they could easily retire when necessary. The Cabeça should be crowned with light troops for their support. On the opposite or eastern side of the road are two very substantial garden walls,

which should have banquettes made to them, between which and the ground first mentioned is a good situation for guns to enfilade the road through the village. For this part of the defences I would propose six pieces of field artillery, which might move from place to place as occasion required, and would command both the Torres Vedras and Mafra roads. On the east of the garden walls above described there is a rising ground, which is a good situation for a work of 300 men and four pieces of artillery, to command the great road and ground near it; but the soil is very hard and unfavourable for working. This work would also command a road which runs along the heights and communicates with Freixal by Fanpoens. In the rear of this spot, at the distance of 900 or 1000 yards, are two hills about 550 yards apart, and connected with each other by lower ground. The easternmost of these bears about south-east from the Cabeça. It would be desirable that each of them should be occupied by a redoubt for 400 men and two field-pieces, both to prevent their being possessed by an enemy and to command a view of the valley on the right and towards Bucellas; but it would be very difficult to construct these works, from the extreme rockiness of the ground. There is an old mill on the east of the road, a little in front of the Cabeça, which is a good situation for a redoubt for 250 men (musketry only); the mill to be fitted as a blockhouse. There is a piece of ground in front of another old mill, on the west of the road, which is a very good spot for a redoubt for 300 men and three field-pieces to enfilade the roads both from Mafra and Torres Vedras. There is a height with some pines on it on the east of the road, where I would propose a work for 200 men and two guns; the trees to be formed into an abattis. This would have a fine command of the road, and would give a good flank to the last hill. There is also an advanced rocky bluff on the north-east of the ground last mentioned, and there is another rocky point bearing rather more eastward: on each of these it would be desirable to have a redoubt for 200 men and a field-piece, if possible to construct such works; but the soil is very hard and unfavourable.

There is a commanding height about 450 yards long in the rear of the Mafra road, and about north by west of the Cabeça. I would occupy one end of this hill with a redoubt for 300 men and 2 guns, and the other with a work for 200 men and 2 guns. This hill has a fine command of the road through the valley, on the left of the Cabeça, which leads to Loures; it would very much support our left flank, and assist generally in the defence of the pass.

About a mile and a half in front of the Cabeça there is a height on the west of the road, a good situation for a work of 250 men and 2 field pieces, and on another hill, a little more advanced, on the east side of the road, there might be two redoubts; that in front for 300 men and 2 guns, and that in the rear for 200 men, and for musketry only; this would rest the right on a valley, and is not commanded; the small village of Prezinheira, on the right, might be occupied. This may be considered as the front of the pass.

Should the works I have mentioned be approved of and executed, they would require 3200 men and 25 pieces of ordnance, of which 6 might be howitzers. The whole number is 29, but it is supposed that those in the two front works may retreat and occupy some of the points towards the rear.

If your Lordship should consider the retreat of the guns and howitzers from Torres Vedras to Cabeça de Montachique as secure, they will be more than I have named for the latter, as they will amount to 34 guns and 8 howitzers; but it would probably be more prudent to arm these posts independently of each other if possible. There would yet remain 1800 men of the 5000 allotted, to act between the works, to sustain the flanks, and watch the rear.

Should it, however, be considered advisable to induce the enemy to attempt the front (which is certainly very good ground to dispute) rather than compel him to endeavour to turn our flanks, perhaps those works only which most immediately contributed to the protection of our right and left would be executed, and the front be defended by light troops and moveable artillery.

There are many trees on each side of the road, about the front of this pass, which, if there were time to cut them down, would occasion considerable impediments to an enemy.

The drawing of the Serra de Servas, including the front of the pass of Bucellas, is, I understand, complete, but I have not received it from the officer who made the survey; he is now employed in connecting it with the position of Alhandra and the mountains ranging in its rear towards Alverca. I will trace on the drawings the points that I think should be occupied by works and guns for the defence of the pass of Bucellas, and send the whole by the first opportunity. I do not think it would be necessary to have more than redoubts to cover the flanks of the troops who defend the pass in front, which is in itself very strong, and affords excellent emplacements for guns, which I will point out.

There is a road leading from Freixal, on the west of the pass of Bucellas, which falls into the Lisbon road in the rear of Loures; this point seems, therefore, worth attention, and indeed it seems very desirable to keep up a connected chain of communication and defence from Bucellas to the Cabeça de Montachique, as far as possible.

The road from Freixal, above mentioned, crosses the river of Loures by a broad ford, about mid-way between that town and the village of Friellas; it might be desirable to place a dam below this ford, and to command it by a redoubt for 300 men and 2 guns, placed on a hill immediately above a building called the Quinta de Corregidor; this would connect with the heights on the slope of which the town is situated, and which, if considered as a position for the rear-guard of an army, is tolerably defensible as to its front, but its left gradually rises into the mountains, by which an attempt would probably be made to turn it; its situation seems important, as in case of reverse a considerable corps of the army from the great road on the Tagus would, I imagine, pass this way.

There is a space on the right, between the Quinta de Corregidor and Friellas, of about 1400 yards, the river in which extent is fordable in most places; 500 yards of this, from the village, might be defended by using the marsh wall as a parapet; but the remaining 900 yards would be still open. Were there time and means, another redoubt might be placed so as to contribute materially to the defence of this space.

The bridge of Loures might be destroyed in four or five hours, for which about two barrels of powder might be required. Two dams placed, the one at

100 and the other about 300 yards below the bridge, would, I believe, render the river impassable for some distance above them; but they would require to be defended.

I do not wish to delay this report, but I will send your Lordship another as soon as possible, in which I will submit my ideas as to a work between this place and Runa, to prevent an enemy from advancing from Mercearia against this place; and perhaps it would also be desirable to have something to check him on the hill south of Runa, or between Ribaldiero and Enxara dos Cavalleiros. On this I will take the liberty of reporting further.

I before mentioned that Alenquer is, in itself, a strong situation, if its local position should be considered as important.

I have sent a list of palisades, fascines, &c., which should be provided for the works at the Cabeça de Montachique, should they be approved; of those for the pass of Bucellas, and of field ordnance for those near Fort St. Julian's and Oeyras.

I am sorry to add that I am seriously uneasy respecting the works at the last mentioned position. The soil at the old mill, immediately above Oeyras, proves so hard and rocky, that a very small quantity of it is removed daily. The ground on which the principal work above the fort is situated is somewhat, but not much more favourable; and the number of men, notwithstanding my repeated applications, does not increase. I had yesterday a note from Captain Goldfinch, mentioning that with the militia now at St. Julian's (about 400) the above works would not be completed in less than three months; under these circumstances I have directed that the whole strength shall be placed on the principal work only. When I last addressed your Lordship on this subject I still hoped that the orders of Marshal Beresford to increase the militia to the number originally demanded would have been attended to, and I did not then believe that the soil, though bad, would have proved so very unfavourable as it now does. I shall repeat my application to the Marshal, though I am well convinced he has done everything in his power to promote the service. Our number at Sobral has never yet amounted to more than half what I asked for, and is now much less than that proportion; there will, therefore, be great delay in the execution of the works near that place; the soil is in general hard and rocky. The entrenchments here will, I think, be completed in about three weeks, should the weather prove tolerable. I would then, with your Lordship's permission, propose to divide the men between the works near Fort St. Julian's and those near Sobral.

I think 12-pounders will answer very well for both the Torres Vedras and Sobral positions, and observe, by the returns your Lordship had the goodness to send me, that we have 30 guns of that nature.

I fear we shall materially feel the want of engineers from the variety of services connected with that department which it may become necessary to undertake at the same moment; they are all now busily employed. Captain Chapman assists me in the general execution of the several duties with which I am entrusted, and to his activity and intelligence I am much indebted. Captain Goldfinch is employed in assisting the Portuguese engineers in the defences of Lisbon, as requested by Marshal Beresford, and on which I have desired him to prepare a detailed report. He has also a general

charge of the works in front of St. Julian's, having Captain Widekind under his orders, who is on the spot; all the other officers are divided among the different works going forward. Should Captain Ross quit head-quarters, it will leave only Captain Burgoyne with the army.

I have lately sent a subaltern to Abrantes, at the desire of Captain Patton, who has long had the direction of those works, and who wishes to have about fourteen or fifteen traversing platforms mounted on the defences of that place, in situations not liable to enfilade fire; under such circumstances they are certainly applicable, and I have written to Lisbon to know how many the Portuguese can spare. I know they have some; but I think a few might be useful in the work in front of St. Julian's. Should I not succeed in procuring the number Captain Patton requires, he wishes to know whether timber might be purchased at Lisbon. I find they could be made at Abrantes.

Captain Patton also wishes for permission to make use of the British depôt of tools now at Abrantes, but which of course I cannot presume to give without reference to your Lordship.

I have ordered the necessary tools to Castanheira, to which place I shall proceed immediately, and shall consider the defences of the plain in the way pointed out.

The different towns and villages to which I have referred will be found in the drawing made by the Portuguese engineers in your Lordship's possession.

The works at Castanheira shall commence as soon as possible after the militia assemble there. There will not now remain more than about one hundred pick-axes disposable for any other works, until some of those now in hand are completed.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

RICHARD FLETCHER,

Lieut.-Colonel, Royal Engineers.

[297.] G. O. Gavião, 28th Dec., 1809.

The Commander of the Forces requests that the officers commanding divisions will direct the officers of the Quartermaster-General's department attached to them respectively to arrange with the magistrates of the different towns and villages in which the troops may be cantoned, in what houses General officers, Field officers, captains, and subalterns, respectively, shall be quartered; and the officers are to be quartered according to this arrangement.

The Commander of the Forces is concerned to notice that complaints of the conduct of some of the officers of the army to the inhabitants of Portugal have already reached him, and he

is convinced that it must be of those who have lately joined the army, and were not partakers of the kindness with which the whole army were treated by the people of this country at the commencement of the campaign.

There is no doubt that by civility and good treatment the officers of the army will receive from the inhabitants of Portugal again all the assistance and kindness which they can afford, and the Commander of the Forces is exceedingly anxious that the people of this country should not be brought by the misconduct of the army to detest those who are sent here to assist them in the defence of their country. He particularly desires that the officers on the Commissariat and Medical Staff will pay attention to these orders, and that the Commissary-General will send a copy of them to each of the Commissaries who are detached.

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Col. R. Fletcher to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Castanheira, 31st Dec., 1809.

I have the honour to report to your Lordship that I have attentively considered the defences of the plain near this place, with the views pointed out in your Lordship's letter of the 13th inst., on which I beg to submit the following observations:—

I have tried on the spot, at a point which appeared to give a fair average height and breadth of ground between the bank and the stream, how far it would be practicable to throw open the whole bed to fire, by cutting away a part of the height, and filling in the space below, so as to be commanded by guns placed on the summit of the hill.

The labour to effect this object would be very different in different places; but, on the whole, I think it would be generally necessary to cut back about thirty feet, and to cut down about four feet. This would give about 10,000 solid yards to remove to the point G, which, admitting that a man did 3 yards per day, would require the labour of 1000 men for nearly three days and a half. But these calculations are always liable to some contingencies; the soil becomes harder the farther it is cut from the surface, and a man may not remove and dispose of the quantity I have mentioned.

The distance from the bridge to the point G is about 1500 yards; and it, therefore, might require double the labour I have mentioned to throw open the *whole* bed of the river to a view of the top of the hill, or the labour of 1000 men for a week.

The slope cut in the way I have proposed would not be commanded by a work in its rear (even were such work 8 feet above the level of the plain), at the distance of more than 60 yards from it; to defend the bed of the river completely in front, therefore, the works must be within that

distance, or the slope from the bed must be more gradual, and the making it will be attended with additional labour, still without the possibility of placing works to command it at any considerable distances from the river. It appears, therefore, that, should the slope I have described be made, the bed of the river must either be entirely defended by flank-fire from the hills, or by works placed near its banks. It is to be remarked that guns on the *summit* of the hill only would see this slope, and that those placed lower down, so as to be concealed on the flank, would lose the view of the bed of the river in proportion as they were on a lower level.

I have to mention that, on seeing the river of Castanheira, I observed that its water was some feet lower than when I was last here. I then saw it two or three days at low tide, and was told by persons residing near it that it was never less deep than at that moment. They said it was then decidedly impassable below the point G, and that, from the depth of water and mud, the attempt would be attended with danger. This assertion was, I believe, then correct; and on my observing the difference of level of the water to one of the same men, he said it was still equally impossible to cross it, and that it continued so throughout the summer, and nothing could induce him to make the experiment. With some difficulty, however, I prevailed on a lad to pass it, which he did with tolerable ease, in various places between the point G and the Tagus. The mud appears soft, except in the very centre of the stream; but the boy did not sink so high as his waist. From the prevalence of northerly winds, I need not add that the tides are unusually low; but, however, as the Tagus is in itself much lower in summer than in winter, I should conceive, from what I have now seen, that the Castanheira river at low water, when the Tagus is low, is not, at any point from the bridge to the latter, a serious impediment. This circumstance seems to call for more attention in the mode of defence to be adopted.

I believe a dam near the mouth of the river would be one of the most obvious remedies; but this would require considerable labour, and should be established in the most solid manner, with a large sluice in it, to allow the water to pass and prevent the dam from being carried away by any considerable increase from rain. Those I proposed in my letter to your Lordship of the 4th inst. were supposed to be made above the point G, and at the moment of occupying the position. It is probable that, in a dry season, some of these might still be necessary, in addition to one near the mouth of the river; the latter might be attempted only when it might become necessary to raise the water, yet without a sluice a few days of rain would, I conceive, destroy it.

On the whole, having submitted these ideas, I shall wait to be honoured with your Lordship's decision as to the mode of defending the river of Castanheira: whether the banks shall be sloped off, so as that the whole bed may come within view, and a part of it within the fire of the hill; or whether the defences in the plain shall be brought to the edge of the bank (which might, in that case, be somewhat strengthened by scarping), so as to command the stream and lower ground on each side of it; how numerous they should be, and what artillery they should contain.

I fear it will not be possible, even though we should sink the batteries and other works in the bank, to conceal them completely from the view of an enemy; the guns and men must, in that case, fire over the present

level, and, unless the bank were sloped for musketry, it would not still command the bed of the river; the labour, also, of cutting out the whole surface to a sufficient depth would be very considerable.

If, as your Lordship proposes, a redoubt be constructed on the road from the principal ford, and about 300 or 400 yards from it, and another at the junction of the Tagus with the river of Castanheira, and the infantry are to be placed in trenches to cover them from the fire of cannon, there are several drains, at various distances from the latter stream, some of which might be deepened and widened for this purpose; and I could wish for your Lordship's commands as to the distance they should be from that river. Such of them being employed as would best answer the end, by cutting other cover where required the musketry-line might be continued across the plain. The other drains might afford a little partial cover from distance to distance to an enemy who had forced the river, should he compel our troops to retire; and, unless their giving the same degree of cover to our own men, to enable them to check the enemy from time to time, should more than counterbalance the advantage he could derive from them, they should be filled up as far as possible. They might, in their present state, considerably derange a charge of cavalry coming suddenly upon them.

At the distance of from 600 to 900 yards from the river of Castanheira there is a large trench running to the Tagus, made also to drain the land; and in rear of this is an embankment (marked 4, 5 in plan) now affording considerable cover, and which could, with a moderate degree of labour, be increased and formed into a good parapet, and which might, I think, at that distance be concealed from the enemy. At present the trench in its front is no very serious impediment to infantry, nor could it be made so without great trouble. A dam might be constructed to stop the water coming from the land; but should it, from heavy rains, be very abundant, it would become necessary to have a sluice. In dry weather no good would arise from it; the present high tides do not rise to a level with even the mouth of this drain, and therefore could not be introduced into it.

Were this not too distant from the river of Castanheira, or were a mere parapet considered as sufficient, it might be continued from the point 5 to the main road, and might be flanked for the full range of artillery from concealed batteries at 6 and 7 (as marked in the accompanying plan), at one of which I would, to meet your Lordship's ideas, propose three, and at the other two of the 18-pounders mentioned for the summit of the hill in my report of the 4th inst. These guns would also act on the ground in front of a redoubt on the road from the principal ford, leaving or not, as may be considered best, the other three 18-pounders on the hill, to have a more general command in front as well as flank. There is a garden on the west of the road in which two field-pieces might be placed in a concealed work among the trees, and which would, by removing a part of the wall, have a fine flank command on the left of the plain; but its own flank would not be so well covered as that of those shut in by the height. The last-mentioned line in the plain, however, seems too distant to have any immediate connexion with the defence of the river, and perhaps even for a second line or reserve.

My first wish is to follow your Lordship's views with respect to this

ground generally, by paying due attention to the actual strength of it without too great an appearance of preparation; and your Lordship will best judge from this further report in what manner this should be effected.

Should your Lordship think it desirable to establish a dam and sluice at the mouth of the Castanheira river, it would be necessary to employ men accustomed to this kind of work, of whom there must be many in Lisbon. It would, I imagine, be easy to find some master-workman who would undertake the whole, to whom I could give my ideas on the subject; but, indeed, from what is said of the effect of winter torrents in this country, it might be extremely difficult at present to construct such a sluice as would be secure, adverting to the nature of the soil and the probable increase of water during the execution of the work.

I am sorry to say I have this day received a report from Fort St. Julian's that on the 28th inst. only 300 of the Portuguese militia could be found to parade. This regiment ought, I understand, to muster 1200 strong, though it has not given us an average of 400 men for the works. The number at Sobral does not yet increase.

The militia intended for this place have not yet begun to assemble here, nor have I heard anything of them. I have written to Marshal Beresford on the subject. The moment they arrive, the communications up the hills and other works, as ordered, shall be begun.

With further reference to the river at Castanheira, it is important to observe that on the enemy's side there is a great deal of cover by drains and hollow roads; of the latter there is one nearly parallel to the river, at the distance of about 600 yards from it, about 300 yards of which is behind a rising ground, and affords tolerable cover even for cavalry. This road continues nearly to the Tagus, affording protection to infantry, and is crossed by the road leading to the principal ford of the Castanheira river.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

RICHARD FLETCHER,

Lt.-Col. and Com. Roy. Engineers.

[298.] MEMORANDUM IN ANSWER TO QUERIES BY LORD WELLESLEY.

1. The object in entering Spain. Portugal was safe, our army disposable, and every prospect that it was sufficiently strong, with the Spanish troops which had kept the French in check, to penetrate to Madrid at least.

2. It was asserted that we should find means of transport in the same situations in which Sir John Moore found them in such numbers. In this expectation we were disappointed, and could get none; and I then, on the 17th of July, gave notice to General Cuesta that I could undertake no more than the original operation on the Alberche which I had promised him

to undertake on the 11th, in an interview with him near the bridge of Almaraz. I could not decline to undertake this operation, having had reason to believe that the troops of Venegas in particular had been put in motion according to the plan settled.

I still hoped I should have been supplied; but all has failed, and we get nothing, and are almost starving.

3. Our immediate objects now are to keep the French back as long as possible. I wish not to retire into Portugal till the last moment, for the sake of the general cause, and because I think that there will be an end of all connection between the two nations from the moment I shall retire, unless my retreat shall be brought about by one of these circumstances: by an invasion of Portugal, in which case the Spaniards know that I must go; by their ordering Cuesta's army nearer to Seville, in consequence of their apprehensions that the French are approaching Seville by the road of Ciudad Real; or by an absolute and unqualified statement on the part of the Spanish government that they cannot support us where we are. As it is not very likely that any diversion will be made north of the mountains before the French will have it in their power to reinforce from France, I don't think it very important in a military point of view that we should remain any longer. On the contrary, I think it an object to retire, if it can be done without creating an irreparable breach between the two nations.

WELLINGTON.

Extract taken for Mr. Villiers from a letter written by Lord Wellington to Marquess Wellesley.

"I estimate the French force in Spain disposable for service to amount to 125,000 men, well provided with cavalry and artillery, in which number I do not include the garrisons of Pamplona, Barcelona, &c. I include, however, the corps commanded by St. Cyr and Suchet, which I calculate to amount to 32,000 men, which are employed in Aragon and Catalonia, and the remainder, being about 90,000 men, are in Castille and Estremadura; of this number 70,000 are actually in the field in the corps of Victor, Soult, Ney, Sebastiani, and Mortier, and the remainder are employed in garrisons, as in Madrid, Escurial, Avila, Valladolid, &c., sick and wounded not included. Calculation made upon what was the known force of the French before the battle of Talavera, deducting 10,000 killed or rendered unserviceable on that day."

[299.]

To Lieut.-Col. Grant.

DEAR SIR, Pombal, 2nd Jan., 1810.

I have received your letter of the 16th December, and I am much obliged to you for the offer which you make of endeavouring to procure for me information of the enemy's movements on the frontier. I shall be much obliged to you if you will do so, and I will defray any expense which you may incur in this business. I beg you, however, not to risk yourself.

The greatest part of the British army is by this time in its cantonments between Guarda and Viseu. One division, with a great part of the cavalry, remain upon the Tagus, and Lieutenant-General Hill commands the troops in that quarter. I request you to transmit to him as well as to me any intelligence which you may receive which you may deem worthy of notice. My head-quarters will be for some days at Coimbra, afterwards they will be at Viseu.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing-street, 2nd Jan., 1810.

As it may be material that you should receive some further instructions from His Majesty's government, under the present circumstances, respecting the eventual operations of the army under your command beyond the frontier of Portugal, I am to inform you that, although His Majesty is not inclined to impose any restriction upon your conduct which may prevent your embarking in any operation which, upon full knowledge of all the circumstances, may appear to you to be likely to be advantageous to the general cause, yet, after the experience of the last campaign and the difficulties which have been found to attend all conjoint operations with the Spanish army, His Majesty would be unwilling to see the army under your command advanced beyond the frontier of Portugal, and the Spanish provinces immediately adjoining to it, under any other circumstances than those which I have before mentioned; and His Majesty trusts that previous to any such movement taking place, you will be fully assured that the Spanish government have adopted every precaution for securing the necessary supplies for your army, and for the effectual cooperation of a sufficient Spanish force. And if an adequate provision shall not appear to have been made for both these objects, you will inform the Spanish authorities, both civil and military, that you have received the King's positive commands not to advance into Spain.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing-street, 3rd Jan., 1810.

The intelligence which has been lately received of the defeat of the Spanish armies under General Areyzaga and the Duque del Parque, though not altogether unexpected, may, when combined with the advance of considerable reinforcements from France, produce a material effect on the probable success of the contest in the Peninsula, and may render all the efforts of the British and Portuguese armies for the defence of Portugal ultimately unavailing. It appears, therefore, to be material that you should be apprised of the measures which have been taken for enabling you to reembark your army in case of necessity, and of the intentions of His Majesty with respect to your ulterior destination.

Orders have for this purpose been given to complete the transport tonnage at present at Lisbon to 45,000 tons. This amount will, it is conceived, be sufficient, together with the assistance which you may derive from the ships of war off Lisbon, to move the whole of your army (horses excepted), in the case supposed, from the Tagus and ports of Portugal.

Upon embarking your army, you will direct 6000 men to proceed immediately to Gibraltar, to be landed there to wait His Majesty's further orders; and you will proceed yourself with the remainder of the army off Cadiz, unless any circumstances should occur at the time which should appear to render your proceeding to that destination inconsistent with the safety of your army. Even in the event of the loss of Lisbon, there may still exist hopes of the contest being maintained at least in the southern part of the Peninsula for a considerable time, if Gibraltar and Cadiz can be preserved as places of retreat. But it would be impossible for His Majesty in this case to risk a British army in Spain unless both these objects were effectually secured; and you will, therefore, decline to land the troops under your command unless the Spanish government shall consent that the garrison of Cadiz shall be composed, in such proportions as you may deem adequate, of British as well as of Spanish troops, and unless such an arrangement shall be made respecting the command of the garrison as shall be considered by you as unobjectionable.

His Majesty's minister in Spain will receive instructions to open a negotiation, with a view to this contingency, at the first convenient opportunity. But, as it is a point felt by the Spanish government to be of considerable delicacy, as they may be disposed to resist it except in the case of absolute necessity, and may nevertheless be prevailed upon to yield to it when the necessity shall actually occur, it is not desirable that this object should be considered as abandoned in consequence of any refusal which may have been signified in the course of any previous negotiation, but that the chance should still be taken, if possible, of the effect of the presence of a British army off Cadiz when the circumstances to which I have alluded shall actually arise.

If, however, after having made every effort to accomplish this object, the Spanish government should still continue to refuse the admission into Cadiz of an adequate proportion of British troops, you will in that

case return with the whole of the force then under your command to England.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
LIVERPOOL.

[300.]

To the Right Hon. J. C. Villiers.

MY DEAR VILLIERS, Coimbra, 4th Jan., 1810.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have seen the Commissary-General; and the only mode which occurs to us in which we can assist the Portuguese government with more money than we have already given them, or with provisions, is by giving bills upon England for any cargoes of provisions which they may purchase from merchant importers. It is important, however, that they should observe that we are purchasing in this manner, and that they should take care to avoid all competition with us, which would only have the effect of raising the price upon both parties.

I send you my despatches open for your perusal.

I have seen several Portuguese battalions on my road through the country, and I am happy to inform you that some of them are in very good order, and all of them very forward in discipline. They are, in general, ailing, principally for the want of those articles of clothing, appointments, and necessaries, which all soldiers require in order to keep them healthy.

Believe me, &c.,
WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing-street, 4th Jan., 1810.

The situation of the Portuguese army, in the event of the necessary evacuation of Portugal by the British forces, has occupied the most serious consideration of His Majesty's government.

It would certainly be very desirable to facilitate the retreat of any part of that army which might be efficient, and which might at the same time be willing, in such a situation of affairs, to quit the country, leaving it open for decision, under all the circumstances as they might then exist, whether it would be better to convey them to the Brazils, or whether they might be most advantageously employed in some other part of the Peninsula. At

the same time it must have occurred to you, that in addition to the immense expense already incurred for the transport service, and for that branch of it in particular which is connected with the defence of Portugal, it could not be judged advisable that His Majesty's government should provide tonnage for the eventual embarkation of the Portuguese army.

I am to desire, therefore, that you would consider how far it would be practicable for the Portuguese army, in the event of the evacuation of Portugal by the forces under your command, to retreat in reasonable security across the Tagus, through the provinces of Alentejo and Algarve to Lagos or Faro, and ultimately, if it should be judged expedient, to the Spanish province of Andalusia; or whether it might be more advisable, and at the same time more practicable, to collect craft at the time in the Tagus and on the coast of Portugal for the purpose of conveying them to the Berlings or Bayona Islands, and whether they could be maintained in these islands till some decision could be made as to their ultimate destination.

I shall be glad to receive your opinion on this part of the subject as soon as you have had an opportunity of fully considering it.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

LIVERPOOL.

G. A. O. Coimbra, 5th Jan., 1810. [301.]

1. As the profession of Free-masonry is contrary to the law of Portugal, the Commander of the Forces requests that the meetings of the lodges existing in the several corps, the use of masonic badges and emblems, and the appearance of the officers and soldiers in masonic processions may be discontinued while the troops will be in this country. The Commander of the Forces is convinced that the officers and soldiers of the army will feel the necessity of obeying the laws of the country which they are sent to protect, and that they will show their respect for the attachment of the people of Portugal to their own laws by refraining from an amusement which, however innocent in itself, and allowed by the law of Great Britain, is a violation of the law of this country, and very disagreeable to the people.

2. The officers of the army are informed that the government of Portugal have lately issued a decree, by which they have called upon all persons having horses of a description fit for the Portuguese cavalry to send them to certain depôts formed for their reception, without loss of time; and as the government have been informed that some of the horse-dealers and others have offered their horses for sale to the officers of the British army, the Commander of the Forces wishes to warn the officers of

the army that those persons who shall thus dispose of them will be guilty of a breach of the law of the country; and that the purchasers of the horses of this description, after the date of the decree in question, will be liable to lose the horses they shall have purchased. Horses fit for cavalry service are fifteen hands.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, Downing-street, 9th Jan., 1810.

I have received your private letter of the 21st ult. You will be glad, I am sure, to learn that I have anticipated most of your wishes with respect to the staff of the army under your command.

In consequence of a private letter received at the Horse Guards, which intimated that Sherbrooke was disposed to return home, I considered who were the persons most likely to be acceptable to you as second in command. Graham, Oakes, and Sir George Peacocke occurred to me. As the former, however, was the only one of the three in this country, and as he is now the senior officer, I determined to ascertain his disposition to go out to Portugal, which I had little doubt would be favourable. I am happy to say that he acquiesces in the eventual proposal which has been made to him, and will be ready to go out whenever you are ready to receive him. As Sherbrooke has really intimated an intention to come away, the sooner he puts it in execution the better: a man is never as zealous as he ought to be in a service which he is on the point of leaving. I wish you would let me hear from you how soon you think Graham may proceed to join you.

With respect to General officers, I have already sent you William Stewart and Picton with the reinforcements. Campbell has promised to return now he is gratified by a regiment. I have not had a decided answer from Paget; but I have desired Torrens would apply to Generals Dyott, Leith, and Houston. Nightingall is too unwell to be able to go on service at the present moment.

I trust that these arrangements will be satisfactory to you as far as regards the infantry. I wish I knew how to propose to you as satisfactory an arrangement with respect to the cavalry: no private consideration would for a moment prevent it. But if you look at the Army List and advert to the rules of our service, you will see all the difficulties to which I allude. Lord William Bentinck declines, for private reasons, going abroad at present. If the contest should continue till the summer, I hope I may be able to persuade him to join you. He is, however, most desponding with respect to the cause of the Peninsula, and this is not a favourable state of mind for an active command.

Believe me to be, with great truth, dear Lord Wellington,

Yours very sincerely,

LIVERPOOL.

Lieut.-Col. Fletcher to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Torres Vedras, 11th Jan., 1810.

I have the honour to report to your Lordship that I have revisited the ground about Torres Vedras and Runa, to consider how far it might be desirable to construct a work at the latter place to impede the march of an enemy by that road to the former.

The roads from Merciana and Alemquer fall into the main road between Runa and Torres Vedras; that most used passes by the village of Matacaens; and therefore any work to check his approach by these roads to Torres Vedras must be between the latter and the junction of such roads with the paved communication to Runa.

A work at Runa would impede the approach of an enemy by the great road through that place to Sobral, or to the Cabeça de Montachique; but, if his route lay from Merciana, he might strike off at Corvoiera or Zibreira for Duas Portas or Ribaldeira. Being, however, at Alemquer or Merciana, he would, perhaps, take a shorter road to Lisbon than that by Torres Vedras; but, to render his approach upon the last place more difficult, a redoubt might be placed at a mill on the north of the road leading from Runa for 2 guns and 300 men, which would have a good command; at the distance of about 500 yards west of this is another mill, at which a redoubt for 500 men and 3 guns might be made, which would assist in defending the great road, and from which also other car-tracks, that lead to the plain on the east of the castle, would be seen and defended, particularly one passing very near it.

I had before thought that, at all events, the last of these might be useful as a sort of outpost to the works at Torres Vedras, though not immediately connected with them, its distance being about 2000 yards; but I knew that our hands were pressingly called for at the other places. Should your Lordship think it proper to have one or both of these works executed, it might be proper to keep about 250 of the men now employed here, and to dispose of the remainder between Sobral and St. Julian's, as mentioned in my letter of the 25th ult. Should they not be undertaken, a part of the militia now here might, I believe, be spared in about a week; and I should conceive St. Julian's to call for the first attention.

There is a road from Ramalhal which passes about two miles on the right of Torres Vedras; this also falls into the main road to Runa near Matacaens. It is now, in some places near the latter, exceedingly heavy, but not impassable for carriages. A little on the west of Runa are two hills, one on each side of the main road, forming a strong pass. They do not seem well calculated for works; but, by being occupied by light troops, having with them two or three field-pieces, they might check an enemy who had struck off from Ramalhal, and should take this road to avoid Torres Vedras; but, by a more circuitous movement by Zibreira, he would also turn this point.

On the road from Ribaldeira to Enxara dos Cavalleiros, where it passes the spot marked Portella (in the sketch made by the Portuguese engineers), the hills on each side of the road are favourable for disputing it. But I think the situation of Enxara dos Cavalleiros is more important, as the two roads from Torres Vedras towards Montachique unite there, and as from thence others branch off for Enxara do Bispo and Villa Franca do Rosario. From the latter the communication is said to be good to Malvera,

from whence, I mentioned in a former letter, a road leads directly on to Queluz, without joining any of the great communications. It might be desirable to construct two redoubts on a hill immediately above and about north-west from Enxara dos Cavalleiros, which would command the junction of two of the great roads from Torres Vedras, as well as those leading to Enxara do Bispo and Villa Franca do Rosario. If time and means should allow, another work might be constructed on a hill about 600 yards south of the village, on the road to the Cabeça de Montachique, and at the bottom of this hill a bridge across a gully might be destroyed; but this would not occasion any serious impediment. The two first works might be for 300 men and 2 field-pieces each; the last for 200 men and 2 guns, and might be useful in covering the retreat from the others.

I have now the honour to forward your Lordship a plan of the position and works at this place, and of those near Sobral.

In the former, the principal entrenchment (marked No. 1) will contain 15 guns and 4 howitzers, and will be well occupied by about 2500 men. This has an excellent view of the road from Obidos and of that leading to Paul, and the situation is very strong and commanding. The work No. 2 greatly assists in defending the main road as well as the plain on the east of it, and is so much under the fire of No. 1 that it would be impossible for an enemy to keep it, even though he had obtained possession; it is for 6 guns, 2 howitzers, and about 500 men. No. 3 occupies a spot of ground which it is desirable to keep from an enemy, and it also commands the road leading through the village of Paul to Ponte do Rol; it is for 4 guns, 2 howitzers, and about 300 men. The castle is considered to have 7 guns and 300 men; it has a good command of the principal roads from Ponte do Rol, of the main road from Obidos, and of the plain on the east of it. A small work at No. 4, about 600 yards south-east of the castle, for 2 guns and 200 men, covered by an old convent in flank, is not yet begun; this will greatly assist in commanding the plain.

I would propose, when the enemy was advancing, to dam the river under the protection of the castle, and to make another dam to be under the fire of troops posted behind the wall of the road to Runa marked A B. The bridge at C might be destroyed, unless it were considered as desirable to keep this road open to our troops. The remainder of the force might be posted in the buildings best calculated for commanding the plain, the principal road, and for covering the retreat of the main body. As there will now be only 12-pounders instead of 18-pounders for this place, I could wish that 6 of the guns were of that nature, instead of 3, as mentioned for the latter calibre.

As the works at first proposed for defending the approach to this place by the great road are now drawing towards completion, I have been naturally led to consider whether anything further should be done to strengthen the flanks or rear.

I think the plain will be well defended by the fire which will cross it in various directions from the main work, the redoubt No. 2, the castle, the work No. 4, and musketry on the road to Runa; but, should any doubt exist, a small stockaded work or emplacement for guns, at D, might be added to support the right; but, as the ground rises rapidly from it, it would be necessary to have two redoubts at or near two windmills on the summit of this and an adjoining hill, otherwise even musketry would

become so plunging as to dislodge the troops placed in the lower work. These three works might contain about 800 men and 6 field-pieces, and, should they be considered as necessary, the whole of the men now employed here should be continued to complete them. As being detached they should be stockaded, and they would require about 1500 palisades and as many fascines, as there is no sod on the spot. The original demand for fascines for this place will be somewhat extended, though I have taken the liberty of using a part of those ordered for Sobral, where there is an abundance of sod. I trust your Lordship will have the goodness to allow of the additional quantity which may become necessary, as the calculation was made in the hope of finding sod or some other substitute.

I yesterday again visited Ponte do Rol and Contada. It appears clear, from everybody I consulted, that at all times carriages may pass with ease from Obidos to Vimeiro, and from the latter to either Ponte do Rol or Contada, or by a shorter and better road from Ramalhal to Ponte do Rol; and that, excepting after continued heavy rains, they also constantly pass, without any difficulty, from the latter place to Mafra, and from Contada to Ericeira. When, from the state of the weather, they cannot pass to Ericeira or Mafra, they are prevented by the same heavy soil from moving by Ponte do Rol to Torres Vedras, unless by following a sort of heath on a more elevated level, and falling into the main road in front of the town and of our position. When carriages can pass from Ponte do Rol to Torres Vedras by the direct road, they can also move on to Trocifal, and thus get far into our rear; or they may, by taking a bye road through Varratoga (which, having examined, I find, though bad, is certainly now passable), gain a height, the summit of which is about a mile in rear of our entrenchments. From any part of this ground they could not with field-artillery affect the safety of our works, and they could, of the two, attack them with more advantage in front without any détour, though they should, even in this case, hold out some days. About three redoubts would prevent the ground I have mentioned from being occupied by an enemy as long as they were held; but the soil is rocky, and the attempt to establish works would probably be attended with excessive labour. It, therefore, is to be considered whether it is advisable to undertake works under such disadvantages to keep an enemy from ground, by possessing which he could not hope materially to affect our entrenchments, and where he would lose less distance as to his main object by passing on to Serra de Villa, or Trocifal, or even to Mafra: the probability, therefore, appears to be that he would move on to the last-mentioned place, by which he would turn the strongest ground in its front. These circumstances render the situations of Ponte do Rol and Contada, or rather St. Pedro da Cadeira (which is more commanding ground), of considerable importance.

On the whole, I am inclined to believe that, were an enemy at Ponte do Rol with artillery, he would not come towards Torres Vedras. If he moved in this direction without guns, it would, I should imagine, be with a view to watch the motions of our troops, or to induce them, by appearing in their rear, to abandon the post, and throw open the main road to his artillery, and to interrupt their retreat.

With reference to the works at Sobral, the principal line of entrench-

ments (No. 1) would be well occupied by about 2000 men and 20 pieces of artillery. This work is situated on the highest and most commanding ground, and immediately defends the main road from Sobral. The redoubts Nos. 2, 3, and 4, with the fire of the principal entrenchment between them, perfectly command all the inferior parts of the hill, as does the last the road from Sobral leading through Cozaes. They will require about 1400 men and 14 pieces of artillery. Were I to propose any other, it would be a redoubt for 200 men and 2 guns at No. 5, to assist in the command of the Cozaes road; but perhaps 2 or 3 moveable field-pieces, supported by a few troops, and protected by the redoubts, would be more useful, generally, than another work. The redoubt No. 6, which will be on the spot on the east of the road which your Lordship first visited, will require about 700 or 800 men and 4 guns; and a small work at No. 7, for 300 men and 3 guns, would assist in the command of the main road, and might be of use to cover the retreat of the troops from No. 6, should they be forced to retire. Being so immediately under the fire of the principal entrenchment, it could not be held by an enemy, should he succeed in taking it.

I have to add that the road between Runa and Sobral offers some very favourable points for disputing by light troops and field-pieces, by which the road might in some places be enfiladed for nearly the full range of round shot. I before mentioned that the road from Runa to Enxara dos Cavalleiros affords the same advantage.

With respect to the numerous cross roads by which an enemy may probably endeavour to turn our positions, it has occurred to me that in some places, where they are cut in the sides of very steep rocky hills, their being destroyed would occasion some delay, even though they should not be defended; and I beg to submit to your Lordship whether it would be desirable to effect their destruction, as far as they are known, before matters come to extremities, as at that moment, when so many objects will press imperiously for attention, it may be impossible to attend to others of minor importance. It may, however, be objected to this idea that it might impede the inhabitants in their endeavours to drive their cattle, and to remove whatever could prove useful to the enemy, and it would certainly prove inconvenient to them in their efforts to remove their effects generally.

I have had a report from Castañheira that about 700 of the militia of Figueira have arrived there, and that the communications along the position near that place have been commenced. I am sorry to say that the men at work at Sobral amounted two days since to only 160, and the day before to only 180.

The officer who made the different surveys is now employed in laying them down, and, as soon as I receive them, I shall have the honour to offer my ideas on the points to which they refer.

I request your Lordship will have the goodness to grant me another warrant for 500*l.* as soon as convenient.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

RICHARD FLETCHER,
Lt.-Col. Royal Engineers.

To Lieut.-Col. Fletcher. [302.]

MY DEAR SIR, Viseu, 12th Jan., 1810.

I have received your letter of the 31st December, regarding the defence of the river of Castanheira. It is obvious to me that, whether we have many or few redoubts on the plain, and whether we place them at a distance or near to the river, it is best that we should expose the bed of the river to the fire of the guns upon the hill. I therefore decide in favour of cutting away the bank as proposed.

I am also of opinion, adverting to what you say of the state of the bed of the river and of the facility of passing it, that it will be necessary to construct a good solid dam, with a sluice in it, near the mouth of the river, and I request you to make all your preparatory arrangements and to execute that work as soon as you may think proper.

In respect to the farther defence of the line of the river, whether we shall effect it by redoubts placed near or at a distance, or by one or more, or where we shall make the cover for the infantry, I think it would be best to delay deciding upon those points till I shall have had another opportunity of looking at the ground.

I would, therefore, at present, wish you, as far as this part of the position is concerned, to lay open the river to the fire of the hill, to construct the redoubt at the junction of the Castanheira with the Tagus, and to construct the concealed redoubts upon the hill which are to defend the river and the plain, and to leave the rest till I shall have gone over the ground with you again. You will attend to what I wrote in my letter of the 13th December as to the order in which these and the other works are to be performed.

As soon as the rains have set in decidedly, I intend to go to Torres Vedras, from whence I will look at all that you have done and propose to do, particularly in respect to this plain and to other parts.

I am concerned that you have not had the assistance of men which you require. I have, however, written again to the government upon this subject, and Marshal Beresford informs me that the militia which he had ordered to Castanheira had marched, and must have arrived there before now.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[303.] *To Lieut.-Col. Fletcher.*

MY DEAR SIR, Viseu, 12th Jan., 1810.

I have received your letter of the 25th December, regarding the positions of Mafra and Cabeça de Montachique. The left of the line between the Tagus and the sea is certainly the most important to *us* the English, and I have always been apprehensive that we should experience great difficulty in defending it. Upon the whole of this line, I consider the defence of the two ravines in front of Ericeira and of that between Ericeira and Corvoiera to be the most important of any.

That which I propose to do in respect to the whole of this position is to have a reserve, or rather corps of observation, of about 10,000 men, if I can make it up to that number, employed on the left of the army. Its first position should be Sobral de Monte Agraço, from whence it should follow the movements of the enemy if he should endeavour to turn our left, or move to the support of the right at Cadafoes and Castanheira or of Torres Vedras respectively, if the great effort of the enemy should be made on either of these points.

Besides this corps, I propose that all the works which you have proposed for the defence of the passes of Mafra and Montachique shall be executed and occupied by the militia till this corps would be in a situation or under the necessity of occupying them. The militia would then occupy the ground which you suppose to be favourable for turning the flanks of these several positions, and will serve to keep the enemy's light troops in check, and, at all events, to delay their operations.

I wish you, therefore, to construct all the works which you have proposed for the defence of these positions, beginning with those on the left for the defence of the ravines of Ericeira and Corvoiera, and taking them up afterwards in the order of their relative importance in your own opinion.

The men now employed on the works at Sobral de Monte Agraço or at Torres Vedras may be employed upon these as soon as the works at those places will have been finished.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Viseu, 12th Jan., 1810. [304.]

1. All officers wishing to go to any part of the country by post must apply for a passport; if at head quarters, to the Commander of the Forces; if at any of the cantonments of the army, or at Lisbon, Elvas, &c., to the General officer commanding the division, or to the commanding officer at Lisbon, Elvas, &c. respectively; to whom blank passports will be transmitted for this purpose.

2. When the commissary attached to any division detached from head quarters wishes to send a courier by post, he is to apply to the commanding officer of the division for a passport, who will grant it if he should concur in the expediency of sending the courier. The Commissary-General will apply for passports for the same purpose to the Commander of the Forces.

3. Persons belonging to the English army will not be supplied with post horses at any of the post stages unless they should produce these passports for post horses of the Commander of the Forces.

4. When soldiers are sent to the general or any detachment hospital, their ammunition is to be delivered into store to the officer commanding the artillery with the division in which the regiment is placed, with a return of the quantity so delivered in; which the officer commanding the artillery with the division is to direct the commissary of artillery to receive. The commanding officers of regiments are to adopt means for the preservation of the ammunition of soldiers in regimental hospitals.

5. The Commander of the Forces desires that the shooting of bullocks may be discontinued, as being a great waste of ammunition.

6. The government of Portugal having expressed their desire to give the troops a double allowance of wine on three days, as a demonstration of their satisfaction upon the return of the army to Portugal, a double allowance for each man is to be issued by the commissary on the 18th instant, being Her Majesty's birth day, on the 21st January, and on the 28th January.

7. The officers commanding regiments are informed that they must not allow either officers or soldiers to absent themselves from their regiments without leave from the Commander of the Forces.

WELLINGTON.

[305.] *To Captain Cooke.*

DEAR COOKE, Viseu, 14th Jan., 1810.

I have no objection to your giving Mr. Casamajor any assistance you please as long as you will remain at Lisbon on account of your health, but, as soon as you may recover, it will be necessary that you should either join the army or resign your situation on the Staff. You must be aware that I cannot allow an officer on the Staff to be absent from the army in order to perform the duties of a political situation.

I shall be obliged to you if you will give this answer to Mr. Casamajor.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. J. C. Villiers to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Lisbon, 23rd Jan., 1810.

The packet is come in. I receive the enclosed despatch from Lord Wellesley. Mr. Stuart is appointed to this mission. I should not, however, be surprised if Lord Wellesley changed his plan upon my suggestion respecting yourself. I am to stay here till my successor arrives.

I regret extremely that government make up their accounts upon such calculations either of men or money.

My paper sent in August would have shown them that for 20,000 *complete*, more money would be wanted; and 250,000*l.* will not pay the additional 10,000. If your reinforcements in men are not hurried, they will not come out in time.

Forjaz has heard of reinforcements already sending to the French in Spain.

Believe me to be ever yours,

J. C. VILLIERS.

I cannot but strongly advise the making the additional pay to the Portuguese officers depend upon the numbers being kept complete. I will submit a scheme of this sort to your consideration in a day or two.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. J. C. Villiers.

SIR, Foreign Office, 5th Jan., 1810.

Your despatches to No. 78 inclusive have been received and laid before the King.

The condition of Spain and Portugal, under recent events, has engaged His Majesty's most anxious attention; and I am commanded to signify to you

His Majesty's determination to maintain the cause of his allies in the Peninsula by continuing to supply to them every assistance compatible with the resources and security of his own dominions, as long as the contest shall appear to afford any reasonable prospect of advantage against the common enemy or of benefit to His Majesty's allies.

With these views, instructions have been addressed by His Majesty's commands to Lord Wellington, containing directions respecting the extent of the aid which it is proposed to furnish to Portugal for the purpose of defending that kingdom and of co-operating under certain limits in the defence of Spain.

A copy of these instructions is enclosed for your information and guidance.

You will observe that it is His Majesty's intention to employ in Portugal a British force of 30,000 effective men, and further to furnish in aid of Portugal the annual sum of 980,000*l.*, viz. :—

£.
600,000 for 20,000 troops already in the British pay.
250,000 for 10,000 additional troops.
130,000 for increased pay of Portuguese officers.
980,000

This great and generous effort cannot fail to confirm in the Portuguese government and nation the just sentiments of attachment to the British alliance, nor to inspire additional zeal and confidence in the maintenance of the security and independence of the kingdom of Portugal. The sum granted by His Majesty for increasing the pay of the Portuguese officers must be considered as the strongest testimony of a liberal regard for the interests and honour of His Majesty's ancient ally.

The policy of this measure has been repeatedly urged in your despatches, and I trust that His Majesty's government will derive from its adoption those advantages which you have anticipated, and which it may justly be expected to produce. In return for these liberal supplies, His Majesty is entitled to claim from the Portuguese government every assistance which can be afforded to the British commanders and troops; a faithful and judicious application of the funds granted for the support of so large a portion of the Portuguese army; and every effort for the due maintenance of that part of the Portuguese force which must be supplied from the exclusive resources of Portugal.

The condition of the resources of Portugal has been fully stated in your despatches, as well as in those of Lord Wellington, to which the enclosure contains a reply. However unsatisfactory the state of the finances of Portugal may have appeared to His Majesty, I am commanded to signify to you his expectation that the extraordinary efforts of His Majesty's government for the aid of Portugal and the consequent pressure upon the British resources will be met with corresponding exertions on the part of the Regency, and that all local and temporary prejudices will be submitted to the urgent necessity of placing the finances of the kingdom in that state which may render them available for its defence in the approaching time of danger.

You will direct your immediate and vigilant attention to this most important object; nor will you refrain from offering or even from urging your advice on any occasion which may open the prospect of effecting any useful reduction in the civil charges or augmentation in the revenues or military resources of the country.

In addition to these arrangements, His Majesty will expect to receive regular monthly accounts of the expenditure of the sums applicable to the military charges of Portugal, under the orders issued to Lord Wellington, as

well as accurate returns of the state and condition of the several corps receiving British pay, and you will be pleased to direct your particular attention to these objects.

It is also desirable that His Majesty should be acquainted with the state and condition of that part of the Portuguese forces which is to be maintained from the revenues of Portugal. You will therefore transmit to me such information as you may be enabled to obtain on this point, as well as upon the general situation of the finances and resources of Portugal, and particularly of the funds applicable to the expenses of the army.

The crisis demands the most unreserved confidence and communication between His Majesty's minister and the local government of the Prince Regent. No jealousy or suspicion should be harboured under such a pressure of common danger; the great sacrifices which we have made for the interests of our ally must not be frustrated by any consideration inferior to the main purpose of our mutual security; nor must we now hesitate to take the lead in any measure evidently necessary to enable Portugal to contribute a just share of her own efforts and resources for the accomplishment of her own security.

His Majesty has observed with deep regret the circumstances of infirmity and irresolution which you have remarked in the councils and character of the Regency. It is, however, matter of considerable consolation to learn that you have never doubted the genuine loyalty of the Regency towards their Prince, their true attachment to the interests and welfare of the people of Portugal, nor their sentiments of good faith towards the British alliance. With such favourable dispositions, and with the advantage of a regular appointment from their legitimate Sovereign, the Regency of Portugal might certainly have been expected to prove a proper and adequate instrument for the purpose of calling forth the spirit and resources of the kingdom in maintaining its independence. It must also indeed be admitted that great exertions have been made by Portugal under this government, and that considerable aid has been derived by His Majesty's officers and troops from the services and co-operation of the civil and military authorities of Portugal.

Under these circumstances it would not have appeared that any alteration in the form of the governing power in Portugal was absolutely necessary for the defence of that kingdom, or for the general interests of the alliance.

The situation of Spain is unfortunately different. The governing power in Spain does not derive its authority from the appointment of the Sovereign. The disposition of some of its leading members is at least equivocal, and its conduct has not satisfied any expectation either of the Spanish nation or of the allies. In Spain the assembly of the Cortes is the only remedy to which that country can resort for the purpose of investing the government with a regular form or a national spirit. Nor can any hope be entertained of a sufficient exertion of the military resources of Spain until a governing power shall be so framed as to unite a due representation of the crown with a just security for the interests and welfare of all the estates of the realm. But although the situation of Spain essentially differs from that of Portugal, it is certainly probable that the Portuguese government may suffer from the effect of recent transactions in Spain unless precautions be adopted to counteract such a misfortune. The example of Spain may naturally turn the attention of the Portuguese to the state of their own government and to the principles of a more temperate constitution, which they have occasionally enjoyed.

If the mass of the Portuguese nation, consisting of the several orders of the state, should be affected by any spirit of discontent, from the want of a due connection with the executive power or from the pressure of any particular public abuses or grievances, the Regency may become altogether unequal to the functions of government, and the state may fall into disorder and con-

fusion. Without local knowledge it is difficult to estimate the extent of this danger or the period of time within which it might become imminent. The principal members of the Regency appear to have considered this delicate question with great judgment and with a proper sense of duty, both towards their Prince and their country. Much attention, therefore, is to be paid to their sentiments, and much confidence to be rested in their discretion.

You will communicate freely with the Regency on the whole subject, advising that course of proceeding which shall seem best calculated to preserve internal tranquillity, and to give strength and energy to the government in the great work of defending the country against the common enemy.

His Majesty commands me to observe to you that any step requisite for that indispensable purpose cannot fail to be advantageous to the interests of the Prince Regent.

If, therefore, the Regency should be of opinion that either the removal of any existing abuses or grievances or the assembly of the Estates of the realm may be necessary to animate the Portuguese nation in the prosecution of the contest against France, it would undoubtedly be an act of duty towards the legitimate Sovereign of Portugal to adopt those measures at the most seasonable opportunity which might offer.

Experience has sufficiently proved that the most powerful obstacle which can be opposed to the success of the French arms is the determined resistance of the body of the people. This resistance will be most active in proportion to the affection of the people for the person of their Sovereign, and for the principles of their government.

In Spain these sentiments have been supplied by some peculiarities in the national character. The great difficulty which the French have experienced in Spain has been the general spirit of the Spanish people, and if that spirit had been happily directed and wisely connected with the action of the executive power, the career of France would have been checked in the Peninsula.

Adverting to these considerations, His Majesty would view with satisfaction any proceedings of the Regency of Portugal tending to unite the mass of the nation in interests and affection with the executive power.

I am commanded to direct you to regulate the advice which you may offer to the Regency of Portugal in conformity to these suggestions.

You will, however, earnestly recommend that whatever step may be taken, either for convoking the Estates of the realm or for the redress of any existing grievances, may proceed directly in the name and under the authority of the Sovereign, and with all practicable attention to ancient forms and customs; and if the Cortes should be assembled, or any other mode should be adopted of convoking the Estates of the realm, you will urge the wise policy of preserving all the old foundations of the government, and of introducing any salutary improvements which may be suggested in the existing administration of affairs, on the basis of the established laws and constitution of the monarchy, according to the most respected precedents and to the practice of the best times.

It would be advisable that the Regency should report their proceedings with every degree of practicable regularity and despatch to the Prince Regent.

His Majesty has commanded me to acquaint his minister at the Brazils of the course which is to be pursued in Portugal. I am further commanded to authorise such seasonable representations to be made to the Prince Regent as may satisfy His Royal Highness of the wisdom and policy of the plan proposed for the protection of Portugal.

The confidence which has been reposed by the Prince Regent in Lord

Wellington, and his occasional admission to the Council of Regency, render it peculiarly proper that you should consult with him on all the points stated in this despatch.

You will, therefore, be pleased to communicate a copy of this despatch to Lord Wellington, and to obtain his opinion and advice previously to the adoption of any of the important measures which are herein suggested.

I am, with great truth, &c.,

WELLESLEY.

[306.] G. A. O. Viseu, 24th Jan., 1810.

3. As the distance which the army is from Lisbon makes it impossible to procure money in time to discharge the amount of the estimates in advance as required by the regulations, and as the consequence of the discharge of the balances due to the soldiers on the 24th of each month, for the month then ending, would be, that for a month the officers commanding companies would have no money in hand to supply those necessaries which the soldiers should require;

The Commander of the Forces desires that in future the accounts of the soldiers are to be settled on the 24th of every month, according to the regulations of the service, and the balances struck; but the balance is not to be paid to the soldiers till the 24th of the following month; that is to say, the balance due to the soldiers on the 24th January not till the 24th February, and thus in succession from month to month.

An alteration in conformity to this order must be made in the certificate of payment at the bottom of the monthly return of regiments.

WELLINGTON.

[307.] *To Lieut.-Col. Fletcher.*

MY DEAR SIR, Viseu, 26th Jan., 1810.

I have received your letter of the 11th inst., and I now enclose you a warrant for 500*l.*

I propose to set out from hence for Torres Vedras on the day after to-morrow, and I shall arrive there on the 1st of February, and hope to meet you there; I can then give you answers on all the points which you have referred for my consideration.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Force in the Battle of Talavera, taken from a Return dated 25th July, 1809.

Horse Guards, 26th Jan., 1810.

Regiments and Corps.	Stations.	Present and fit for Duty.	Sick.	On Command.	Total.
3rd Dragoon Guards	Talavera de la Reyna	525	63	77	665
4th Dragoons	Ditto	545	2	116	663
14th Light Dragoons	Ditto	464	12	173	649
16th ditto	Ditto	525	75	64	664
23rd ditto	Casas Lequors ..	459	44	23	526
1st ditto, K. G. L. ..	Ditto	451	71	45	567
Royal Artillery British ..	Near Talavera ..	681	113	285	1,079
Royal Artillery German	Ditto	330	34	114	478
Royal Engineers ..	Ditto	22	5	..	27
Royal Staff Corps ..	Talavera de la Reyna	63	15	16	94
Coldstream Guards, 1st Battalion	Near Talavera ..	970	203	10	1,183
3rd Guards, 1st Bat.	Ditto	1,019	166	13	1,198
3rd Foot (Buffs) 1st Bat.	Ditto	746	159	32	937
7th ditto, 2nd Batt. ..	Ditto	431	127	5	563
24th ditto, 2nd Bat. ..	Ditto	787	124	6	917
29th ditto	Ditto	598	147	10	755
31st ditto, 2nd Bat. ..	Ditto	733	70	17	820
40th ditto, 1st Bat. ..	Ditto	745	153	18	916
45th ditto, 1st Bat. ..	Casas Lequors ..	756	116	34	956
48th ditto, 1st Bat. ..	Near Talavera ..	807	78	..	885
48th ditto, 2nd Bat. ..	Ditto	567	124	10	701
53rd ditto, 2nd Bat. ..	Ditto	537	135	18	690
60th ditto, 5th Bat. ..	Casas Lequors ..	552	62	7	621
61st ditto, 1st Bat. ..	Near Talavera ..	778	99	..	877
66th ditto, 2nd Bat. ..	Ditto	526	102	31	659
83rd ditto, 2nd Bat. ..	Ditto	535	277	36	848
87th ditto, 2nd Bat. ..	Ditto	599	199	28	826
88th ditto, 1st Bat. ..	Ditto	599	118	60	777
97th ditto	Ditto	502	110	24	636
1st Bat. Detachments	Casas Lequors ..	609	308	14	931
2nd ditto	Casas Lequors ..	625	302	13	940
1st Line Bat., K. G. L.	Ditto	604	96	27	727
1st and 2nd Light Bats. K. G. L. (Det.) ..	Ditto	106	33	3	142
2nd Line Bat.	Ditto	678	95	15	788
5th ditto	Ditto	610	95	47	752
7th ditto	Ditto	557	141	29	727
	Total	20,641	4,073	1,470	26,184

G. A. O. Viseu, 27th Jan., 1810. [308.]

The passports for post horses sent to the officers commanding divisions, &c., are to be used only to procure post horses for couriers and others whom it may be necessary to send by post upon the public service, or for officers to whom the officers in whose hands the passports are lodged choose to give permission to travel by post.

WELLINGTON.

[309.] *To Lieut.-Col. Gordon.*

SIR, Viseu, 30th Jan., 1810.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 6th instant, and I can have no objection to the relief of Mr. Murray by Mr. Kennedy in the situation of Commissary-General to this army. It will be necessary, however, that Mr. Murray should remain in charge of his office till Mr. Kennedy will have arrived and taken charge.

I have not known of any want of efficiency in the Commissariat, excepting from the sickness of some of the officers and clerks, which appears to me, on the perusal of Mr. Murray's letter, to be the cause to which he adverts of the inefficiency of which he complains. Neither am I aware of any particular instance of want of zeal.

I must say, however, that there are instances of want of ability or of activity, or of activity misapplied, owing to want of knowledge of the duties of the employment which these gentlemen fill.

In fact, the duty of a Commissary to an army in the field, on any great scale of operations, can be but little understood by the officers of the English Commissariat, and it must be difficult to perform them adequately in Spain and Portugal. In these countries the population is excessively small in proportion to their extent: the produce consequently in any particular district but little adequate to support the drain of the subsistence of a body of troops. It must be difficult to procure what is required, at the same time that the deficiency cannot be made up excepting by drawing supplies from a great distance; and the communications are bad and extremely difficult, and the means of transport in the country are few, not easily procured, of a bad description, and slow in their movements. Your experience will point out to you how difficult it must be for the Commissaries to supply the consumption of the troops in a country of this description, particularly for Commissaries whose duties, till they joined this army, had been confined to the receipt from, or the superintendence of the delivery by, a contractor of a certain specified quantity of supplies, or even upon a larger scale of service to the delivery to a small number of troops engaged in operations near the sea, of provisions received regularly and daily from the ships. To these circumstances must be added

the complicated nature and the extent of the accounts which the Commissaries are required to keep, at the same time that they have these extensive, laborious, and to them novel duties to perform.

Making allowances, then, for the inexperience of the officers of the Commissariat of service on any large scale, and particularly for the difficulties with which they have to contend in Portugal and Spain, I cannot but report to you that they have done their duty well, and they are certainly improved and are improving daily. There are exceptions, upon which I will request Mr. Murray to write to you, and I am convinced that you will do everything in your power to apply a remedy.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Viseu, 30th Jan., 1810. [310.]

2. The officers of the army who have soldiers for their servants should be particularly cautious not to give them orders the execution of which is in breach of discipline and good order, and not to expose them in a state of intoxication to the temptation of committing offences which must lead to the punishment of the soldier.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, Downing-street, 13th Feb., 1810.

We received a few days ago letters from General Campbell from Gibraltar, which gave us the first information of Castaños being appointed to command the Spanish armies in Andalusia, and enclosed a correspondence which had passed between them on the subject of Ceuta and the Lines of St. Roque. Lord Wellesley about the same time received a private letter from Castaños, and likewise one from Whittingham, who was with him. The appointment of Castaños (if it has not come too late) is undoubtedly an event of great importance to the common cause. We know from experience that Castaños is the most right-handed Spaniard who has appeared since the Revolution. We believe him to be sincerely and zealously attached to British connection, and we recollect that he was so principally concerned in all those events which have led to the present state of things in Spain, that it is scarcely possible for him, under any circumstances, to look forward to any prospect of terms with the enemy.

It appears by his letters that he thinks unfavourably of the issue of the contest in Spain upon the principles on which it is at this time conducted,

but he is, nevertheless, of opinion that it will not be possible for the French to subdue the country, and that the cause may still be retrieved by the adoption of a new system. I should fear from his account that the enemy may prove successful in passing the Sierra Morena, and in getting possession of Seville. In that case the Spanish armies must retreat to the Island of Leon, and every effort must be made for the safety and defence of Cadiz. With Cadiz and Gibraltar in our hands and those of our Allies, the contest may still be maintained.

The question which naturally, however, occurs upon this view of things is, what should be done in the event of an application being made to you to furnish a force to assist in the defence of Cadiz and the Island of Leon?

Could you supply it from your present force, consistently with the security of Portugal; and if an option must be made between the two objects, which of them ought to be preferred? There can be no doubt but that in this country a higher value is set upon Cadiz (connected with the Spanish fleet, arsenal, &c.) than upon Lisbon; but even if the value of the two objects were equal, is it not true that Cadiz and some part of the south of Spain might be defended if Portugal were for the time lost, but that Portugal could not long be defended if Andalusia were in possession of the French? It is material likewise to consider how far under such circumstances the Portuguese army could be induced to retreat to the southern provinces of Portugal, and to keep up thereby a line of communication with the British and Spanish armies.

Though I have no doubt you have thoroughly considered all these points, I think it important at this time to direct your attention particularly to them.

I hope soon to receive from you an account of the actual state in point of efficiency of the British and Portuguese armies, and likewise an answer to my letter respecting the practicability of withdrawing the Portuguese army from Portugal in the event of our being obliged to evacuate the country.

Upon the subject of internal politics I have little to communicate which you will not learn from the newspapers. It is impossible to say what will be the result of the inquiry into the Walcheren Expedition in the present state of parties: we are not, however, to be intimidated, and shall certainly not give way as long as there is a possibility of standing.

Lord Castlereagh has gained great credit since the commencement of this session. You must have expected from the character of our opponents some share in the general attack, but I can assure you that the impression which has been made in your favour has been most satisfactory to your friends.

Believe me to be, dear Lord Wellington,

Yours very sincerely,

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing-street, 17th Feb., 1810.

Your despatches 24th, 27th, 30th, 30th, 31st, and 31st January have been received and laid before the King.

I hope to be able in the course of a very few days to communicate to you the sentiments of His Majesty's government on the many important topics contained in them; but as it appears from Mr. Frere's despatches of the 1st and 2nd February that he had applied to your Lordship for a detachment of British troops to garrison Cadiz and the Island of Leon, and as it likewise appears by your despatch of 31st January that you consider Lord Castlereagh's instruction of 3rd April to be in force, and that you would consequently send a detachment from the army under your command to Cadiz in case application was made to you for that purpose, I think it of the utmost importance to lose no time in acquainting you that His Majesty entirely approves of the determination which you have taken in this respect, and that, considering the various essential objects connected with the security of Cadiz, and the means of defence which that place affords compared with any other in the Peninsula, it is His Majesty's pleasure that you should have your attention invariably fixed on this object, and that you should afford every assistance which may be necessary for its preservation consistently with the security of the army under your command.

I have, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

G. A. O. Viseu, 19th Feb., 1810. [311.]

2. During the absence from the army of Lieutenant-Colonel Bathurst, all applications and letters hitherto addressed to the Military Secretary are to be sent to Captain Bouverie or Lord FitzRoy Somerset, and answers will be given by one of those officers.

The warrants signed by the Commander of the Forces are to be countersigned by Captain Bouverie or Lord FitzRoy Somerset, and either of those officers will sign the duplicate and triplicates to be lodged with the Commissary-General.

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Viseu, 22nd Feb., 1810. [312.]

1. The brigade consisting of the 3rd battalion 27th, 97th, and 40th regiments is to be Major-General Cole's brigade; and that consisting of the 45th, 88th, and 74th regiments Major-General Picton's.

2. The 3rd division is to consist of the brigades of Major-General Picton and Major-General Lightburne; the 4th division, of the brigades of Major-General Cole and Brigadier-General Alexander Campbell: Major-General Picton is to command the 3rd division, and Major-General Cole the 4th division, until further orders.

Colonel Kemmis is attached as a Colonel on the Staff to the brigade of the Honourable Major-General Cole, and Colonel Mackinnon as a Colonel on the Staff to the brigade of Major-General Picton, during the time those officers will command the 3rd and 4th divisions respectively.

The Portuguese brigade of infantry, consisting of the 9th and 21st regiments, now stationed at Coimbra, is attached to the 3rd division; and the Portuguese brigade of infantry, consisting of the 3rd and 15th regiments, now stationed at Lamego, is attached to the 4th division. These brigades will hereafter be ordered to join the divisions to which they belong.

3. The 1st and 2nd battalions of Portuguese Chasseurs are attached to the brigade of Brigadier-General R. Craufurd, which is to be called the Light Division. These troops will be ordered to join the division to which they belong.

4. A company 5th battalion 60th regiment is to be attached to each of the brigades of the army, according to the plan detailed in the Orders of the 4th May, 1809. The commanding officer of the 5th battalion 60th regiment will detach three companies to Lieutenant-General Hill's division as soon as he shall receive this order and a route from the Quartermaster-General for the purpose; and as the General officers commanding brigades have invariably expressed the highest satisfaction with the uniform good conduct of this valuable body of men, which has always continued effective under many trying circumstances, the Commander of the Forces desires that as far as possible the same companies may be attached as formerly to the same brigades.

Two companies to be attached to Sir J. Sherbrooke's division, one to the brigade of Guards, and one to Brigadier-General Cameron's brigade; two companies to the 4th division, being one for Major-General Cole's, and one for Brigadier-General A. Campbell's brigades; and three companies, with the head-quarters of the regiment, with the 3rd division.

5. The Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General will take measures for placing under the orders of Major-General Picton an officer belonging to each of their departments; and the Commissary-General and Inspector of Hospitals, the same proportion of Commissariat and Medical Staff as attached to the other divisions of infantry.

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Col. Fletcher to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Mafra, 24th Feb., 1810.

I was last night honoured with your Lordship's letter of the 18th instant, and your Lordship may rest assured that I shall continue to do my utmost to forward the several objects to which I was directed to attend.

I have examined with attention the country in front of the main road between the Serra do Chipre and the Cabeça do Montachique, and I do not find that it will be possible to command the several roads falling in from the northward, within even a moderate range of artillery, with less than thirteen redoubts, which would require about 3000 men. The points on which it would be proper to place these are in general rocky, and extremely unfavourable for removing, and I much fear that we shall not be able to do anything effectual on this important line by works only; but every exertion shall be made that time and circumstances will admit of. Strong reserves to support such points as may be pressed will, I apprehend, be absolutely necessary.

I have sent returns to Marshal Beresford of the whole of the guns and ammunition that will be required for the several works proposed, and have requested that the artillery department may be directed to prepare them with the necessary stores, to be in readiness to march at a moment's notice.

The works on the Serra do Chipre are commenced, as are those on the left of Mongeira and at Carvoira. I rather think it would be proper to throw up three redoubts to command the three principal roads leading across the ravine in the rear of Encarnacão, by Ribamor, Marvão, and Pecaneira, in addition to whatever can be done for their destruction.

I will immediately attend to your Lordship's commands as to a road along the rear of the Serra de Servas, and communications from thence into the road from Villa Longa to Alverca.

I find the interior length of parapet (exclusive of the space for guns) of the works at Fort St. Julian's, Sobral de Monte Agraço, and Torres Vedras, at the rate of two men to a yard, as decided by your Lordship, gives the following number for each: viz. at the first station, including the detached redoubts, if completed, about 3300 men; at Sobral 2500; and at Torres Vedras, allowing about 500 for the castle, about 3200 men. To the last should be added perhaps 600 men, to throw into the buildings, &c., best adapted for defence; and the total may be about 3800 men.

I shall venture to employ a body of peasantry at six vingtems per day each, as proposed in my letter to your Lordship of the 19th instant, without waiting for an answer, trusting it will not, under present circumstances, be disapproved of.

I beg to suggest that if Lieut.-Colonel Fisher, commanding the British artillery at Lisbon, were ordered to afford the Portuguese artillery such assistance as might be necessary in selecting, examining, and forwarding the guns, ammunition, and stores to the several stations, it might assist the service materially at this juncture.

Having received eight hundred dollars yesterday evening to divide between the several works, I find I have overdrawn the last warrant of 500*l.*

I once more beg to assure your Lordship that nothing shall be left undone that, to the best of my judgment, and with the means I possess, can be performed; but should the contest come to extremities very soon, I am conscious the system proposed will not be easily completed.

I shall naturally pay my first attention to those objects which your Lordship appeared to think most important, and with this view I shall as soon as possible proceed to strengthen the line between Mafra and the Cabeça de Montachique.

Thirty-seven guns of different natures being arrived at Alhandra, I have desired that about one-half of them should be sent to Torres Vedras and the remainder to Sobral de Monte Agraço.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

RICHARD FLETCHER,
Lieut.-Colonel Royal Engineers.

[313.] *To Marshal Beresford.*

MY DEAR BERESFORD, Viseu, 27th Feb., 1810.

I wrote to General Stewart respecting his employment of Colonel M'Donnell, of the 78th, as soon as I heard of his having taken him to Cadiz; and by a letter which I received from him yesterday, I observe that he has allowed him to come away and to join his regiment.

I am glad that you ordered the 12th regiment to Fundão.

The Duque del Parque's corps is not above half the strength he states it. I will let you know whether we can give you any medicines as soon as I can receive Franck's answer.

I have written to Mr. Phillips nearly to the purport of your remark upon his paper. I cannot and will not give him transports to import corn.

Romana has not sent me the last intercepted letters, I conclude because they contain something which ought to induce me to refuse to adopt the measures which he proposes for the momentary relief of Badajoz. What does the intercepted correspondence contain?

I don't think the account of our debts to you in arms is quite clear; that is to say, the parties to the account are not agreed upon it. I think, however, that you might safely begin by taking 1000 stand, in addition to those you have already got, for the delivery of which I beg you to give Colonel Fisher orders. I also request you to desire the commanding officer of the Portuguese artillery, or the storekeeper, to settle this account

with Colonel Fisher, and let me have it, that I may send him an order to pay you the exact balance which may be due to you.

I shall be obliged to you if you will send me a copy of the letter which you have received regarding the income tax upon bât and forage.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Portuguese regiment has given great satisfaction and has excited much admiration at Cadiz.

What arrangement have you made for holding possession of the castle of Palmela, and likewise of Fort St. Philip, and Oataa, at St. Ube's? These points are important. The batteries on the left of the river should be dismantled, and the guns, &c., taken out of them, as-well as from Cezimbre.

Do you mean to occupy any works at Almada? If you do not, you should dismantle them and take the guns out of them. All this is important in a view to our shipping.

To Marshal Beresford. [314.]

MY DEAR BERESFORD, Viseu, 28th Feb., 1810.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know whether the troops ordered have marched to Elvas, &c., and when they will arrive there; and also whether the garrison is in Abrantes, and of what number they consist.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I wish you would communicate personally with the governor of the province of Estremadura, and tell him that if the enemy should invade Alentejo, it may be necessary to desire him to order out of the enemy's reach all carts, carriages, and other means, with the provisions which they can carry away, &c.; that he ought to have all his arrangements prepared for ordering them away as soon as the enemy will approach; and that they should assemble under the protection of Palmela, St. Ube's, &c. That the Captains Mor and their Ordenanza ought to be prepared to give the enemy all the opposition in their power, not by assembling in large bodies, but by lying out in the moun-

tains and the strong parts of the roads, and annoying their patrols and small parties, and by interrupting their communications.

[315.] G. O. Viseu, 28th Feb., 1810.

6. The Commander of the Forces draws the attention of the soldiers of the army to the consequence of the crimes committed by the soldiers thus ordered for execution under the sentence of a General Court-Martial. ———, of the — regiment, and ———, of the — regiment, committed a crime which the Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe is too common in this army; they robbed and ill-treated an inhabitant of this country whom they met on the road; a crime which the Commander of the Forces is determined in no instance to forgive.

The soldiers of the army have been invariably well treated by the inhabitants of Portugal; and the frequent instances which have occurred of their being robbed and ill-treated, and of murders being committed, by soldiers who straggle from their detachments on a march, are a disgrace to the character of this army and of the British nation.

The Commander of the Forces is therefore determined, in every case of the kind that may occur, to have proof adduced of the crime committed; and the sentence of the General Courts Martial, whatever it may be, shall be carried into execution.

The Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe that the crime committed by ———, private in the — regiment, is no less common in this army than robbery and murder; and in respect to this crime he is equally determined to carry into execution the sentences of the General Courts Martial, whatever they be.

WELLINGTON.

** The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.*

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 9th March, 1810.

You are probably surprised at not having yet heard from me, but I did not arrive at Cadiz until the 28th of February, and have since had no opportunity of writing to you. We sailed from Portsmouth, and put back three times, and at last made a very indifferent passage.

I had no knowledge of the state of affairs in Spain until three or four days previous to my arrival at this place, when we fell in with a ship from which we learnt that the French were in possession of Seville and were marching upon Cadiz. The force you have sent here has saved the place; and I have no doubt that if it continues to hold out, it will be owing to the confidence of the inhabitants in the English troops. But such a set of wretches as the Spanish troops I never yet beheld. Nothing has been done towards their improvement, although they have the example (and no doubt a most humiliating one to them) of a Portuguese regiment in a very respectable state of discipline and efficiency. After seeing the Spanish troops I despair of any thing being done in Spain. They are now in a manner secure from any immediate attack from the French, and have time to think a little of their improvement in discipline, &c., and yet, notwithstanding General Stewart's remonstrances and exertions (which are very considerable), they are as bad, if not worse than they were the day they entered the Isla de Leon.

The government too are following the example of their worthy predecessors: owing to some foolish misunderstanding with the Junta of this place, they cannot be prevailed upon to take up their residence here, but remain at the Isla de Leon, conducting themselves more like the Junta of a miserable village than the Regents of a kingdom in a condition to require all the energy and exertion of the most vigorous minds. Their only act of *vigour* has been one which I think will surprise you: their Minister of War has written by their direction to General Cuesta (who is here) a letter full of the most extravagant compliments; they call him the pillar of the state, and the man to whom the kingdom must look for its salvation, and they invite him to reside near their persons in order that they may have the advantage of his counsels! If I can get a copy of the letter, I will send it you.

The French are endeavouring to establish themselves upon the Peninsula opposite to Puntales. We have still the fort of Matagorda, but I fear we shall lose it unless the French can be dislodged. I conclude, however, that General Stewart will write to you upon this subject, and will explain all his plans much better than I can do.

We have had a most dreadful storm here, the result of which has been the loss of four Spanish and one Portuguese line of battle ships. The storm commenced on Sunday night, and blew with almost unremitting violence until yesterday evening. I never witnessed so shocking a scene: several of the Spanish ships got on board of the English, and the *Temeraire* was on shore, but was fortunately got off again with little or no damage. Had the gale continued four and twenty hours longer, I believe every ship in the bay would have been lost; but as it is, the loss is sufficiently great: I enclose a paper which will show you its extent. We must get rid of the Spanish ships and the French prisoners by some means or other, for as long as they are here the town and the harbour are really not safe.

I hope when they hear in England of British troops having been admitted into this place they will send us a few more regiments, for Cadiz must depend for its defence upon the British and upon the British alone. We know nothing of the rest of Spain, excepting what we hear from Lisbon.

General Stewart is very popular here, and very deservedly so. I trust if more troops are sent from England, he will not be superseded.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

I am sorry to say that one of the ships lost is a transport with 120 men of the 4th regiment, all of whom have fallen into the hands of the enemy. Riquebara was on board the *Paz* frigate, and was killed by a shot from the enemy.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Cadiz, 12th March, 1810.

I have not much to say in addition to my official letters. I fear that very little is to be expected from this government; and, since their letter to Cuesta, their best friends have begun to be of the same opinion. I am assured, however, that the Regency did not see the letter to Cuesta until it appeared in the "Gazette," and that General Castaños entirely disapproves the expressions it contains in praise of Cuesta. You know that Cuesta is the bitter enemy of Castaños and of the Duke of Alburquerque; and when the letter was shown to the Duke of Alburquerque, he said that, were it not for his apprehension of offending the English nation, he would use his best endeavours to remove the government. I believe Castaños and the other members of the Regency to have the best intentions; but even Whittingham is now of opinion that Spain cannot be saved. You may be assured, however, that I will use every exertion to maintain, and, if possible, to improve the friendly communication now subsisting between the Regency and the British Minister, and that I will not relinquish this object as long as there is a shadow of a government or a remnant of spirit remaining in the country.

You will find the Freres (if they both return to England, which is at present doubtful) very sanguine in their language about this country. The eldest told me that, since the commencement of the contest, the affairs of Spain never, in his opinion, wore so favourable an aspect as they do at this moment; and I believe his brother is of the same way of thinking. I own I cannot see any justifiable grounds for this opinion. If, indeed, they were inclined to make any exertions for the improvement of their army, they never had so favourable an opportunity, and General Stewart is ready to give them all the assistance in his power. An army of 30,000 men, regularly trained and disciplined, and punctually paid, might still do a great deal in the south of Spain, and would be a good example to the other parts of Spain which continue to hold out; but I have no hope that any improvement will take place; and, as the defence of this place must depend principally upon the English, I wish it were possible to send a few more regiments here. I hope, however, that General Stewart will not be superseded, as he is very popular with the Spaniards, and upon good terms with the Duke of Alburquerque, which is an essential point.

I know not what the effect of a bombardment would be here. If the French get possession of the peninsula opposite Puntales, the ships must move from their present anchorage, as they will be completely within

range of the enemy's shells; but, unless they can force the Isla de Leon and the new battery of the Cortedura, which is now nearly completed, they will never be able to get near enough to Cadiz to injure it with their shells. I have sometimes thought that, in the event of the conquest of the rest of Spain, Cadiz might be induced to declare itself a free port under the protection of the English, and that its connection with South America might (if Spain were to be conquered) facilitate any arrangements we might wish to make in that quarter. I merely throw this out as a hint for your consideration.

If Cadiz should be hard pressed, I believe it to be the intention of the Regency to remove to Majorca or Minorca, and to keep up their connection as long as may be possible with Catalonia and other parts of Spain.

I hope you will not disapprove what I have done about the French prisoners. Their remaining here is really most dangerous; but I think it very probable that, before any arrangement is made by the government for sending them away, I shall receive your instructions, if you think any necessary, upon the subject.

Ever, my dear Wellesley, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing-street, 13th March, 1810.

Since I wrote my despatches of the 27th ultimo I have received your public and private letters of the 21st February.* Though they make the attack upon Portugal by the French armies more probable than the former accounts, they do not seem to call for any alteration in my instructions. I should apprise you, however, that a very considerable degree of alarm exists in this country respecting the safety of the British army in Portugal; and as it is always some advantage to know on a question of doubtful policy on which side it may be best to err, I have no difficulty in stating that, under all the circumstances, you would rather be excused for bringing away the army a little too soon than, by remaining in Portugal a little too long, exposing it to those risks from which no military operations can be wholly exempt. I do not mean by this observation that you would be justified in evacuating Portugal before the country was attacked in force by the enemy; but whenever this event shall occur, the chances of successful defence are considered here by all persons, military as well as civil, so improbable that I could not recommend any attempt at what may be called desperate resistance.

I cannot avoid making a few observations in this place upon the re-embarkation of the army.

The two places of embarkation to which our attention appears to have been directed are St. Julian's in the Tagus, and Peniche. The advantage of the former is, that it is connected with the defence of Lisbon and the Tagus, and that Lisbon and the Tagus would not thereby be abandoned till all resistance had proved fruitless. But then, on the other hand, the embarka-

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. v., pp. 510, 511.

tion at St. Julian's and the means of getting out of the Tagus must always be uncertain; and the position, if I am not misinformed, is one that could not be maintained long against a powerful and successful army.

In deciding upon Peniche as the place of embarkation, you determine on your retreat to abandon Lisbon and the Tagus altogether; but the advantages of Peniche consist in this, that it is represented to be so far an impregnable position that, with proper precautions, it might be defended for weeks, and even for months, against a superior enemy, so that there could be no doubt, according to this representation, of your being able in so long a space of time to embark the army in perfect safety.

I am anxious, therefore, that you should seriously consider whether, if these facts are well founded, it would not be more consistent with the principle of your instructions, viz., that the safety of the army is to be your first object, to look to Peniche as the place of embarkation rather than to St. Julian's.

I may view this question very ignorantly, but I think it a duty to bring it before you for your consideration in the same point of view in which it has occurred to me.

In the event of the evacuation of Portugal it will be a great object to make Cadiz as strong as possible. It is believed here that 15,000 or 20,000 British troops might make it secure for the remainder of the war, and such a garrison would either oblige the French to evacuate the south of Spain or would compel them to keep in that part of the country an army of at least three times the amount of the British force.

It is very desirable likewise to obtain secure possession of Ceuta. The last accounts from Gibraltar give us every reason to believe that no further opposition would be made to the admission of a British garrison into that place.

Brigadier-General Charles Stewart has determined upon returning to you. I have had a full conversation with him upon the whole state of affairs, and he will be able to inform you more in detail than could be done by letter, what are the general impressions and feelings of the public upon the subject of the war in the Peninsula.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

[316.] *To the Corregidor of Aveiro.*

Viseu, 14th March, 1810.

I enclose the duplicate of a letter which I wrote to you ten days ago, to which you have returned no answer, and you have omitted to obey the orders which I gave you in a former letter either to supply straw to the Commissary at Coimbra or to repair to my head-quarters.

I now send a messenger to bring you to my head-quarters forthwith.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 16th March, 1810.

I enclose a copy of my letter of this date to Mr. Stuart, which contains all the intelligence from this place, excepting what you will hear from General Stewart, who has, I think, acted very properly with regard to the proposed attack of the French posts upon the Peninsula opposite to Puntales.

You will receive with this a letter from me, dated the 4th of March, which by some mistake was sent to Gibraltar.

General Whittingham has desired me to send you the enclosed, and to recommend to your attention his application for corporals to drill his cavalry.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

P.S. General Stewart has just shown me your letter to him of the 27th of February. I entirely agree with you in all your reasoning upon the importance of the defence of this place, but I much fear that it will at last depend upon the exertions of the British troops, and upon their exertions alone. It is for this reason that I am anxious for further reinforcements from England, if indeed they can do more in England than keep up your army to the number of 30,000 men, which I understood from Wellesley was all they could do until the army recovered a little from its losses at Walcheren, and I understand that you have not now anything like 30,000 men in the field. Should the French ever get near enough to Cadiz to bombard it, I much fear it would not hold out a week. The whole force for the defence of the town and of the Isla does not amount to 15,000 men, including the force you sent here. This is not enough by 10,000 men, even supposing the troops to be well disciplined and properly equipped for service.

Since my arrival here, I have been making every effort to induce the government to send away their fleet and French prisoners. Some of the prisoners are to go to England whenever the Spaniards will provide vessels for their conveyance there; the remainder are to be distributed among the Balearic Islands, Ceuta, and the Canaries: at least this was the arrangement agreed upon. They cannot, they say, send many to Minorca on account of its weakness, and they give the same reason for not sending their fleet to Minorca. Upon reading that part of your letter to General Stewart relative to the importance of the Balearic Islands, a plan has occurred upon which I wish you would send me your opinion. There are five sail of the line at Carthagena, which are more likely to fall into the hands of the French than the ships at Cadiz. Blake's army is at Guardia, and the moment the French choose to attack it with any force will of course disperse; and if the French choose to make a point of getting to Carthagena, I suppose they will accomplish it: at least Blake with about 8000 men at Guardia will be no great obstacle to their doing so. I was thinking that if the government could be prevailed upon to put 2000 or 3000 men of Blake's army on board the Carthagena fleet and send it to Minorca, it would be the means of saving the fleet and strengthening the garrison of the island, so as perhaps to admit of their sending more of their ships there from hence. Their losses in the storm have not left them

more than ten sail of the line, and they wish to keep three or four sail of the line for the purpose of conveying the government and the people belonging to it away if the place should be so pressed as to render it probable that it would fall into the hands of the French. The Spanish admiral proposed to me to send two sail of the line to Majorca and four to the Havannah, but I think it would be better if the four destined for the Havannah were to be sent to Minorca.

But these people are so slow that after they have decided upon a measure they are months before they carry it into execution, and I really have serious apprehensions that the French prisoners will do some mischief before they are removed. There are 8000 of them in hulks in the bay, ill guarded. Had they cut their cables during the late gale, they must have been driven upon the opposite coast, besides the danger of their falling on board our ships. From a passage in your letter to General Stewart I think it possible that you may know of reinforcements coming here from England, or that you may have recommended such a measure. You say that Captain Landmann may be sure that he will always have a sufficient number of men to occupy and defend the works, the construction of which he may recommend. At present I understand from Whittingham there are hardly men enough to defend the works upon the island which are already constructed. Every suggestion of yours for the defence of the place shall, as far as I am concerned, be scrupulously attended to, and strongly recommended by me to the attention of the government.

I have added this long postscript in consequence of General Stewart having sent me your letter to him of the 27th of February.

H. WELLESLEY.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to C. Stuart, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR, Cadiz, 16th March, 1810.

Owing to some foolish mistake on the part of some of the Admiral's people, a letter which I wrote to you on the 4th instant was sent to Gibraltar instead of to Lisbon. It has been returned to me, and I now forward it to you.

There has been no great change in the state of affairs here since my last letter to you. The French are not supposed to be in great force. By comparing the different accounts we have received, we conceive them to be about 12,000 men; but these accounts are very imperfect, and until some system of espionage can be established, we cannot expect to get any intelligence which can be relied upon.

The enclosed letter from the Duke of Alburquerque to the Regency will give you a pretty accurate idea of the state of the army. The Regency, you will perceive by their reply, have endeavoured to shift the blame from themselves to the Junta of Cadiz, who conceive themselves to be very ill-treated, and are preparing a reply which is to contain a statement of all they have done since the army entered the Isla de Leon. I have represented to General Castaños the necessity that the Regency should establish themselves at Cadiz in order to maintain the authority of the government. I believe it will end in their coming into the town, and the head-quarters

of the Commander-in-Chief being established at the Isla de Leon. I hope also that a very salutary change will soon be effected in the War Department by the removal of General Eguia and the appointment of General Blake in his room. General Castaños is very anxious to effect the change, provided he can find a person equal to the command of Blake's army.

The Junta applied to me to-day to know if it would be possible to supply Cadiz with provisions occasionally from Lisbon. I told them I would write to you upon the subject, but gave them no hopes of success. I have received your letters up to the 10th of March, and return you many thanks for the intelligence I have received from you since my arrival here.

When you have read the Duke of Alburquerque's letter, have the goodness to forward it to Lord Wellington, as I have no other copy to send him.

Ever, my dear Sir, most faithfully yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Cadiz, 21st March, 1810.

From what you told me previously to my leaving England respecting the state of the army at home, I fear that to ask for reinforcements would be totally useless; but 5,000 men, in addition to what we have got, would not only secure this place, but enable General Stewart to attack the enemy with advantage, and without danger of failure. There are now not more than 10,000 Spaniards and about 5000 English and Portuguese in the Isla and in Cadiz, making in the whole a force of about 15,000 men; and to defend the island and the town as they ought to be defended, require a force of about 25,000. General Stewart is very anxious that the chief engineer, Captain Landmann, who has a perfect knowledge of all the works of the town and of the island, should not be superseded.

I very much fear that the Duke of Alburquerque has lost all his popularity in Cadiz by the absurdity of his conduct in publishing his letter to the Regency. He is now at the Isla, where he has established his head-quarters.

I cannot say that my opinion of the government is changed. They have disappointed all their warmest friends, and nothing good is, I fear, to be expected from their measures. It is the opinion of everybody that they ought to establish themselves at Cadiz, and they cannot, I think, avoid doing so, as the Duke of Alburquerque has removed his head-quarters to the Isla.

Ever, my dear Wellesley, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

General W. Stewart to Sir David Dundas.

SIR, Cadiz, 22nd March, 1810.

I had the honour of forwarding to the Adjutant-General on the 13th inst., and by His Majesty's ship *Antelope*, a return of the troops under my

command, amounting to 2922 rank and file British, and 1276 rank and file Portuguese.

I have now the honour of enclosing, for your Excellency's information and that of His Majesty's ministers, a return of the Spanish army in the Isle of Leon, and under the command of Captain-General the Duke of Alburquerque. Brigadier-General Lacey having been lately appointed Adjutant-General of that army, has consolidated and inspected many of the weaker corps, and assures me that the accompanying returns may be relied upon as accurate.

I doubt not that the small proportion of effective rank and file in the Duke of Alburquerque's army will occupy much of your attention and that of His Majesty's government. Until Brigadier-General Lacey made his inspection of *corps*, the actual amount of *effective* men could not be ascertained; my reports on this subject have been unintentionally, and I may add unavoidably incorrect.

In addition to the regular army under the command of the Duke of Alburquerque, there are in this garrison four corps of volunteer infantry and artillery, the effective rank and file of which are stated to be 2400.

The general total of effective rank and file in the Island of Leon may therefore be stated as follows:—

Duke of Alburquerque's army	10,400
British troops	2,900
Portuguese ditto	1,200
Volunteers of Cadiz	2,400
	16,900

The total sick and non-effective, not included in the above force, may be calculated at 3600 rank and file, giving an aggregate force of 20,500 rank and file. As the whole of these sick and non-effective are Spanish, with the exception of a few British and Portuguese, the actual force for the defence of the Isle of Leon, including cavalry, artillery, infantry, and volunteers, is, as I have had the honour to detail, 16,900 rank and file. The number of men required for the adequate defence of Cadiz and the present extensive works on the Isle of Leon may be stated at 25,000 effective rank and file.

A corps of *eight or nine thousand* British troops appears to be indispensable for the security of Cadiz, in addition to the force already here. I have stated this to His Majesty's minister, Mr. Henry Wellesley, and he fully accords with me in opinion.

When His Majesty's government become informed from Mr. Wellesley of the general disunion which prevails in every department of state, civil and military, and of the undisciplined nature of the whole of the Spanish forces, His Majesty's ministers will, I doubt not, deem it expedient to give their earliest attention to the critical situation of one of the most important points on the theatre of war.

From the knowledge which I have acquired of the Spanish resources and of the Spanish character in the few weeks of my command in the Isla de Leon, I think that I may without presumption foretell that unless the British government undertake nearly the *whole of the defence of Cadiz*, and that without loss of time, the enemy, if in earnest, and as powerful in

numbers as there is reason to expect, will ultimately possess himself of the whole Isle of Leon: that he, on the other hand, will never possess himself of it if England be determined to defend it, may, I feel, without more presumption be equally asserted.

The *Ethalion* frigate is about to sail for England in a few days with Messrs. Frere. I shall, by that opportunity, have the honour of forwarding to your Excellency as correct a statement of the engineer and ordnance resources as the active exertions of Captains Landmann and Owen of those departments under my orders can procure.

When submitted to your observation and to that of His Majesty's government, the alarming state of deficiency in which the Isle of Leon is, will, I doubt not, induce the adoption of active measures.

The amount of the enemy's force in our front does not in the mean time exceed 12,000 men. Marshal Victor commands, and has his head-quarters at Chiclana, opposite to Isla, on the Isle of Leon.

I have the honour, &c.,

W. STEWART, Major-General.

The amount of the enemy's force above stated includes the whole from Rota to the sea at Santi Petri. The fort of Matagorda is the only point out of the Isle of Leon which is at present occupied by the allies. It has a garrison of 150 soldiers, sailors, and marines, all British.

The large body of officers and men returned on the hospital establishment in the Spanish army are of a description whose services cannot be counted upon.

[ENCLOSURE.]

THE ARMY OF ANDALUSIA.

General State of the Actual Force of the Army, made up to the present Date, with the Names of the Corps and Officers Commanding Divisions.

Real Isla de Leon, 21st March, 1810.

Posts.	Divisions.	General Officers.	General Total.
Santi Petri	Advanced Guard	Colonel Don Joseph Scadirabel	2,577
Puente de Suazo and Gallinieres	1st Division	Brigadier Don Joseph de la Torre ..	1,896
Caracca	2nd Division ..	Captain of Royal Spanish Guards, Don Raymond Goto	3,577
Cadiz	3rd Division ..	.. ..	4,689
			12,739

W. STEWART, Major-General,
Commander of British Troops.

[317.*] G. O. Viseu, 23rd March, 1810.

1. The soldiers of the army are desired not to eat roots, particularly the onions which they find growing wild in the fields: even in the gardens many of them are poisonous, and a serjeant of the 57th regiment has died of the consequences of eating some of them.

WELLINGTON.

[318.*] G. O. Viseu, 25th March, 1810.

The Commander of the Forces requests that the officers commanding regiments will draw the attention of the soldiers under their command to this example of the consequences of the disgraceful outrages of which too many of the soldiers of this army have been guilty.

The Commander of the Forces repeats his determination to spare no trouble to procure and produce evidence against those who may be guilty of such outrages, and to carry into execution invariably whatever may be the sentence of the Court Martial. His Excellency particularly requests the commanding officers of regiments to revert to the General Orders, and to draw the attention of the officers and non-commissioned officers under their command to those orders which have for their object to prevent the commission of those crimes, and to render unnecessary these dreadful punishments, by the preservation of order and regularity among the soldiers, on their marches, in their quarters, and particularly on detachments.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 27th March, 1810.

I take the opportunity of a vessel going to Lisbon to apprise you of the arrival of General Graham on the 24th: as he knows, however, that a vessel is to sail, he will certainly write to you himself. You have of course later intelligence from the army of Romana than we can have, but letters were yesterday received from him giving a very favourable account of the state of affairs in that quarter, but speaking confidently as to the result of operations there. We have also very good accounts to-day from Gibraltar: the whole country is represented to be in a state of insurrection, and one of the letters mentions that the French are concentrating their force in the neighbourhood of this place. If this be true, I suppose it must be with the intention of waiting for reinforcements, or if they should be

compelled to retreat (which I can hardly hope will be the case) of retreating in a large body. In the meanwhile, because we have not enough upon our hands, we are quarrelling among ourselves. The publication of the Duke of Alburquerque's letter upon the state of the army drew (as might have been expected) a reply from the Junta of Cadiz, which they have likewise published, in which they deny all the facts stated by the Duke of Alburquerque, and treat him throughout the letter with great contempt and disrespect. I endeavoured to prevent this last publication (as I should have done the first if the Duke had communicated his intentions to me), but without success. The Duke is very anxious to make a reply, but this I have prevented for the present. He is, however, determined that something shall be published, and equally determined to resign the command of the army. He sent the documents to the Regency to prove his first statement, and the Regency wrote him a very handsome letter condemning the conduct of the Junta, at least so far condemning as to give the Duke full credit for his statement, and to attribute their publication to indiscreet zeal for the public service. The Duke insists upon this letter being published by the Regency: they have, however, declined it for the present, but have given him hopes that it shall be published hereafter. I was persuaded that the end of this business will be the Duke's resignation, and I am not at all sure that affairs here will not go on better without him. At the same time his services, and particularly those which he has rendered to this town, deserve, I think, better treatment than he has met with from the Junta and the inhabitants (with whom he is now very unpopular), and require that he should be supported by the English as far as that can be done without injury to the common cause. He has promised not to resign the command of the army, nor to publish anything more, without giving me previous notice of his intention. I have at length prevailed upon the Regency to take up their residence in Cadiz, and they are to come in as soon as houses, &c., can be provided for them. They are very little better than the Supreme Junta, excepting as to their intentions, which are certainly good. I hope I shall succeed at last in getting rid of the Spanish fleet and French prisoners.

28th March.

I am just returned from the Isla, and find that the Duke of Alburquerque has applied for and been appointed to go to England upon a complimentary embassy. He has resigned the command of the army, which General Castaños has taken, but continues at the head of the Regency, and General Blake has been sent for to command under General Castaños. The Regency are very glad to get rid of Alburquerque, and Castaños assured me that his embassy would be merely complimentary, and that they did not mean to confide any affairs of importance to his management.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

The *Caledonia*, *San Josef*, and the *Eagle* arrived here on the 24th.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 2nd April, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 21st of March.* I have repeatedly applied to the government for all the intelligence received from the provinces, and I hope that in future I shall be able to send it to you. There has been no change in the state of affairs here since my last letter to you. General Graham is proceeding upon the plan recommended by you of strengthening the defences of the Isla, and I believe does not feel at all certain that if the French were to make a determined attack upon it they would not succeed in possessing themselves of at least the first line of defence. At present the French are very inactive, but they have shown no symptoms of an intention to withdraw; though if the country is as adverse to them as it is represented to be, it is hardly possible that they should continue long in their present positions unless they receive reinforcements. I cannot help being of opinion that if we had an active admiral here, much might be done towards driving them from their positions in the Caño de Trocadero.

I cannot conceive that there would be any objection to sending back a part if not the whole of the troops you sent from Portugal, provided the French should withdraw from their position before this place and there should be no immediate prospect of their returning. I should recommend, however, that 3000 men should remain here so long as they do not excite the jealousy of the Spaniards, and think by good management this may always be avoided. The reinforcements from England, consisting of 1200 Guards and the Rifle corps, are arrived, and the 44th regiment is expected immediately. There will be sufficient to remain here if the French should withdraw, and you should wish to have your troops back again; but I have very little doubt that if the French were to withdraw, the government would immediately apply for our assistance in the field. Upon this head, General Graham is, I conclude, to abide by your instructions to General Stewart, which confine his operations to the defence of the Isla and of Cadiz.

I think that by proper management (if even the French were to retire from before this place) any force would be admitted here which might be thought necessary to ulterior operations in the field, and that the Spaniards would make no objection to a British garrison remaining here during our operations in the field. This I apprehend would be necessary to secure a place to retire upon in the event of any reverse.

The inhabitants of Cadiz are at present perfectly satisfied with the conduct of the British troops, and it is highly desirable that they should be accustomed to the presence of a British garrison. No man can say what the final result of this contest will be, and it is important to look a little beyond the mere defence of the Peninsula. The city of Cadiz is more connected with South America than all the rest of Spain put together, and the establishment of our influence here will greatly facilitate any arrangements we may wish to make hereafter with South America. This you know quite as well as I do, and indeed have stated as much in your letter to General Stewart of the 27th of February.

I have done everything in my power to get the government to pay more

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. v., p. 585.

attention to the Balearic Islands. There has been an insurrection in Minorca, which has, however, been quelled. I enclose an account of it sent to me by Admiral Purvis. The government have in consequence ordered a regiment to be sent there, and are going to send several skeletons of regiments to be filled up by recruits. I think the government are improving, and they certainly are more actively disposed than I thought them soon after my arrival. They have got some good people about them, such as Bardaxi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Justice (by the bye almost a useless appointment here), but they must get rid of old Eguia.

Whittingham tells me that the army is improving. The troops are now regularly paid, more attention is paid to their discipline, and they are clothing them as fast as they can; but they are still worse even than the troops of the Nabob of Oude.

I had advanced so far in my letter when I received yours of the 27th of March. It gives me the greatest satisfaction to perceive by that letter that I have anticipated many of the measures which you recommend. About a week ago I presented a note to the government, of which I enclose a copy. The consequence of that note has been that the Regency has directed the Junta of Cadiz to confer with me upon the means of sending away the fleet and prisoners. A deputation from the Junta has been with me this morning, and it is settled that three sail of the line are to be ready in a fortnight to carry 1000 prisoners to the Canaries, and the ships are then to proceed to Puerto Rico or the Havannah. Three sail of the line are to be ready in twenty days, and are to carry 1000 prisoners to be distributed among the Balearic Islands (query whether this is advisable in the present state of these islands?). The ships to go to Port Mahon. The arrangements for the remainder of the fleet and prisoners are not yet settled, but I hope will be in a few days. Two days after the violent storm, in consequence of my own observation and the representations of the Admiral and the General of the dangerous state of the bay, I took upon myself to send 4000 of the prisoners to England: 800 of them (sailors) are to sail in a day or two in five transports (not belonging to the troops) under convoy. A large portion will, I believe, be sent in victuallers returning empty from Gibraltar.

In this way we shall, I hope, get rid of the larger part of the prisoners; but I am sensible that I have taken upon myself a heavy responsibility, and that probably the least I shall incur will be a severe censure. I feel, however, that having nothing but a choice of difficulties, I have done that which it was my duty to do under the circumstances. You will observe that I proposed to send part of Blake's corps to Minorca. At the time I proposed this I was aware of the insurrection in Andalusia, but I was not aware (nor was the government) of the importance you annex to the operations of Blake's army. However, no part of it is to be detached, but other arrangements are to be made (as I stated in a former part of this letter) to provide for the defence of the Balearic Islands. I will immediately urge the Regency to send the Viscount de Gard's corps there.

I have frequently urged the recruiting in Cadiz, and the Junta tell me they think they shall be able to raise 4000 or 5000 men in the town; but this place has been saved by the troops you sent here, and my decided

opinion is that if ever it comes to be vigorously attacked, it must be saved by their exertions and by theirs alone.

General Graham is taking measures to fortify the island, and will of course apprise you of what he proposes to do.

I am endeavouring to establish a system for getting better intelligence, but you know how difficult it is to get intelligence even in a situation of less difficulty than that in which we are placed. We have excellent intelligence from Valencia: I send you all that I have been able to collect, but it is reported that the French have lost 4000 or 5000 men. I have not, however, been able to trace this to any authentic source, but before this letter goes I hope to be better informed.

From all I have heard I have reason to believe there will be no want of water here, and I have made it a subject of particular inquiry, but I will have that point most accurately investigated.

They have no apprehension here of a scarcity of provisions, that is of salt provisions. Stuart is alarmed at a letter I wrote him to ask if provisions could be supplied from Lisbon. This was a measure of precaution suggested by the Junta, who I must say (for Spaniards) are extremely active. However, constant supplies of fresh provisions would certainly be extremely desirable; and I will find out from the Junta what measures they have taken to procure this supply. Unfortunately half my time is occupied in journeys to the Isla and back again, and I am obliged to reside in Cadiz, because I have as much business with the Admiral, the General, and the Junta, as with the government; so that will be a great relief to me, and I shall have more time to attend to other matters when the Regency settles in the town.

3rd April.

I enclose the Gazette published at Valencia, and also some news from Catalonia, where it appears the Spaniards have had some successes. Suchet's corps has retired into Arragon from Valencia.

I have made further inquiries respecting water and provisions. Of water I am satisfied there will be no want. All the houses have tanks, and some of them cisterns, and there has been a vast deal of rain here during the last month, which has completely filled the tanks. The water they get from Port St. Mary's in peaceable times is merely a luxury, but by no means necessary to the supply of the town.

I am not quite so easy respecting the supply of provisions, though the Junta have no apprehensions of a failure, but I perceive they have no regular plan for procuring provisions. I have urged them to look a little more accurately to this important subject, and they have promised to give me a report in a few days.

A Mr. Reid came here a few days ago with an order from the Commissary at Lisbon to supply 400,000 dollars for the use of the army. He applied to General Stewart and General Graham, who did not like to have anything to do in the affair, and referred him to Mr. Duff, who would have nothing to say to him. He then came to me to procure for him a licence for the exportation of the dollars which he expected to obtain free of duty. I thought it necessary to speak to Duff upon the subject, who told me he

had written to you about it, and that if Mr. Reid were suffered to interfere with him in the market, he never could be sure of keeping down the exchange or of obtaining supplies of money for the use of the army upon tolerable terms. I was besides by no means certain that the licence would be granted free of duty, and I ascertained from Mr. Reid that the duty in that case would fall upon the public, and not upon the contractors. For these reasons, but particularly as Duff had informed me he had written to you, I declined applying for the licence until your reply was received. I wanted Duff to take the transaction out of Mr. Reid's hands (who was ready to make it over to him), but this he declined doing.

The transports with the 2nd battalion of the 44th arrived yesterday evening.

Ever most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

G. O. Viseu, 4th April, 1810. [319.]

2. The Commander of the Forces requests that the attention of the troops may be drawn to this additional example of the consequences of the bad conduct of the soldiers; the soldiers must see that it is impossible for them to commit these outrages without being discovered, and that conviction and punishment are the certain consequences of their crimes: indeed it has rarely happened that one of those who have conspired to commit these crimes (for they are all the result of conspiracy) has not offered himself as an evidence to convict the other criminals. The Commander of the Forces is obliged to observe that these crimes could not be so frequently committed, these conspiracies could not be formed, a robbery of the description of that for which these prisoners are now ordered for execution could not have been known to the soldiers of almost the whole company, if the non-commissioned officers did their duty, and remained at all times among the soldiers.

His Excellency also observes that the non-commissioned officers can do their duty, and can maintain the authority of their situation, only by having the support of the officers belonging to their company given to them upon all occasions, by constantly visiting the soldiers' quarters, and by invariable attendance upon the parade, from the moment the soldiers are under arms. The Commander of the Forces draws the attention of the General and superior officers of the army, and of all the other officers, to his Orders of the 29th May, 1809, to which he desires a strict attention may be paid in future: it is impossible

that the time of the officers of the army can be employed to so much advantage to the service, or with so much satisfaction to themselves, whilst the troops are in cantonments, as in giving their attention to support the authority of the non-commissioned officers, to instil into them a just sense of their situation and of their duties, and thus to prevent these conspiracies and crimes, of which the Commander of the Forces finds himself under the necessity of making such frequent examples.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to C. Stuart, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR, Cadiz, 4th April, 1810.

I return you many thanks for your letters of the 24th.

Since my last letter to you nothing material has occurred here. General Graham is proceeding upon a plan of strengthening the defences of the Isla. At present the French are very inactive, but they have shown no indications of an intention to withdraw; though if the country continues as adverse to them as it is represented to be, it is hardly possible (if they do not receive reinforcements) that they should continue in their present positions.

The government are certainly becoming more active. They have got some good people about them, such as Bardaxi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Justice (by the bye, almost a useless appointment here); but it is very desirable that they should get rid of old Eguia. The army is also improving. The troops are now regularly paid, more attention is paid to their discipline, and they are clothing them as fast as they can.

I fear you have been more alarmed than was necessary at a passage in one of my letters respecting provisions. They have no apprehension of a scarcity, but my writing to you was a measure of precaution suggested by the Junta, who are, I must say, very active. Constant supplies of fresh provisions would, however, be very desirable, and if you can prevail upon merchants to send provisions here you will render us a great service.

I enclose the Gazette containing an account of what has passed at Valencia. It appears that Suchet has been compelled to retire into Arragon with considerable loss. There are also good accounts from Catalonia, which you will see detailed in the Gazette.

There has been an insurrection at Minorca, which has, however, been quelled. I have sent the only account I have to Lord Wellington, and will desire him to send it to you as soon as he has read it. The Guards, the 44th, and the Rifle corps are arrived, making upon the whole a reinforcement of about 2400 men.

Ever, my dear Sir, most faithfully yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Marques de la Romana to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MON CHER MONSIEUR, Badajoz, le 4 Avril, 1810.

Je trouve toujours un vrai plaisir à recevoir les avis que vous voulez bien me donner, ainsi qu'à profiter de vos lumières et de vos connaissances, et, persuadé de ma franchise, permettais que je vous en témoigne ma reconnaissance.

Je n'aurais pas hésité un moment à suivre votre insinuation si j'eusse cru pouvoir soutenir le poste de Merida; mais suivant les forces de l'ennemi dans cette province, et maître de l'Andalousie, je ne saurais le conserver sans m'hasarder à une action générale, dont l'issue ne pouvait pas être avantageuse, vu l'état délabré de ma petite armée, surtout de la cavalerie, à moins d'être supporté par quelque division Anglaise ou alliée. Partant de ce principe, j'ai cru qu'il valait mieux ôter ce repaire à l'ennemi, et en conséquence j'ai fait démolir le *Conventual*, de sorte à ne plus lui servir de retraite. Ce poste offre tout l'avantage à l'ennemi qui se tient à la droite du Guadiana; et si Cuesta ne put l'occuper, ayant ses derrières assurés, et étant maître de la Sierra Morena et de l'Andalousie, je pourrais moins le faire dans la situation où nous sommes, et eu égard à la ligne que nous occupons. La rivière ne peut pas tarder à baisser, et alors le pont de Merida est de très petite conséquence pour quelque opération que ce soit. Si le Conventual eut commandé le pont de cette partie, ci du Guadiana, je n'aurais pas manqué de profiter de cette position pour y tenir un poste fort; mais dans l'état actuel de la guerre toutes ces postes éloignés ne peuvent que tomber à la longue au pouvoir de l'ennemi et augmenter nos pertes.

En vous écrivant ceci je reçois la nouvelle que l'ennemi est parti en toute hâte de Merida, et s'est porté sur Villanueva de la Serena, dans l'intention, d'après le bruit qu'il fait courir, de passer en Andalousie, où ils essuyent des pertes très considérables. Ce serait, peut-être, le cas de faire avancer sur Truxillo la division du Général Hill en même temps que j'avancerais du côté de Merida. Je crois que nous aurions beau jeu, d'autant plus que la marche du Général Hill pouvait s'exécuter secrètement et avec la plus grande sûreté.

J'ai l'honneur de vous renouveler les sentiments de ma parfaite estime et vraie amitié.

LE MARQUES DE LA ROMANA.

G. O. Viseu, 5th April, 1810. [320.]

The Commander of the Forces calls the attention of the officers of the army to the General Orders 4th May, Nos. 5 and 6, and of the 7th October, Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11, also of the 8th December, No. 5; their inattention to these Orders is the greatest inconvenience to the service, increases the detail of business in the public departments, renders necessary references to themselves and to the Commander of the Forces, on every article which they receive from the magistrates of the country

upon irregular vouchers: the whole of this might be avoided, if the officers would attend to the Orders which have been issued upon this subject.

Irregular receipts and vouchers are now before the Commander of the Forces.

It will give the Commander of the Forces much concern to be under the necessity of requiring officers who give irregular vouchers to the magistrates of the country, to pay for the articles which they have received; but the frequent occurrence of inattention to these Orders which can be obeyed with so much facility, and the extent of the business which so much inattention throws upon all the departments, will render this measure necessary.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 5th April, 1810.

As I find the *Manilla* has not sailed, I take the opportunity of sending you a note I this day received from the Spanish government, and which I have communicated to General Graham. He was before of opinion that it would be advisable to supply the British army with meat through our own commissaries, still retaining the bread, wine, fuel, and forage, as long as it can be supplied by the Spaniards. I suppose you will hear from him on the subject, but I do not quite understand whether he means to adopt this measure immediately or wait till he receives your opinion upon it.

A French deserter (a sergeant) came in yesterday, who gives a deplorable account of the French armies: he says universal discontent prevails among the troops; that they were promised the war should cease with the taking of Cadiz, which they were assured would fall immediately, but that instead of that they had been beat out of Estremadura, and that their loss in the Caño de Trocadero was so great in proportion to their numbers, that it was with difficulty the men could be forced down to occupy the posts; that they had received no pay for twelve months; and that the troops were so dissatisfied that nothing but the dread of ill treatment from the peasants prevented them from deserting. This man was very well treated, and desired to write to some of his comrades to say that they would be equally well treated if they would come over to the Spaniards.

A mail was also brought here which was intercepted in La Mancha, and the escort, consisting of fifty men, cut off. This proves that the French cannot be in tranquil possession of La Mancha. I desired to have copies of the intercepted letters, but have not yet received them. If I get them in time, they shall be sent to you by the *Manilla*.

Most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

To the Earl of Liverpool. [321.]

MY DEAR LORD, Viseu, 6th April, 1810.

Since I addressed my last official despatch to you upon the subject of supplies of money, 500,000 dollars have arrived from England in the *Comus;* and about 50,000*l.*, half in specie and half in Portuguese paper, have been raised at Lisbon for bills upon England since the arrival of the packets. Your Lordship is aware of the state of the demands upon us, and will see how inadequate these sums are to answer them. We have received no money from Cadiz for some time, and none from Gibraltar; and even a sum of 70,000*l.* has been detained at the former place, for which the Commissary-General had given his bills at Lisbon, and a vessel had been sent to Cadiz. It is impossible to get on without money, and I trust that your Lordship will continue to supply us from England, and will place matters at Cadiz upon such a footing as that all the supplies which that place and Gibraltar can afford will be applicable to the service in this country. It is useless to trouble you with more official despatches upon this subject. I am convinced that you will do everything in your power, and I write now only to show you how we stand since the arrival of the last sum which has been sent.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Cadiz, 7th April, 1810.

I have not much to trouble you with in addition to my public despatches; but I wished to mention to you, in a private letter, that this is the moment for concluding a commercial arrangement with the Spanish government, which should be so formed as to make it easy to prove that, while it is advantageous to the interests of Great Britain, it is not injurious to those of Spain. Bardaxi (who is a very clever man, and very much the friend of the English) dwelt much upon the necessity of any arrangement which might be concluded being equally advantageous to both nations as affording the only chance of its being permanent; and he cited many treaties, and among others one concluded by Lord Strangford at Rio Janeiro, as being much in favour of the English, and so prejudicial to the Portuguese as to excite great discontent at the Brazils. Where he got his information I know not, and I never saw Lord Strangford's treaty; but I am certain that the Spanish government and Bardaxi are anxious to meet

me half way in any arrangement which may have for its object the mutual benefit of the two kingdoms. I shall therefore wait with anxiety for your instructions upon this subject.

The Duke of Alburquerque will, I believe, sail in a few days. I am pretty certain that one of his principal objects in going to England is to engage you to favour his views with regard to South America. He has not concealed from me his desire to be appointed Viceroy of Mexico; but from what I have seen of his temper, disposition, and character, I have no hesitation in pronouncing him to be the most unfit man that could be selected for that appointment; and, if he were to obtain it, I should not think the interests of Spain or of England in South America secure for an instant. Whittingham is likewise of this opinion; indeed, his conduct here has disgusted the greater part of his friends. At the same time, his services, particularly those which he has rendered to this town, deserve, I think, better treatment than he has met with from the Junta and the inhabitants, and require that he should be supported by the English as far as that can be done without injury to the common cause. If you think it can be avoided with propriety, it will certainly be desirable not to send an embassy here for the mere purpose of complimenting the Regency. Such an embassy must, for the time, lessen the influence of the minister, and I do not think that the government expect it. You are, however, the best judge how far it may be advisable to send one or not; and, whatever your decision may be, I shall most cordially acquiesce in it. I have heard frequently from Arthur, and I am very happy to say that I have anticipated all the measures which he has recommended me to adopt.

Ever, my dear Wellesley, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

General Whittingham, who is now a Major in the British service, is anxious to obtain the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel *in Spain*, and this is important. If any part of the 13th should come here, it will give him the command of it as well as of the corps of Spanish cavalry under his orders. He requested me to write to you upon the subject, and General Graham says there will be no difficulty in obtaining this for him.

[322.] *To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

MY DEAR HENRY, Viseu, 8th April, 1810.

I have always omitted to ask you whether you gave any directions or authority for the employment of a man by the name of Bayford to apply to the Court of Admiralty for the allotment to the army of salvage for the English vessels saved at Oporto?

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing Street, 12th April, 1810.

Considering the probability that the enemy may soon be enabled to employ such an overwhelming force in the invasion of Portugal as may oblige the army under your Lordship's command to abandon that kingdom, I feel anxious that your attention should be turned not only to the permanent possession of Peniche during the remainder of the war (which subject has been already brought under your consideration by my despatch of the 6th instant), but also to the practicability of retaining the fort of Bugio at the entrance of the Tagus, and to learn whether any additions or repairs which we have the time and means to execute could render it tenable in case it is not so already, and how far such a post would in your Lordship's opinion be detrimental to the enemy or useful to the British shipping.

It is conceived that if we could hold such posts as the Bayona Islands, Peniche, Bugio, and perhaps one of the islands off Faro, the whole of the Portuguese coast might be rendered useless to the enemy, and that he might be prevented from carrying on even a coasting trade, while we should possess a facility of constant communication with the people of the country.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

LIVERPOOL.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 16th April, 1810.

Since my letter to you of the 2nd and 3rd * nothing material has occurred here. The French have made no progress, and their loss in the Caño de Trocadero must certainly be very considerable. The latest accounts we have from Seville mention the French force there to be about 8000 men. Castaños told me that the Marques de la Romana had written to the government to say that the most satisfactory accounts had reached him from Seville of the disposition of the inhabitants to rise against the French. General Castaños also assured me that from the intelligence which he had received, he had no doubt that the same spirit prevailed throughout Andalusia, but that the government wished to restrain it from breaking out until a more favourable opportunity, which would certainly occur unless the French received large reinforcements. The army is certainly improving here. The troops are regularly paid, and most of the corps have received their clothing, and they have parades twice a day, at which the officers attend.

We have no news from the Mediterranean, but I am glad to tell you that General O'Donnell is appointed Captain-General of Catalonia, and to command the army in that province, with the rank of Lieutenant-General, so I hope we shall hear no more of the Duque del Parque. Blake has been sent for here, and as soon as he arrives the general staff of the army

* See pp. 502-3.

is to be new modelled for the purpose of being established upon a footing similar to that of the French, and Blake is to be put at the head of it. Castaños said that one of the consequences of this arrangement would be the removal of old Eguia, as his situation would then become a subordinate one, and that it would not be possible for him to hold it.

These measures display something like vigour and activity, but the perusal of the enclosed copy of my despatch of this day's date on the subject of the transfer of the management of the finances to the Junta will afford you a lamentable proof of the weakness of the government. There are some good men, however, in the Junta, and I think it extremely likely that the finances will be much better managed by them than by any minister of finance the Regency could or would have appointed. I have seen some of the members of the Junta since the agreement between them and the Regency was shown to me, and I have recommended to them to confine the direction of the finances to as few of their members as possible. I also enclose a copy of another of my despatches to England of this day's date, as it is necessary that its contents should be known to you and to Mr. Stuart, and I shall be glad if you would let me have your opinion respecting the proposed treaty of alliance between Spain and Portugal. Souza has not behaved well to me about this negotiation, and he played the same trick to Frere at Seville when he attempted to procure the admission of the claims of the Princess of the Brazils without his knowledge or concurrence. I have, however, expressed my opinion of his conduct very frankly to himself, and I dare say we shall go on very well together in future.

Ever, my dear Arthur, yours affectionately,

H. WELLESLEY.

We have accounts of the arrival in England of the *Antelope* with my first despatches, and by a letter from Mr. Hamilton to Mr. Vaughan, I have reason to believe that the measure of sending some of the French prisoners to England is approved by the government; 800 of the sailors (which are those we are most anxious to get rid of) sailed three days ago in five transports. The Freres sailed in one of the frigates that conveyed the prisoners.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Cadiz, 18th April, 1810.

No material change has taken place in the state of affairs since my last despatches. The French cannot, I think, maintain themselves long in their present positions unless they receive large reinforcements; but it is our business to profit by their inactivity in order to strengthen ourselves as much as possible in the Isla, and General Graham appears to be fully impressed with this necessity.

I cannot account for the conduct of the Regency in placing the management of the finances in the hands of the Junta, for the encroaching spirit of the Junta has been a constant subject of complaint in all my interviews with the Regency. I had some conversation to-day with some of the members

of the Junta on the subject of the late agreement, and recommended to them to confide the management of the finances to as few of the members as possible. They told me that they did not conceive that greater power had been given to them than ought always to be given to a Finance Minister, and that, in fact, they were merely placed at the head of the Finance Department, and liable to be removed whenever the Regency shall disapprove of their conduct. I cannot, however, but consider this measure as a lamentable proof of the weakness of the government, and I fear it will be so considered throughout the country.

Ever, my dear Wellesley, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 23rd April, 1810.

I am sorry to tell you that we have lost Matagorda. The French opened a severe fire upon it yesterday morning from three batteries containing 20 twenty-four pounders, and three mortar batteries. It was defended by Captain Maclaine of the 94th most gallantly; he would not leave it until it was a heap of ruins, and until he had received a peremptory order to do so. I am sorry to add that Major Lefebre, the chief engineer, was killed by one of the last shots from the batteries. I know not how we shall supply his loss, though General Graham says that Captain Birch, who is now at the head of the department, is a very clever man. Our loss upon the whole consists of about 17 killed and 38 or 40 wounded: I conclude General Graham will send you a return. I have serious apprehensions of the consequences of the French getting possession of this point, for from the batteries which they actually have they can throw shot and shells into Puntales and a considerable way beyond it. As it is, a large part of the shipping must move farther out towards the entrance of the bay. Everything now depends upon the activity of the navy; for if the French are allowed to establish themselves at Matagorda, they will be able to command the road to the Isla, and to throw shells into the town: at least I am assured that this is so. I think, however, that if the navy are tolerably active, they may prevent them from occupying Matagorda.

I send you some letters from Doyle, which I have not time to get copied: I shall be glad, therefore, if you will return them. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has announced to me that Galicia, Catalonia, Arragon, and Valencia have acknowledged the Regency. I am sorry to tell you that notwithstanding the repeated assurances given me by Castaños that as long as he continued at the head of affairs Cuesta should not be employed, he has lately been appointed Captain-General of the Balearic Islands. This, I fear, knocks up all our plans for establishing a military depôt there. Two days before this event took place Castaños told me he should not be employed; but the government has been bullied into this measure by the Council of Castille and by some of the inhabitants of Cadiz, who were intriguing to get him appointed Viceroy of Mexico. This and their

transferring the management of the finances to the Junta will give you a pretty good idea of the character of the government. Castaños has taken great pains to reconcile me to this appointment, but I have told him that I am certain it will be considered by the government at home as an act of deplorable weakness. Alava is here, and wants to return to your army.

Ever, my dear Arthur, yours most affectionately,

H. WELLESLEY.

I have this moment received the enclosed letters of the 12th from Doyle, of which I send you copies. This is really good news. I mean without delay to send 6000 stand of arms to Catalonia: we have not many more to spare.

General Blake is arrived, but I have not seen him.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Cadiz, 23rd April, 1810.

You will receive two bad pieces of news by my public despatches of this date: the appointment of Cuesta to the Balearic Islands, and the loss of Matagorda; but, to make up for these, I send you excellent intelligence from Catalonia, and I really think that we may reasonably hope for a series of prosperous events in that quarter.

The loss of Matagorda will not, I hope, be of much consequence; but everything depends upon the activity of the navy, for, if the French are suffered to establish themselves there, they will be enabled to command the road to the Isla with shells, and to throw shell into the outer part of the town. I cannot express of what importance it is that we should have an active Admiral here. It would have been impossible to have kept Matagorda after the French had established their batteries. It is wonderful, indeed, that we kept it so long; but common activity at first (I mean before the British troops came here) would have prevented the French from establishing themselves in the Caño del Trocadero. As it is, this is the point from which we have at present most to apprehend.

I hope soon to get your instructions respecting a commercial arrangement and also on the Convention, to define the nature of the assistance to be given to Spain, as stated in M. de Bardaxi's note, forwarded by the messenger Shaw. I have no doubt that the trade might be rendered more advantageous to England, without being prejudicial to Spain, and this, I apprehend, is the basis upon which a commercial arrangement should be formed.

Ever, my dear Wellesley, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, London, 25th April, 1810.

As I think it may be a satisfaction to you to know what are the King's sentiments in consequence of our late correspondence, I enclose a private letter from Colonel Taylor to me upon the occasion, in answer to one which I had written to him desiring that he would read your last letters to His Majesty.

I have had the pleasure this day of seeing Lady Wellington and your little boys. I am happy to be able to say that they are all well. Arthur is growing quite stout. They have no remains whatever of the hooping-cough, and appear to have received great benefit from Lady Wellington's excursion into the country.

Believe me to be, dear Lord Wellington,

Yours very sincerely,

LIVERPOOL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Colonel Herbert Taylor to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD, Windsor, 21st April, 1810.

I have had the honour of submitting your Lordship's letter to the King, and of reading to him the private letter from Lord Wellington to which it refers; and His Majesty desires you will accept his thanks for this communication, which has proved in the highest degree interesting and satisfactory to him.

I think it my duty to acquaint your Lordship that in the course of the reading, the King observed that the arguments and remarks which this letter contains, the general style and spirit in which it is written, and the clearness with which the state of the question and of prospects in Portugal is exposed, have given His Majesty a very high opinion of Lord Wellington's sense and of the resources of his mind as a soldier; and that as he appears to have weighed the whole of his situation so coolly and maturely, and to have considered so fully every contingency under which he may be placed, not omitting any necessary preparation, His Majesty trusted that his ministers would feel with him the advantage of suffering him to proceed according to his judgment and discretion in the adherence to the principles which he has laid down, unfettered by any particular instructions which might embarrass him in the execution of his general plan of operations.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

H. TAYLOR.

[323.*]

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD, Viseu, 26th April, 1810.

I enclose the weekly state to the 15th, and you will be glad to see how healthy the army is becoming. Including the artillery, we are not much short of 28,000 rank and file fit for duty. There are many men in the returns as "sick absent" who will soon join, and there are but very few who are seriously ill, as you will observe by the weekly return of the sick. There are no men sick present with the regiments who cannot march.

I likewise enclose a state of the Portuguese army, rank and file, taken from the returns of March. The returns of April, which I have not yet received, will, I understand, give us a disposable force for the field of 30,000 men. This army is also becoming more healthy, and it has been much improved since the pay of the officers has been increased, and other measures have been adopted.

I am more afraid of the failure of our finance than of anything else. We are much in debt to the Portuguese government, and are not able to perform our engagements. We are, however, better supplied than we were some time ago; and the regular arrival of the packets lately has had the usual effect of enabling us to get more money for bills upon England. Have government yet come to any decision respecting the preparations to be made by the Portuguese government for evacuating the country eventually? If they have, it is desirable that the King's Minister at Lisbon should receive his instructions upon that subject. I acknowledge that I don't expect that the necessity for the evacuation will exist for some time yet, if it ever should; but I have always been of opinion that it is impossible for any man to be certain what would be the state of this contest in a week from the time he should pretend to foretell its issue; and therefore we ought to be prepared, as far as possible, for every event.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing-street, * April, 1810.

I have reserved for a private letter the question of second in command in the army in Portugal; but before I explain to you our intentions on this point, I am anxious to assure you that your last letters of the 30th March and 2nd April have given here the greatest satisfaction, and that the fullest confidence is placed in your discretion in the important and delicate service in which you are engaged. You will observe that when the instructions were given to General Graham, we were not aware of the instructions which you had given to General Stewart. He might have arrived there under circumstances when it would have been impossible for him, consistently with the security of the place, to have referred to you; but it was always intended, as his instructions prove, that he should be under your command, and we were certain that any discretion which was left to him would not be abused.

As to the question of second in command in Portugal, it has been most seriously considered in Cabinet. Graham was intended for that service, but we were all of opinion that the service at Cadiz is of such a critical nature that it could not be entrusted to any person so well as to him, considering his habits of acting with foreigners and his personal intimacy with General Castaños. He is certainly to be considered as second in command in the Peninsula. If anything should unfortunately happen to you, he should succeed to the command of the army. Under very special circumstances you might send to him to join you; but it is very much wished that, except in a case of emergency, he should be left where he is for the present.

In this state of things I have sent to Lord William Bentinck, and I intend to propose to him to go out as second in command in the room of Sherbrooke, but subject always to Graham coming before him. If Lord William should decline, I intend then to propose it to Edward Paget; and if he should decline, to Sir Brent Spencer. I have no doubt that one of the three will accept it.

My public despatches of this day will, I trust, prove satisfactory to you. As far as respects our military means, I am confident they will be as great, if not greater, than you had reason to expect. Our principal difficulty is about money, or rather about specie; and if any means can be found for providing for our wants in this respect, we shall, I trust, get through the campaign creditably, and perhaps brilliantly.

I am quite satisfied with your explanation about Peniche and St. Julien's, but I thought it necessary to bring the subject distinctly under your consideration; and that part of your letter of the 2nd instant is so satisfactory that I cannot regret having given you the trouble of going into so much detail on this subject.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

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* No date in copy.

GENERAL RETURN of the ARMED POPULATION of the whole Kingdom of PORTUGAL, according to Provinces.

April, 1810.

PROVINCES. Designation.	MEN.						REMARKS.
	Pikemen.	Fusiliers.	Horse.	Total.	Unarmed.	Total.	
Algarve Captaincies 14	6,364	2,992	1,956	11,312	3,193	14,505	
Alentejo 59	19,691	7,545	73	27,309	..	27,309	Wanting the Captain Mor of Gavião, there are 12 Cos. of Marcs.
Beira 118	43,380	27,460	12	70,852	19,489	90,341	
Estremadura	45,649	8,027	1,637	55,313	3,313	58,626	Some Captains Mor have not sent in their returns.
Partidoz Porto 51	26,631	21,339	45	48,015	22,695	70,710	
Minho 65	22,834	15,531	..	38,365	24,626	66,991	
Tras os Montes 45	19,160	19,685	..	38,845	3,678	43,123	The Ordenanzas of 4 Cos. were disarmed by the French.
Peninsula to the south of the Tagus ..	6,781	533	25	7,339	..	7,339	
Defence of the Capital	28,550	1,900	..	32,894	..	32,894	In this number the Artillery are included.
Sum Total	219,040	105,012	3,748	330,254	76,994	411,838	

N.B.—Of the 105,012 Fusiliers, 2456 were drawn for the Battalions of Sharpshooters, and the Artillery of the Militia, as stated in the accompanying Return of the Armed Force of the whole Kingdom.

To the Hon. Admiral Berkeley. [324.]

MY DEAR SIR, Celorico, 3rd May, 1810.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have looked over again ————'s letter to me, from which I observe that he is not aware of the reasons for which you have superseded him, viz., taking money for a passage in a transport; and as he will probably have some explanation upon the subject with his superiors in England, it would be better to let him know precisely what you think he has done. It would be awkward if he were to be told, on his arrival in England, that he had been corrupt, and should reply that he had been charged by you only with an irregularity. I mention this, not from any desire of interfering in this business, but merely to remind you of that which I am convinced your own sense of justice would suggest to you if you were aware that ———— did not know the exact nature of the cause of complaint against him.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool. [325.]

MY LORD, Celorico, 3rd May, 1810.

I enclose a letter from Marshal Beresford regarding the absence of Sir Robert Wilson from his duty in this country.

There must be some mistake in the statement of Sir Robert Wilson that he has remained in England for the purpose of settling some accounts of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, as your Lordship has directed that those accounts should be settled in this country, and they are now under the consideration of the Commissary of Accounts of this army.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Celorico, 4th May, 1810. [326.]

1. The frequent loss of money on its progress from one station to another renders necessary the following regulations:

2. When any officer of the Commissariat or Paymaster-

General's department takes charge of money to be transmitted from one station to another, they are to count it and place it in the different boxes or packages in which it is to be carried, and to see that those boxes or packages are well closed and secured.

3. When the money is to be removed, the officer of the commissariat or pay department in charge is to see that all the boxes and packages are secured, and he will give them over in this state to the officer or non-commissioned officer commanding the military escort; he will himself accompany the escort, and at the end of the march he will again inspect the boxes, have them all placed in his own quarters, and apply for a sentry over the treasure.

4. The same practice must be repeated daily on the march till the arrival of the money at the place of its destination.

5. The money is to be counted and delivered over to the person to whom it had been consigned, in presence of the officer of the commissariat or pay department in whose charge it had been sent; and he is to be responsible for all deficiencies from the hour from which he originally receives charge.

6. Whenever money is sent from one station to another, the officer of the commissariat or pay department in charge must have with him a copy of these orders.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing-street, 4th May, 1810.

Since I wrote to you last week I have tried Lord William Bentinck, General Paget, and Sir Brent Spencer, for the purpose of replacing Sir John Sherbrooke.

Lord William Bentinck declined on account of the uncertain situation in which he should stand in the army by the command eventually devolving on General Graham.

Paget's objection was the state of his health, and I believe in some degree that of his family. He assured me that he would otherwise have gone out third as soon as second, and fifth as soon as third.

I accordingly saw Sir B. Spencer yesterday, who has accepted the situation offered to him, and has expressed himself particularly gratified at the idea of serving again so immediately under you. I explained to him that he could only be third in the army in the Peninsula, and that it would rest with you to call General Graham to Portugal, if you should be of opinion that his services there would be of more use than at Cadiz. He professed to see the necessity of this arrangement. He said that it certainly might make an alteration in his situation, which he would rather should not occur;

but that he certainly never should think of leaving the army on that account as long as the campaign continued, or as any active operations were going on. If his health should suffer from the climate, or if any particular circumstance should occur which might render it desirable for him to come away when the operations of the campaign should be at an end, he trusted that there would be no objection to his applying for leave of absence, to which I could not object, always desiring that he would give sufficient time for a proper successor to be sent out. This arrangement will, I trust, prove satisfactory to you.

I believe as a practical officer Sir Brent Spencer is one of the best in our service; and after the refusal of Lord William Bentinck and General Paget, there was hardly any other alternative. General Oakes is at Malta, and cannot now be called from thence. Sir George Prevost is at Halifax, and if I had sent to him to come to Portugal, we could not have had the benefit of his services for three months to come. General Colin Campbell is very usefully employed at present at Gibraltar.

We are in anxious expectation of further intelligence both from you and from Cadiz; but the prevalence of the easterly winds for the last fortnight has prevented any arrivals. You will have seen by the papers that Lord Mulgrave has retired from the Admiralty on account of his health, and has taken the office of Master-General of the Ordnance. Mr. Yorke has, in consequence, succeeded as First Lord of the Admiralty.

I trust the business of Parliament is so far advanced that we may hope to be able to get through the session in the course of next month.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 4th May, 1810.

I send you an account just received from Gibraltar, but have not received any letters from Doyle. This account is believed at Gibraltar and at Cadiz.

There are very good accounts from Seville. A person arrived from thence yesterday, who reports that there was a fair at Marcina, about 4 leagues from Seville, on the 25th of April, and that 80 men were sent there from Seville to maintain good order, all of whom were murdered. The same person states that Joseph Bonaparte left Granada for Madrid on the 12th, but that when he arrived at Andujar he was compelled to turn back on account of the whole country being in a state of insurrection, and that he is now at Seville with just a sufficient number of troops to guard his person, the remainder having been sent to Cordova and Andujar to quell the insurrection in those places. All this is good if true; but I cannot vouch for it any further than by telling you it is believed here. You have probably earlier and better information than we can obtain here.

The French have been quiet for these few days past, but I expect they will open a tremendous fire upon Puntales very shortly: however, if the distances have been accurately measured, they cannot annoy the town. We have great trouble in getting the requisitions for the army complied with: this

depends principally upon the Junta of Cadiz, and I have sent a note to them to-day, which I hope will be of use. The government are going on much as usual: they now and then issue an edict which promises great things. I enclose one published within these two days, which, if it were enforced, could not fail to be attended with great advantages; and Bardaxi assures me that it shall be strictly enforced. Some boatmen arrived to-day from Port St. Mary's, who represent the French army to be in a state of the greatest discontent. It is curious that we have not yet been able to ascertain their numbers.

Ever, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

The *Asia* and *Algeciras* arrived here on the 2nd of May with four millions of dollars, so that I hope we shall not want money. Two thousand prisoners are going to England in a few days, and a thousand to the Canaries.

[327.*] G. A. O. Celorico, 8th May, 1810.

3. The General officers commanding brigades, and officers commanding regiments of cavalry, are requested to adopt efficient measures to prevent the sale by the soldiers of the cavalry of the grain intended for the horses; this object can be effected only by the constant attention of the officers to their stable duties.

The Commander of the Forces likewise requests the officers commanding brigades and regiments of cavalry will communicate with the magistrates in the several districts and villages in which the cavalry are cantoned, to prevent the purchase by the inhabitants of the country of any article whatsoever from the soldiers, most particularly those destined for the food of the horses.

WELLINGTON.

[328.] *To Brig.-Gen. Craufurd.*

MY DEAR SIR, Celorico, 9th May, 1810.

I send Captain D'Aubraiva, an officer of the Lusitanian Legion, to the frontier, principally for the purpose of endeavouring to communicate with the foreign corps in the enemy's army and to entice deserters, and he will also get intelligence.

I beg to introduce him to you, and that you will communicate with him.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

G. A. O. Colorico, 14th May, 1810. [329.]

The officers of the Commissariat have been frequently urged to attend to the orders of the Commissary-General; and the Commander of the Forces is concerned to have to observe that many of them have neglected to obey his orders in very important instances in which obedience was undoubtedly in their power.

He now publishes the names of officers of the Commissariat from whom reports ought to have been received at stated periods of the state of the magazines and supplies in their charge, with the dates of the last reports received from each, showing a neglect of an important duty, and a disobedience of a positive order.

The Commander of the Forces will take no further notice of this neglect, but to warn these gentlemen and others of the necessity of paying strict obedience to the orders of their superiors; and he assures them that the publication of their names to the army as persons guilty of disobedience and neglect will not be the only notice taken of such conduct in future.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 18th May, 1810.

I have received your letters up to the 29th of April and 3rd of May.

It is now become absolutely necessary that we should take our supplies upon ourselves. Notwithstanding the repeated applications I have made to the Junta to communicate to me their plan for provisioning this place, and the assurances that they had taken every possible measure to prevent a failure in these supplies, they informed me a few days ago that they had not more flour and wheat in store than was sufficient for the maintenance of the army and of the inhabitants for eighteen days, and they begged my assistance to procure flour and wheat from Gibraltar in order to prevent the possibility of a scarcity before the arrival of other supplies from South America, which they tell me they expect every day. I immediately wrote to Gibraltar; but, as I expected, General Campbell did not feel himself

justified in sending any flour or wheat from the stores at that place. He, however, sent two empty transports to Algiers, where he is sure of obtaining a supply; and I think by these means we shall get in the course of a very few days 600 tons of wheat and flour. It happened luckily that at the time I received this intimation from the Junta, the packet from England for Sicily and Malta was in the bay, on board of which was Mr. Burgman, the Commissary-General to the army in Sicily; and with some difficulty I prevailed upon the Junta to send for a supply from Sicily, and Malta, and Sardinia, and to put the purchase of it into the hands of Mr. Burgman. I trust, therefore, that there is no probability of a failure in this necessary article; but both General Graham and myself are convinced of the necessity of our taking the supplies for the British army into our own hands, and by doing so I trust we shall be able to carry other points with the government and the Junta which are of great importance. There is now a quantity of wheat and flour in the town sufficient for its consumption for about twenty days, and since the Junta apprised me of their difficulties they have been enabled to purchase at Algeciras a supply for about ten days. I trust, therefore, that there is no probability of a scarcity, although it is scandalous to have run the thing so near.

I conclude that General Graham will apprise you of what he is doing to strengthen the place. When the works upon the heights and at Santa Petri are completed, I think they will defy the efforts of the largest force the enemy can bring against them. I do not feel quite so easy about Puntales. Since the loss of Matagorda two batteries have been erected near Puntales, one of five mortars and two howitzers, and the other of four mortars; but they have not yet opened upon the enemy. Whenever the French open a serious fire from the opposite coast, I fear they will command the whole of the inner bay, and render the communication with the Isla by water extremely difficult, probably impracticable excepting at night.

I am sorry to tell you that one of the hulks with 700 prisoners on board, 300 of which are officers, got on shore on the opposite coast a few nights ago in a gale of wind. The prisoners are supposed to have cut the cables. A large proportion of the prisoners are said to have been lost in getting ashore, and to have been destroyed by our fire, but a much larger proportion must have been saved. The ship was burnt by a carcass thrown from one of our bomb vessels. Two thousand prisoners are to sail in a very few days for England, and this will reduce the numbers remaining here to little more than 2000, which I will send to England immediately if we can get convoy and the means of conveyance for them.

We have no further intelligence from Catalonia since my last letter to you. I send you in Spanish the last accounts brought in here by a deserter from the French.

It is reported that Joseph Bonaparte is at Cordova, where he is detained by the turbulent state of the country, but our intelligence is as little to be relied upon as ever. I am now trying other means of procuring information, which I hope will succeed better. All accounts agree in stating the French force before this place not to be more than 16,000 or 18,000 men, and I believe that at least one third of it is composed of foreigners.

There is a variety of reports here about your army, each more extrava-

gant than the other: one is that you are arrived at Madrid with your army. Colonel Alava is going to join you. I spoke to Castaños about this, thinking that you would like to have him, and also feeling it to be necessary that some person should be with you who should tell the government the truth with respect to your operations. Alava is one of the best Spaniards I have seen, and very much attached to you, and indeed to the English in general.

Ever, my dear brother, yours most affectionately,

H. WELLESLEY.

Since I commenced this letter I have seen some of the Junta, and I have at last forced out of them a part of their arrangement for the supply of this place. They expect 6000 barrels of wheat from Ayamonte, which with that which is expected from Algiers and the supply in the town will give them bread for from thirty to forty days. They have contracted with an American here, under a penalty of 50,000 dollars if he should fail in any part of his contract, for 50,000 barrels of flour to be delivered at the following periods: 8000 barrels in June, 10,000 in July, 12,000 in August, and 20,000 in September; and they reckon besides that large quantities will arrive from America, being certain of finding a good market here. I do not find, however, that they have made any other arrangements for the supply of the place, excepting those which have been made through me for their supply from the Mediterranean, and I have prevailed upon them to-day to allow me to write to Burgman to send for their supplies from thence.

It is a fact scarcely to be believed that since this place has been invested, ships laden with grain and flour have left the bay with their cargoes unsold, because the Junta would not purchase them. They deny this fact, but I know it to be true.

Five hundred men and some skeletons of regiments are to sail to-morrow for the Balearic Islands. Cuesta is to embark in a few days. I am very glad you have sent home your opinions repecting the proposed treaty between Spain and Portugal. I am afraid that I made a mistake in my official letter when I called it a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, as in the letters to me from the Portuguese ministers and from Bardaxi it is mentioned as a defensive alliance only. I am certain, however, that in talking to me Bardaxi called it offensive and defensive. As I expect instructions immediately, I think it better to avoid any further conversation upon it until they arrive.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 22nd May, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 11th instant, since which General Graham has heard from you under date the 13th. I find by the letters he has received from England that he will remain here, and that you are to have Lord W. Bentinck for your second in command.

I enclose a letter which I have received from General Graham. I know

not whether you will think it advisable to send the Commissary-General here, or whether you can spare him just at this time. Mr. O'Meara, who is now here, is, I think, a very intelligent man; and his report to the Commissary-General of the state of things here will be perfectly worthy of credit, though it might be better that the Commissary-General should be on the spot for a few days.

There are excellent reports from St. Roque, if they are entitled to any credit. I enclose General Jacome's report, which is official, and all the intelligence he sends is *of course* believed by the government.

There are accounts from Seville stating that Joseph Bonaparte has made a third attempt to go to Madrid, and has been compelled to return after having got as far as Cordova, his guards appearing to have suffered much. In the second attempt he got as far as Baylen, and was attacked by 4000 insurgents, who, after having compelled him to turn back, took the whole of his camp equipage and baggage, and he actually entered Seville with only the coat to his back: he is said to be much dejected. This Castaños told me himself. I give you this intelligence just as I received it, without vouching for its truth. I believe it, however, to be true that Joseph has made three attempts to get to Madrid, and has failed in all of them. I send this by Alava, who will tell you how we are going on here. The *St. Elvo*, a Spanish ship of the line, in attempting to get out this morning drifted under the battery of Sta. Catalina, and was fired at by the French for two hours: she was at last towed away by our boats without much damage. I am not certain what the loss has been, but I believe 2 killed and 6 wounded, and Alava says they are Spaniards. I really think it would be for the advantage of the service that Mr. O'Meara should be left at the head of the Commissariat Department here, and I have reason to believe that General Graham is likewise of this opinion. Mr. O'Meara is upon perfectly good terms with the Junta, which was not the case with Mr. Bagster. I am aware, however, that he may be too young in the service to be left at the head of the department here.

Affectionately yours,
H. WELLESLEY.

[330.] *To Brig.-Gen. W. H. Campbell.*

DEAR SIR, Celorico, 31st May, 1810.

I have received intelligence of the enemy's movements upon the Agueda, which render it probable that I shall have occasion to move the army in the morning, of which I apprise you, and request you to send notice of this probability to General Blunt, and desire him to forward it to the Caçadores. If I should move you, you will receive your route in the night.

Believe me, &c.,
WELLINGTON.

G. O. Celorico, 1st June, 1810. [331.]

3. The Commander of the Forces republishes an order given out by the late Commander of the Forces; and it is to be understood that the stoppage from the soldier, on account of cartridges lost or made away with, ought always to have been, and must in future be, 4*d.* for each cartridge, and 1*d.* for each flint. It is not intended, however, to open again old accounts for those losses.

WELLINGTON.

ETAT GÉNÉRAL DE L'ARMÉE FRANÇAISE EN ESPAGNE.

1er Juin, 1810.

Corps d'Armée et Généraux.	No. de Bataillons.	No. d'Escadrons.	Compagnies d'Artillerie.	Observations.
1er Corps d'Armée, Maréchal Victor	32	20	17	Before Cadiz.
2me Corps d'Armée, Général Regnier ..	29	18	17	Crossing the Tagus.
3me Corps d'Armée, Général Suchet ..	32	8	27	In Aragon and Valencia.
4me Corps d'Armée, Maréchal Mortier	27	24	9	In Sierra Morena.
5me Corps d'Armée, Général Sebastiani	24	20	11	In Andalusia.
6me Corps d'Armée, Maréchal Ney ..	37	16	24	Ciudad Rodrigo.
8me Corps d'Armée, Général Junot ..	32	32	7	Ciudad Rodrigo.
Armée de Catalogne, Maréchal Macdonald	58	21	26	In Catalonia.
Division Bonnet ..	16	1	1	In Asturias.
Ditto Dessolles ..	12	..	2	Near Madrid.
Arrière Garde	6	..	..	At Zamora.
Réserve	..	16	..	Attached to Ney's Corps.
En Garnison	17	3	38	
Total	322	179	179	

In this account the Emperor's Guards at and near Burgos, 7200 men, and the King of Spain's Guards, 4000 or 5000 men, are not included.

GENERAL RETURN of the NATIVE and AUXILIARY TROOPS in the Pay of FRANCE on the 1st June, 1810.

Number of Battalions of Infantry.	Number of Squadrons of Cavalry.	Companies of Artillery.	Troops of Horse Artillery.	Description of Troops.	Where Stationed.	Remarks.
189	82	42	8	French	In France.	It is to be observed that a considerable proportion of the French battalions have been recruited in Germany and Italy, and perhaps one-fifth may be considered as foreigners. 600 men per battalion is, perhaps, too low an average for the whole army, as the establishment is 800 and upwards. The establishment of a squadron is about 200.
39	..	..	..	Foreigners and auxiliaries		
240	156	160	14	French	In Spain.	
84	24	23	1	Foreigners and auxiliaries		
60	28	44	5	.. ..	Germany.	
127	46	48	11	.. ..	Italy.	
32	4	12	1	.. ..	Illyria and Seven Islands.	
5	..	..	..	.. ..	Corsica.	
16	12	16	1	.. ..	Holland.	
792	352	345	41	.. ..	.. ..	

Estimated Number of Effectives.		
792 battalions	600 each	475,000
352 squadrons	150 each	52,800
345 companies Artillery	100 each	34,500
41 Horse Artillery ..	100 each	4,100
		566,000
Imperial Guards, Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, at least		14,000
		580,000

The under-mentioned Corps are not included in the 580,000 men, viz.:—	
13 battalions of Sapeurs, Mineurs, &c.	6,500
109 companies of Artillerie des Gardes Côtes	10,900
116 companies Réserves Départementales	11,600
12 battalions équipages militaires	5,000
10 demi brigades of Veterans en activité	12,000
18 companies of Artillery ditto	1,800
59 squadrons of Imperial Gendarmerie	5,900
	63,700

G. A. O. Celorico, 2nd June, 1810. [332.]

1. The officers commanding regiments of infantry are requested, as soon as possible, to make the following arrangement for sending into store the great coats or the blankets belonging to the regiments under their command respectively, according to the returns they before made upon this subject.

2. The blankets to be sent in are to be made up in bales, each containing 50 blankets; and if the bales which brought the blankets to the army should be lost or mislaid, a blanket may be used as the bale to hold the others.

3. The great coats must each be marked with the name of the soldier to whom it belongs, and his company and his regiment. The great coats must likewise be made up into bales, each containing 50 great coats; and each bale must be marked, viz. *Great coats belonging to — regiment.*

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Celorico, 4th June, 1810. [333.]

3. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to be obliged to bring before the troops another example of the consequence of their irregularities, breach of discipline, and crimes. In order to get liquor, these soldiers formed a conspiracy to commit a robbery; in the course of the commission of this crime, one of a greater enormity, a murder, is committed, which is soon discovered. Then the parties to the commission of these crimes are eager to give information against each other, and the result is an example, such as that which will be brought before the troops upon this occasion.

If such frequent instances had not occurred of the same circumstances produced by the same unvaried course of events, it would not be credible that British soldiers should so far forget their duty as to conspire to commit a robbery on a people they are sent to protect, and by whom they have been invariably well treated, and should murder in cool blood a fellow creature who had done them no injury; more particularly having a knowledge that those guilty of these crimes are invariably discovered, that the conspirators invariably inform against each other, and that the result of the trial must be the execution of the criminals.

The Commander of the Forces repeats his determination to

persevere in carrying into execution the sentence of every General Court Martial on crimes of this description, in the fervent hope that each of them which he will confirm will be the last which he will have to consider.

WELLINGTON.

[334.] *To the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, Celorico, 6th June, 1810.

My despatches of this date will give you an account of the state of affairs in our front. General Mahy has sent me an abstract of a return of Junot's corps of the end of April, which has lately been intercepted at Irun, which makes it above 34,000 infantry and above 8000 cavalry, including men at the depôts and hospitals in France and Spain. I don't think that more than one-third can be supposed to be absent, considering that this corps arrived from France only in January, and has not been engaged in any operation in which it could be supposed to have sustained any great loss. The whole of this corps and of Ney's are now in Castille.

The despatch will also give you a more accurate view of our money concerns than you have yet had before you, and you shall have a paper of this description every month.

If I had money at my command and disposal, and if we had a depôt of arms and ammunition and clothing at Lisbon, we might put the whole of Galicia and Leon in movement upon the enemy's back; but I have nothing with which to assist these provinces, and without assistance it is vain to endeavour to move them. Indeed, I doubt whether the Portuguese government can subsist their militia when assembled, for want of money which we owe them.

I have often told your Lordship that money could be procured in England in large sums, if proper measures were adopted. No man who knows anything of Portugal will believe that the trade of Lisbon would supply sums for the Commissary-General's bills amounting to 144,000*l.* *per mensem*, besides the sums for the bills of individuals, of the Navy Agents, and of the Agents of Transports. The most intelligent Portuguese calculate that not less than 7 millions in specie have been imported from England since September, 1808, and you will observe that government pay from 16 to 20 *per cent.* for every

shilling which is procured in this manner. I have been told repeatedly that a most profitable trade in money is carried on between England and Lisbon, which does not appear to be impossible; and I can only say that there never has been an instance of delay in the arrival of the packets that difficulty has not been experienced, and sometimes it has been impossible to raise money by bills. Not a ship of war or vessel of any description arrives that does not bring money. If individuals can purchase specie in the market in London and export it, I should think that government might do the same, more particularly as they would save about 20 *per cent.* by the transaction. If, however, government are not able to export sufficient sums to defray their expenses here, I trust they will not put a stop to this traffic by individuals, unless, indeed, they should recall the army.

I am afraid that from the spirit and tone in which the letters from the Treasury are written, I have not given satisfaction to that department of the government, which I regret much. I have done everything in my power to keep down the expenses, and it is not my fault if they have increased. The question is, are we at war with France for the existence and independence of the country? and is it advisable to maintain the contest as long as possible at a distance from home? If it be so, government must make up their mind to incur expense. It is impossible to carry on the war in the Peninsula upon any great or advantageous scale without having the means and the power of aiding the allies to put their troops in motion and in operation. I can easily confine my attention to the British army and the subsidiary Portuguese troops, but in doing so I throw up a great part of the game, which may be lost for want of attention to other means of resisting and annoying the enemy.

Besides Romana's army, there are no less than three Spanish detachments of considerable strength on the frontiers of Portugal, with which I am in communication. All these require assistance, and might have been made available. Without this assistance I can hardly expect they will do anything. The war continues in all parts of the Peninsula, and does not appear to be nearer its end than it was a year ago. It will be rather disgraceful if we should be the first to withdraw from it, leaving all these Spanish armies and detachments on foot; and although it may be a very good argument in Parliament, it will not do *in*

foro conscientiæ, to say that these people were unable to do anything for themselves, when we know that the well-applied assistance of Great Britain, which could and ought to be afforded to them, would have enabled them to co-operate with us. Depend upon it that the contest won't last a day after we shall withdraw from it, and we shall yet repent its conclusion.

What I have written may be inconsistent with the opinion of people in England and with the politics of the government. I wish that the government were stronger, and that more pains were taken to inform and guide the opinion of people upon this as well as other important subjects. I see more and must know more of what is going on here than others, and I certainly have no prejudice in favour of the continuance of our exertions here, founded upon any partiality for the business of guiding them; but I sincerely feel what I write, that if the resources of Great Britain were fairly applied to this contest, as they have been to any other in which the country has been engaged, the French would yet repent the invasion of Spain.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 9th June, 1810.

I enclose translations of the answers to my application to the government on the subject of the occupation of the Bayona Islands by the British army in the event of its being obliged to evacuate Portugal. After the receipt of Bardaxi's first letter I called upon him and desired to know whether the government meant to refuse us the Bayona Islands as a point to retreat upon in case of such a measure being necessary. He said by no means, and I then desired that he would write me a letter to that effect, which produced one from him. Bardaxi mentioned to me some time ago that orders had been given to fortify these islands, and that it was intended to establish a depôt there, and to form a corps of troops chiefly for the service of Galicia. How far they have proceeded in this object I know not; but, if I were to judge by their conduct in other parts of Spain, I should have no hesitation in saying that they had not taken a single step towards its accomplishment. Their absurd jealousy respecting the occupation of points in the Spanish territory by British troops is beginning to revive. This is principally owing to the imprudent paragraphs which have appeared in the English newspapers concerning Ceuta. I suspect, however, that the Bishop of Orense is averse to our occupying the Bayona Islands; but I have no objection to renewing my application if you think it necessary, and of pushing it as far as you may think advisable.

I send you an abstract of some very important interceptions which Bardaxi assures me only arrived the day before yesterday, although I suspect they have been here some days. If so, you very likely have got them already through General Campbell; but it appears to me to be so important that you should have them immediately, and that General Hill should be made acquainted with them, that I shall send another copy by land under a flying seal to General Hill. I will endeavour, if possible, to get copies of the papers which relate to the corps on the frontier of Portugal. Nothing can be worse than the intelligence from Catalonia. Lerida is taken by the French, and Hostalrich likewise. The surrender of Lerida is attributed to treachery. I have no accounts from Doyle of a later date than the 7th of May. I send a parcel of his letters.

Ever, my dear Arthur, yours most affectionately,

H. WELLESLEY.

I have copied the two letters from the Duke of Elchingen myself, everybody else being employed. Bardaxi has again assured me that the government only received the intercepted letters the day before yesterday.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Since my letter to you of the 22nd of May there has been no intelligence from the Mediterranean, so that we are still ignorant with respect to O'Donnell's operations in Catalonia, neither have we any further intelligence respecting the supposed defeat of Sebastiani. If any intelligence of importance reaches me, I will take care to forward it to you without delay. The last accounts from Seville are of the 20th, and from Plymouth of the 25th of May: they state that Mortier has left Seville with the intention of assembling all the French corps in the neighbourhood for the purpose of opposing the Marques de la Romana, who was said to be advancing towards Seville. The letters to Bardaxi state that the French at Seville are much depressed at their situation, and with the little prospect of their receiving reinforcements; they also state that accounts have been received at Seville from Madrid, mentioning that the situation of the French was very precarious, and that there appeared to be no prospect of the arrival of reinforcements.

The Regency is at length fixed at Cadiz. They made their public entrance into the town on the 20th of May: I cannot say they were received with much enthusiasm, but there were no symptoms of dissatisfaction; and upon the whole the ceremony went off very well. They had a levee next day, which was numerously and respectably attended; and they afterwards gave a dinner to the corps diplomatique, the grandees, and some of the principal persons at present residing at Cadiz. I think their establishment here will be attended with good effects.

Castaños told me yesterday he was surprised at the appointment of Masséna to the command of the French army in Spain, for that from accounts he had from their emissaries in France, he had every reason to believe he was disaffected to Bonaparte's government, and had expressed his readiness, if an insurrection in France were once organized, to put himself at the head: this I think can hardly deserve credit.

Our works on the heights at the Isla are nearly completed, while those agreed upon as necessary for the defence of the post of Santi Petri, the construction of which was undertaken by the Spaniards, are not yet begun. Since my last letters to you we have lost another ponton full of sick. This I consider as rather a relief to the town than otherwise. We have now not more than 1700 prisoners remaining: 700 of them are to be sent to England in the *Algeciras*, a Spanish 74; the remainder are sick and convalescent, and as they get well are to be distributed among the Balearic Islands and the Canaries.

Ever, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Cadiz, 12th June, 1810.

You will learn, by my despatches of this day's date, that the Spaniards are bent upon an expedition. I heartily wish it may succeed; but I cannot help feeling apprehensive that Lacey will get into a scrape. General Graham has not exactly determined upon what point he shall act with the British troops. Our loss, whether successful or not, cannot, I think, be considerable; and I am sure that Graham will not commit himself in a foolish enterprise, although he feels it incumbent upon him to afford the Spaniards all the assistance he can upon this occasion, without rashly exposing the lives of the troops under his command.

It has been reported to me this morning that the Havannah has acknowledged the Regency, and I have no doubt that they will be also acknowledged by the kingdom of Mexico. I have also heard that letters have been received from some merchants at the Havannah, stating that the inhabitants of that place are determined not to allow Admiral Alava to land. As Admiral Alava's appointment took place before my arrival in Spain, I did not think it prudent to remonstrate against it, and, from what I have seen and heard of him, I do not think that any mischief is to be apprehended from him.

I hope you will give these people assistance in money, for I really do not think they can go on without it, and they certainly are disposed to make great exertions during this summer. The sooner your intentions are known respecting the loan the better. I believe that a very advantageous commercial arrangement might be made, and many of the merchants here are well acquainted with our interests in this respect, so that I should not be at a loss, if it were necessary, to refer any point to commercial authorities. We are much in want of arms, and I could dispose of 40,000 or 50,000 stand to-morrow if I had them. The army here is improving rapidly under Blake, and recruits arrive daily by sea.

The only Englishman who has the least influence over old Cuesta is Captain Campbell, of the artillery, at Gibraltar, who, for some time past, has been acting as aide-de-camp to General Castaños. I have got Castaños to allow Campbell to accompany old Cuesta to the Balearic Islands, and it would be of great use if you could prevail upon Lord Liverpool

to empower me to appoint him a military agent in the Balearic Islands. I say *empower me*, because I think it very probable that Cuesta will never leave Cadiz, in which case Campbell's appointment would be unnecessary. The Balearic Islands are in a dreadful state. There are perpetual insurrections there, and, from their local situation, they are of such importance that I am making every exertion to prevail upon the government to send reinforcements there. I wish there were two or three British regiments there, for they would then be quite secure; but, even if the government were disposed to admit them, I know not where the troops are to come from, and the paragraphs in our newspapers respecting Ceuta have made them so jealous of us that I am afraid to propose any measure of this kind.

People hardly know what to think of the Baron de Rolly's business: it does not appear to have created much sensation here. The people who believe it think that its miscarriage was entirely owing to the want of firmness and energy in the character of the King. The government wanted to publish a paper denying the whole transaction; but I prevented this, thinking it very likely that it might, at some future period, be brought forward in Parliament, although I see that Perceval has declined giving any information upon it.

Ever, my dear Wellesley, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 19th June, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 11th inst.* You will easily believe that I am most anxious for further accounts from you, for it appears to me to be hardly possible that you should remain long where you are without an affair with the enemy. We make out Masséna's force, including the corps under Junot, to be nearly 85,000 men. In this I include the corps of Junot, Ney, Regnier, and Mortier. It is said here that all the generals are disagreeing among themselves, and that Masséna is generally detested among them all.

General Graham will probably have informed you that the combined attack upon the enemy's posts has for the present been abandoned. Lacey has been sent with 3000 men to the Serrania de Ronda for the purpose of keeping alive the war in that quarter, and upon his report the expedition originally in contemplation will, I apprehend, be resumed or relinquished altogether. He took some of the best Spanish troops with him from here; but many of them have embarked with their arms in such a state as to be totally useless. The government exhorted me to write to General Campbell to request his assistance from Gibraltar, and I have accordingly done so, but without any expectation that he will feel it safe to comply with the application. I have, by dint of absolute persecution, got Duff to exert himself to procure larger supplies of specie. 150,000 dollars are to be sent by the vessel which carries this letter; and I hope

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. vi., p. 186.

200,000, but certainly not less than 150,000 will be embarked for Lisbon on Saturday or Monday next. I am, however, more than ever convinced of the necessity of your sending some person here to make further arrangements for your supplies, which I am persuaded may be very considerably increased here. In the meanwhile I shall not cease urging Duff to make every possible exertion to procure money. The exchange is now at 43, which is not very high.

The accounts from Catalonia are deplorable. O'Donnell has resigned the command; the only reason he has assigned for this extraordinary step is in a letter to Doyle, in which he states that the wound in his thigh (from which the ball is not yet extracted) is in such a state as to render him unable to bear the fatigue of the command. I believe the true reason to be the fall of Lerida and the difficulties which are consequently accumulating upon him. The command has fallen upon General Villena, who, in a letter to the government, has stated himself to be unequal to it, and has asked for a successor. I have prevailed upon the government to write to O'Donnell to desire him to resume the command. I have also written a letter to him to the same effect, which I have put into Doyle's hands with a desire that he will deliver it if he thinks it will be of any use. In the meanwhile a second in command is to be appointed to relieve General Villena, and until O'Donnell's final decision shall be known.

General Caro is, I believe, to be removed from the command in Valencia. The fall of Lerida is attributed to his not having advanced into Arragon with the Valencian army.

I hope the abstract of the returns I sent you through General Hill arrived in time to be of use.

Ever, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

My latest letters from Doyle are of the 4th of June. I enclose a number for you. I also enclose an abstract of a letter from Madame Sebastiani to her husband. The date is merely the 29th, without mentioning the month; but, from some circumstances to which she alludes as happening about that time, it must be the 29th of April.

G. O. Celorico, 20th June, 1810.

[335.*] 7. The Commander of the Forces requests that the order of the 19th May, 1809, may be understood as applying to the horses, &c. brought in by deserters from the enemy; it is desirable, and it must be the wish of every officer in the army, that these men should have the full benefit which may result from the sales of what they may bring off with them, and therefore their horses, &c., should be allowed to be sold by public auction.

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher to Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Lisbon, 25th June, 1810.

I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that, on my way from Abrantes, I examined the batteries, constructed under the direction of Captain Chapman, for the defence of the fords commencing immediately below Valada, most of which have had their platforms stolen, and are otherwise not in a very good state.

These batteries were ten in number, and were intended for twenty-four pieces of artillery, on an extent of little more than five miles, but one of them (No. 10) has been destroyed by the river. This line was chosen to command three principal fords, and which, I understand, are passable before any others in the Tagus below Abrantes. The lowest of them is nearly opposite to Salvaterra, and I cannot learn that any fords are known to exist farther down the river.

Captain Chapman's reason for not proposing batteries between Valada and Abrantes was, that the places for passing the river in that space are so numerous that to defend them by stationary artillery became altogether out of the question. The guns intended for the batteries above alluded to are at Abrantes, and there are not any at present appropriated for them. I understood from the people of that part of the country that the fords which these batteries are intended to defend are not likely to be passable till about the 1st of August those higher up somewhat later. They were not, I am told, passable near Abrantes, last year, till the middle of August.

As, however, the batteries would defend but a small proportion of the whole fordable space, it is perhaps a question whether it would be advisable to place heavy artillery in them at all, unless they could be supported with strong corps of troops; and indeed, in any event, well-appointed field ordnance would apply more generally to the defence of the passage of the river, and might act in the batteries already thrown up with great advantage.

On my return from Abrantes on the 23rd instant I was honoured with your Lordship's letters of the 15th, 16th, and 21st. The Admiral informs me that he thinks the 24 or 18-pounders for the works near St. Julian's may be supplied in a few days, but that to complete a sufficient number of carriages for the 12-pounders may yet require three weeks; so that if the side-arms, &c., appear to be complete, Lieutenant-Colonel Fisher will relieve the heavy guns first.

I am sorry to find that there still appears some difficulty as to an establishment for the signals, but the Admiral said he had written to your Lordship on the subject. I understand there will be a sufficient number of the copies of the books in about a week.

I return the list of works, &c., corrected in red ink,* as your Lordship directed, which is certainly much more clear than the first method.

From the addition of the three new works at the end, and of one enclosed emplacement which had not been numbered, the total is now 108. I have added another abstract.

* The corrections have been printed in figures differing from those used in other parts of the detailed statement.

Among the officers whom I would propose to join the army, as soon as they can be spared from the works, I would beg to mention Captain Squire for Lieutenant-General Hill's division. He is an officer of acknowledged ability, and from having been a considerable time with Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope in that part of the frontier of the Alentejo, I think he might render himself highly useful.

As the Portuguese engineers now possess drawings of the manner in which it seems advisable to finish the redoubts now in execution to cover Lisbon, and which, I understand, Marshal Beresford thinks is all that can, under existing circumstances, be undertaken, it seems unnecessary to detain Captain Goldfinch any longer for that purpose; but I beg to request your Lordship's commands whether he should still be kept in this neighbourhood, to be in readiness to visit the Bayona Islands.

I am extremely sorry I committed a mistake in my last letter but one, dated 8th April, from Mafra. It should have been the 15th of June.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
RICHARD FLETCHER,
Lieutenant-Colonel Royal Engineers.

Return of the Number of Redoubts and Batteries extending from the Tagus at Alhandra to the Sea near St. Pedro da Cadeira, with the Number of Guns in each, and the Number of Men required for their Defence.

Mafra, 8th June, 1810.

FIRST LINE:

From Alhandra to the Valley of Calhandriz.

Names of Places ..	Trenches.		Batteries.				General Total.
	Right of Lisbon Road.	Left of Lisbon Road.	Mill, Right of Heights.	Flanking to the Left.	Extremity of Left of Heights.	Retired ditto upon Valley.	
Number of Works ..	1	2	3	4	5	6	6
,, Guns, of what calibre ..	..	..	4 12-prs.	2 12-prs.	3 12-prs.	4 12-prs.	13 12-prs.
	3 6-prs.	4 6-prs.	..	..	..	..	7 6-prs.

To Shut the Valley of Calhandriz.

Names of Places	Heights in rear of Calhandriz.	Heights in rear of Trancosa de Cima.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	7	8	2
,, Infantry required	200	200	400
,, Guns, of what calibre	3 12-prs.	3 12-prs.	6 12-prs.

From the Valley of Calhandriz to the Valley leading in the rear of the Heights of Sobral de Monte Agraço.

Names of Places	Pass of Matos. Right.	Pass of Matos. Left.	Windmill on Arruda Road.	Rocky Bluff.	Paved Road to Bucellas on Left of Rocky Bluff.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	9	10	11	12	13	5
,, Infantry required	280	400	300	120	120	1220
,, Guns, of what calibre	3 9-prs.	2 12-prs. 1 9-pr.	4 12-prs.	3 9-prs.	2 12-prs.	8 12-prs. 7 9-prs.

Heights of Sobral de Monte Agraço.

Names of Places	Main Work.	Redoubts. Advanced.	Redoubts. Right.	Redoubts. Left.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	14	15	16	17	4
Number of Infantry required	1590	460	250	300	2600
Number of Guns, of what calibre	1 5½-in. how. 14 12-prs. 6 9-prs. 4 6-prs.	.. 3 12-prs. 3 9-prs. 1 6-pr.	1 5½-in. how. 1 12-pr. 2 9-prs. ..	1 5½-in. how. 7 6-prs.*	3 5½-in. how. 18 12-prs. 11 9-prs. 9 6-prs.

* Of the above 6-prs., 4 are upon travelling-carriages, to move out as occasion may require.

Redoubts upon the Serra de Sta. Ajuda, to cover the Retreat from Sobral de Monte Agraço.

Names of Places	Right.	Left.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	18	19	2
,, Infantry required	300	200	500
,, Guns, of what calibre	4 12-prs.	3 9-prs.	..

Torres Vedras.

Names of Places	Main Work. S.E. Bastion.	Main Work. S.W. Bastion.	Main Work. N.W. Bastion.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	20	21	22	3
Number of Infantry required	470	270	380	1120
Number of Guns, of what calibre	1 5½-in. how. 5 12-prs. 5 9-prs. 2 6-prs.	1 5½-in. how. 1 12-pr. 2 9-prs. 4 6-prs.	1 5½-in. how. 5 12-prs. 5 9-prs. 3 6-prs.	3 5½-in. how. 10 12-prs. 2 9-prs. 9 6 prs.

Names of Places	South Curtain.	West Curtain.	N.E. Curtain.	General Total.
Number of Infantry required	150	90	360	600

Torres Vedras—continued.

Names of Places	Redoubts. West.	Redoubts. East.	Redoubts. Convent of St. João.	Redoubts. Advanced Mill towards Runa.	Castle.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	23	24	25	26	27	5
,, Infantry required	180	300	200	300	500	1480
,, Guns, of what calibre	..	..	..	..	5 12-prs.	5 12-prs.
	4 9-prs.	7 9-prs.	2 9-prs.	3 9-prs.	..	16 9-prs.
	3 6-prs.	..	..	..	..	3 6-prs.

Recapitulation of the Post of Torres Vedras.

Names of Places	Main Work.	Detached Redoubts.	Castle.	Town.	General Total.
Number of Infantry required	1720	980	500	600	3800
Number of Guns, of what calibre	3 5½-in. how.	..	..	..	3 5½-in. how.
	10 12-prs.	..	5 12-prs.	..	15 12-prs.
	2 9-prs.	16 9-prs.	..	..	18 9-prs.
	9 6-prs.	3 6-prs.	..	..	12 6-prs.

Redoubts at Enxara dos Cavalleiros to cover the Retreat from Torres Vedras, and to command the Junction of the Great Roads from Runa and Torres Vedras.

Names of Places	North.	South.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	28	29	2
,, Infantry required	270	280	550
,, Guns, of what calibre	3 12-prs.	..	3 12-prs.
	..	4 9-prs.	4 9-prs.

From Ponte de Rol to St. Pedro da Cadeira, near the Sea.

Names of Places	Ponte de Rol.	Algatena.	St. Pedro da Cadeira.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	30	31	32	3
,, Infantry required	340	370	260	970
,, Guns, of what calibre	3 12-prs.	..	3 12-prs.	6 12-prs.
	1 9-pr.	3 9-prs.	1 9-pr.	5 9-prs.

SECOND LINE.

From the Banks of the Tagus, in the rear of Alverca, to the Sea near Riba Mar.
From the Tagus to the salient point of the Serra de Cerves; above the Caza de Portella.

Names of Places	Banks of Tagus.	Advanced. To Enfilade the Great Road.	Advanced. To Enfilade the Great Road.	Advanced. Summit of Hill.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	33	34	35	36	4
,, Infantry required	300	200	120	370	890
,, Guns, of what calibre	4 12-prs.	..	..	9 12-prs.	13 12-prs.
	..	3 9-prs.	4 9-prs.	..	7 9-prs.

Names of Places	In a Garden Right of Great Road.	Building Left of Great Road.	Summit of Hill.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	37	38	39	3
,, Infantry required	50	340	340	730
,, Guns, of what calibre	..	..	5 12-prs.	5 12-prs.
	3 9-prs.	5 9-prs.	3 9-prs.	11 9-prs.

Names of Places	Caza de Portella. Advanced.	Caza de Portella. Right.	Caza de Portella. Left.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	40	41	42	3
,, Infantry required	150	240	350	740
,, Guns, of what calibre	Musketry	5 12-prs.	6 12-prs.	11 12-prs.

Pass of Bucellas.

Names of Places	Right. Battery.	Right. Front Emplacement.	Right. Rear Emplacement.	Left. Front Emplacement.	Left. Rear Emplacement.	General Total.
Number of Batteries	43	44	45	46	47	5
Number of Guns, of what calibre	4 12-prs.	..	3 12-prs.	..	3 12-prs.	10 12-prs.
	..	2 9-prs.	..	2 9-prs.	..	4 9-prs.

Redoubt in the rear to cover the Retreat from the Pass of Bucellas.

Names of Places	Near a Windmill, to enfilade the Great Road.	General Total.
Number of Redoubt	48	1
,, Infantry required	200	200
,, Guns, of what calibre	2 12-prs.	2 12-prs.

Pass of Freixal.

Names of Places	Emplacement at the extremity of the Right.	Redoubts.		General Total.
		Stockaded in the Rear. Right.	Left.	
Number of Redoubts	49	50	51	2
,, Infantry required	..	160	300	460
Number of Guns, of what calibre	2 12-prs.	..	4 12-prs.	6 12-prs.
	..	2 9-prs.	..	2 9-prs.

Pass of Montachique.

Names of Places ..	Right.						General Total.
	Entrance of Pass.	Near Village on Right.	Mill on Enxara Road.	Rocky Bluff.	Pine Wood.	Rocky Height covering Left.	
Number of Redoubts	52	53	54	55	56	57	6
Number of Infantry required	190	230	210	150	150	270	1200
Number of Guns, of what calibre	..	..	Musketry.	3 12-prs.	2 12-prs.	3 12-prs.	8 12-prs.
	3 9-prs.	2 9-prs.		..	..	..	5 9-prs.

Names of Places	Left.				General Total.
	Entrance of Pass.	Front of Mill on Mafra Road.	Covering Left Flank.		
			Flèche.	Left.	
Number of Redoubts	58	59	60	61	4
Number of Infantry required	310	260	150	190	910
Number of Guns, of what calibre	..	4 12-prs.	..	..	4 12-prs.
	3 9-prs.	..	2 9-prs.	2 9-prs.	7 9-prs.

Covering the Great Road between the Passes of Mafra and Montachique.

Names of Places ..	Alto de Chiera.	Cazal de Serra.	Corner of Park Wall.	Outeiro de Sta. Maria.	Malviera.	Right of Road leading to Malviera.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	62	63	64	65	66	67	6
Number of Infantry required	390	280	210	270	350	120	1620
Number of Guns, of what calibre	3 12-prs.	..	..	3 12-prs.	4 12-prs.	..	10 12-prs.
	..	3 9-prs.	3 9-prs.	..	..	2 9-prs.	8 9-prs.

Names of Places ..	Monte a Tinho.	Pinhel de Fidalgo.	Quinta do Estrangiero	Portella de Freixal.	Astadieros.	Cazal de Couto.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	68	69	70	71	72	73	6
Number of Infantry required	260	240	240	240	130	340	1450
Number of Guns, of what calibre ..	4 12-prs.	4 12-prs.	4 12-prs.	..	..	3 12-prs.	15 12-prs.
	..	..	2 9-prs.	4 9-prs.	2 9-prs.	..	8 9-prs.

Pass of Mafra.

Names of Places	Right. Outside of Park. Cazal de Pedro.	Right. Within Walls of Park. Advanced.	Right. Within Walls of Park. Cabeça de Senival.	Right. Within Walls of Park. Juncal.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	74	75	76	77	4
,, Infantry required	190	70	390	380	1030
,, Guns, of what calibre	..	..	4 12-prs.	4 12-prs.	8 12-prs.
	2 9-prs.	2 9-prs.	..	..	4 9-prs.

Names of Places	Left. Serra de Chipre. Advanced Hill.	Left. Serra de Chipre. Advanced Mill.	Left. Serra de Chipre. Second Mill.	Left. Serra de Chipre. Lower.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	78	79	80	81	4
,, Infantry required	110	270	310	280	970
,, Guns, of what calibre	2 12-prs.	3 12-prs.	3 12-prs.	..	8 12-prs.
	1 9-pr.	..	..	3 9-prs.	4 9-prs.

Names of Places	Left of the Village of Mongiera. Right.	Left of the Village of Mongiera. Centre.	Left of the Village of Mongiera. Left.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	82	83	84	3
,, Infantry required	210	240	290	740
,, Guns, of what calibre	2 12-prs.	..	3 12-prs.	5 12-prs.
	2 9-prs.	3 9-prs.	..	5 9-prs.

Names of Places	Ericiera Road. Alto de Arriero.	Ericiera Road. Alto de Pass.	Mill South of Ericiera Road.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	85	86	87	3
,, Infantry required	290	280	340	910
,, Guns, of what calibre	3 12-prs.	3 12-prs.	3 12-prs.	9 12-prs.

Between the left of the Pass of Mafra and the Sea.

Advanced Line.—*Vide* end of this List.

Names of Places	Defence of Picanciera Road.	Defence of the road to Marvão.	Riba Mar. Right.	Riba Mar. Left.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	89	92	93	94	4
,, Infantry required	310	180	330	320	1140
,, Guns, of what calibre	3 12-prs.	3 12-prs.	3 12-prs.	2 12-prs.	..

Ravine in the rear of Ericiera.

Rear Line.

Names of Places	Right. Monte Gourdo.	Centre. Carvoira.	Left. St. Julian's.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	95	96	97	3
,, Infantry required	250	280	350	880
,, Guns, of what calibre	2 12-prs.	3 12-prs.	2 12-prs.	7 12-prs.

Position in Front of Fort St. Julian's.

Names of Places	Main Work.	Enclosed with a Stockade.		General Total.
		Right Battery to Flank the Beach and Valley of Oeyras.	Left Battery to Flank the Valley of Oeyras.	
Number of Redoubts	98	99	100	3
,, Infantry required	1340	70	50	1460
,, Guns, of what calibre	20 24-prs.	..	..	20 24-prs.
	12-prs.	6 12-prs.	6 12-prs.	12 12-prs.
	9-prs.	..	..	9-prs.
	6 6-prs.	..	..	6 6-prs.

Names of Places	Near Old Mill, upon road from Oeyras to St. Julian's.		Advanced Mills, East of Valley of Oeyras, and Right of Lisbon Road.			General Total.
	Right.	Left.	Front.	South Mill.	North Mill.	
Number of Redoubts	101	102	103	104	105	5
,, Infantry required	250	260	130	100	170	910
,, Guns, of what calibre	10 12-prs.	8 12-prs.	..	..	..	18 12-prs.
	..	..	3 9-prs.	2 9-prs.	4 9-prs.	9 9-prs.

Names of Places	Vineyard Left of No. 1.	Quinta Nova.		Left Flank.	General Total.
		Building.	Redoubt.		
Number of Redoubts	106	..	107	108	3
,, Infantry required	320	400	400	360	1480
,, Guns, of what calibre	6 12-prs.	..	6 12-prs.	6 12-prs.	18 12-prs.

RICHARD FLETCHER,
Lieut.-Colonel, Royal Engineers.

Names of Places	Works last Proposed.			General Total.
	To command the Road from Sobral de Alvares to Mafra.	To command 2 Roads communicating from Picanciera and Encarnacão to top of Heights.	To command 3 Roads from Encarnacão and from foot of Heights to Ericiera.	
Number of Redoubts	88	90	91	3
,, Infantry required	200	230	200	630
,, Guns, of what calibre	3 12-prs.	3 12-prs.	3 12-prs.	9 12-prs.

GENERAL ABSTRACT.

FIRST LINE.

Names of Districts.	Number of Works.	Number of Infantry.	Number and Nature of Guns.				
			5½-in. how.	24-prs.	12-prs.	9-prs.	6-prs.
From Alhandra to the Valley of Calhandriz	6	..	..	..	13	..	7
To shut the Road through the Valley of Calhandriz	2	400	..	..	6	..	..
From Valley of Calhandriz to Valley in rear of Sobral Works	5	1,220	..	..	8	7	..
Heights of Sobral de Monte Agraço	4	2,600	3	..	18	11	9
Serra de Sta. Ajuda	2	500	..	..	4	3	..
Torres Vedras	8	3,800	3	..	15	18	6
Enxara dos Cavalleiros	2	550	..	..	3	4	..
From Ponte de Rol to St. Pedro da Cadeira	3	970	..	..	6	5	..
Total of First Line ..	32	10,040	6	..	73	48	31
	SECOND LINE.						
From the Tagus to the Caza de Portella	10	2,460	..	..	29	18	..
Pass of Bucellas	5	..	..	..	10	4	..
Redoubt to cover Retreat ..	1	200	..	..	2	..	..
Pass of Freixal	3	460	..	..	6	2	..
Pass of Montachique	10	2,110	..	..	12	12	..
Covering the Road from Mafra to Montachique	12	3,070	..	..	25	16	..
Pass of Mafra	14	3,650	..	..	30	13	..
Between Mafra and the Sea (including new works), 1st Line	7	1,770	..	..	20	..	..
Second Line	3	880	..	..	7	..	..
Total of Second Line ..	65	14,600	..	..	141	65	..
Position of Fort St. Julian's ..	11	3,850	..	20	48	9	6
General Total ..	108	28,490	6	20	262	122	37

Redoubts lately constructed on the Position of Alhandra.

Names of Places	Detached Redoubt serving as a Flank to the Front.	Small Redoubt serving as a Flank to the Front.	Uppermost Flanking Redoubt.	Flèche where the Escarpe finishes.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	114	115	116	117	4
,, Infantry required ..	100	100	100	150	450
,, Guns, of what calibre	12-prs. 2 9-prs.	2 9-prs.	5 9-prs.	.. ..	12-prs. 9 9-prs.

Alhandra Redoubts—continued.

Names of Places	High Redoubt Signal Staff.	Redoubt closing the Left of Position.	Detached Redoubt on Left of No. 5.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	118	119	120	3
,, Infantry required ..	400	350	130	880
,, Guns, of what calibre	8 12-prs.	5 12-prs.	2 12-prs.	16 12-prs.

Redoubts lately constructed on the Heights of Calhandriz.

Names of Places	Advanced Redoubt.	Retired Line.			General Total.
		Right.	Centre.	Left.	
Number of Redoubts	121	122	123	124	4
,, Infantry required ..	250	300	300	350	1200
,, Guns, of what calibre	..	3 12-prs.	3 12-prs.	3 12-prs.	9 12-prs.
	3 9-prs.	..	..	1 9-pr.	4 9-prs.

Position of St. Julian's.

Names of Places	Redoubt above Oeyras.	Trench on Right of Mills.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	109	110	2
,, Infantry required	330	..	..
,, Guns, of what calibre	6 12-prs.	..	6 12-prs.

Redoubts lately constructed between St. Pedro da Cadeira and the Sea.

Names of Places	Right.	Centre.	Left.	General Total.
Number of Redoubts	111	112	113	3
,, Infantry required ..	250	220	50	520
,, Guns, of what calibre	5 guns.	4 guns.	2 guns.	11 guns.

*Telegraph.**

This telegraph consists only of five balls, a flag, and pendant of any colour; and, if more than one thousand signals are requisite, then an additional flag and pendant.

It might be executed with four balls, but the combination would require sometimes three balls to be hoisted; whereas, by having five balls, no more than two are ever hoisted on the same combined line.

The drop balls, which are only two in number, ought to have distance-

* See letter to Admiral Berkeley, 24th June, 1810, *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. vi., p. 224.

lines fixed to them, not only for ascertaining their position, but likewise to hook to the bottom of the upper ball when a combination of the sort is wanted.



Examples.



The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, London, 26th June, 1810.

In the event of your being obliged to evacuate Portugal and reinforce the British army in Cadiz, I am confident that you need be under no embarrassment with respect to the command, as far as Graham is concerned. I understand from all Graham's most intimate friends that he is the last man upon whom feelings of disappointment and jealousy, even in the case of a supercession, would operate; but independent of this consideration, I had so full a conversation with him before he left England as to his own situation, as well as with respect to yours, that I am thoroughly convinced that if you were obliged to leave Portugal, he would expect you and a considerable part of your army at Cadiz, and would consider you in that case as most welcome.

I can assure you we are making every effort to supply you with specie.

The Bank have had from the beginning the most positive directions to purchase all that can be procured in the market; but notwithstanding the prosperous state of the trade of the country, they are in such distress with respect to specie, that they were positively in want about a fortnight ago of a hundred thousand dollars for the purpose of internal circulation. I should think that there must be large quantities of specie in Portugal, for the balance of trade between Portugal and Great Britain is at all times in favour of the former, and I am not aware of any circumstance which can lead to an export of specie from Portugal to other countries except for the purpose of purchasing corn. It would be a great relief if the Portuguese government would take a considerable part of the subsidy in kind. The Americans who will bring flour both to Lisbon and Cadiz would be too glad to receive bills upon England for it.

You shall hear from me at length upon the subject of supplies in a few days, as soon as all the necessary inquiries have been made. We should feel mortified to the greatest degree if the contest in the Peninsula should fail for want of pecuniary means: no government could attach more importance to the continuance of it than the present, or be more disposed to direct the whole disposable efforts of the country to this one object. When I accepted the seals of the War Department, I laid it down as a principle that if the war were to be continued in Portugal and Spain, we ought not to suffer any part of our efforts to be directed to other objects. Upon this principle we have acted and are still acting. Every regiment which is serviceable, and every General officer of reputation and experience whose station in the army admitted of his being employed in Portugal or Spain, has been selected for this service. I have no doubt we shall get through the contest with honour, and I cannot avoid entertaining hopes of ultimate success.

I wish it may be practicable for Blake and Graham to strike a blow against Victor. The latter might then reinforce you with a large proportion of his force.

By all the accounts recently received it does not appear that the French have more than 30,000 men in the whole of Andalusia.

Believe me to be, with great truth, my dear Lord,

Very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 26th June, 1810.

Your letter of the 13th reached me yesterday.* You will be surprised to hear that the Duke of Orleans is arrived at Cadiz. It was mentioned to me some time ago by M. de Bardaxi that the Duke of Orleans had renewed an application which he had before made to the Central Junta, with (as M. Bardaxi said) the approbation of the British government, to be allowed to come to Catalonia for the purpose of raising a corps of foreigners to act in the southern provinces of France, and that, as this application had been sanctioned by the British government, the Regency had not

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. vi., p. 191.

thought it right to reject it. I stated my opinion of the ill consequences which might arise from the employment of the Duke of Orleans, and particularly if any command were to be given to him in the Spanish armies; and M. de Castaños assures me it was not intended to give him a command, and that he thought it probable he would lay aside the idea of coming to Catalonia.

I have repeatedly renewed this subject both with Castaños and Bardaxi, and have always received the same answer. The Duke of Orleans, however, is arrived, having first landed at Tarragona, where he expected to have been invested with the command of the army, according (as he states) to a very flattering letter which was written to him by the Regency requesting him to take the command of the army in Catalonia. Castaños and Bardaxi deny, on the other hand, that the letter will bear any such construction, and declare that the Spanish government intended that his employment in that province should be confined to raising a corps of foreigners to be employed on the frontiers of France. The Duke, upon finding that no orders had been sent to Catalonia to place the command of the army in his hands, immediately came to Cadiz.

I am thus placed in a situation of great embarrassment. I have not received a line from Lord Amherst, nor have I any information by which I can judge whether the Duke's coming to Catalonia is with his concurrence, or whether he has any instructions from England upon the subject. Neither do I know whether Bardaxi's assertion that the Duke's original proposal to be employed in Catalonia was sanctioned by the British government be correct or not. I am also ignorant whether the Duke is acting in conformity to the wishes of the Bourbon family at home. I have, therefore, proceeded in this business according to my own view of the subject, and have so strongly urged the injurious consequences which will ensue from placing him at the head of any of the Spanish armies, that if the Regency had any such intention, I hope they have now abandoned it, Castaños and Bardaxi having both assured me, in the most positive manner, that he should not have any command in the armies of Spain, and that they will get rid of him as soon as they can with decency. The Duke of Orleans appears desirous of avoiding all communication with me, but has written to Lord Wellesley; and I think his not manifesting any wish to communicate with me is a proof that he has nothing to show which can prove that his employment in Spain is desired by the British government.

The people of this place are very much dissatisfied at his arrival, and I think that dissatisfaction would be expressed in much stronger terms if an idea had not gone forth that he was supported by the English, and had been brought here by their influence; but I have told Bardaxi that I will not suffer the inhabitants of Cadiz to continue in this idea, and I am only deterred by the apprehension of their breaking into some act of violence against the Duke's person from making it publicly known that we have nothing to do with his arrival here.

I have no other news to tell you which you will not learn from General Graham: indeed I believe he will have nothing new to communicate.

Ever, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM BY MARQUESS WELLESLEY ON A SPANISH ARMY.

To those persons who are acquainted with the present situation of Spain, and have watched the progress of the struggle which that country is making against France, it is unnecessary to employ any course of argument to prove the truth of the following observations. The truth of them will be felt the moment they are stated.

1st. That there is no probability of improving the army of Spain by the mere introduction of British officers into the Spanish service, without a complete reform be previously effected in the whole military system of that country.

2nd. That it would be vain to endeavour to operate any improvement in the military system of Spain under any form of government which that country is likely to assume.

3rd. That the Spanish army is at present in a worse condition than it was at the commencement, or has been at any subsequent period, of the contest against France.

4th. That no exertions on the part of the British force in the Peninsula will be sufficient to bring the contest in Spain to a successful issue without a Spanish army be created capable of being employed on separate operations, and of creating a powerful diversion in some part of Spain.

5th. That the Spaniards are capable of being made as good soldiers as any in the world; that they are perhaps the cheapest soldiers which Great Britain can employ; and that they would serve with confidence and ardour under the command of British officers.

6th. That to create a Spanish army capable of co-operating with effect with the British army in the Peninsula, it is absolutely necessary that Great Britain should take a body of Spanish troops into her service, to be raised, armed, clothed, equipped, paid, fed, and commanded as other foreign corps are in the British service.

It appears that the best mode of carrying this plan into execution would be for Great Britain to offer to take the foreign regiments in Spain into her service, and to consider them as part of the British army during the continuance of the present war.

There are at this moment a number of what are termed "foreign regiments," composed originally of Germans, Flemish, Irish, and Swiss, and commanded by foreign officers. These regiments are still distinguished by foreign names, but are now composed of Spanish soldiers.

The following is a list of the foreign corps in the service of Spain:

Walloon Guards	4	battalions
3 Irish regiments	9	do.
6 Swiss regiments	18	do.
5 regiments of "Petits Wallons" ..	10	do.

The whole consists of 41 battalions.

These corps might be completed to 30,000 men, to be commanded by a British officer, with the designation of Colonel-General of the Foreign Corps of Spain.

The corps might consist of three divisions and nine brigades, each

division to be commanded by a Lieutenant-General, and each brigade by a Brigadier-General.

The establishment would require:

1 Colonel-General.
3 Lieutenant-Generals.
9 Brigadier-Generals.
1 Adjutant-General.
1 Quartermaster-General.
3 Assistant-Adjutant-Generals.
3 Assistant-Quartermaster-Generals.
9 Majors of Brigade.
3 Officers on the personal Staff of the Colonel-General.
3 Officers on the personal Staff of the Lieutenant-Generals.
27 Commandants of Corps.
81 subordinate Officers in the Corps.

144 British Officers, besides those employed in the Commissariat.

This number of British officers would probably be sufficient, at least for the first formation of the corps; the remainder of the officers might be drawn from Austria, Prussia, and Spain. There would probably be no difficulty in procuring a thousand officers from different parts of the Continent, particularly from the Austrian service; but it must be observed that in general the German officers are not likely to agree so well with the Spanish soldiers as British officers.

It would be desirable that as many Spanish officers should be employed with the corps as might be thought consistent with the discipline of it. Young Spaniards with the rank of subalterns and captains would be useful, and the most deserving of them might gradually be promoted to the higher ranks.

It would be absolutely necessary to the success of the whole plan that all interference on the part of the government of Spain in the formation, payment, promotion, and interior economy of this body of troops should be avoided. They might be clothed in red, which was the distinguishing colour of the foreign corps in the Spanish service; the arms and accoutrements to be furnished by Great Britain. The payment and provisioning of the men, the promotion of the officers, and, in short, every measure connected with the discipline and equipment of the corps, should rest absolutely with the Colonel-General, subject to the authority and control of the officer commanding in chief the British forces in the Peninsula.

A commissariat, under a British Commissary-General, would, of course, be attached to this body of troops.

The pay of the Spanish soldiers was very small before the late revolution. One of the first measures of the Central Junta was to increase their pay considerably, and the nominal rate of their pay is perhaps larger than that of any other soldiers in Europe. But, in fact, the Spanish soldiers are ill-paid and ill-fed. If taken into the British service, and that they were certain of regular payments and regular issues of provisions, it is probable that they would be satisfied with their former rate of pay.

It is not easy to exhibit an accurate statement of the expense of 30,000

men in Spain; but some notion of the expense may be had by showing the expense of a similar number of Portuguese troops:

The estimated expense of 30,000 Portuguese troops is	1,613,286*l.* per annum.
And the feeding of them will probably amount to	1,260,000*l.*
Making the whole charge	2,873,286*l.*

It is probable that, in round numbers, every 10,000 men in the Spanish service will cost one million sterling a year.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, London, 5th July, 1810.

Lord March will deliver to you the letters of this mail; he is going to join his regiment. I have no doubt the Duke of Richmond has written to you about him; you must have known him, however, in Ireland. He appears to be a fine young man; but, like all persons of his age and rank in life, he will be the better for some attention, and occasional good advice.

I send you a public letter from the Treasury to-day respecting our finances, and a private one on the same subject from Mr. Perceval. I hope we shall not be disappointed in our expectation of supplies from Vera Cruz, and if they should arrive in the course of the next six weeks, we shall do tolerably well. We cannot expect to carry on war on a large scale without some difficulties. Those of a pecuniary nature are perhaps more trying than any other, but they are at the same time most common; and we are in general such good paymasters when compared to our enemies, that it is very difficult for us to resort to those shifts and expedients to which they are in the constant habit of recurring whenever a pressure of difficulties comes upon them, or the circumstances of the service require them.

You will receive a letter of this day on the subject of arms. I am happy in being able to inform you that I believe there will be no difficulty in furnishing you with double the number now ordered, if you should be of opinion that you could make a good use of them. They should be placed at your disposal and dealt out by you, according to circumstances, to such of the Spanish armies as may appear to you to be likely to make the best use of them.

The Spanish provinces in South America have begun to look to their own security. This spirit has broken out where it might be most naturally expected, in *terra firma*. I should doubt its extending itself at present to Mexico or Peru; but if the cause of Spain should become desperate, I think we might confidently look to a similar disposition manifesting itself throughout the whole of South America.

As I thought you would like to know the tone which government have thought proper to take upon this occasion, I have sent you a copy of my instructions to General Layard at Curaçoa for your private information.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

G. O. Alverca, 6th July, 1810. [336.]

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to notice the frequent omissions of the regiments to send proper returns of the necessaries, &c., of the soldiers to the general hospital along with them, the consequence of which is, that the purveyors of the hospital cannot be responsible for the necessaries of the men. They are referred to the General Orders 17th December, 1809, in which it will be observed that a report is required to be made to the General officer commanding the brigade that they have been obeyed.

2. As it appears that the necessaries of several men, particularly 1st battalion 11th regiment, were found deficient, in addition to the men who were sent in without proper returns, an officer of the 11th is to proceed to Coimbra forthwith, to inquire into the circumstances which occasioned the deficiencies.

3. The Adjutant-General will send to the Commanding officers the list of the names of the men, and the deficiencies of each.

4. As it appears, from comparing at the Adjutant-General's office the Division Order books with the General Order book of the army, that various omissions and mistakes have arisen, it becomes necessary to call the attention of the officers of the department very particularly to the future regularity of the General Orders issued by them to the different divisions.

5. It has been conceived by some gentlemen that the order books were their own property, and on the removal of an officer of the department from one division to another, they have thought themselves entitled to the order book of the division they served in.

6. It is the Commander of the Forces' positive directions, that the order books now belonging to each division are never to be carried away or exchanged, but to be considered as wholly appertaining to the division; and if it should be broken up or divided, the officer of the department in charge of the order books will apply to the Adjutant-General's office for instructions concerning them.

7. The officers of the department must enter the General Orders into the order book themselves, and not entrust them to

a clerk. They must sign their names at the bottom of each day's orders, as being responsible for the entry.

8. The General Orders are to be kept at one end of the book, and the Division Orders at the other: when they meet, a new book is to be procured, which is charged in the contingent account. This will facilitate the comparing the General Orders.

9. Division Order books will be called for every two months, to be compared, and returned with the Adjutant-General's signature as being correct; any errors the officers of the department will have to repair to head quarters to correct.

10. Division officers of the department will call for in the same manner the Brigade Major's order books, and compare them with theirs.

11. Officers of the department are not only to acknowledge the receipt of General Orders, but they are to make a particular report, on the 1st and 14th of every month, of the days upon which no General Orders have been received, addressed to the Adjutant-General.

12. General officers commanding divisions will please to see these orders strictly complied with.

WELLINGTON.

[337.] G. O. Alverca, 9th July, 1810.

1. Paymasters of regiments and other officers, who have money to pay to the Commissary-General on account either of necessaries furnished to the regiments, or any other account, are to pay it, on account of the Commissary-General, into the hands of the Deputy-Paymaster-General, and take his receipt for the same.

2. The receipt of the Deputy-Paymaster-General is then to be taken to the office of the Commissary-General at head quarters, and exchanged for the receipt of the Commissary-General, which can alone be the discharge for the sum due.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 9th July, 1810.

I have received your letters of the 19th and 20th June.* I now send you the originals of the returns of the corps opposed to you, of which I before sent you extracts, and I wish they may arrive in time to be of any use. I could not, however, get them from Bardaxi sooner. You will also find enclosed an intercepted return of Victor's corps, with a letter from himself to Berthier, without a date.

You will before this time have had an interview with the Marques de la Romana, and he will have told you that the government have proposed to him to take the command in Valencia and Catalonia. The plan which has been communicated to me is that M. de Romana should be made Captain-General of Valencia and Catalonia, that General Bassecourt should command under him in Valencia, and some other good officer in Catalonia, and that General O'Donnell should be removed to the command of the army in Estremadura. To this arrangement I suppose you would have no objection, as O'Donnell is thought to be the best officer in the Spanish service. I suggested the expediency of uniting Arragon to the command of Romana, if the government could dispose of the Marques of Palacios, who was appointed Captain-General of that province some months ago, but who is still here. I think it not improbable that this arrangement will be made, and General Lacey appointed to command the army in Arragon under Romana.

The government have likewise determined to bring away the Army of the Centre, after leaving sufficient garrisons in Alicante and Carthagena. The plan is to attack Malaga, and get possession of it, if possible, and likewise to reinforce General Lacey in the Serrania de Ronda. They expect to bring away about 9000 of Blake's army; but I understand the cavalry is to continue in Murcia under Freire. I know not what to say to this project; for, if Blake's army were any check upon Sebastiani, its removal will leave him at liberty to move where he pleases, and he may either reinforce the corps before this place, or make some movement which may enable Masséna to strengthen his army, or else he may overrun the whole country abandoned by Blake's corps. The government, however, are bent upon doing something to relieve this place, and they are therefore determined to strengthen Lacey as much as possible. General Elio, who is lately arrived from Monte Video, and is a great friend of General Blake's, is to command the expedition against Malaga. The projected attack upon Malaga is a profound secret at present.

This is all the military intelligence I have to send you. The government are deplorably in want of money, and I have applied to England for two millions sterling, and unless they get it I know not how we are to go on. You have probably heard that the government of the Caraccas have declared they will hold themselves responsible to no authority but that of Ferdinand VII., for whom they will hold the country in trust. This has not excited much alarm here, and it is thought that they will be brought to acknowledge the Regency. General Venegas is appointed Governor of

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. vi., pp. 206, 212.

Mexico. I know not that, in the actual dearth of public men, a better one could have been found, and I really believe him to be well disposed to the Spanish cause.

The Duke of Orleans is still here; but the government have given me the most positive assurances that they do not mean to employ him. Great dissatisfaction is expressed by the public at his remaining so long.

Ever, my dear Arthur, yours affectionately,

H. WELLESLEY.

Since I began this letter I find that the project of bringing away Blake's army is abandoned, Blake having represented that it will be more useful where it is than anywhere else, and that there will be great danger from Sebastiani's corps if it should no longer be kept in check by a Spanish force. General Elio is to be sent to command it.

Duff has been very active lately about procuring money for your supplies. 300,000 dollars have been sent by the *Dolphin*, and he tells me that in the course of a few days we shall have 300,000 more to send. I have desired him to procure all the money he can raise, and not to wait for a credit from the Commissary-General.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to C. Stuart, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR, Cadiz, 9th July, 1810.

I have received your letters up to the 30th of June, and return you many thanks for the intelligence they contain.

I have no objection to what you propose respecting the Junta of Badajoz, but I apprehend that they cannot expect arms purchased from individuals in England without the permission of the government: at least I know that C. Johnston was unable to fulfil his contract with the Spanish government for the purchase of arms in England because our government would not allow him to export them. As I have no means of communicating with the Junta of Badajoz excepting through you, I shall be much obliged if you will apprise them of the necessity of obtaining permission from the government for the exportation of arms previous to entering into any contract with individuals for their supply.

I have left my letter to my brother open for your perusal, and have nothing further to communicate to you. I fear that the Regency are getting unpopular: it is hardly to be imagined the mischief which the arrival of the Duke of Orleans has done them. There is no truth whatever in the report so industriously circulated of the enthusiasm with which he has been received in Catalonia: I have ascertained, on the contrary, that nothing could be more mortifying than his reception, and that this was one of his principal motives for coming to Cadiz.

Ever, my dear Sir, most faithfully yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

There is certainly a disagreement between the Admirals respecting the freight-money. My Admiral complains bitterly, and I think with some

reason. They surely ought, at least, to *divide* the profits of freight from hence. I believe Pickmore has referred Admiral Berkeley's letter upon this subject to the Lords of the Admiralty. Of course, I have avoided all interference in this dispute.

H. WELLESLEY.

G. O. Alverca, 11th July, 1810. [338.*]

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers commanding divisions will direct that those soldiers who may be inclined to reap the harvest may have leave of absence for that purpose.

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Alverca, 13th July, 1810. [339.*]

1. The men [*according to the return underneath*] were deficient in necessaries when sent to the general hospital on the 6th inst. These men have declared, what the Commander of the Forces is disinclined to believe, that the returns of their necessaries were made without a previous inspection by the officers of the companies to which they belong.

The General officers commanding brigades are requested to inquire into this circumstance.

The further particulars of the return are sent to the regiments concerned.

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool. [340.*]

MY DEAR LORD, Alverca, 18th July, 1810.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatch of the 26th June.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a report from Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, on the success of an attempt to procure water in the Berlingas. I have desired him to persevere in his endeavours to obtain water in wells, without which it is impossible to be certain of a supply.

I wrote some days ago to His Majesty's Minister at Cadiz, to request that he would apply to the Regency for permission to send an officer to survey the Bayona islands, with a view to

secure the possession of them. I have not received an answer, but I learn from Admiral Berkeley that a Spanish ship of the line has been sent to Vigo with directions to take possession of the Bayona islands, and to fortify and erect storehouses upon them. I propose, however, to draw the attention of the King's Minister at Cadiz again to this subject, as it cannot be expected that the Spanish government will effect what ought to be done at those islands either so expeditiously or so well as it can be done by British officers.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[341.] G. O. Alverca, 20th July, 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that when commanding officers of regiments, brigades, or divisions think it proper to order that any of the troops should fire by way of practice, they will give notice of their intention to fire to the detachments of troops which may be cantoned in their neighbourhood.

WELLINGTON.

[342.] G. O. Alverca, 24th July, 1810.

1. The officers commanding detachments proceeding to the army must conform to all the regulations in respect to sending men into general hospital which are laid down for the conduct of the regiments by the different General Orders.

4. The Commander of the Forces repeats that he considers the Assistant Adjutant-General at Lisbon and the commanding officer of the detachments at Belem to be responsible that the officers proceeding in command of detachments from Lisbon are made acquainted with the General Orders which have been given out at different times for their guidance.

6. * * * * * * *

7. The Commander of the Forces has no doubt that the measures he has adopted will soon discover to him who committed this horrid murder; but that the murderers may not any longer enjoy the fruits of their crime unpunished, he hereby offers a reward of 50 dollars and a pardon to any person who

will give information to produce the conviction of the murderers.

8. The Commander of the Forces repeats that he is convinced, if the non-commissioned officers did their duty, these crimes could not be committed by the soldiers without their knowledge. It is incumbent upon those belonging to the regiments stationed at Guarda, whose uniforms have been described, to exert themselves to discover who committed this shocking murder.

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Alverca, 27th July, 1810. [343.]

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the officers commanding regiments, will invariably adopt effectual measures to prevent the streets of the towns in which they may be cantoned, or the roads in the neighbourhood of their cantonments, from being choked up with baggage, with carriages, or otherwise.

2. All carriages and loaded animals on their march must, when halted, if only for a short period, be packed in a field in the neighbourhood of the high road, or housed, but must not on any account be left in the streets of any village, or on the road.

3. When a regiment on its march is halted for any length of time, or when halted is bivouacked, the soldiers must not be permitted to sit or lie down upon the road, but must be placed on one side of it.

4. The officers commanding detachments with baggage, or carriages of any description, the conductors of ordnance or commissariat stores, and the officers commanding regiments, are responsible for a strict obedience to this order.

5. The General and other officers of the army will see the necessity of an early and strict obedience to the orders of the army respecting the marching, cantoning, and provisioning of the troops, and to the preservation of order and discipline, as well as those which may be issued for the operations of the troops.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 28th July, 1810.

I have received your letters of the 12th, 19th, and 20th, all on the same day.*

I had heard before of the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. However anxious the government were that you should succour that place, the opinions here are now quite right about it, and both the government and the inhabitants of this place are convinced that no attempt could have been made to succour it without exposing the safety of the British army to imminent hazard. I enclose a copy of a note which I received some time ago from the Spanish government upon this subject, with my reply to it. I forgot to send you these papers before.

Sir Richard Keats arrived yesterday in the *Implacable* to take the command of the squadron in this bay. He brought me some instructions relative to the late proceedings at the Caraccas. Government are determined not to give any encouragement to those provinces in maintaining their independence, but to do everything in their power to induce them to return to their allegiance to the mother country. At the same time, no assistance is to be given by England to the Spanish government if they should have recourse to arms for the purpose of compelling the Caraccas to acknowledge the Council of Regency, nor is it the intention of our government to break off all communication with the Caraccas. If they should continue to assert their independence, ministers are desirous of availing themselves of this opportunity to obtain the consent of the Spanish government to a free trade with South America; but, as long as Cadiz is of any importance in the Peninsula (and particularly at the present moment), no Spanish government will, I am apprehensive, venture to consent to such a measure. They are willing enough that we should trade through Cadiz, and would admit all articles which have hitherto been prohibited, and, if this would satisfy our government, I have no doubt that I could conclude a very advantageous arrangement; but a free trade would entirely ruin Cadiz, and I doubt much whether we shall ever be able to carry it.

The arrival of the Duke of Orleans in Spain is entirely disapproved in England, and I am desired to get rid of him as quietly as I can. This is no easy matter; but I mean to endeavour to prevail upon him to go to England. Armstrong arrived in England on the 13th. You will see, by Doyle's letters, which I send you by this conveyance, that General O'Donnell has resumed the command in Catalonia, and I trust that things will go on better in that province. Romana is expected here immediately, and is to go to Valencia. General Bassecourt has, in the meanwhile, been directed to take the command of the Valencian army, from which orders have been sent to remove General Caro. General Blake is gone round to the Army of the Centre, for the purpose of reconciling the differences prevailing there. He is accompanied by General Elio, who formerly commanded at Monte Video, and who is now to be placed at the head of the Army of the Centre.

There is some mystery attending Lacey's proceedings in the Serrania de

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. vi., pp. 260, 281, 284.

Ronda. His conduct is generally condemned by all but his friends at Cadiz. It is said that the peasantry fired upon him in revenge of the imprisonment of some of their chiefs here and at Ceuta. Colonel Valdivia, a very active partisan, has been taken prisoner, and it is reported that the enemy has put him to death. Lacey has been ordered to return to Cadiz, and I am afraid that, what with desertions and other losses, he will not bring more than half his force back with him.

I hear that government are sending out a man to arrange the money concerns here.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

I think we owe the safety of Tortosa to the exertions of General Doyle. He appears to have been very active.

G. O. Celorico, 29th July, 1810. [344.]

4. The Commander of the Forces observes that, notwithstanding repeated orders upon the subject, nearly all the regiments of the army have cars in their possession carrying baggage and attended by soldiers. He refrains upon this occasion from taking any further notice of this irregularity, but if he should see hereafter a cart drawn by bullocks in any part of the line of march of the troops, orders will be given that the baggage shall be destroyed, and the officer to whom it belongs will be brought before a General Court Martial.

5. The Commander of the Forces observed yesterday that several men of the Hanoverian Legion were straggling from their corps; he requests that Brigadier-General *Baron* Low will report what number of men were reported absent from each regiment after the march of yesterday, and the cause of their absence.

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. W. W. Pole. [345.]

MY DEAR WILLIAM, Celorico, 31st July, 1810.

Affairs have begun to take a serious turn in this country lately, and I think it advisable to let you know how we stand. The enemy have in my front immediately the 6th corps, consisting of 31,000 effective men, including 4900 cavalry; and the 8th corps, consisting of 26,000 effective men, including above 4000 cavalry: and on their left the 2nd corps, consisting of about 17,000 men, including 3000 cavalry. Besides these

three corps, they have about 5000 or 6000 men under Kellermann in Castille, and about as many under Seras in Leon; and they have 7200 Guards at Burgos or on this side of that town. The effective men which I can bring into the field of the British and Portuguese army may be about 50,000 men, of which one half are British troops.

During the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, the enemy having the 2nd corps in Estremadura, from whence they could with ease have cut me off from Lisbon, I was obliged to keep a corps of from 12,000 to 15,000 men in Alentejo to watch their movements, and another body of from 3000 to 4000 men of the Portuguese army, being ill disciplined and equipped, were posted in the rear of our right, as the only means of making them useful, and as a further security to that important point. We were thus reduced to an army of about 32,000 men, to raise the siege or relieve a place attacked by 57,000, of which 9000 were cavalry, and supported on their right and in their rear by the troops under Kellermann and Seras. To this add that half these troops of ours were Portuguese new troops; that we must have advanced over a plain against the enemy's superior cavalry; and if defeated, we should have had to cross the Coa in front of a victorious army, and should probably have been destroyed. I considered the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo to be so important, that I wished to undertake it notwithstanding these disadvantages; and I proposed to the Marques de la Romana that he should protect my right while I should collect the troops from Alentejo for that purpose: but anxious as he was that Ciudad Rodrigo should be relieved, he declared positively that he could not maintain his position, if General Hill were withdrawn, as long as the 2nd corps should remain in Estremadura. I was therefore obliged to allow matters to take their course.

I see that the French papers have lately begun to abuse me, and the English newspapers will soon follow their example, and the Opposition will follow theirs, because I did not strike a blow against the French before their force was collected for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

First, it must be observed that I had not 32,000 men, nor even 25,000, in this quarter till the beginning of summer. The Portuguese troops were not clothed or equipped, and the British troops had not recovered their sickness, till late in the spring;

and there was always in my front, since January last, the 6th corps, consisting of 31,000 men. There would have been many difficulties, some in that season amounting to impossibilities, in attacking them; and if I had attacked them, I could not have gained any important success before they would have been joined by the 8th corps, which were never farther from them than Leon. There would then have been 57,000 men against 25,000; and whatever might have been my first success, I must have retired with loss; and the army, which would have been exposed to the bad weather early in spring, would not now have been half so efficient as it is. To these reasons add the orders of government not to enter upon any operations in Spain unless all the means of subsistence, &c., which I required were provided, and that there were no means to be procured of any description: so that no operation could be undertaken upon the enemy previous to the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo from which any advantage could be expected.

There is another topic upon which I think I shall be abused, and that is the promise which I am supposed to have made to relieve the place. It happens that although it was most important that this place should hold out, and that I knew it would not hold out a day unless they had hopes of assistance from me, I uniformly and repeatedly, in writing, verbally, and by message, told the governor (of which I have evidence) that whether I could attempt to relieve him or not must depend upon the force with which he should be attacked, and upon other circumstances.

Although I shall be hanged for them, you may be very certain that not only I have had nothing to do with, but had positively forbidden, the foolish affairs in which Craufurd involved his outposts. Of the first, indeed, in which Talbot was killed, I knew nothing before it happened. In respect to the last, that of the 24th, I had positively desired him not to engage in any affair on the other side of the Coa; and as soon as La Concepcion was blown up on the 21st, I had expressed my wish that he should withdraw his infantry to the left of the river; and I repeated my injunction that he should not engage in an affair on the right of the river in answer to a letter in which he told me that he thought the cavalry could not remain there without the infantry. After all this he remained above two hours on his ground after the enemy appeared in his front before they

attacked him, during which time he might have retired across the Coa twice over, where he would have been in a situation in which he could not have been attacked.

You will say, if this be the case, why not accuse Craufurd? I answer, because, if I am to be hanged for it, I cannot accuse a man who I believe has meant well, and whose error is one of judgment, and not of intention; and indeed I must add that although my errors, and those of others also, are visited heavily upon me, that is not the way in which any, much less a British army can be commanded.

Since the 24th the enemy have made no movement of importance. They are near Almeida, but I doubt their intention to lay siege to that place, and I think they propose to make a dash at this army. I have made all the arrangements for the retreat, and I propose to draw back towards Lisbon, and if I can give battle at all, to do it where I shall have all my troops collected in one body.

You have thus the history of our operations, &c.

The enemy are wofully strong; I should think not less than 80,000 men whom they can bring into Portugal: but I don't give the game up as lost, and I think it will be gained, if government will only lend me some infantry to fight the battle near Lisbon.

The enemy have at least 250,000 effectives in Spain.

Pray give my best love to Mrs. Pole and the girls, and to the Duke and Duchess, &c., &c. Show this letter to the Duke. I'll write to the Duchess about her boy, who is the best fellow I ever saw.

Ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

[346.] G. O. Celorico, 1st Aug., 1810.

1. The following orders and rules are to be observed respecting communications with the enemy's outposts:

2. No flag of truce must be sent to the enemy without orders from the Commander of the Forces.

3. No letter or other communication must be sent by a flag of truce which has been ordered by the Commander of the Forces, unless such letter has first been transmitted to head-quarters, and it must be open.

4. Flags of truce from the enemy must be received by the officer commanding the first post at which they will arrive. The officer commanding the post is to receive the flag of truce, or officer coming with it, to take from him the letter or communication with which he will be charged, and to give him a receipt for it, and he is then to send him back again to his own lines.

5. The simplicity and indiscretion with which communications have been made to the enemy respecting the positions, &c., of this army and other circumstances, render these orders absolutely necessary; and the Commander of the Forces trusts that the officers commanding at the out-piquets, who may have to receive the enemy's flags, will confine their conversation entirely to the subject on which they are to communicate, viz. the receipt of the letter or message from the enemy, and the immediate departure of the officer delivering it.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Cadiz, 1st Aug., 1810.

I return you many thanks for your private letter of the 14th inst., and am most happy to find that my conduct since I have been in Spain meets with your approbation.

I much fear that we shall not be able to carry the point of a free trade with the colonies. If we do carry it, it can only be by a decree of the Cortes; for be assured that no government will venture upon such a measure, in defiance of the opinions at Cadiz, without the support of the Cortes, and I doubt whether we shall find in that assembly a majority of Deputies of a sufficiently enlightened policy to decide upon this measure against the powerful opposition which will be made to it. The circulation of the edict mentioned in my despatches has unfortunately shown the prevailing opinions here relative to the opening of the trade; otherwise the measure might have been proposed and concluded before it became publicly known here, and then it would have been too late to have recalled it.

With regard to money: it is hardly possible to ascertain what sum can be procured here until a loan shall be proposed. I should think, however, not much beyond a million sterling. The government, I understand, are trying, with some prospect of success, to raise a loan in Mexico, and I dare say that, under our guarantee, they could procure a considerable sum there. Everything here, I think, depends upon a command of money; and the armies of Catalonia, Arragon, and Valencia might be augmented to any extent, and might really be made formidable, if there were the means of supplying and recruiting them. I expect good effects from the removal

of General Caro, and the cordial co-operation of the provinces of Catalonia, Arragon, and Valencia.

The Duke of Orleans is intriguing to a much greater extent than you are aware of. Castaños told me yesterday that he had given in plans for the defence of Catalonia and of the Isla de Leon, and was very angry at not being admitted to discuss them in the Council of Regency, or that the Ministers were not, at least, instructed to communicate with him upon them. In addition to this, he has applied for the command of the army in the Isla de Leon, and, upon that being refused, for the command in Galicia, which has likewise been refused. I told Castaños that, in one case, the English would not have served under him, and, in the other, all supplies would have been withheld by England from Galicia. It is wonderful that he does not feel the impossibility of his being employed here. I am persuaded that the first intelligence of his employment would occasion an insurrection. I fear it will require some strong measure to drive him from hence; for I have no hope of being able to get him away, excepting by an official application to the government.

The Admiralty seem never to have thought of the Carthagena squadron, which were certainly in much greater danger than the ships at Cadiz. I have no doubt, however, that we shall now get rid of the whole. I am sorry for poor Pickmore, who has really done very well here; and his removal came upon him like a clap of thunder, for he had no previous notice of it whatever. Keats met with a very flattering and cordial reception from the Regency, to whom I presented both him and Cockburn the day after their arrival. You may be assured that I will pay every possible mark of attention to Cockburn, and I hope we shall live upon the most cordial terms.

Castaños told me that the government were most truly sensible of the conduct of Ministers with regard to the Caraccas. I have not yet, however, received an answer to my note transmitting the correspondence upon that subject.

Ever, my dear Wellesley, most affectionately yours,

H. Wellesley.

The Military Secretary to Col. Torrens.

My dear Torrens, Celorico, 1st Aug., 1810.

I am directed by Lord Wellington to request that you will recall to the recollection of Sir David Dundas the applications formerly made by his Lordship, when Secretary for Ireland, on behalf of Captain Lloyd of the 43rd, and which his Lordship begs leave to renew; and desires me to acquaint you that this officer has made himself particularly conspicuous on several occasions, and was wounded in the affair of the 24th, near Almeida; and his Lordship understands that if Captain Lloyd could now obtain his promotion in any regiment, there would be no difficulty in effecting his removal again to the 43rd regiment by an exchange with Captain Dishon, now recommended for the succession of the Majority, but whose health renders him not particularly well qualified for the situation of a field officer of a light battalion.

Yours very sincerely,

James Bathurst.

Army under the immediate Command of Lord Wellington, August 1st, 1810.

	Effective Rank and File, independent of sick.
Cavalry.—Lieut.-General Sir S. Cotton	3077
1st Division.—Sir B. Spencer	4784
3rd do. Major-General Picton	2884
4th do. Major-General Cole	4081
Light do. Brig.-General Craufurd	2394
Total (besides artillery)	17,220
Corps under Lieut.-General Hill	5213
Do. Major-General Leith	1544
Corps at Lisbon	1344
On Command	1548
Total Artillery, rank and file	2179
Total effective rank and file	29,048

G. O. Celorico, 2nd Aug., 1810. [347.*]

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the officers of the Staff, and the infantry of the army, will not employ the farriers of the cavalry to shoe their horses.

2. The farriers of the cavalry must be employed solely in making shoes and shoeing the horses belonging to the cavalry.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, 2nd Aug., 1810.

Your despatches of the 11th, 13th, and 18th ultimo were received here the day before yesterday.*

Though it is impossible not to regret on every account the loss of Ciudad Rodrigo, yet I can assure you that ample justice is done to you here by every person with whom I have had an opportunity of communicating, for the proceedings of the British army upon this occasion. Even those military men who are most sanguine about a favourable result of the war in the Peninsula appear to be completely satisfied that it would not have been expedient, under all the circumstances, for you to have risked a general action for the safety of that place; but the attitude you were enabled to assume on the frontier had certainly the effect of protracting the siege, and of obliging the enemy to collect together the great means which they were on that account compelled to employ for effecting their purpose.

It is impossible not to look with the greatest anxiety to the next movement of the enemy. By the last letter from Mr. Stuart we learn that Junot had been detached with his division of the French army to Zamora. Does this movement, combined with the detachment to Plasencia and Coria, indicate that the French are dispersing their armies, because they

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. vi., pp. 255, 257, 262, 278, 279.

could not feed them if they were more concentrated? or is it a preliminary to a combined movement upon Portugal, in three divisions, by Chaves, Almeida, and the Tagus? I am fully persuaded that the French will make every effort in their power to drive us out of Portugal.

I doubt, however, very much, whether Bonaparte will come in person into Spain for this purpose, and I am not at all sure, considering the character which the war has now assumed, that Masséna is not more likely to succeed without him than with him. The issue of the contest, we are well aware, must depend upon two considerations: the magnitude of the effort which the French can make against Portugal, and the reliance which can be placed on the Portuguese troops when they come in contact with the enemy.

The last can be known only by experience. On the single occasion on which there has been hitherto an opportunity of trying them, they appear to have acquitted themselves with credit.

With respect to the first. The account you have sent us of the state of the French army in Spain makes it, upon the whole, from 220,000 to 230,000 men. The means which they have of reinforcing it from France do not by the same account exceed 40 battalions, or, at 600 men per battalion, 24,000 men, which bears no proportion whatever to the ordinary waste of every army to that amount, but more particularly to that of a French army. Supposing, however, this last account to be incorrect, and that they have the means of keeping up their armies in Spain to their present amount, it would then remain to be considered what proportion of this force can be allotted to an attack upon Portugal, after maintaining all their positions and keeping up their communications, as far as may be necessary, from the Pyrenees to Cadiz; and it is further to be observed that the force destined for the attack upon Portugal must be calculated not only with reference to the British and Portuguese force in Portugal, but likewise to the different Spanish corps which may be on the frontier of that kingdom. I should hope that the communication which you have had with the Marques de la Romana may have enabled you to concert some plan with him and the other Generals commanding Spanish armies in the adjoining provinces, by which essential assistance may be afforded to you by their corps in the event of a serious attack upon Portugal by the French.

Now with respect to reinforcements to your army, I am under the painful necessity of informing you that the effects of the fever contracted by our army last year in Walcheren are still of that nature that, by a late inspection, we have not at this time a single battalion of infantry in Great Britain and Ireland reported fit for service in the field, with the exception of the infantry of the Duke of Brunswick's corps. This circumstance is rendered the more distressing from the present situation of Ireland, which is more alarming, as far as respects internal discontent, than I have ever yet recollected it; and not a mail arrives from thence which does not bring requisitions from the Duke of Richmond and Pole for reinforcements of troops. Notwithstanding these difficulties we are, however, determined to send you the infantry of the Duke of Brunswick's corps, which are at present in Ireland, as soon as they can be relieved by regiments from hence. There are actually on the passage, or embarked, about 1300 men as drafts for the regiments now in Portugal; and there can be no doubt that by this

time the 7th regiment from Halifax, consisting of 920 men, is arrived at Lisbon. We have not yet received any positive intelligence respecting the regiments which were to come from the Mediterranean; but I agree with you that from the last accounts we must be prepared for Sir John Stuart detaining the force which was expected from that quarter.

Under the present circumstances of the contest in the Peninsula I can see no reason why you should not draw about 2000 men as per margin * from Cadiz. The British and Portuguese garrison consists at present of 9000 men. It will consist of 7000 when these corps are drawn from the place; and, considering the improved state of the defences, that all Victor's efforts appear at present to be directed rather to his own defence than to an attack, and that the force in Andalusia with all its detachments is hardly equal at the present moment to any serious and decisive operations in that quarter, I should certainly think that the 7000 men to which I have referred will, for the present, be amply sufficient, together with the Spanish forces already there, for the defence of the place. By General Graham's last letters I think he foresees that such a call will probably be made upon him, and that he can answer it without much risk. I shall write to him by this day's mail, to desire that he will hold this force in readiness in case you should think proper to send for it; and I recommend to you strongly, if you think the attack upon Portugal is likely now to be made, to direct him to detach without delay this force to Lisbon. They might always be replaced at Cadiz if circumstances should afterwards render it expedient.

I should add, that as the 7th regiment will have arrived at Lisbon a month sooner than was expected, the 23rd will, I fear, not reach you from Halifax before the beginning of October. We shall be able, however, before that time, to send you some further detachments to keep up the numbers of the regiments actually in Portugal, to the amount, I hope, of 1200 or 1500 men.

I have thus stated to you all the exertions which are at present within our power respecting reinforcements. With regard to General officers, General William Stewart will by this time have arrived at Lisbon. If you send for the two regiments from Cadiz, General Graham ought to send a Brigadier-General with them. General Lumley will receive orders to go to Portugal, and I will endeavour to add one or two more as soon as I have had an opportunity of communicating with the Commander in Chief upon the subject.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

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* Light Dragoons	160
Riflemen	100
79th	1020
94th	700
	1980

[348.] G. O. Celorico, 4th Aug., 1810.

4. When a Lieutenant-Colonel of a regiment is announced in General Orders to command a brigade of which the regiment under his command forms part, he is to receive a Staff allowance of Lieutenant-Colonel on the Staff equal to the subsistence of his rank.

7. The Commander of the Forces has frequently had occasion to complain of the inconvenience which resulted to the public service from the practice which prevails of officers and soldiers pressing the carriages of the country by their own authority, and this inconvenience has been again felt in an aggravated degree in consequence of the pressing of carriages, in a recent instance, by a conductor of stores, ————; he requests the commanding officer of artillery will report what occasion this conductor had for carriages, and will cause strict inquiry to be made, whether, before he pressed these carriages, he made application for them to any British Commissary or magistrate of the country, and will report whether Conductor ———— had made any report of his having pressed these carriages.

8. It is impossible to carry on the service if these irregularities are persevered in, and the Commander of the Forces is determined to punish, in this and in every other instance, any disobedience of his repeated orders upon this subject.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 4th Aug., 1810.

The enclosed translations of intercepted letters are so important that, although I think it very probable that copies of the letters may have been sent to you by M. de Romana, I have thought it right to forward them to you. It is clear from these letters that if Buonaparte means to keep Spain, he must relinquish every other object; and then it does not appear in what way he is to supply his armies with money, for I apprehend that the ordinary expenses of his government and his military and naval establishments absorb the whole of the revenues of France. The means which he has recommended for raising money here are already exhausted, and I do not imagine that any considerable supply could be obtained either by contribution or by the plunder of church plate.

I mean to send copies of these letters to England.

I yesterday received your letter of the 27th ult.* Things appear to be draw-

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. vi., p. 303.

ing towards a crisis with you, and I cannot express how anxious I am to hear from you again. If you can maintain yourself in Portugal, I think we have a fair prospect of ultimate success; and it is provoking to think that, if you are compelled to embark, it will be for the want of 10,000 or 12,000 men. I should like much to know what your plans are in the event of your being obliged to abandon Portugal.

We are getting rid of the Spanish men-of-war, and I hope that four of them will sail to-morrow for Port Mahon, and two for the Havannah in the course of a few days.

Ever most affectionately yours,

H. Wellesley.

Four hundred and twenty thousand dollars (420,000) are embarked on board the *Dotterel* (which carries this letter) for the supply of your army.

Au Maréchal Ney, Duc d'Elchingen. [349.]

Au Quartier Général de l'Armée Anglaise,

Maréchal, ce 5 Août, 1810.

J'ai reçu une lettre de la part du Général Loison sur le sujet du Major Napier * du 50me régiment d'infanterie Anglaise. Aussitôt que cet officier est arrivé à l'armée, il s'est empressé de vous écrire pour vous remercier des bontés que vous avez eues pour lui, et pour vous envoyer la copie du cartel d'échange qui avait été fait en sa faveur. Il m'avait donné cette lettre pour vous l'envoyer, mais malheureusement je l'avais oublié.

Je vous envoie une lettre que je viens de recevoir de cet officier après lui avoir communiqué celle que j'ai reçue du Général Loison, et la copie du cartel d'échange qu'a le Major Napier.

J'ai, &c.,

Wellington.

The Military Secretary to Col. Carroll.

Sir, Celorico, 5th Aug., 1810.

I am directed by Lord Wellington to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th July, with its enclosures, and to desire that in future you will always send copies of intercepted letters, and not translations.

I have also to desire that you will be pleased to send copies of Nos. 30 and 31 if possible, as his Lordship does not understand the financial statements contained in them according to the translation given of them.

I have, &c.,

James Bathurst.

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* Major-General Sir C. Napier, G.C.B., Governor of Sinde.

[350.] G. O. Celorico, 10th Aug., 1810.

7. The Commander of the Forces will not make any inquiry to discover the writer of the letters which have occasioned this unnecessary alarm in a quarter in which it was most desirable it should not be created. He has frequently lamented the ignorance which has appeared in the opinions communicated in letters written from the army, and the indiscretion with which those letters are published. It is impossible that many officers of the army can have a knowledge of facts to enable them to form opinions of the probable events of the campaign; but their opinions, however erroneous, must, when published, have mischievous effects.

8. The communication of that of which all officers have a knowledge, viz. the numbers and disposition of the different divisions of the army and of its magazines, is still more mischievous than the communication of opinions, as must be obvious to those who reflect that the army has been for months in the same position; and it is a fact come to the knowledge of the Commander of the Forces that the plans of the enemy have been founded on information of this description extracted from the English newspapers, which information must have been obtained through private letters from officers of the army.

9. Although the difficulties inseparable from the situation of every army engaged in operations in the field, particularly in those of a defensive nature, are much aggravated by communications of this description, the Commander of the Forces only requests that the officers will, for the sake of their own reputations, avoid giving opinions upon which they cannot have a knowledge to enable them to form any; and that if they choose to communicate facts to their correspondents, regarding the positions of the army, its numbers, formation of its magazines, preparations for breaking bridges, &c., they will urge their correspondents not to publish their letters in the newspapers until it shall be certain that the publication of the intelligence will not be injurious to the army or to the public service.

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Celorico, 11th Aug., 1810. [351.]

1. The Commander of the Forces wishes that the General Order of the 17th June, 1809, regarding the mode of cutting and procuring green forage, may be considered applicable to the unthrashed corn required for the use of the horses of the army.

2. In cases in which the owner of the unthrashed corn or the magistrate of the village is not on the spot to take the receipt or payment of what is required, a Commissary or Quarter-master is to keep a note of the quantity taken from the neighbourhood of each village on each day.

3. It is to be understood that when ripe unthrashed corn of any description is issued to the horses of the army, it is in lieu of an equal weight of straw and corn, and 24 lbs. are to be considered the full ration of unthrashed corn of any description.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Lieutenant-Colonel Ross, 48th Regiment.** [352.]

MY DEAR SIR, Celorico, 14th Aug., 1810.

I received your letter of the 8th June from Barca de Codes. I was aware that you would be the senior Lieutenant-Colonel of the brigade in which you are placed, but I was unwilling to put you in orders to command it till I had ascertained from you whether you would prefer to go as a Colonel into the Portuguese Cavalry, of which you would command a regiment, and, possibly for the present, a brigade. This would be a permanent advantage to you during the war in this country, whereas the command of the brigade of British infantry would be but temporary till the arrival of some General officers or Colonels on the Staff.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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* Major-General Sir Patrick Ross, G.C.M.G.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

My dear Arthur, Cadiz, 16th Aug., 1810.

I have received your letters up to the 2nd of August,* and will attend to that respecting General Franceschi. I understood he was at Majorca, and I think it not improbable that he is among the prisoners lately received at Gibraltar from thence.

I am happy to say that 2000 men are embarked to-day to join you, and I wish you had all our force here, for nothing can be attempted against this place until the business is decided in Portugal.

I have had letters from England. The government has limited the amount of the assistance to be given to Spain for the next six months to one million sterling, and this is to include the expense of all military stores furnished by England. The Spanish government, on their side, have applied, first, for an immediate advance of two millions; and, secondly, for a loan of ten millions, for which they offer security both for principal and interest. Some medium might be drawn between the two; but there is no man who has read Azanza's correspondence who will not be convinced that this is the moment for a great exertion, and that Buonaparte must either relinquish the idea of conquering Spain altogether, or turn his attention solely to that object. If Perceval had taken a credit for six millions instead of three, he might have been enabled to assist the Spaniards effectually; but the assistance they are prepared to give them will be of little or no use. I am also instructed to propose a commercial arrangement to them, opening the trade direct with South America. This is quite out of the question for the present, nor do I think it will ever be granted so long as Cadiz has any influence in Spain; but nothing short of this is considered as likely to be advantageous to England. If this should fail, I am directed to propose a circuitous trade through Cadiz in British bottoms. This will likewise be rejected, I have no doubt; but they are willing to admit our manufactures of every description in Spanish bottoms, and to agree to other regulations which would be highly advantageous to us.

We have got rid of four Spanish sail-of-the-line, which are gone to Mahon, and two three-deckers are to sail to-morrow for the Havannah. There will then be only ships enough left here to keep up the communication between Spain and the colonies. Keats is very active; and I hope we shall soon have a formidable flotilla here.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. Wellesley.

Poor Ferguson has been obliged to go home on account of a liver complaint. Houghton is very anxious to join you, and begged me to say so.

O'Donnell has again been very active in Catalonia. He had had several

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. vi., p. 318.

affairs with the French, in all of which the Spaniards have behaved well, and the French have lost a great many men. He has fortified Montserrat, which he represents as very strong. I believe, if the Valencian army can be prevailed upon to advance, there can be no doubt that the siege of Tortosa will be raised.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to C. Stuart, Esq.

My dear Sir, Cadiz, 16th Aug., 1810.

I have just received your letter of the 10th of August, and wish you joy of your new dignity.

Two thousand men are to sail to-day to join Lord Wellington's army. I wish he had all the rest, for I am persuaded that the French will not attempt anything against this place until the question is decided in Portugal.

The Duke of Orleans is still here, using all his efforts to obtain the command of one of the armies; but from the communications which have lately passed between me and the government, I think it quite impossible that they should employ him. I have hitherto acted without instructions with regard to him, but I expect some daily, and I know by private letters that the government disapprove his arrival here.

The *Myrtle* carries 250,000 dollars for the supply of the army, and I hope that in the course of a fortnight we shall be able to send 300,000 more. Mr. Reid, I understand, has been here endeavouring to raise money on account of the Portuguese merchants, and I heard that he had raised a considerable sum, when he received instructions from his employers to desist until it should be decided whether Lord Wellington could continue in Portugal or not. He, of course, gave a much higher price for the dollar than Duff gives, and his object was to profit by the high rate of exchange between Lisbon and England in supplying the army. These speculations do us infinite mischief, and I wish they could in any way be prevented, for I really believe that Duff is now raising money as expeditiously as it is to be procured without raising the exchange to an exorbitant height.

Ever, my dear Sir, most faithfully yours,

H. Wellesley.

I forget whether I mentioned in my last letter that there would be no objection to your having the two-thirds of the flour expected from Barbary.

G. O. Celorico, 20th Aug., 1810. [353.]

1. The General Order of the 17th December, 1810, specifying the ticket to be sent to the General Hospital

with sick soldiers, is applicable to detachments as well as regiments.

2. It is extraordinary that the Commander of the Forces should be obliged to remind the officers of the army, in General Orders, of the common practices and forms of the service and of the standing military regulations; as if these forms and regulations were not founded on the same principle of utility, and were not particularly necessary in an army on service in a foreign country.

3. The ticket required under the General Order of this army to be sent with soldiers is that in use throughout Great Britain, and ordered by His Majesty's regulations.

4. The King's regulations, likewise, and the common forms of the service, require that when an officer is passing through a town in which there are troops, he should report himself to the commanding or Staff officer there stationed. All this is neglected, to the great inconvenience of the service.

5. The Commander of the Forces will at last find himself under the necessity of bringing to trial those officers who shall neglect the performance of the common duties required, not only by the General Orders of this army, but by the King's regulations and the universal practice of the service at home as well as abroad.

WELLINGTON.

[354.]

To the Earl of Liverpool.

*

MY DEAR LORD, Celorico, 20th Aug., 1810.

I have received your Lordship's despatch of the 19th July, in which you enclosed a letter from the Secretary to the Treasury, containing the instructions of the Treasury to Mr. Drummond for his guidance in the commission with which he is charged by their Lordships.

Nothing can be more satisfactory to me than that the Lords of the Treasury should have an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the objects referred to Mr. Drummond through a channel in which their Lordships place confidence, and every information and assistance that it is in my power to afford shall

be given to Mr. Drummond; but as some points are referred to the consideration of Mr. Drummond, upon which it might be very inconvenient, if not injurious, to the public service to make any alteration in the system now in practice, such as the directions conveyed to him "to point out any articles which he may think might be supplied from Great Britain, or from any other part of the world, either for the use of the British army or in part payment of the subsidy to Portugal," and in the directions to him to report any observations or suggestions which may occur to him for reducing the demand for money; and it may be desirable that your Lordship and the Lords of the Treasury should receive the opinion of the Commissary-General and myself upon Mr. Drummond's suggestions, as we have had some experience in the resources of this country, and the demands of different kinds of the army, I propose to desire Mr. Drummond to furnish the Commissary-General with copies of all his reports to the Treasury, in order that our observations upon them may reach their Lordships as soon as possible.

I also propose to direct Mr. Drummond not to make any alteration in the mode of raising supplies of money at Lisbon or at Cadiz without previous reference to me, of which directions, adverting to the evils which may result from any mistake of Mr. Drummond, I trust that His Majesty will approve.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. J. C. Villiers to Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR LORD WELLESLEY, Nunwell, Isle of Wight, 22nd Aug., 1810.

I cannot help, as *amicus curiæ*, just apprising you of the extraordinary delay which attends the sailing of the little reinforcement destined for Lord Wellington's army above two months since. They have now been waiting a month at Portsmouth, in addition to the delays which retarded their going thither. You will be told that they wait only for a wind, which is true; but it is a wind that is first to blow another convoy from the Downs (to go under the protection of the same frigate), and is to last long enough afterwards to take the Portsmouth convoy down Channel. In fact, the orders are, to wait thirty-six hours *after* a fair wind before they sail. At this season of the year another month may possibly elapse, in addition to that which has already passed, before there is settled, favourable wind for so long a time; though there have been light breezes and shifting winds, with which they could have got out if they had not been waiting for this other object. If Pole were in England, he would account to you

for the supposed necessity of these various combinations; but, without entering into that subject, if a frigate can be spared for the sole object of taking these troops to Lord Wellington as soon as possible, I am sure that you will not think the despatch unnecessary or unimportant, when, in the arduous task consigned to him, the means of defending a single pass, or the smallest reinforcement, may perhaps decide the operations of the campaign. I flatter myself that you will excuse the motive of this letter, and will have the goodness to consider the communication as made to you confidentially.

Believe me to be ever most truly yours,

J. C. Villiers.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

My dear Arthur, Cadiz, 23rd Aug., 1810.

I have received your letter of the 10th, enclosing your public letter of the 8th. Before this can reach you, I hope that the reinforcements sent from hence will have joined you. I am glad to see that the Portuguese troops behave so well; but, as you say, everything depends upon your being reinforced from England, and from what I hear, they either cannot or will not do much more in that way.

The accounts from Catalonia are up to the 11th; but nothing of importance had occurred. The Governor of Tortosa mentions, in a letter to the government, that he had been slightly wounded in a sally; and he speaks in high terms of the spirit of the inhabitants and of their resolution to defend themselves to the last.

Caro is advancing with his army towards Morella. General Bassecourt has been ordered to take the command of the Valencian army; and it is supposed that General Caro had been endeavouring by underhand means to excite the populace to resist this order, but that his plan had been discovered.

Blake's head-quarters, by the latest accounts, were at Murcia, and his advanced posts near the enemy. He had issued an order for raising 10,000 men in the province of Murcia.

An expedition sailed last night under Lacey for the purpose of endeavouring to surprise the Duke d'Aremberg's corps, which is stated to consist of 1000 men; Lacey has 3000. It was at first intended that it should go to St. Lucar, to destroy the boats and craft collected there; but, as the object was, *of course*, the subject of general conversation, it was supposed but too probable that it had reached the ears of the enemy, and was abandoned. It is, however, still the ostensible object of the expedition, and there may, therefore, be some hope of the real one being successful.

Intelligence has been received of 4000 men having marched from Port St. Mary's to reinforce General Mortier's corps, and it is hoped that this expedition may oblige them to return. Sir R. Keats was applied to for assistance, and has appointed Captain Cockburn to command the naval part of this enterprise.

I have no further intelligence to send you. The Cortes are expected to assemble in the whole of the month of September.

Ever most affectionately yours,

H. Wellesley.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley.

My dear Wellesley, Cadiz, 23rd Aug., 1810.

I have detained the packet two days, with the hope that I should receive the answer of the Spanish government to my note respecting a commercial arrangement; but it has not yet been sent to me, and I think it better not to detain the packet any longer. From the conversation which I have had with Bardaxi, I have no doubt that the proposal for a direct trade with South America will be rejected. He says, with perfect truth, that no Spanish government could venture to make such a concession, and that, if it is an arrangement likely to be advantageous to the colonies, it will probably be discussed in the Cortes; indeed, as they are likely to be constituted, I doubt much whether it is a question that will ever be brought forward.

I mean, as soon as I receive the answer from the Spanish government, to propose the circuitous trade in British bottoms; this, I think, will be rejected, likewise. Bardaxi is constantly endeavouring to point out the advantages of the Convention which I have already submitted to you, and which certainly holds out great advantages to merchants who might be disposed to trade in Spanish ships, and likewise furnishes an opening to our cotton trade. It strikes me that a Convention of this kind ought not to operate as a prohibition to the contraband trade any more than any commercial treaty which may actually subsist between England and Spain. This Convention holds out, besides other advantages which may be worth looking at, such as the reduction and regulation of duties in Spain, the importation of specie from the colonies free of duty, &c. It would also have the advantage of being well received here, and I am not at all clear that it might not, in a short time, lead to the admission of British ships to the circuitous trade with the colonies.

I regret much that the government does not feel itself at liberty to do more for this country in the way of pecuniary assistance. There never was a moment when it was more required, or when so many important advantages would be reaped from it; and a liberal sum granted at this moment would effect in six months what will probably not be accomplished in as many years at ten times the expense. The copies of Azanza's letters, which I find were sent you from Lisbon, must have reached you sooner than those forwarded from hence. I can give you no idea of the impression they have made here, and I hope they have had their due weight in England.

From something I have heard to-day, I have reason to believe that the Duke of Orleans begins to feel the necessity of removing from Spain, and I rather think his resolution will be quickened by a letter which he will receive from the government. He has contrived to get upon bad terms with the army by the contemptuous terms in which he has spoken of their discipline and appearance in a memorial which he has presented to the

government, and which has got into circulation. He has also printed the letters of the Council of Regency to himself and to the King of Sicily, inviting him to Spain, and has distributed several copies to people in Cadiz. I made use of this to urge Bardaxi to represent to Castaños the weakness of allowing himself and his colleagues to be treated with so little ceremony, and I hope that measures will be taken for getting rid of him immediately.

I hope you approve the proposal sent in by Whittingham to the government, and which they have agreed to. If this corps were confined to the defence of the Balearic Islands alone, it would be of immense importance; but it is of still greater importance as a model to the rest of the Spanish army. It is a great object, likewise, to introduce our officers into the Spanish service.

Everything is going on well in the navy, and Keats is very much respected by the government. It is very desirable that his command should be made a separate one. He is now under the orders of Sir Charles Cotton, which cramps all his operations. I know he is of this opinion himself, but feels a delicacy in writing to the Admiralty upon it. Perhaps you could mention it to Mr. Yorke. Cockburn is everything I could wish. If these people had been here at the commencement of the siege, the French could not have succeeded in establishing themselves in the Caño del Trocadero, the point from which, I think, we have most to apprehend, if any serious attack should ever be made upon this place.

The Cortes will probably assemble in the whole of next month. I understand it now to be the intention to elect provisional deputies, for the provinces in the hands of the enemy and for South America, from the natives of those provinces and of the colonies actually residing here. This is not, however, quite settled, and I have, therefore, not mentioned it in my public despatches. I am endeavouring to procure all the information in my power as to the possibility of establishing a paper currency in Spain; but this is a subject of which less is understood in Spain than in any other part of the world.

Ever, my dear Wellesley, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

[355.] G. O. Alverca, 24th Aug., 1810.

3. The Commander of the Forces publishes for general information the following letter from His Majesty's minister at Lisbon, and the translation of a paper enclosed, being the proposal for a subscription to raise a sum for the release of several Portuguese captives at Algiers, to which it is the intention of the Commander of the Forces to subscribe 500 dollars.

4. Such officers as choose to contribute to this charitable purpose will report their names, and the sums they propose to contribute, to the Adjutant-General of the division in which they are placed.

WELLINGTON.

The Military Secretary to H. Drummond, Esq.

Sir, Alverca, 26th Aug., 1810.

I am directed by Lord Wellington to acquaint you that his Lordship has received a copy of your instructions from the Lords of the Treasury, and I am to desire that in the execution of them you will conform to the following directions:—

1st. You will not attempt to make any alteration in the mode of raising money, or of carrying on any part of the service of the Commissariat department, either at Lisbon or at Cadiz, but you will refer any suggestion upon these subjects to Mr. Kennedy for his Lordship's decision.

2ndly. You will transmit to Mr. Kennedy, for his Lordship's information, copies of all reports, observations, or suggestions which you may think it your duty to make to the Treasury, in order that his Lordship's remarks, and those of Mr. Kennedy, may be transmitted as early as possible upon any alteration which you may propose in the mode of carrying on the service between England, this country, or Cadiz.

I have, &c.,

J. Bathurst.

The Military Secretary to H. Drummond, Esq.

Sir, Alverca, 27th Aug., 1810.

I am directed by Lord Wellington to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd, and to acquaint you that Mr. Kennedy has been directed to communicate with you, and to furnish you with every information in his power upon the subjects mentioned in your instructions.

I have, &c.,

J. Bathurst.

G. O. Alverca, 28th Aug., 1810. [356.]

1. The officers commanding at the several stations on the high road by which the *parté* goes, or in the neighbourhood of the high road, are to keep a man stationed on the road to receive their letters from head quarters, or to deliver those to the *parté* which they wish to send to head quarters, in order that the *parté* may not be delayed as it has been hitherto.

The *parté* will, in future, have directions to wait for nobody, and to carry on to Thomar all letters which there may be no one stationed on the road to receive.

Wellington.

[357.] *To Lieut.-Col. Torrens.*

My dear Torrens, Celorico, 29th Aug., 1810.

I have received your letter announcing the appointment of ———, ———, and ——— to this army. The first I have generally understood to be a madman: I believe it is your own opinion that the second is not very wise: the third will, I believe, be an useful man. But I should be glad to get rid of a few of the same description with ——— and ———; and there are some in this army whom it is disreputable and quite unsafe to keep. Colonel ———, whose memorial I enclose, who was sent away from ——— for incapacity, and whom I was very glad to get rid of from hence last year, has lately come out again. I have been obliged to appoint him on the Staff because he is senior to others; and I wished to keep him away, and prevent him from destroying a good regiment by joining it; and he remains at a distance till further orders, as perpetual President of General Courts-Martial.

Then there is ———, whose conduct is really scandalous. I am not able to bring him before a court-martial as I should wish, but he is a disgrace to the army which can have such a man as a Major-General.

Really when I reflect upon the characters and attainments of some of the General officers of this army, and consider that these are the persons on whom I am to rely to lead columns against the French Generals, and who are to carry my instructions into execution, I tremble; and, as Lord Chesterfield said of the Generals of his day, "I only hope that when the enemy reads the list of their names he trembles as I do." ——— and ——— will be a very nice addition to this list! However, I pray God and the Horse Guards to deliver me from General ——— and Colonel ———.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley.

My dear Wellesley, Cadiz, 29th Aug., 1810.

I have not thought it right to state in a public despatch all that is felt here at the late intelligence from England. Alburquerque and Apodaca have certainly complained in strong terms of the reception given to the deputies from the Caraccas; and Bardaxi told me that it was the opinion of

the Council of Regency that the countenance given to those deputies in England would lead the other colonies to declare themselves independent.

The article in the 'Espagnol' has also excited great discontent. This publication is supposed to be patronised by the British government, and to contain the opinions of Ministers relative to all the occurrences in Spain, as well as the measures which should be pursued in the actual crisis of her affairs. It is, therefore, read here with great interest, and the article which has given so much offence is supposed to have been inserted at the desire of the government.

Everybody is crying out for the Cortes, and deputies are arriving every day; so that they will probably assemble in the course of next month, and I think they must adopt a better policy with regard to South America.

In the meanwhile, everything is going on in the interior as well as could be expected. The guerrillas are increasing daily. Blake is taking measures for augmenting and disciplining his army, and I have the greatest hopes from the corps to be formed by Whittingham; but we want arms and all kinds of military stores. Arthur has sent me a copy of his letter to Lord Liverpool requiring that arms and military stores should be sent to Lisbon. It is also very desirable that a quantity should be sent here. I see that Lord Liverpool has placed some at the disposal of General Campbell; but I cannot help suggesting that they ought all to be left at the disposal of the King's Minister, excepting those to be sent to the Commander-in-Chief in Portugal.

Ever, my dear Wellesley, most affectionately yours,

H. Wellesley.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

My dear Arthur, Cadiz, 31st Aug., 1810.

I have received your letters of the 20th inst.*

I am very anxious to see the intercepted letters, copies of which have been forwarded to you by General Mahy; but the letters have not yet reached this place. I am glad, however, to find that they confirm the statements contained in Azanza's letters.

In the mean while, instead of giving the assistance required by Spain, our government is doing everything to make us unpopular here. Although they have not actually acknowledged the deputies from the Caraccas, they have given every possible countenance to them short of absolute acknowledgment. At the same time, an article has been published in the 'Espagnol' (a Spanish periodical work published in England), applauding the proceedings at the Caraccas and at Buenos Ayres, and stating the impossibility of preventing the spirit which led to the declaration of the independence of these provinces from extending itself over the remaining colonies in America. You can have no idea of the ferment occasioned here by this article, which is attributed to the government, as it is supposed (and I believe justly) that the 'Espagnol' is patronised by the government, and contains its sentiments with regard to the occurrences in Spain and the measures necessary in the present crisis of her affairs.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. vi., p. 373.

Thus are petty British objects of commerce suffered to interfere with the great and interesting work of releasing this country from the yoke of France; and, unless the British government takes the decided line of discouraging the spirit which has broken forth in the colonies, and that too in the most open manner, it will create such a jealousy here as never can be got under, and will probably be the ruin of the whole cause.

It is wonderful that they cannot be satisfied in England with a commercial arrangement which would be attended with immense advantages to ourselves, and would likewise be greatly beneficial to Spain. I apprehend this to be the true spirit of all commercial treaties, and why are we to take advantage of the weakness of Spain to endeavour to impose terms upon her which would be ruinous and disgraceful? I have it in my power to conclude to-morrow a commercial treaty which, without breaking in upon the Spanish colonial laws, would pour millions into the pockets of our merchants, and be equally advantageous to the resources; but this will not do, and we must either have the trade direct with the colonies or nothing. However, I have received my answer, and the government will not hear of opening the trade.

I will endeavour to see Castaños before I close this letter. In the mean while I will give you my ideas as to what might be done in the event of the siege of this place being raised. The last returns given to General Graham make the Spanish corps (including the corps gone with Lacey to Huelva) 15,000 men; 5000 with two British regiments would, I imagine, be sufficient for the garrison of Cadiz. There would then be left 10,000 disposable for the field, as you would of course call the remaining British and Portuguese to Portugal. General Campbell has, I believe, 5000 men at Gibraltar. I cannot conceive that it would be necessary for him to have more than 3000 men in the event of the enemy being obliged to leave this quarter. Blake's army consists of 16,000 men, of which 2500 are cavalry, and I understand very good. The enclosed paper, given to me by Mr. Tupper, will show you the amount of the force in Valencia.

O'Donnell has an army of 25,000 men, which is increasing daily; there is also a considerable force in Arragon; but arms, clothing, and military stores of all descriptions are wanted in Murcia, Catalonia, and Arragon, particularly the latter.

Whittingham has, with my concurrence, given in a plan for raising a division of 10,000 men, to be formed principally in the Balearic Islands, and to be clothed and armed from England.

There are to be two English officers to each battalion, and the whole is to be commanded by Whittingham. The Spanish government has consented to this, and I have written to England about it; but I fear it will be at least five or six months before any good can be derived from this plan.

1st Sept.

Since I began this letter I have seen Castaños, and talked over with him the points to which your letter refers. He thinks that, if the siege of this place were to be raised, the whole force here might be employed in the field, and that it would be sufficient to have here the skeletons of regiments, which they are now employed in recruiting. I doubt, however, whether it would be safe to leave this garrison without a respectable force;

and I do not think you ought to count upon more than 10,000 Spaniards from hence.

Blake, he (Castaños) says, has an army of from 16,000 to 20,000 men, and that it is rapidly increasing. The army in Catalonia has enough upon its hands already; nevertheless, if the Valencian army, which Doyle says is the best appointed he has seen, can be prevailed upon to advance, the siege of Tortosa will probably be raised. But the system of intrigue now going forward in Valencia will, I fear, throw obstacles in the way of the assistance which ought to be given to Catalonia.

I am sorry to tell you, likewise, that the plan for Whittingham's corps is abandoned in consequence of the dissatisfaction which the conduct of the government has excited here with respect to the Caraccas and the demand for a free trade.

Nothing surely was ever more absurd than our conduct with regard to the deputies from the Caraccas. The ostensible ground for objecting to Whittingham's plan is that it changes the whole system of the Spanish army and interferes with the recruiting of other corps; but the real ground of objection is pique at our conduct, and a determination (as I understand) not to apply to us for any assistance, but to receive it if it should be offered. I have not, as yet, written home upon this subject, because I hope, when I get the instructions which I am now expecting, I shall be able to explain this matter satisfactorily to the Spanish government. In the mean while, however, the reports of the Spanish ministers in London have made a very unfavourable impression here.

I read over many parts of your letter to Castaños, with which he appeared to be very well satisfied. He entirely agreed with you in opinion as to the necessity of avoiding general actions in the field.

Lacey's corps is returned, and the enclosed is an account of his expedition. I suspect the statement with regard to the killed and wounded is a little exaggerated, and I doubt much whether the Duke of Aremberg is among the latter.

Accounts were received yesterday from Monte Video of the 6th of June, by which it appears that while they were deliberating whether they should follow the example of Buenos Ayres or not, intelligence arrived from Spain of the appointment of a Regency, upon which they unanimously resolved upon acknowledging the Regency. It is a curious fact that the government here delayed sending any intelligence of their appointment to Buenos Ayres for two months after it had taken place, and the authorities at the Caraccas were never apprised of it at all!

I send you a copy of a communication which was made to me the other day, with a copy of my despatch to the government upon it. I am of opinion that the Cortes will not allow the present government to continue in power.

Ever, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

Tell Alaix that I have received his letters and have taken care of the enclosures, and that I will write to him by the next opportunity.

If you get the supplies you have asked for from England, I hope you will let us have some of them for distribution here. There are unceasing applications made for them.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing-street, 4th Sept., 1810.

I send you enclosed some information which I have received from Dumourier. I give it you only for what it is worth, without any disposition to vouch for any of the particulars contained in it. He has certainly been in the habit of receiving from time to time information from Paris, which I have sometimes had reason to believe was correct. I think it very probable that the conversation of military men in the confidence of the French government may correspond with what is stated in this paper; but I doubt very much the fact of any formal council of war having ever been called by Buonaparte on the affairs of Portugal.

We have just received the account of 2000 men having sailed from Cadiz to join you. The transports have been gone some time to Ireland for the Duke of Brunswick's corps; but we have not yet heard of their having sailed. I have a report of detachments, to the amount of 500 men, belonging to the different regiments in Portugal, being ready for embarkation, which will be sent out in one of the troop-ships which have been recently equipped. I trust, therefore, that with the 4000 men now ordered from Cadiz, you will have received in the course of the months of August and September reinforcements to the amount of 7000 rank and file. I wish it were in our power to make a still greater effort, consistently with our security at home and the permanent efficiency of our army.

Believe me to be, with sincere regard,
My dear Lord,
Yours very sincerely,
LIVERPOOL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

"Dumourier has just come here in a great hurry, asserting that he has authentic information of a council of war, held at Paris on the 31st July, in consequence of a despatch received from Masséna. The latter is stated to have demanded a reinforcement of 40,000 men, *with which* the conquest of Portugal may be insured. He rates his sick (N.B. His despatch must have been of the middle of July) at 7600, and that of the British at 4200: a proportion, he remarks, greater than that of his army. Masséna says nothing of desertion or distress, but asserts that the Portuguese are disgusted with the English, and will be happy to see a French army enter the country; but that it must be *in great force*. He is stated to represent that from the insurrection in Galicia, and the détour necessary to turn the positions of the allies from the northward, he must renounce all operations upon that side; and he proposes, when reinforced, to strengthen Regnier's corps very considerably, so that he may outflank Hill, and by manœuvring upon the Tagus oblige him to abandon the strong positions near Castello Branco without fighting, and force him beyond the Zezere; that then Regnier should throw his whole force upon the right of Lord Wellington, while Masséna moves upon his front. Such is the alleged plan of Masséna, who is supposed to report that without a great reinforcement he is not strong enough to force the allies in their intrenched positions, or to outflank and turn them. To this plan Buonaparte is said to have objected that there is an insurmountable difficulty, namely, that the season for campaign will be gone by before the reinforcements could arrive, and that there would be the greatest difficulty in feeding and supplying the armies till next year in the exhausted provinces of Spain; that he has taken

measures for reinforcing the armies in the course of the winter, but that in the mean time the chance of becoming master of Portugal must not be allowed to go by; and in short that, for this object, a general battle must be hazarded, notwithstanding the strong positions of the allies. He argues that if the French are not decidedly beaten, Portugal must fall; and that if they should be beaten, Lord Wellington will not venture to pursue, or to enter Spain. In pursuance of this opinion (which no councillor opposed) Dumourier supposes that a courier will have left Paris the beginning of August with positive orders to Masséna to bring Lord Wellington to a general action. The reinforcement prepared by Buonaparte is stated to consist of 30,000 Austrians, who are to arrive in Catalonia in December, and relieve other troops which may then join Masséna or Soult. Such is Dumourier's intelligence, which he desires may be communicated to your Lordship without delay."

To the Right Hon. W. W. Pole. [358.]

MY DEAR WILLIAM, Gouvea, 5th Sept., 1810.

I have received your letter of the 7th August by Burgh. I concur entirely in opinion with you upon the state of Ireland. The Ministers in England are not aware of the great and general detestation of the Union, and the indifference even of their friends respecting the British connexion. You will find, even among these last, a very prevalent opinion that Ireland could stand alone as an independent nation; and another opinion is equally prevalent, and probably more dangerous, as, in case of accidents, it would paralyse all their exertions, viz.; that in case of separation from Great Britain the Roman Catholics are not inclined to seize the properties of the resident Irish Protestants; that they would be satisfied with the properties of the absentees, which would suffice for their purposes.

I would refer you, for my opinion for a remedy to this state of things, to a letter which I wrote to Lord Liverpool shortly after the formation of the government of the Duke of Richmond: it is among my papers in London, and Mr. Wyatt or Mr. Forbes will find it for you. It goes to recommend a system of fortification.* I would also recommend you to prevent Foster's laying on any new taxes. It is a favourite notion with the Treasury politicians that the income of Ireland ought to be made more equal to the war expenditure; and they allege what is true, that Ireland is taxed neither in proportion to her means or her expenses, nor to the taxation of the other parts of the empire; but they forget the political situation of Ireland, the detestation

* See *Civil Correspondence of Sir Arthur Wellesley—(Ireland)*, 1807—1809, p. 28.

of the whole people of the connexion, and particularly of the Union, and all the measures which have been the consequence of it, and the indifference, even of friends, which has grown out of it; and they won't see that in the present temper of that country an unpopular tax might lead to the greatest excesses, even to general resistance of the measures of the legislature. What I would recommend, therefore, is that you should confine your exertions, till the war is over, to measures for improving the collection and produce of the old taxes, and that nothing should induce you to consent to lay on new.

So much for Ireland, where I think matters are in a much more dangerous state than they are even here.

You will have seen the accounts of the surrender of Almeida. I have no fault to find with that unfortunate event excepting that they did not inform me as they might by telegraph of the exact nature and extent of the misfortune which had happened, and did not give me the option of saving the garrison, and themselves the chance of being saved. Possibly I might not have been able to save them without incurring the risk of fighting a general action in a disadvantageous situation: but I think I should; and I should have tried it. As it is now, the surrender of the place stands upon their own shoulders, and the accident which immediately occasioned it. The enemy have made no movement of importance since the fall of Almeida. I have made all my dispositions for falling back, and collecting my army; and when that is done I shall act according to my own view of the circumstances of the moment. The enemy are exceedingly cautious; they risk nothing; and I think they are scarcely strong enough, even in their own opinion, for the attainment of their object. We have been now nearly in the same position since last January; and considering that almost with a touch they have overturned other powerful empires, our maintenance of this weakest country in Europe for so long is not discreditable, and I hope yet to save it.

I have, however, terrible disadvantages to contend with. The army was, and indeed is still, the worst British army that was ever sent from England. Then, between ourselves, the spirit of party and of the times prevails in some degree here as well as elsewhere. There is a despondency among some; a want of confidence in their own exertions; an extravagant notion of the power and resources of the French, and a

distaste for the war in the Peninsula, which sentiments have been created and are kept up by correspondence with England, even with Ministers and those connected with them.

All this is uncomfortable. With the exception of Beresford, I have really no assistance; I am left to myself, to my own exertions, to my own execution, the mode of execution, and even the superintendence of that mode: but still I don't despair. I am positively in no scrape; and if the country can be saved, we shall save it. Government have behaved with their usual weakness and folly about reinforcements, and I shall get none of those which have been promised me, but the Duke of Brunswick's infantry instead.

Give my best love to Mrs. Pole and the girls, and the Duke and Duchess and all the little girls; and believe me

Ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD, Isla de Leon, Sept., 1810.

In my despatch, No. * , I mentioned it to be the intention of the Council of Regency to require an explanation from the Cortes on several points relative to the power and responsibility of the government. I now enclose a translation of the letter of the Regency to the Cortes upon that subject, with the reply of the latter.

The debate on this subject lasted for several hours. On one side it was argued that a detailed reply should be given to the letter of the Regency, pointing out the restrictions which were to be imposed upon their power, and several proposals were submitted to the Assembly for that purpose; among others, one from Señor Huerta, which tended rather to impose restraints on the legislature than the executive power of the Regency, but which, in the last article, restrains them from interfering in the judicial tribunals, and from granting pensions or privileges.

It was contended, however, on the other side, in a motion made by Señor Torrero, a priest and deputy from Catalonia, that it was not necessary for the present to do more than reply briefly to the two questions submitted to the Cortes by the Regency relative to the extent of the executive power entrusted to them, and to the degree of responsibility attached to their holding it. That the answer should simply state that the executive power was to be the same as that exercised by the King, but that the Regents were to be responsible to the laws of Spain for their acts, and were not to possess the inviolability of the Sovereign.

After a discussion, in which more warmth was introduced than has yet

* Blank in manuscript.

appeared in the deliberations in the Cortes, a division took place upon Señor Torrero's motion, which was carried by a majority of forty-eight against twenty-five, and the enclosed reply forwarded to the Regency. Many, however, who voted in favour of this motion did it upon an express condition that a committee should immediately be appointed to inquire into the power of the executive branch of the government, and to impose restrictions upon it.

I learnt yesterday from M. de Castaños that the Bishop of Orense has written to the Cortes declining to take the oath required of him as one of the members of the Regency, and desiring to resign his situation. I have not learnt how this was received by the Cortes, as strangers were excluded during the debate which took place upon it; but I understand that some violent measures were proposed in order to compel the Bishop to take the oath, and that the more moderate proceeding, of accepting his resignation, was afterwards agreed upon. I have not heard that any person is likely to be appointed in his room, nor does it appear to me to be in the contemplation of the Cortes to make any change whatever at present in the government.

I have, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

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*Particulars regarding General Moreau.**

General Moreau is a man of frank, unreserved manners, with an honest countenance and convivial disposition, of some acquired knowledge, having received a liberal education, and much natural quickness of perception. He has a good library, and has acquired enough of the language to converse with tolerable facility in English. He resides in winter at New York, receiving much company, and in summer at a country house he has bought on the Delaware, between New York and Philadelphia, where he spends his time in shooting and fishing. He entertains the highest opinion of the talents of his fortunate rival, and the worst possible of his principles. He believes that B—— really intends an invasion of England, or at least intended it some years ago; and he, M——, thinks it difficult, but by no means impracticable. B—— did not expect to effect a conquest, but a destruction of the principal arsenals, and to dictate a peace in the capital. Neither B—— nor M—— have or had a high opinion of the British army, at least as to skill. The experience that army has acquired within a few years, and the unquestionable proofs of courage and discipline they have given, may have, and I think have, altered their opinions. B—— never at any time intended to put himself at the head of the invading army, much less now. M—— says that the best Generals are not employed by B——, who wants none near him but such to whom he may *donner des coups de pied dans les os des jambes;* and that they do nothing well without him. I do not think that General M—— has any political correspondence in France. I know he considers any attempt to overthrow the present government as vain. He thinks B——'s destruction is likely to come from his

* Endorsement on Copy, "In Sir John Sinclair's Note of 8th September."

own army, when exasperated by extreme hardships or any reverse of fortune. M—— has still a predilection to a republican government, and some idea that it would have answered in France, which is certainly no evidence of his wisdom. He has a respect for the British government and national character. Mr. Jefferson and his party avoided showing any attention to General M——, for fear of displeasing B——.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 9th Sept., 1810.

I have received your letter of the 30th August.* The loss of Almeida is, indeed, a misfortune; but I still look for good news from you.

I sent you my last despatch of intelligence, which is all I have to communicate. Blake is in a very strong position; but I have my fears respecting the result of a battle. I think it not impossible that Mortier may be returning to Seville for the purpose of reinforcing Sebastiani.

The 94th sails to-day. I wish you had General Graham and all the troops we have here, for they are certainly thrown away here at present. You know that Maclaine, who behaved so gallantly at Matagorda, is in the 94th.

Nothing is now talked of here but the approaching assembly of the Cortes, and I do not think it can be deferred much longer. I have no accounts from Doyle; but I fear it is too true that the French have got reinforcements in Catalonia.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

There are flying reports that Blake has taken and destroyed 1500 men, and that the French have been beaten in Catalonia; but I believe there is no foundation for them. Indeed I have generally observed that such reports are preludes to news of defeat.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, London, 10th Sept., 1810.

I have received your letter, marked private, of the 19th ultimo.†

I am at a loss to conceive upon what ground you can have supposed that the King's Ministers had no confidence in the measures adopted for the defence of Portugal. I should have thought that their language in Parliament must have had the effect of satisfying the world as to their public sentiments upon this subject. It certainly exposed them not only to the censure of opposition, but even to the animadversion of some of their friends, for what was represented to be their extreme sanguineness in the cause of the Peninsula. With respect to their *private* sentiments, I never knew a question on which there was less difference of opinion in Cabinet than upon the subject of Portugal, either as to the expediency of persevering in the defence of it, as long as could be consistent with the safety of the British army, or as to the belief that there existed a fair chance of success, pro-

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. vi., p. 394.

† Ibid., vol. vi., p. 369.

vided the attack was deferred till after the British army was reinforced and had recovered the effects of the sickness of the last campaign, and that time could be gained for the equipment and discipline of the Portuguese force.

It is certainly true that in the House of Commons the Portuguese subsidy was carried by a small and unwilling majority; and I believe that if the House had been left to act upon their own feelings, they would in the month of February, when the subsidy was voted, have decided for withdrawing the army from Portugal; but this is principally to be ascribed to the circumstance that all the officers in the army who were in England, whether they had served in Portugal or not, entertained and avowed the most desponding views as to the result of the war in that country. Not one officer, as far as I recollect, expressed on the occasion any confidence as to probable success, and not a mail arrived from Lisbon which did not bring letters at that time from officers of rank and situation in the army (many of which were communicated to me), avowing their opinions as to the probability and even necessity of a speedy evacuation of the country. It is true that some of the officers to whom I allude have since entirely changed their opinions, as I know from letters which I have recently seen from them, and they may now, therefore, be very ready to shift their former opinions upon the members of government; but the truth is, the contest never could have been maintained in Portugal through the winter and spring if it had not been for the determination of government to persevere in it, at all risks to themselves, against not only the declared opinions of their opponents, but the private remonstrances of many of their friends.

Upon another part of your letter I am anxious to make an observation. I can assure you that you are very much mistaken if you suppose that the defensive system of warfare which you have felt it necessary and expedient to adopt during the present campaign has lowered your reputation in this country. Upon this subject I can safely refer you to any friends or correspondents you may have in England, in whatever situation of life they may be, and I am sure you will find them all concur in stating that your military reputation never stood so high as it does at the present moment, and that even those persons whom you might suppose were least favourably inclined towards you, are disposed now to do you the fullest justice.

You will find in the enclosed paper the answers to all your propositions in the order in which you brought them forward. I trust that most of them will prove satisfactory to you.

When the reinforcements now destined for you shall have reached you, and the four regiments shall have arrived from Sicily, the British army in Portugal will have received an augmentation of nearly 14,000 rank and file; and allowing for a waste during the campaign of 4000 men, the augmentation at the end of it would still amount to 10,000 men beyond the force originally destined for the defence of Portugal.

I should deceive you if I held out to you the expectation that either the military or financial resources of this country would enable government to keep up an army to this amount in Portugal for any considerable length of time, in addition to all the other necessary drains upon the service.

The recruiting does not at this moment cover in proportion the ordinary waste of our army at home, and unless we receive larger supplies of money from South America than we have any reason to expect, Mr. Perceval is at a loss to know how we shall be able to find specie to meet such a great

increase of expenditure. The augmentation, therefore, of your force must be considered as made with reference to the *present exigency*; and if the contest is to be maintained in Portugal and in the Peninsula upon the principle originally adopted of its being a *long contest*, the British army must be reduced as soon as the *present exigency* will admit of it.

We are very anxious, therefore, not with a view of abandoning, but for the purpose of maintaining the contest in the Peninsula for an indefinite time, that as soon as the present crisis shall appear to be over, you would send home the excess of your force, after keeping 30,000 effective rank and file in Portugal, and a sufficient garrison in Cadiz, selecting, of course, those regiments to be returned home which are the least efficient, and consequently the least fitted for active service.

The question, in short, must come to this: we must make our option between a steady and continued exertion upon a moderate scale, and a great and extraordinary effort for a limited time, which neither our military nor financial means will enable us to maintain permanently.

If it could be hoped that the latter would bring the contest to a speedy and successful conclusion, it would certainly be the wisest course; but unfortunately the experience of the last fifteen years is not encouraging in this respect.

Ever most sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Propositions referred to in page 592.

Proposition 1.—To order positively the commanding officers in Sicily and Malta to send their troops.

Answer.—Instructions have been sent to Sir John Stuart to detach the four battalions before ordered, as soon as the attack upon Sicily appeared to be given up or suspended. Further instructions will be given to the same effect by a vessel now ready to sail for the Mediterranean.

Prop. 2.—The same orders to be sent to Halifax.

A.—Troop-ships have been sent to Halifax for the 23rd regiment. They were prevented sailing for more than three weeks by contrary winds; but the regiment may be expected to arrive at Lisbon by the end of October.

Prop. 3.—To make Lord Wellington responsible for the safety of Cadiz and Gibraltar, and to leave it to his discretion to draw away such parts of the garrison of these places as he may think proper.

A.—Lord Wellington has already a complete discretion as to the garrison of Cadiz, with only one qualification, that *some* British force should be left there. This restriction is founded not on military, but on political considerations; it being conceived to be of great importance that there should be stationed, under the present circumstances in that place, a British General officer, and a small proportion, at least, of British force. With respect to Gibraltar, it has always been a distinct command, and the King will not approve of its situation in this respect being altered. The garrison will be reduced as low as is consistent, even under present circumstances, with the security of Gibraltar and Ceuta.

Prop. 4.—To send to Lisbon as much of the disposable Walcheren infantry as may be in any state for service. They shall not be removed from the neighbourhood of that town, and they will probably recover there entirely.

A.—Reinforcements to the amount of between 6000 and 7000 men have been ordered to Lisbon, of which Lord Wellington was unapprised when he wrote the letter of the 19th ultimo, viz., 4000 rank and file from Cadiz; 1000 Brunswick infantry from Ireland; 1600 to complete corps already in Portugal. Upon the principle stated by Lord Wellington, the 4th, 50th, 71st, and 92nd regiments will be ordered to Lisbon, making a further addition to the British army of about 3000 rank and file.

Prop. 5.—To send, without loss of time, to the Tagus, arms, military stores, clothing, shoes, great coats, and blankets, and to authorize some person to distribute them amongst Spaniards and Portuguese, as may be thought expedient.

A.—Sixty thousand stand of arms have been recently sent to Portugal; more may be added gradually. A supply of shoes and blankets shall likewise be sent, and cloth for making great coats and other clothing. But these latter articles must be advanced on the credit of the Portuguese subsidy, or on that of the Spanish government.

Prop. 6.—To send some victuallers and ordnance store-ships to Lisbon loaded with provisions, arms and ammunition, shoes and great coats, and to authorize Lord Wellington to send them round to the eastern coast of the Peninsula for the supply of the garrisons there.

A.—There can be no objection to such an authority, as far as the means of supplying the articles extend.

Prop. 7.—To authorize Lord Wellington to assist the Spaniards and Portuguese with small sums of money, if he should have it in his power, or stores of provisions, if necessary.

A.—A discretion may be understood to exist for this purpose; but it should be exercised only in cases of necessity and with the greatest prudence and reserve, as the regular expenses of the war in the Peninsula are become so much more considerable than were originally calculated, and such as it may be very difficult for the country to support for any length of time.

[359.*] G. O. Gouvea, 13th Sept., 1810.

2. The Commander of the Forces laments that Captain —— should have thought proper to defer till he was brought to trial to explain the disrespectful expressions which he made use of to his commanding officer, notwithstanding the repeated offers made to him by his commanding officer to receive such explanation.

The officers of the army should recollect that it is not only no degradation, but it is meritorious, for him that is in the wrong to acknowledge and atone for his error, and that the momentary humiliation which any man may feel upon making such an acknowledgment is more than atoned for by the subsequent satisfaction which it affords him, and by avoiding a trial and conviction of conduct unbecoming an officer.

WELLINGTON.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR WELLINGTON, Mount Stewart, 19th Sept., 1810.

I feel very grateful in common with the rest of this family for the feeling and kind manner in which you apprised me of the heavy calamity with which it has pleased Providence to visit us. As your letter arrived the day before the messenger from Charles, it enabled me to break the fatal event gradually to my sisters, on whom the blow must be expected to fall with the greater severity, as Thomas, from being nearly of the age of his three sisters now here, had been brought up with them, and was their companion and favourite. Their sufferings cannot be expected shortly to terminate, but I trust we shall carry them safely through them. My father and mother support themselves better than I could have hoped. Had my brother fallen on the field of battle, it would have been some consolation; as it is, we can only be thankful that he lived long enough to make many friends, and that he terminated his life in the zealous pursuit of his profession.

It would be a great relief to all our anxieties to learn that Charles has not been disqualified by this calamity from the active discharge of his duty.

With the most affectionate sense of your attention to my feelings on this painful occasion,

Believe me, dear Wellington,

Ever yours most sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

Officers serving at the Battle of Busaco.

21st Sept., 1810.

LORD VISCOUNT WELLINGTON.

Lieutenant-General Sir B. Spencer.
Marshal Sir W. Beresford.

Major-General Stewart, Adjutant-General.
Colonel Murray, Quartermaster-General.
Lieutenant-Colonel De Lancey, Deputy Quartermaster-General.
Brigadier-General Howorth, Commanding the Artillery.
Colonel Fletcher, Commanding the Engineers.
Colonel Bathurst, Military Secretary.

Major-General Leith.

Lieutenant-Colonel Barnes, Commanding the Brigade.
Lieutenant-Colonel Craufurd, Commanding the 9th Foot.
Lieutenant-Colonel Nugent, 38th ditto.
Major Gordon, Royals, ditto.
Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas, 8th Portuguese.

Major-General Picton, Commanding 3rd Division.

Colonel Mackinnon, Commanding Brigade in ditto.
Colonel Champelmond, Commanding Brigade in ditto.
Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, 88th Regiment,
Lieutenant-Colonel Meade, 45th ditto.
Lieutenant-Colonel Trench, 74th ditto.
Lieutenant-Colonel Sutton, 9th Portuguese ditto.
Lieutenant-Colonel Bacellar, 21st ditto.
Major Arentschildt, Portuguese Artillery.
Major Smyth, 45th Regiment, Commanding the Light Battalion of Colonel Mackinnon's Brigade.

Brigadier-General Craufurd.

Lieutenant-Colonel Beckwith, Commanding 1st Brigade.
Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, Commanding 2nd ditto.
Lieutenant-Colonel Macleod, 43rd Regiment.
Major Gilmour, Detachments 95th Regiment.
Major Stewart, ditto.
The Hon. Major Arbuthnot, 52nd Regiment.
Lieutenant-Colonel Elder, 3rd Caçadores.
Lieutenant-Colonel D'Avelais, 1st ditto.

Brigadier-General Coleman.

Lieutenant-Colonel Macbean, 19th Portuguese.

Brigadier-General Pack.

Col. Don L. de Regoa, 4th Caçadores.
Lieutenant-Colonel Hill, 1st Portuguese Regiment.
Major Armstrong, 16th ditto.

Lieutenant-Colonel D'Urban, Quartermaster-General to the Portuguese army.
Lieutenant-Colonel Arbuthnot, Military Secretary to Sir W. Beresford.
Brigadier Brito Mozinho, Adjutant-General to the Portuguese army.

[360.] *To Dom M. Forjaz.*

SIR, Busaco, 24th Sept., 1810.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 17th inst. containing a note from the Governors of the Kingdom, explanatory of the views which induced them lately to send certain persons out of the kingdom, which I acknowledge I do not consider sufficient; and if my opinion had been consulted, I should have given it against the measure. These persons are suspected of being friendly to the enemy, which they have shown by no act excepting criticisms on the conduct of the armies, by assertions that the British troops would embark, and others of this nature calculated to damp the enthusiasm of the people. Many of their assertions may have been perfectly true,

although imprudent at the moment; and I must say that I think it is not just in the government to punish and stigmatize people for words spoken which are only imprudent. It might have been worthy consideration whether the tone and matter of these supposed conversations had not been taken from some of the recent deliberations of the government themselves. That which is required in the government is to punish those guilty of neglect and malversation in office, those who disobey or delay to obey orders, and those who neglect, or delay, or omit to perform the duty of their situations.

By producing a reform in the manners and opinions of the country in this respect, they would render a real service, and it would certainly be saved; but I am sorry to say that notwithstanding my repeated remonstrances, I have not yet heard of one person having been punished for these crimes, the most fatal in these times; and they still exist in a most lamentable degree.

I am happy to learn from such high authority as the government themselves, that the popular clamour had no effect upon the measure which I am now considering, as I acknowledge that I had at first been apprehensive that popular clamour alone had been the cause of it.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

A Monsieur le Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Française. [361.]

Au Quartier Général de l'Armée Anglaise, ce 24me Sept., 1810.

MONSIEUR,

Il m'a fait la plus grande peine d'apprendre que vous avez donné des ordres à l'armée Française de ne pas faire des prisonniers parmi l'Ordenanza Portugaise, et que les troupes Françaises obéissent à cet ordre, et fusillent tous ceux de ce corps qui leur tombent dans les mains.

Il faut que je vous fasse savoir que tout Portugais est obligé par les anciennes lois du pays de servir dans les troupes de ligne, ou dans la milice, ou dans l'Ordenanza; et que les troupes des trois descriptions sont également soumises aux lois militaires et sous les ordres des officiers généraux Portugais. La preuve en est que malgré que l'Ordenanza a souffert et se plaint des ordres que vous avez donné et de la violation des

usages de la guerre en leur personnes, ils obéissent aux ordres qui leur ont été donnés, et ont préservé la vie et ont bien traité tous les prisonniers qui leur sont tombé dans les mains. Un officier, M. le Colonel Pavetti, dans le sort duquel vous êtes intéressé, a été fait prisonnier par cette même description de troupe, et il en a été bien traité aussi bien que son escorte.

Comme l'Ordenanza fait partie de l'armée Portugaise, comme elle est également sujette aux lois militaires, et comme elle agit d'une manière loyale envers les prisonniers de l'armée Française qui lui tombe dans les mains, je vous prie de donner ordre que les officiers et soldats de l'Ordenanza faits prisonniers jouiront également avec les autres soldats de l'armée Portugaise des droits et usages de la guerre.

Depuis que j'ai commandé les troupes dans ce pays ci j'ai fait tout en mon pouvoir et j'ai réussi à faire faire la guerre d'une manière loyale, et j'ai fait respecter les usages de la guerre établis et reconnus parmi les nations civilisées qui avait été oubliés; mais si l'armée Française continue à faire fusiller les prisonniers qu'on fera de l'Ordenanza, on ne peut pas s'attendre que les soldats de ce corps aussi bien que les autres soldats de l'armée Portugaise ne retalieront pas sur les prisonniers qu'ils feront de l'armée Française. Il ne sera plus en mon pouvoir de les protéger; et les ordres que vous avez donné seront la cause des malheurs que souffriront les soldats de l'armée Française qui tomberont dans les mains des troupes Portugaises.

J'ai, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing-street, 24th Sept., 1810.

Mr. John Downie having laid before His Majesty's government a proposal for raising 3000 men in the province of Estremadura, which has been approved by the Spanish Regency, and to the command of which he has been appointed with the rank of Colonel in the service of Spain, and having represented that the only aid required from England towards the equipment or maintenance of the proposed legion consists in the arms and accoutrements necessary for 2400 infantry, 300 cavalry, and 300 horse artillery, His Majesty's government has thought proper to take upon itself the providing of the said arms and accoutrements, the latter of which (together with carbines and swords for his cavalry) will be delivered in

England to Mr. Downie; and I am to desire that your Lordship would be pleased to order that he should receive 2400 muskets, with due proportions of ammunition and flints, from the supplies already sent to Lisbon to be at your Lordship's disposal.

I should not omit to state that the sanction and assistance thus afforded to Mr. Downie are given upon the understanding that the Spanish government consents to the admission of a limited number of British officers into the corps about to be raised by Mr. Downie; and that he has obtained the previous approbation of your Lordship, and of His Majesty's minister at Cadiz, to his present undertaking.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your most obedient humble servant,

LIVERPOOL.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD, Real Isla de Leon, 26th Sept., 1810.

A short time after I had forwarded to your Lordship my despatch No. 93, the government determined finally upon the measure of electing to the Cortes provisional deputies for the provinces in the hands of the enemy, and for the colonies. These elections were conducted in a manner which gave great satisfaction to the public, and the number requisite to enable the Cortes to meet being thus completed, it was determined not to delay the opening of the session beyond the 24th instant, which was the day originally fixed for it by the Council of Regency in the proclamation issued on the 15th inst.

The government accordingly removed from Cadiz to the Isla on the 22nd instant, and on the same day I received an invitation from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to repair to the Isla for the purpose of being present at the ceremonial of the 24th.

At an early hour on the morning of the 24th the Council of Regency, attended by the foreign ministers, and the deputies of the Cortes, who were previously assembled at the residence of the government, walked in procession to the church, the garrison being under arms. After the performance of divine service, a sermon was preached by the Bishop of Orense, suited to the occasion. The Minister of Grace and Justice then advanced to the altar, and turning to the Deputies proclaimed the oath of fidelity to their King and religion, which the Deputies, with one voice, swore to maintain. The oath was afterwards administered separately to each Deputy, and the ceremonial in the church being concluded, the Deputies and the Council of Regency, accompanied by the Foreign Ministers, proceeded in the same order to the theatre, which had been fitted up for the reception of the Cortes.

The Deputies having taken their seats, and the Council of Regency theirs, in the place allotted for the Throne, a speech was delivered by the President of the Council of Regency, which was not very distinctly heard, but which concluded by a surrender of the government into the hands of the Cortes. The Regency then left the hall, and a debate immediately ensued on the expediency for the present of reinvesting the Regency with the exe-

cutive power. The previous necessity of electing a President and Secretary was, however, suggested and acquiesced in, and, after some discussion, Don Benito Hermida was called to the chair for this purpose. The vote of each member for a President was taken down in writing, and M. de Gomida and Don Ramode Lazaro de Don having a majority of voices of seven deputies, for whom votes had been given, the assembly proceeded again to vote for one of these, when the choice fell upon Señor Don, who is a priest and a deputy from Catalonia.

The Cortes next proceeded to appoint a secretary, and the choice fell upon M. Perez de Castro, formerly chargé des affaires at Lisbon, and lately elected Provisional Deputy for Valladolid.

A President and Secretary having been chosen, Don M. Luxan, a Deputy for Estremadura, proposed certain resolutions as the basis of a national decree. These resolutions, there is every reason to believe, were the result of the private deliberations of some of the most respectable members of the Cortes. Considerable discussion arose upon every proposition contained in the decree as it is now published, but more particularly upon the declaration that the sovereign legislative authority resides in the Cortes, upon the nature of the oath to be taken by the Council of Regency, and upon the responsibility of the executive power. In the discussion of the latter point, which was argued at great length, an excessive jealousy of the executive power appeared to prevail, and the majority of the Assembly seemed to be bent upon giving some public pledge of their being actuated by this feeling, and to be impressed with the necessity of making the Regency subordinate to the Cortes. Although they were resolved to delegate to the persons composing it many of the prerogatives as well as the representation of the Sovereign, the difficulty, therefore, of attaching responsibility to the executive power soon became evident in the discussion. It was observed by several members, that the declaration of the responsibility of the executive power would only tend to render a Regency undecided and slow in all its operations; that the Cortes which delegated that power reserved the privilege of resuming it whenever they should be dissatisfied with the manner in which it was exercised. At length, the words "responsibility to the nation" in the original proposition were modified to the form in which they are now published in the decree.

In a subsequent discussion respecting the manner of receiving the present members of the Regency upon their entering the assembly to take the oath, the precedency of the Cortes was especially provided for by a decree that their President should place the President of the Council of Regency on his left hand.

A deputation was then instructed to wait upon the Regency with a copy of the decree relative to the sovereign power residing in the Cortes, and the oath of fidelity required of the executive power; and the deputation was further directed to invite the members of the Regency to repair to the Cortes for the purpose of taking that oath.

In compliance with this invitation, the Regency, with the exception of the Bishop of Orense, came to the Cortes, and M. de Saavedra, who acted as President, was placed on the left hand of the President of the Cortes. After a short address from the latter the oath was administered to the Regents, who, after some expressions of their desire that their conduct

should be conformable to the wishes of the representatives of the nation, retired from the assembly. The cause of the absence of the Bishop of Orense is not yet publicly known, but some allusion was made to it in the Cortes, and I have some reason to believe it proceeded from a determination not to subscribe to any of the decrees of the Cortes with regard to the executive power.

The principal feature by which the assembly has been distinguished is a very remarkable jealousy in delegating any power from itself, arising probably from the bad use which has been made by every government which has assumed the sovereign authority since the captivity of Ferdinand VII. This jealousy is apparent in the decree by which the Cortes have conferred upon themselves the title of Majesty, and upon the executive power that of Highness only; which, in fact, makes the latter, in point of rank, the second power in the State, deprives it of the influence and dignity which it derived from representing the King, and constitutes those who hold it the mere ministers of sovereign authority, which, it would appear, is to reside in the Cortes alone, although, for the sake of form, they have agreed to constitute an executive power. It would also appear, that, by the assumption of the sovereign honour, the Cortes can only be dissolved by their own act, which is certainly an invasion of the rights of the executive authority; the power of assembling and of dissolving the Cortes having hitherto belonged to that authority alone.

The decree likewise puts an end to every idea which may have been entertained of making the Princess of Brazil Regent, with the view of ultimately calling her to the throne, since it declares the sovereignty to be vested exclusively in the Cortes until the release of Ferdinand VII. from captivity; and in the oath administered to the Deputies, of which a copy is enclosed, it was originally proposed that they should swear to maintain the monarchy in the person of Ferdinand VII., and in the line of the House of Bourbon; but the Deputies, having learnt that the oath was to be proposed to them with a condition in favour of the House of Bourbon, requested that it should be altered to the form in which it now stands.

Another very important and excellent feature in this assembly is, its evident desire to conciliate the colonies. This has been apparent in the course of the long and animated discussions throughout the first and second days, when frequent allusions have been made to America, not only by the Deputies from the colonies, but by many other individuals who took a lead in the debate, and particularly so in the nomination to the Vice-Presidency of the only Deputy who has been regularly elected from the colony which he represents, all the other elections for the colonies being provisional. From the tone, indeed, of conciliation, and of justice towards the colonies, which so generally prevails, little or no doubt is entertained of their faithful adherence to the mother country.

I have endeavoured to give, as shortly as possible, a distinct account, for the information of His Majesty's government, of the first proceedings of this assembly, which are so intimately connected with the future destiny of Spain, and so important in every point of view. I am sensible, however, that no description from me can do justice to the interesting scene of which I have been a witness. The discussions which have arisen upon the several decrees, of which copies are enclosed, have been managed with consider-

able ability, and there was no appearance of improper warmth in the speeches of the Deputies, although some of them were highly animated. Upon the whole, with the exception of the decree by which the rank of the executive power is placed below that of the Cortes, their proceedings are extremely creditable to them, and justify a confident expectation that the most important consequences will be derived from this meeting. It has certainly already produced more men of talent, energy, and useful knowledge than the country was generally supposed to possess; and it is to be recollected that the Deputies of those provinces which were principally relied upon for men of capacity are not yet arrived. In justice, likewise, to the motives of those who proposed the decree relative to the title of Majesty being conferred upon the Cortes, and that of Highness on the Council of Regency, I must express my firm conviction that this does not proceed from any revolutionary feeling among the Deputies, many of whom declare both titles to be in conformity to ancient usage. It certainly, however, is considered by the Council of Regency as depriving them of all power, and I understand it to be their intention to send a message to the Cortes requesting explanations upon this, as well as upon several other points connected with that part of the decree which relates to their authority and responsibility.

I have, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD, Isla de Leon, 28th Sept., 1810.

Soon after the Cortes had assembled yesterday Señor Arguelles, deputy from Asturias, rose to call the attention of the Assembly to the important subject of establishing the liberty of the press.

He introduced his subject by shortly stating the advantages to be derived from free discussion of political subjects at the present moment. He observed that public opinion, which could only be ascertained through the medium of the press, was the true foundation of the power and influence of the Cortes. With a view of conciliating as much as possible the opinions of the deputies, his proposal went only to inquire whether or not the Cortes were disposed to appoint a committee to take into consideration the liberty of the press on political subjects, and to determine the restrictions necessary to prevent the abuse of it. Notwithstanding that this speech was received with universal applause by the Assembly, one of the deputies moved the previous question, and Señor Hemida entered into a discussion of some plan which he had proposed to the Central Junta. The speeches of these members were very ill received, when Señor Torrero rose, and in an animated speech supported the motion of Señor Arguelles, calling upon the Assembly immediately to adopt it. He observed that the deputies required information upon the various points of government which would certainly come under their consideration, and this could only be obtained through the means of the press. That the discredit of the Central Junta principally arose from two causes: the first that they chose to shut themselves up at Aranjuez and deliberate in private; and the second, that from

confined notions of policy they refused to grant the liberty of the press, in consequence of which the people were kept in ignorance of every circumstance with which it was most important they should be made acquainted; that they were ignorant of the numbers composing the enemy's forces in Spain; nor did the Central Junta itself know that the French had forced the passes of the Somo Sierra until they were actually at the gates of Madrid. The Cortes, he proceeded to state, had wisely decreed the publicity of their deliberations, and that step should immediately be followed by a declaration of the liberty of the press, under such restrictions as the committee might judge to be advisable for the purpose of preventing the abuse of it.

* At the conclusion of Señor Torrero's speech the Assembly voted, with three or four dissentient voices only, the appointment of a committee to consider of the propriety of the establishment of the liberty of the press upon political subjects, under such restrictions as would be necessary to prevent the abuse of it. Some members, however, left the Assembly apparently to avoid voting upon this question, and among these was M. Capmany.

I have, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

G. O. Coimbra, 30th Sept., 1810. [362.]

1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the General and other officers and soldiers of the army for their conduct during the whole time they occupied the position of Busaco, and in the action with the enemy on the 27th inst.

He witnessed several instances of intrepidity in the officers and troops, and others have been reported to him by the General officers, of which he will not fail to report his sense to His Majesty, and to the government of H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.

Every friend to his country and to the liberties of the world, and the whole British army, must have observed with the greatest satisfaction the gallantry and steadiness of the Portuguese troops during these days, and that they, equally with their brother soldiers in His Majesty's service, have deserved and obtained the approbation of Marshal Beresford, and of the Commander of the Forces.

Although the designs manifested by the enemy's movements induced the Commander of the Forces to withdraw the army from their position, which it was not in the power of the enemy to force, he hopes to be enabled, by the discipline and determined bravery of the officers and troops, to frustrate all his

designs, and to save this country, "in which the British army has been so well treated," from the degrading yoke which is prepared for it.

2. * * * * * * *: which sentence has been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

3. Although the Commander of the Forces has long determined that he will not pardon men guilty of crimes of which these prisoners have been convicted, he is induced to pardon these men in consequence of the gallantry displayed by the 45th regiment on the 27th inst.

He trusts that this pardon will make a due impression upon the prisoners, and that by their future regular and good conduct they will endeavour to emulate their comrades, who have by their bravery saved them from a disgraceful end.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 2nd Oct., 1810.

I think it right to apprise you that in the event of your being obliged to retreat to the position near Lisbon, there will be no objection to your taking from the fleet, if you shall think it expedient for the purpose of strengthening your position, the lower deck guns of the ships of war, and of your availing yourself of the assistance of a proportion of the seamen and marines for the purpose of manning them.

Such an arrangement may provide you, without difficulty, with a battery of 100 or 150 32-pounders. The guns may be abandoned in case you are obliged to embark, as they are of little comparative value in themselves, and the ships of war will become better calculated for the accommodation of a part of the army after they shall have been left behind.

I have not made this suggestion without communication with the Admiralty, though I should think it most probable that if there are not any unforeseen objections to it, such an arrangement would have been in the contemplation both of yourself and Admiral Berkeley.

I am, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

Extract of a Despatch from the Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington, dated 2nd Oct., 1810.

"I have communicated the copy of your Lordship's despatch relative to the late proceedings of the Regency of Portugal to the Marquess Wellesley, His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in order that he may

give the necessary instructions to Mr. Stuart thereupon; and I can assure you of the entire support of His Majesty's government in any measure which you may find it necessary to adopt for upholding your own authority, and that of Marshal Beresford, in the command of the British and Portuguese armies, and for providing effectually for the security of the country, the military defence of which is intrusted to your care."

G. O. Leiria, 3rd Oct., 1810. [363.]

1. * * * * * *

There are more stragglers from these three regiments than from all the others of the British army taken together, which must be occasioned either by the neglect of the officers, or by the soldiers being unable to keep up with the march. In either case these regiments are unfit to do duty with the army; and if the Commander of the Forces should observe any more of this straggling on the march, he will send the regiments into garrison, and report their conduct especially to His Majesty.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests that Major-General Leith will communicate these Orders to the Portuguese troops in his division, of whom, particularly the Lusitanian Legion, there is as much reason to complain as of the British brigade. He also requests to have a return this day of the number of men missing from each regiment, British and Portuguese, in the division, on each day's march, since the 1st inst. inclusive.

3. General officers commanding divisions are requested to direct the Provost Marshal attached to their division to punish any man who may be found straggling from the regiment and division to which he belongs.

4. General officers commanding divisions are requested to direct that there may be an inspection of the soldiers' packs, both British and Portuguese, this day after the march, and everything, not strictly regimental necessaries, is to be taken from them and burnt, and those who have these articles are to be punished, as they have certainly procured them by plunder.

Major-General Picton is requested not to allow the troops of his division to enter any town unless necessarily obliged to pass through it, until further orders.

WELLINGTON.

[364.] A. G. O. Leiria, 3rd Oct., 1810.

The Commander of the Forces is concerned to have been under the necessity of acting on the determination which he has so long announced, of directing the immediate execution of any soldiers caught plundering; and that a British and a Portuguese soldier have consequently been hanged this day for plundering in the town of Leiria, where they were contrary to order, and for this criminal purpose. He trusts that this example will deter others from those disgraceful practices in future; and the troops may depend upon it that no instance of the kind will be passed over. They are well fed and taken care of, and there is no excuse for plunder, which could not be admitted on any account. Once more, the Commander of the Forces calls upon the commanding officers of regiments to oblige their men to march in a regular manner with their companies.

WELLINGTON.

[365.] *To the Right Hon. W. W. Pole.*

MY DEAR WILLIAM, Leiria, 4th Oct., 1810.

I am obliged to watch and superintend the operations of the army so closely, that I had not time to write to you on the 30th, and indeed I have little intelligence to give you which is not contained in my despatches of the 20th and 30th September, both of which I hope that government will publish.

The croakers about useless battles will attack me again on that of Busaco, notwithstanding that our loss was really trifling; but I should have been inexcusable if, knowing what I did, I had not endeavoured to stop the enemy there; and I should have stopped him entirely if it had not been for the blunders of the Portuguese General commanding in the north, who was prevented by a small French patrol from sending Trant by the road by which he was ordered to march. If he had come by that road, the French could not have turned our position, and they must have attacked us again: they could not have carried it, and they must have retired. The question is whether, having it in my power to take such a position, it was right to incur the risk of a general engagement in it? That which has since happened shows that, if not turned, I could have maintained

it without loss of importance, and that, if turned, I could retire from it without inconvenience; and under these circumstances there could be no doubt. To this add that the battle has had the best effects in inspiring confidence in the Portuguese troops both among our croaking officers and the people of the country. It has likewise removed an impression which began to be very general, that we intended to fight no more, but to retire to our ships; and it has given the Portuguese troops a taste for an amusement to which they were not before accustomed, and which they would not have acquired if I had not put them in a very strong position.

Since the 30th I have continued the retreat of the army without inconvenience, or loss, or hurry. This day we all halt, and I shall fall back no farther till I shall see what the enemy's arrangements are. I have not heard that they have yet crossed the Mondego in force, and I suspect that their loss in this battle has been so severe that they are not strong enough to accomplish their object.

Whether the battle of Busaco is approved of or not, I believe everybody will admit that the movements by which the British army was collected in and afterwards removed from that position were very satisfactory. Indeed the French themselves are astonished at my having been able to bring Hill up to that point in so short a space of time.

Give my best love to Mrs. Pole and the girls, and believe me

Ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Isla de Leon, 4th Oct., 1810.

As you will be anxious to know something of the first proceedings of the Cortes, I send you my despatches upon that subject, with printed copies of their decrees. One of their first measures has been the sending away the Duke of Orleans, who (after an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a hearing from them) sailed this morning in a Spanish frigate for Palermo. I was sure this would happen to him whenever the Cortes met.

Their proceedings are extremely interesting; and there are certainly more men of talent among them than I thought Spain could produce.

There are excellent accounts arrived to-day from Catalonia, and there is no doubt of their truth, although they are not official. O'Donnell has been

very successful in the Ampurdan, having taken 900 prisoners (among whom are General Schwarts and 42 officers) and 18 pieces of cannon. He is however, I am sorry to say, returned to Tarragona wounded, but not dangerously. Two hundred and fifty prisoners have also been taken at Falaca. I have sent 4000 stand of arms to O'Donnell and the same number to Blake; and the government has supplied them with money, so that I hope we may look for further successes.

I fear that now I am no longer at Duffe's elbow he will not be quite so active in procuring money. I shall, however, write to him to-morrow upon this subject, and I expect to be able to send you a large supply upon the arrival of the *Bulwark*. She will probably arrive in the course of this month.

I have received your letter of the 22nd, and am most anxious, as indeed is everybody here, for further accounts from you.

Ever most affectionately yours,

H. Wellesley.

The Cortes have been for several days discussing the question of South America. A petition has been presented by the American deputies demanding for South America equal rights and privileges with the natives of Spain, and a general amnesty for what has passed at the Caraccas and at Buenos Ayres. They have not yet come to a vote upon these subjects, but they have been very ably discussed.

Copy of an intercepted Letter from Masséna.

[Found in the possession of a person proceeding from the French army in Portugal towards Spain, in the disguise of a Spanish peasant. This person has since been recognised to be one of Junot's aides-de-camp.] *

Monseigneur, Coimbra, le 4e d'Octobre, 1810.

Nous nous sommes mis en marche le 16e pour entrer en Portugal, ainsi j'en ai prévenu votre Altesse. Le 5 jour nous sommes arrivés à Vizeu, après avoir traversé de très mauvais chemins. Nous avons du nous y arrêter cinq jours pour donner au parc d'artillerie et aux équipages le tems d'arriver, et celui de se réparer, comme j'ai eu l'honneur de vous en rendre compte de Vizeu même. Je suis parti le 25e de cette dernière place. Le 3 jour de marche je me suis trouvé devant la position de Busaco, qui étoit occupée par les deux armées, Anglaise et Portugaise, réunis. J'ai reconnu cette position. Le lendemain à la pointe du jour j'ai fait attaquer à la gauche par le 2d corps, et au centre par le 6e. Le 8e corps restoit en réserve. La position est assurément la plus forte de tout le Portugal. Le Général Regnier est parvenu cependant au haut de la crête, et commençoit à s'y établir, lorsque le Général Hill avec un corps de 20,000 hommes a attaqué en colonne serrée les troupes qui, excédées de fatigues, commençoient à le former sur la crête de la montagne, et les a forcées à en descendre. Le mouvement de retraite, soutenu par une bonne réserve, s'est fait avec ordre, et le 2d corps a repris sa première position. Au centre se trouvoient les divisions Loison

* The copy of this document is in the handwriting of Marquess Wellesley.

et Marchand. La première a attaqué sur la droite du chemin qui conduit au couvent de Busaco, et l'autre vers la gauche. Obligé de gravir une montagne très escarpée pour rejoindre la grande route, le Général Loison parvint après des grandes efforts sur cette route, mais il n'eut pas le tems de s'y former en colonne, et de s'y établir. Deux colonnes Anglaises serrées en marche, protégées par une nombreuse artillerie, sont arrivé au pas de charge, et ont forcé cette division à rétrograder. Le Général Marchand, qui devoit soutenir cette attaque, a pris position pour arrêter l'ennemi. Les Anglais n'ont pas osé s'avancer à plus de 300 toises de leur ligne de bataille. Le reste de la journée s'est passé à tirailler. Après avoir reconnu attentivement cette position, que Lord Wellington n'auroit pas osé tenir, si, comme moi, il ne l'avoit pas jugé extrêmement forte, je pris toute de suite mon parti, et je cherchois à obtenir par mes manœuvres un avantage qui nous auroit coûté trop de braves.

J'envoyai des reconnoissances de cavalerie sur ma droite et sur ma gauche pour examiner le pays, et pour tenir l'ennemi dans l'incertitude sur la direction de mes mouvements. D'après les rapports je me décidois à tourner l'armée Anglaise par ma droite. La position de Ponte de Murcella, que l'ennemi avoit retranché, et sur laquelle il pouvoit marcher de flanc par la crête de Penacora, lui facilitoit les moyens d'y porter toutes ses forces en moins de deux heures. Au lieu que le chemin de Sardão traversant le Col de Caramulo me conduisoit sur Boialoo, dans un pays ouvert et fertile. Le mouvement tournoit la gauche de l'ennemi, et me rendoit maître de manœuvrer sur son flanc.

Je quittois donc le 29 à six heures du soir la position de Mouca, et je marchois sur Boialoo. Le 8e corps, qui n'avoit pas souffert, fesoit l'avant garde. Le 6e formoit le corps de bataille, et le 2d se trouvoit en arrière garde.

Tous mes blessés me suivoient sur des caissons et bêtes de somme. L'ennemi s'apercevant après minuit de cette manœuvre sur la gauche, laissa à Busaco une forte arrière garde, et marcha dans un grand désordre vers Coimbra, sur plusieurs colonnes, après avoir fait sauter toutes les munitions, et brûlé tous les magasins.

Je suis arrivé le 1er à Coimbra. L'ennemi avoit laissé toute sa cavalerie, avec quelques régiments d'infanterie, que j'ai fait charger. Il s'en retire sur Condeixa. Le 2d j'ai envoyé l'avant garde sur ce village, et l'ennemi en a encore été chassé. Elle est aujourd'hui à Redinha. Ma cavalerie couvre tous les chemins qui aboutissent sur la route de Lisbonne, et le Général Montbrun s'est porté sur Figueira.

Lord Wellington avec l'armée Anglo-Portugaise est en pleine retraite sur Lisbonne. Il annonce le projet de vouloir nous disputer toutes positions. Je marche réuni, et je ferois tout ce que je pourrois pour le décider à livrer bataille, seul moyen de la détruire, ou de le forcer à se rembarquer. On porte le nombre des deux armées Anglaise et Portugaise à 60,000 ou à 70,000 hommes; parmis lesquels 25,000 Anglais. L'ennemi brûle et détruit tout, en évacuant le pays. Il force tous les habitants à abandonner leurs foyers. Coimbra, ville de 20,000 âmes, est déserté. Nous ne trouvons aucunes subsistances. L'armée vit avec le bled de Turquie et les légumes que nous trouvons encore sur plante. Lord Wellington, n'osant nous attendre en rase campagne, cherche à nous détruire en ruinant tout ce qui pourroit

nous alimenter. Les habitants des villes et des villages sont très malheureux. Il les contraint à servir sous peine de la vie; enfin aucune époque de l'histoire n'offre d'exemple d'une aussi grande barbarie.

Notre perte en tués et blessés est d'environ 3000 hommes; parmis lesquels beaucoup d'officiers. Le Général Simon, de la division Loison, dangereusement blessé, est resté au milieu des rangs de l'ennemi. Le Général Graindorge est mort de ses blessures. Le Général de division Merle est blessé. Les Généraux de brigades Foy et Maucune le sont également. Ils ne pourront de quelque tems reprendre leur service. Les Colonels du 26e de ligne, des 6e et 32e légères, ont été tués, et plusieurs autres blessés. Il manque dans les corps un grand nombre d'officiers, qu'il seroit nécessaire de remplâcer. L'armée Anglo-Portugaise a avoué avoir perdu 4000 hommes, dont la moitié Anglais.

Je laisse les blessés et malades à Coimbra, où je fais retrancher deux couvents. Je ne pourrais y laisser qu'un petit nombre des troupes pour les garder. Battre les Anglais et les forcer à se rembarquer est la meilleure défense que je puisse leur laisser.

Le Général Regnier mérite les plus grandes éloges, et s'est conduit en Général expérimenté. Le Général Loison continue à justifier sa réputation; enfin officiers et soldats tous ont combattu avec bravoure et dévouement. Je vous enverrai l'état des récompenses à accorder à la brave armée de Portugal, animée du plus grand dévouement pour le service de S. M. l'Empereur.

Masséna.

L'adresse est le suivant:—A Son Altesse le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Vice-Connétable, Major-Général, à Paris.

Copy of a Paper found in possession of the same Person.

[It contains supposed questions which may be expected at Paris, with answers prepared for each question.]

Demande.—Où avez vous laissé l'armée?

Réponse.—Marchant sur Lisbonne. L'avant garde étoit à Redinha. Le Général-en-Chef est parti le même jour que moi.

D.—Où a-t-on laissé les blessés et les malades?

R.—A Coimbra, avec une garde de police, et les vivres nécessaires, ayant rendu le peu d'habitants que s'y trouvoient, et ceux qui sont rentrés, responsables du sort des Français qu'on y laissoit; le Prince ayant jugé que 300 ou 400 hommes n'y feroient pas plus qu'un plus grand nombre.

D.—Quel est l'esprit de l'armée?

R.—Bon: surtout d'après le manœuvre du Général-en-Chef, qui a tourné la position de l'ennemi.

D.—Quel est l'esprit des Portugais?

R.—Fanatisé. Les principaux tous Anglais, le bas peuple terrorifié par l'ennemi.

D.—Croyez vous qu'on ira à Lisbonne?

R.—Tout le fait espérer; les Anglais étant en pleine retraite, et les Français pleins de confiance au Général-en-Chef.

D.—Trouve-t-on des ressources dans le pays?

R.—Aucune, sinon les légumes qui sont encore dans les champs. Le soldat n'a pas souffert jusqu'à présent.

D.—Les commandants des corps sont ils d'accord avec le Général-en-Chef?

R.—Je l'ignore, mais le caractère du Général-en-Chef en impose aux commandants des corps de l'armée.

D.—L'armée a-t-elle beaucoup de munitions?

R.—Je sais qu'elle a 2 millions de cartouches à sa suite, sans compter ce qu'elle a dans les gibernes.

D.—Avez vous eu beaucoup de blessés à la bataille de Busaco?

R.—J'ai ouï dire qu'il y en avoit eu de 2500 ou 3000, mais que de leur propre aveu les Anglais ont perdu 4000. L'armée auroit besoin d'un renfort pour le maintenir à Lisbonne, et elle n'a pas le sou en caisse.

D.—A combien estimez vous les armées Anglaise et Portugaise?

R.—De 60,000 à 70,000 hommes, dont 25,000 à 30,000 Anglais, sans compter les milices et ordonnances.

D.—Quels sont les projets des Anglais?

R.—De défendre Lisbonne et les approches, et d'y faire sauter les édifices publics. Les Anglais inspirent une grande terreur dans le pays, et forcent tous les habitants d'abandonner leurs maisons, et sous peine de mort de brûler toutes leurs ressources. Le Portugal est un désert.

D.—Avez vous beaucoup de malades dans l'armée?

R.—Pas beaucoup. Le soldat se porte très bien, et ne respire que de rencontrer les Anglais.

To the Right Hon. C. Arbuthnot. [366.]

MY DEAR ARBUTHNOT, Alcobaça, 5th Oct., 1810.

I received your letter of the 10th, and I assure you that it will give me great pleasure to forward your brother's promotion in the army. I have spoken to Marshal Beresford upon the subject this day; and if we should be successful here, we neither of us doubt that we shall be able to effect our object.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter, and shall be happy to hear from you whenever you have leisure. You must strengthen the government if it is intended that it should last, however difficult it may be to accomplish that object under existing circumstances. Depend upon it that you have no legitimate majority in the House of Commons; and the occurrences of last session show how little dependence can be placed upon the casual support of one or other of the loose parties which are floating about.

Canning would probably in his own person give you most talent in the House of Commons, and by his friends Huskisson

and Bourne most assistance in office; but I doubt whether he will give you as many noses as others; and it may be depended upon that if he goes into office, and not Castlereagh and Sidmouth, the two latter will decidedly oppose; and you will thus lose more than you will gain. I also think there is a dislike and mistrust of Canning in others both in and out of the Cabinet, which would render him alone an acquisition but little desirable.

As for us, I think we are safe for the winter. We gave the French a terrible beating on the 27th of September; and from the intercourse which we have with their officers, I understand they have since changed their tone. Some doubt that Masséna will ever move more forward than he is, and there are wagers that he is about to retire. They all abuse him, and carry their unusual want of confidence in him and in their own exertions so far as to talk of being "prisoners in the hands of the English," of "la fortune de la guerre," &c. &c. However, they won't draw me from my cautious system. I'll fight them only where I am pretty sure of success; and if I should succeed, they must be destroyed.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[367.*] G. O. Alcobaça, 5th Oct., 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces announces to the army that 30 of the stragglers who are absent from their regiments, of which 10 are British soldiers, were taken yesterday by the enemy in villages near the road on which the army marched three or four days before, that is on the 1st and 2nd inst. This misfortune would be a subject of regret to the Commander of the Forces under any circumstances, but it is particularly so, as it has been occasioned by the irregularity of the soldiers themselves, and by the neglect of their officers to attend to the orders repeatedly issued upon this subject.

WELLINGTON.

Captain Burnos to Colonel Murray.

Sir, Caracedilo, 8th Oct., 1810.

I had the honour of mentioning to you when in Celorico that I was going to Castille in company of the Lieut.-Colonel Don Juan Lopez de Fraga, Commander-in-Chief of the guerrillas in that province, who was ordered by the Marques de la Romana, as Captain-General of Castilla la Vieja, to establish himself in whatever part of that kingdom he thought most convenient; as well for the purpose of directing from there the movements of the numerous parties of guerrillas in that country, as also to continue his exertions and extensive correspondence in Castille to obtain positive information from the enemy.

General Mahy received the Colonel on his arrival in Villafranca extremely early; expressed his surprise of not having been officially informed of his arrival by the Marques de la Romana, but promised to give him all necessary assistance. It also appeared to me that not the best harmony existed between both Generals, but having for some time no reason to harbour a suspicion of this kind, I remained perfectly silent on this subject. The reception that, for the time that I am in this province, almost every officer of the Army of the Left has met with here, convinced me that I was but too right.

An official letter of General Mahy, dated the 3rd October from la Coruña, has been received on the 6th by the Commander-in-Chief of the guerrillas; disapproving in it of the Colonel's conduct, denying any benefit that the country had reaped of his well known services and exertions, accusing him of having abused his authority in examining some intercepted correspondence, without delivering them first to General Faguada, who, by the by, has been most carefully provided with correct copies of everything that has fallen in our hands, as well for his as for General Mahy's information; the originals of interesting papers has been sent to the Marques de la Romana, and ordering him, if he does not choose to deliver up all the intercepting correspondence to be first examined by General Taboada, to remove from hence and to draw near the army of the Marques de la Romana. What will be the result of this I do not yet know. But there is no doubt that General Mahy is jealous, in a most ungenerous, most dirty way, of the brilliant and shining merits of the Marques de la Romana; that General Mahy, who has not hesitated to declare publicly that the Marques is *un picano;* that *he* and *England* were *determined to ruin* and *destroy Spain;* will pursue every individual employed under the Marques's immediate orders.

The service at large must suffer by personalities of this kind; and if the General compels the Colonel to return to the Army of the Left, as he expressed in his letter of the 3rd, my with difficulty established correspondence in Castille will suffer considerably by it.

It is surprising that General Mahy in his letter constantly hides himself behind the character and authority of Lord Wellington. As an excuse of his ill-founded charges against the Colonel, he complains that by the Colonel's fault his Lordship would remain without the necessary information; not recollecting that all information first passed through the hands of the Colonel and me before even it reached him. I am certain that if the

Generals Mahy or Taboada have not detained my letter, it must have reached his Lordship sooner than his. General Mahy does not mention the Marques's name in his letter. In short, General Mahy's letter and conduct are most striking proofs of his jealousy and hatred against the Marques de la Romana. Believe me, Sir, it is no recommendation with him to be an English officer; and if the General treats us with civility, he does not prevent the officers of his staff to speak, in his presence and in our absence, in such terms of British officers in general, which cannot be called anything else than scandalous ones.

As it is unavoidable for me to fall in now and then with some of these Generals, as they are more courteous and diplomatical than military characters, and as credentials are necessary with them, I beg you to send me, the sooner the better, either an instruction or open official letter directed to the Spanish Generals, and expressing in such the nature of the service that I am at present employed on, by order of Lord Wellington. These gentlemen are so suspicious, that General Taboada complained to me the other day of Spanish Generals as having *altro* officers employed in watching and observing the movements of the army *de los allados*. Asking him if he considered me as a spy upon his actions and army, he answered me "No;" but in such a way that it was plainly to be seen that he was persuaded of the contrary.

I consider it my duty in mentioning all this to you, particularly as I know that General Mahy is in the habit of corresponding with Lord Wellington.

If the intrigues of General Mahy deprive me of the assistance and company of the Commander-in-Chief of the guerrillas, and compel him to return to the Army of the Left, I shall, according to his Lordship's orders, remain on the north of the Duero, and use all possible means and exertions to continue my correspondence in Castille, and to obtain the necessary information as well for Lord Wellington as also for the Marques de la Romana, who must, after the Colonel's departure, be in want of it. As I, in that case, will be obliged to defray the expense for spies, &c., alone, my correspondence will become a great deal more expensive than at present.

I have, since my last letter to you, of the 27th September, received no information whatsoever from Castille. How to account for it I do not know.

Interesting news are daily expected from Asturias.

I have, &c.,

L. Burnos.

[368.] *To the Earl of Liverpool.*

My Lord, Gouveia, 13th Oct., 1810.

About the period when the accounts of the loss of Almeida arrived at Lisbon there was a fire in the town, at which the two regiments of militia were employed; and either during the continuance of the fire, or after it was over, many of the officers and soldiers of these regiments went into the coffee-houses to refresh themselves. Here the conversation turned upon the operations of the armies, upon the loss of Almeida, and upon the procla-

mations by Masséna and the Marquis d'Alorna; and I understand that the sentiment which generally prevailed was that the design of the English army was to embark, and that it was the duty of these two regiments of militia to seize "the towers," as they are called, meaning Belem, St. Julian, the Bugio, &c., and to prevent the execution of this design.

I should not have troubled your Lordship upon this subject, having already adopted measures to employ this militia more usefully for the public service and to secure the towers, if I did not conceive that these sentiments of the militia were in some degree connected with those entertained by the Portuguese government, and with their conduct since the recent changes.

This country has before been in great danger, and a great part of it, probably the richest and most important, was last year in the possession of the enemy; but at all times and under all circumstances I have possessed the confidence of the government, and their object has been, as far as was in their power, to forward my views for the public service. I have apprised them of the system of operations in which I deemed it expedient to carry on the defence of the country, and they are aware of the grounds of my opinion and the details of the plan; and till the late change, excepting occasional remarks from the Patriarch on the supposed danger of his favourite city Oporto, I never received from the government any observation excepting of confidence in the measures which I recommended or adopted, and the confidence and satisfaction of the public surpassed those of the government. But the Principal Souza, who was introduced recently into the government, is of that impatient, meddling, and mischievous disposition (without, however, designing to do harm) that we cannot expect to go on as we have hitherto as long as he shall continue a member of the government. His indiscretion is equally well known with the other defects of his character, and to this I attribute the dangerous sensation which appears to have been occasioned at Lisbon on the fall of Almeida. In imitation of the fatal conduct of the Central Junta, the Portuguese Regency, since the late changes, have flattered instead of coercing the mob of Lisbon, which will become dangerous in proportion as this new system is persevered in. They have likewise, in imitation of the same body, interfered in the military operations, and have deliberated upon the propriety of adopting offensive measures and of

moving the army into Spain; and I have no doubt that from the usual indiscretion of this same gentleman, these deliberations and opinions are as well known to the mob of Lisbon as they are to me. Then they have cast reflection and suspicion on every Portuguese employed by Marshal Beresford and me, likewise in imitation of the Central Junta; and in many important instances, some relating exclusively to the army, they have recently disobeyed the orders of the Prince Regent to adopt no measure without consulting my opinion.

His Majesty's government will be the best judges what measures ought to be adopted as a remedy for these evils; but I have already desired Mr. Stuart to give notice to the Regency that if they continued to interfere, in any manner, with the military operations or with the appointments of Marshal Beresford's staff, I should recommend His Majesty's government to withdraw the army; that if I found that they did not adopt the political and civil measures recommended to them as corresponding with the military operations, I should bring their conduct under the consideration of His Majesty's government; and that if they refused or omitted to coerce the mob of Lisbon, their neglect in this instance would immediately create a danger which would oblige me to evacuate the country under the instructions which I had received.

In respect to the military operations, His Majesty's government are best aware whether they have been conducted in a manner satisfactory to them or not. About a year has now elapsed since the army under my command has been the only force which could keep the field in the Peninsula; and, contrary to the general expectation, it is still in the field, has sustained no important loss, and the successful result of this campaign to the enemy becomes every day more doubtful.

The Portuguese Regency may be right in their notion of an offensive operation, and I may be wrong in the calculations which have induced me to prefer the defensive system which I have pursued; but I am very certain that the General and other officers of the British army, at least, of the two prefer that which I have adopted, and, if some of them held the command, the army would long ere now have been in their transports.

In respect to an offensive operation in Spain, I have only to observe that if I have mistaken the strength of the several French

corps now opposed to me (which is scarcely possible, as I have their returns to the middle of July, and I believe that the Regency have neither information nor fixed plan of any kind), I think I may infer, from the general conduct of the French, that they will not allow their army to be for any length of time inferior to their enemy, and that the result of this advance, if it could be attempted, would be the abandonment of their projects in Andalusia. This would not give the Allies any corresponding increase of force, unless the Spanish Regency could, in an instant, raise, form, arm, and equip an army. It could not be supposed, even by the Portuguese Regency, that the army which is now blockaded at Cadiz by a part of the enemy's force in Andalusia would be equal to the whole of that force when they should be in the field. The offensive operation, therefore, and the movement into Spain (supposing this last to be allowed by the instructions of His Majesty's government), whatever might be their commencement, must end in defeat and disgrace, and in the destruction of the cause of the Allies in the Peninsula.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Enxara dos Cavalleiros, 15th Oct., 1810. [369.]*

2. General officers who have detained orderly dragoons without the express permission of the Commander of the Forces, and who are not entitled to them, are desired to send them forthwith to Mafra, to join the head quarters of their regiment.

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Pero Negro, 17th Oct., 1810. [370.]*

1. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the General officers of the army to the orders which have been often issued relative to the detention and use of dragoons as orderlies.

2. If circumstances require that any General officer should use dragoons to keep up a communication, he will apply for a party for that purpose, which must be sent back as soon as the purpose for which it was applied for is accomplished, and the dragoons must not be used as orderlies contrary to orders, on any account.

3. The Commander of the Forces is convinced that General

officers will see the necessity of attending to this order, for the purpose of keeping the cavalry in a state of efficiency.

4. All General and Staff officers who have dragoons with them are requested to send a return of their names, their troops, and the regiments to which they belong, to the Assistant-Adjutant-General of the cavalry at Mafra.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, Downing Street, 17th Oct., 1810.

I congratulate you most sincerely on your success in the late attack, which reflects the highest credit both on yourself and on the army under your command. I am most happy in being able to acquaint you that the King has agreed to confer the Order of the Bath on General Beresford. He has certainly well deserved such an honour, and conferring it at such a moment may produce a most favourable impression in Portugal.

I trust all your reinforcements will have arrived with the exception of the 4th regiment, which has been detained in consequence of the ships of war being prevented by contrary winds from getting round to Harwich, and the regiment having been in such a condition till very lately as made it desirable not to expose them to a long march before their embarkation. The ships of war I have no doubt, however, will reach Harwich to-day, and I trust the regiment will be with you soon after this letter.

I have directed a very strong and efficient regiment of light dragoons to assemble in the western district, in order that they may be sent to Portugal with as little delay as possible, as soon as wanted. As I know, however, that the greater part of Portugal is not a cavalry country, and that you have at some periods of the year difficulties in finding forage for your horses, I am unwilling to embark them till I hear from you that they are wanted; but whenever I receive an intimation to this effect, they shall be marched to the coast.

We are, as you may suppose, in most anxious expectation of further accounts; and I shall be very desirous of learning from you *privately* and fully, as soon as you can explain the future prospects which the new aspect of affairs may open to you. I say *privately*, because you may rely upon not being committed by anything you may write in that manner, and the habit of publishing military despatches for Parliament ought to make officers indeed very cautious in what they write officially. I can assure you that I never saw the King more entirely satisfied than he has been with the late operations of the army. Poor man, he is at present in a state of great anxiety and distress from the situation of Princess Amelia, who is still alive, but I fear without hopes of recovery.

I saw Lady Wellington and your children two days ago. They were all very well. The boys are very much grown, and appear advancing as rapidly as any children I have ever known of the same age.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

To the Earl of Liverpool. [371.*]

My dear Lord, Pero Negro, 19th Oct., 1810.

As it is possible that the army may be obliged to make marches during the winter, on which there will be a great consumption of shoes, I take the liberty of recommending to your Lordship to order to Lisbon, without loss of time, 100,000 pairs of soldiers' shoes of the best quality; and that orders should continue to be given for the manufacture of them.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

My dear Arthur, Isla de Leon, 22nd Oct., 1810.

I have received your letters up to the 7th of October,* but have had no opportunity of writing to you since the 6th. I wish you joy with all my heart of your victory at Busaco, and I hope it is only the prelude to further successes. The official intelligence of it did not reach us till the 17th, and on the 19th we had a grand feu de joie from the Spanish and British troops. O'Lalor is to be promoted, and I wish you would find out from Alava what he wishes, as when he was here he declined being a brigadier.

If Masséna should be forced to retreat, I apprehend that the siege of this place must be raised, and that Sebastiani must retreat likewise; and it appears to me to be very desirable that we should know your sentiments as to what should be done in these cases. I suppose we have in all (including British and Portuguese) about 20,000 men here, and Roche says that Blake (including cavalry) has from 16,000 to 20,000. Add to this the force under General Abadia and the assistance which might be afforded from Gibraltar, and it would in the whole form a considerable army. No plan of operations, however, has been formed in case of the retreat of the French, and Castaños' mind is at present so much engrossed by the probability of the Regency being turned out, that it would be useless to talk to him upon any other subject.

There is no probability of the Carlotta being appointed Regent, and I have already apprised you of the departure of the Duke of Orleans, which puts an end to all intrigue on the part of the Sicilian family. They must, therefore, choose a Regency from among the Spaniards, and this is a point of no small difficulty. They are determined not to allow any of the members of the present Regency to continue in power. I have done what I could to save Castaños, but fear I shall not succeed. The rest are not worth saving. They are determined likewise not to appoint any one who signed the Constitutional Act at Bayonne, and this restriction excludes almost all the grandees of Spain who are not in the interest of the French. The only military men of any character are O'Donnell, Blake, and Romana.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. vi., p. 496.

These are occasionally talked of, and I think it not unlikely that one of them may be finally chosen.

They have lately decreed the liberty of the press under certain restrictions, and they are every day employed for some hours in deliberating upon the restrictions which will be necessary. They have likewise come to a resolution with regard to South America, a copy of which is enclosed.

I enclose a paper of intelligence which has been given to me by Bardaxi, and which he assures me may be depended upon as authentic. It is written from Port St. Mary's.

Two thousand barrels of flour are to be sent from hence to Lisbon immediately by the British Commissary.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. Wellesley.

The news of the battle at Busaco was received at Cadiz with the greatest joy.

I have this moment received a note from Bardaxi, stating "that he has received intelligence that on the 27th of September the Marquis of Campo Verde destroyed a French corps of 2000 men in the Puycerda, on the line of the frontier of France. He took all their artillery, baggage, and a prodigious quantity of cattle. It appears from his letter to O'Donnell that he intended to advance with the whole of his division."

O'Donnell's wound was better.

This is a translation of Bardaxi's note.

[Enclosure.]

Don Eusebio de Bardaxi y Ayara to the British Minister.

Sir, Isla de Leon, 18th Oct., 1810.

The Council of Regency has received with the greatest satisfaction the details contained in the copy of the despatch of Lord Wellington, which you were pleased to transmit to me for the information of the Regency yesterday. I am commanded, Sir, to return you most sincere thanks for your polite attention, and I am charged at the same time to manifest to you, in their name, the singular satisfaction which they have experienced from the news of this signal victory which the English and Portuguese army obtained on the 27th of September at Busaco, over the French commanded by Masséna. The Council of Regency sincerely congratulates Lord Wellington upon so glorious a triumph, which it considers as a presage of many others still greater, whose consequences cannot but contribute most powerfully to the salvation of the Peninsula.

The Council of Regency likewise wishes that you would have the goodness to transmit these sincere expressions of their esteem and admiration to Lord Wellington, and that you, Sir, will be pleased to accept their congratulations as a person so particularly interested in the glory of that consummate General.

I am, &c.,

Eusebio de Bardaxi y Ayara.

G. O. Pero Negro, 23rd Oct., 1810. [372.]

1. The Commander of the Forces has observed with the greatest concern the large number of men returned by the several regiments as sick in general hospital, compared with the returns received from the medical officers of the number of men actually on their books in the hospitals.

2. The former, at present, is more than double the latter, and it must be owing to some existing abuse.

3. The Commander of the Forces has besides been informed by many officers commanding regiments and brigades in the army, that there are many non-commissioned officers and soldiers walking about the streets in Belem and Lisbon, quite recovered, while others are doing the duty of these men before the enemy in the field.

4. In order to put a stop to these abuses, the Commander of the Forces desires that the following regulations may be attended to.

5. He repeats the orders which have been so frequently issued, that no officer in the medical department shall have any soldier from the ranks as his servant or bât man, or to attend upon him in any manner, and declares his determination to bring before a General Court Martial any officer of the medical department who shall make use of a non-commissioned officer or soldier in any menial capacity whatever, or as a clerk, store keeper, ward master, or orderly, except under the following regulations.

6. A Board to assemble at Lisbon to-morrow, to consist of Colonel Peacocke, the Inspector General of Hospitals, and Captain M'Kenzie, Assistant-Quartermaster-General, to consider of and decide upon the number of clerks, store keepers, ward masters, and orderlies from the ranks, required to attend upon the sick.

7. In considering these points, the Board will advert to the facility of obtaining the service of Portuguese clerks, store keepers, &c. at Lisbon, and they will send the return for the inspection and approbation of the Commander of the Forces.

They will also advert to the necessity that the officers of the medical department should themselves attend the wards of the hospitals, and not have non-commissioned officers as ward masters, at a period when the whole army are left at their post

day and night. The Commander of the Forces must insist upon the officers of the medical department being at all times in the wards of the hospitals.

8. When the necessary number of attendants in the hospital shall be fixed, Colonel Peacocke will fix upon the names of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the several regiments who are to be attendants in the hospital, and he will send lists of their names to the several regiments.

9. Colonel Peacocke is requested occasionally to inquire respecting the number of sick and wounded in the hospital at Lisbon, and to augment or diminish the number of attendants according to the number of sick, and according to the degree of assistance which can be procured by the employment of Portuguese attendants, reporting such increase or diminution to the Commander of the Forces, and sending lists of names of non-commissioned officers to be so employed, or dismissed from employment, to the several regiments.

10. All men thus dismissed from employment in the hospitals, either now or at any future period, are to be sent by the first opportunity to their regiments, and the Commander of the Forces positively forbids that any non-commissioned officer or soldier shall be employed as an attendant, at the hospitals at Lisbon or Belem, without the order of Colonel Peacocke, in his orderly book.

11. Non-commissioned officers and soldiers employed as attendants in the hospitals are not on any account, at any time, to quit the square of the building in which the hospital is.

12. The soldiers when discharged from the hospital are to be sent to the convalescent barracks at Belem, and it is to be understood by their officers and them that they are not sent there for their amusement, but that they may recover their health entirely, and return to their duty with the army. There appears therefore no occasion for their being in the streets and public houses at all hours of the day and night, but they ought to be made to lead a sober and regular life.

13. The Commander of the Forces therefore desires that no non-commissioned officer or soldier in the convalescent barracks at Belem may be suffered to go out of the barrack yard at any time excepting on duty in charge of an officer or non-commissioned officer.

14. The Commander of the Forces refers the Commandant

of the depôt at Belem to the General Orders of the 17th June, 1809.

15. He likewise desires that non-commissioned officers and soldiers convalescent in the depôt at Belem may not have a ration of wine, unless the surgeon who attended them while in hospital should recommend that they should have it for their more early recovery.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, London, 24th Oct., 1810.

It has occurred here that in the event of *complete* success against Masséna, the question may arise how far it would be expedient or practicable to detach a considerable part of your force for the purpose of raising the siege of Cadiz; and I think it right to apprise you that you will be considered as fully warranted by your instructions in undertaking such an operation under such circumstances, if it shall appear to you to be safe and prudent to embark in it.

In making this communication, I am far from intimating any opinion as to the expediency of such a measure. It may be an operation in itself full of difficulty, or there may be many other ways of applying the force under your command which may be likely to prove far more beneficial to the common cause; but I have thought that no inconvenience could arise from bringing this object under your consideration at the present moment, and at the same time that you might be glad to know how far the operation might be considered at home as within the true spirit of your instructions, if upon military grounds you were disposed to engage in it.

Believe me to be, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

G. O. Pero Negro, 26th Oct., 1810. [373.]

1. The Commander of the Forces has directed the Commissary-General to supply the troops with a certain quantity of rice till further orders. The quantity supplied will be 1 lb. among 8 men, which is to be boiled up with their meat.

2. Commanding officers of regiments will make requisitions upon the Assistant-Commissaries attached to brigades for this rice, as soon as the latter shall be enabled to supply it.

3. In order to keep up the supply of cattle, the Commander of the Forces has likewise given orders that the troops shall be supplied for the present with salt meat on two days in each week.

4. The Commanding officers of regiments will settle with the commissaries the days on which they are to receive fresh, and those on which they are to receive salt meat.

WELLINGTON.

[374.] *To the Marques de la Romana.*

Pero Negro, ce 29 Oct., 1810,
10 A.M.

MON CHER MONSIEUR LE MARQUIS,

Je n'ai eu occasion de lire la lettre que vous avez envoyée hier au soir au Colonel Alava que depuis que je suis rentré; et je suis vraiment bien fâché que Don Francisco Juan croye qu'on n'a pas bon opinion de son bataillon, et qu'il n'est pas traité comme les autres troupes.

Le détachement de ce bataillon avec la cavalerie n'est pas mon ouvrage; il a été envoyé sur la demande du Général O'Donnell pour lui faire plaisir. J'aurois voulu que les troupes Espagnolles fussent en corps pendant quelques jours pour leur donner du repos, des habits et des autres équipemens qu'il leur faut, et pour qu'ils entendent la manière dont tous les troupes ici reçoivent leurs provisions. En tout cas il me parait à présent fort à désirer que ce bataillon soit rappelé auprès de votre quartier-général, et je vous prie de me faire savoir si vous y consentez.

Je vous envois la copie du rapport de l'officier d'hussards sur l'affaire du 27 au soir, mais il me parait fort à désirer de n'en dire plus rien.

Croyez moi, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD, Real Isla de Leon, Oct. , 1810.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs called upon me a few days ago, having been deputed by the Council of Regency to apprise me that in consequence of the interference of the Cortes with the executive power, and the repeated messages which had been sent by that assembly to the Council of Regency, demanding their motives for certain measures which they had decreed advisable, the Regency had sent a letter to the Cortes desiring to resign the government. Finding, however, in the course of my conversation with Mr. de Bardaxi, that this letter, though prepared, had not actually been sent,

I expressed my opinion that if the Regents were determined upon their resignations, it would be better that they should in the first instance state with temper and firmness the grounds of complaint which they had against the Cortes, and conclude by saying that, unless they could be so far confided in as not to be required to state their motives for every measure which, however necessary, might be made a subject of complaint against them by interested individuals, they felt it impossible to conduct the government with any hope of advantage to the public, and therefore begged to deliver it into the hands of the Cortes.

Mr. de Bardaxi approved of this suggestion, and, I believe, submitted it to the Regency. It had not, however, the desired effect, as the letter was sent to the Cortes in its original form. A secret meeting of the Cortes was held upon it, in which it was resolved that a message should be sent to the Regency, requiring them to continue in the exercise of the executive power for the present in order that the Cortes might have leisure to deliberate upon the measures which would be necessary in consequence of their letter.

The present government is, however, becoming hourly more unpopular, and it seems to be the general opinion that it will be removed without delay.

I shall avail myself of this occasion to state the principles which have regulated my conduct in the various projects which have been in contemplation for the formation of a government in Spain.

Before the meeting of the Cortes there appeared to be three distinct parties forming among the deputies in support of individuals having pretensions to the government: one in favour of the Duke of Orleans, another in that of the Princess of Brazil, and a third (though a very inconsiderable one) in support of General Cuesta.

The firmness of Mr. Capmany, which led to the resolution of the Cortes for the departure of the Duke of Orleans from Spain, at once crushed the hopes of the supporters of His Highness's pretensions to the government, which were more numerous than I had at first supposed.

The party of the Princess of Brazil was certainly, however, the most powerful.

In a former despatch I stated to your Lordship my motives for intimating to the Portuguese Minister the objections I felt to the measures he was at that time actively pursuing for the purpose of procuring her appointment to be Regent of Spain. I thought that whatever the sentiments of His Majesty's government might be as to the union of the two Crowns in the event of the final evacuation of the Peninsula by the French, there could be but one opinion with respect to the importance of keeping them separate as long as His Majesty's forces should be engaged in this contest. The experience of every hour affords the most satisfactory testimony to the advantages resulting from the influence possessed by His Majesty in Portugal, and from the resources of that kingdom being exclusively directed to the formation and discipline of a powerful army, under the sole direction and command of the Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Forces in the Peninsula. But if the Princess of Brazil were to be placed at the head of affairs in Spain, such a measure would necessarily place at her disposal a large portion of the resources of Portugal. It would also give rise to per-

petual disputes between the Spanish government and the Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Forces. The expedient of fixing the residence of the Princess of the Brazils in Madeira will, I apprehend, rather tend to increase the evils of her nomination to the Regency, since it would then be necessary to have a government here acting under her authority, and subject to her control, the least of the inconveniences attending which would be the necessity of perpetual references to Madeira, and the consequent loss of valuable time by the endless delays such references would occasion.

I have therefore, as far as I could with propriety, not only objected to the interference of the Portuguese Minister, but also endeavoured to impress upon the minds of those deputies with whom I occasionally converse the evils which will ensue from placing the Princess at the head of affairs under the present circumstances of Spain; and I have reason to believe that the idea of electing her Regent is, in a great measure, abandoned, at least I am certain that her party in the Cortes is considerably weakened.

The proceedings of the Cortes with respect to the Duke of Orleans have, amongst other advantages, been attended with this good effect, that they have put an end to all possibility of a similar intrigue on the part either of the French Princes, or of the reigning family in Sicily.

It may perhaps appear extraordinary that after my repeated expressions of regret at the want of energy and activity in the present members of the Regency, I should, in my conversation with Mr. de Bardaxi relative to their sending in their resignations, have suggested anything calculated to prolong their continuance in power; but such is the extreme difficulty of supplying their places, that if the appointment of a new government were to be left to me, I should feel great embarrassment upon whom to fix my choice.

This difficulty is equally felt by the Deputies; and if they were even disposed to listen to my suggestions in the formation of a government, and that government were not to fulfil their expectations, much discredit would necessarily attach to me. For these reasons I thought it advisable not to betray too much interest upon this point, satisfied that the evils I endeavoured to guard against at the first meeting of the Cortes were no longer to be apprehended.

Having learnt, however, that the Cortes, under a determination at all events to get rid of the present members of the Regency, had turned their views to persons without either rank, character, or influence in the country, I ventured to intimate to some of the deputies how much the character of the Cortes would be likely to suffer not only in the public estimation in Spain, but in England, and on the continent of Europe, by such a selection.

In a conversation with Mr. Arguelles I endeavoured to make him feel the necessity of attending a litttle more to the impression which their proceedings would make upon the rest of Europe. I observed to him that if any of their decrees were at all calculated to give an idea that there was a democratical spirit in the assembly, the appointment to the government of persons of obscure birth, and who, in the course of this contest, had done nothing to distinguish themselves, would tend much to strengthen and confirm that idea. I ventured so far as to say that a government so composed would not be well thought of in England; and that there, as well as

in the rest of Europe, it would certainly give rise to a suspicion that the principles of loyalty and attachment to their Sovereign, for which the people of Spain had been so eminently distinguished during the course of this contest, were very much weakened, since the respectability of the representatives of the Sovereign was no longer considered of any importance.

Mr. Arguelles said, in reply, that whatever might be the opinions in Europe with respect to the proceedings of the Cortes, I might be assured that neither he nor the friends with whom he acted entertained any such sentiments as those I appeared to apprehend; that they were, on the contrary, impressed with a firm and unalterable conviction that the salvation of Spain depended upon the preservation of the monarchy, and that he was persuaded no feeling of a contrary tendency prevailed in the assembly: that, with regard to the choice of a government, it had been a subject which had long engaged the attention of himself and his friends; that they had been anxious it should be composed of grandees or people of the first rank of Spain, but that in looking at the list of those who were not actually in the interest of Joseph Bonaparte, there was scarcely one who had not signed the Constitutional Act at Bayonne, and who had not accepted office under the usurper. He said that, whatever their subsequent conduct might have been, there were transactions which were indelibly impressed upon the minds of the people, the proof of which was, that out of the number of grandees and people of high birth, possessing large properties in almost all the provinces in Spain, not more than two had been returned to the Cortes; that their education besides incapacitated them from being placed at the head of the government in times like the present. With regard to persons of military reputation, or others who had distinguished themselves in the course of this war, he said that their attention was still turned towards forming a government of such persons; that they hoped to accomplish it; but that, if they were not successful, and that the government were not at last composed exactly in the manner which met my ideas, he entreated that I would attribute it to the circumstances and difficulties of the times, and not to the prevalence of any opinions of the nature to which I had alluded at the beginning of our conversation. I was particularly anxious to ascertain the sentiments of Mr. Arguelles, because he is certainly the ablest man in the Cortes, and is supposed (I believe very unjustly) to be at the head of a democratical party in that assembly. In the course of my conversations with some other Deputies, I have, with a view of keeping Mr. de Castaños in power, suggested the possibility of retaining the best of those of whom the present government is composed. I have also represented the Duke of Infantado as a person who has nothing against him but having under circumstances of peculiar difficulty signed the Constitutional Act at Bayonne, observing that that transaction ought to be forgotten in his subsequent conduct, which certainly places him among the most zealous and distinguished supporters of the Spanish cause. I cannot say, however, that the names of Mr. de Castaños and the Duke of Infantado have been favourably received, though I understand that the latter, among many others, has been mentioned to the Cortes for the situation of Regent. At one of their secret

meetings upon this subject I am informed that the Cortes came to the following resolutions :—

1st. That no person shall be appointed to the Regency who was not a subject of the King of Spain, and born a Spaniard on the side of the father and of the mother.

2ndly. That no person shall be appointed to the Regency who has signed the Constitutional Act at Bayonne, or whose character was not entirely free from suspicion.

An adherence to the first part of the second resolution would, of course, exclude the Duke of Infantado. I understand it likewise to be the determination of the Cortes not to appoint any person who was a member of the Central Junta : but however good the intentions with which these resolutions may have been proposed and passed, they are certainly attended with this bad effect, that they exclude from employment in public affairs some of the ablest, most distinguished, and most respectable men in Spain.

I have said nothing of General Cuesta's party, as it was so inconsiderable that all idea of bringing him forward was soon abandoned. Indeed he is in so infirm a state of health as to be utterly incapable of any public employment.

I have, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Isla de Leon, 1st Nov., 1810.

The government has at length been changed. The Cortes, after a discussion which lasted more than twenty-four hours, have elected General Blake, Don Gabriel Ciscar, and Don Pedro Agar. The two last are in the naval service, and are said to be men of considerable talents. Agar, however, was elected on account of his connection with South America, and of the influence which he possesses there. Besides these, two provisional deputies were elected: the Marques of Castellon, a grandee of Spain; and Don José Puig, a counsellor of state. I enclose the decrees by which they were elected.

Upon the whole, the appointment of the new Regents seems to have given satisfaction; not that I think they are at all better than their predecessors, but perhaps they may act with more decision and firmness from finding that they are the immediate choice of the Cortes, and are certain of their unqualified support.

Several other persons were proposed, such as the Duke of Montemar, the Duke of Infantado, and the Marques of Romana. Infantado was objected to on account of his having signed the Constitutional Act at Bayonne, and Romana because he was a member of the Central Junta. Romana's conduct in Denmark, as well as his opposition to the measures of the Central Junta, were pleaded in his favour, and with some success, until other members of the Central Junta were proposed, when it was resolved to exclude them all.

The sessions were secret; but there appears to have been nothing like a democratical spirit in the discussions which took place previous to the appointment of the new government. The pretensions of such of the grandees as were proposed were fairly discussed and examined, and the choice was very near falling upon the Duke de Montemar, who is one of the very few persons of high rank in Spain who had not sworn allegiance to Joseph Bonaparte, or who was not excluded by the rules laid down by the Cortes for their proceedings in choosing a government. There is a strong party in favour of placing the Cardinal de Bourbon at the head of the government, and I do not think this idea is as yet abandoned. Those who know his character must be convinced that this can only be with a view of keeping alive the memory of Ferdinand by placing one of his own family at the head of affairs.

I am very anxious to convince you that we are not *Jacobins*, and I send you a copy of my despatch written previous to the change in the government.

I wish if you have any arms you would send them here, as they are much wanted in Catalonia, Arragon, and Murcia. Great coats are likewise wanting in Catalonia: in short, clothing of every description is required for the whole of the Spanish army. I have written upon this subject to England, and have sent a list of their wants.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

You will probably hear from other quarters of a fever having broken out at Cadiz, which I hear has every symptom of the yellow fever. The number of deaths on the 31st of October was 52, and the whole number from the 25th to the 31st 271. Sir James Fellowes attributes the increase in the number of deaths to the cold weather, which he thinks will put an end to the disease, although it has hastened the deaths of many who have long been ill. Every precaution has been taken to prevent its getting among the troops.

G. O. Pero Negro, 3rd Nov., 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces desires the Commanding officer of the depôt at Belem may be ordered to warn Lieutenant ——— of the —— of the necessity of attending more particularly to his duty when he shall march with a detachment of convalescents in future. The excuses he has made for bringing up 29 men out of 41 placed under his command are frivolous, and by his own account many of the men said to be unable to march have since joined the army under another officer.

2. The Commanding officer of the depôt at Belem will

report if Lieutenant ——— had a copy of the orders of 24th June, 1809, relative to the march of detachments.

WELLINGTON.

[376.] *To the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, Pero Negro, 3rd Nov., 1810.

I have not observed any alteration in the enemy's position or numbers since I addressed you on the 27th ult.*

They have a considerable body of troops, principally cavalry, on the Tagus, between Punhete and Santarem; and I have reason to believe that Loison's division of infantry had not marched in that direction, as I reported to your Lordship they had in my last despatch; some of the corps composing that division have certainly remained in the camps in front of this army. The enemy have pushed some troops across the Zezere above Punhete, principally cavalry, apparently to reconnaitre the roads in that direction and the fort at Abrantes; but I conclude that the rains which have fallen within these few days will have swelled that river, and that these troops will have retired again.

They are still reported to be at work upon materials for a bridge both at Santarem and Barquinha; but I have detached Major-General Fane with a body of cavalry and infantry to the left of the Tagus, from whom I hope to receive accurate accounts of what is passing opposite to him on this side; and he will endeavour to destroy these materials if it should be practicable.

It is reported by all the deserters that the enemy's troops continue to suffer great distress from the want of provisions. It is impossible to form an estimate of the quantity of provisions which they found in the villages on the ground which they occupy; but it is certain that they can draw none from any other part of the country, the whole being in the possession of our troops.

The garrison of Peniche, and the garrison of Obidos, which place Captain Fenwick of the Portuguese service has lately occupied, under the direction of Brigadier-General Blunt, and the British cavalry, continue to carry on a destructive warfare,

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. vi., pp. 543-555.

in the rear of the enemy's right, while the high road from Coimbra by Leiria is in the possession of Colonel Wilson's detachment. I enclose a letter from Marshal Beresford on the effects of the operations of Brigadier-General Blunt and Captain Fenwick.

I have received no letter from General Silveira of a later date than the 19th Oct. He had not, at that time, heard of the march of any of the enemy's troops in Castille. He occupied with his detachment the roads from Almeida to Trancoso, Celorico, and Guarda. He had heard that General Bonet had evacuated the Asturias, and, it is supposed, had moved into Biscay.

I have letters from Estremadura and Castro-marin of as late a date as the 27th Oct., stating that Mortier's corps was still at Seville in a very inefficient state, and having many sick.

My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 22nd ult.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Pero Negro, 4th Nov., 1810. [377.]

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to hear that some officers of the army have forgotten their own situation so far as to threaten the serjeant postmaster at Lisbon.

2. It is to be understood that the serjeant postmaster at Lisbon is not obliged to send letters from the office to any body excepting the Commandant, the Assistant-Adjutant-General, and the Assistant-Quartermaster-General, and officer commanding the depôt. The other officers at Lisbon must send to him for their letters after the bags are duly sorted, and not before; and Colonel Peacocke is requested to protect the postmaster from the violence or impatience of any individual.

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Pero Negro, 5th Nov., 1810. [378.]

1. The Commander of the Forces desires that when paymasters or quartermasters, or other officers of regiments are sent to Lisbon on duty, they may not take detachments of non-commissioned officers and soldiers with them.

2. The depôt at Belem will always furnish the men which

are required for any fatigue duty which they may require to be performed.

3. Officers and others allowed servants, who proceed to Lisbon on duty, or on account of their health, if allowed to take with them their servants, should not be allowed to retain those soldiers who are able to do their duty. There are at Belem men belonging to every regiment in the army not fit to do their duty in the field, who should be employed as servants to officers and others who, on account of duty or health, are obliged to remain at Lisbon or Belem.

4. When any officer proceeds to Lisbon with a detachment, or with only one soldier as his servant, he must make a nominal return of the detachment, or send the soldier's name to the officer commanding the depôt of convalescents at Belem.

WELLINGTON.

[379.] G. O. Pero Negro, 10th Nov., 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to have received reports from some of the regiments of the desertion of British soldiers to the enemy; a crime which, in all his experience in the British service, in different parts of the world, was till lately unknown in it; and the existence of which, at the present moment, he can attribute only to some false hopes held out to these unfortunate criminal persons.

The British soldiers cannot but be aware of the difference between their situation and that of the enemy opposed to them; and the miserable tale told by the half-starved wretches whom they see daily coming into their lines ought alone, exclusive of their sense of honour and patriotism, to be sufficient to deter them from participating their miserable fate. However, although the Commander of the Forces laments the fate of the unfortunate soldiers who have committed this crime, he is determined that they shall feel the consequence of it during their lives, and that they shall never return to their friends or their homes. He accordingly requests that the Commanding officers of regiments from which any soldier has deserted to the enemy will as soon as possible send to the Adjutant-General's office a description of his person, together with an account when he was enlisted with the regiment, where born, and to what parish he belongs, in order that the friends of these soldiers

may be made acquainted with the crime which they have committed, may be prepared to consider them as lost for ever, and may deliver them up to justice in case they should ever return to their native country.

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool. [380.]

MY LORD, Pero Negro, 10th Nov., 1810.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th ult. with its enclosures respecting the ships of war which are sent from Lisbon for money, and I beg leave to transmit a letter I have received from Admiral Berkeley on the subject.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Major-Gen. Picton to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Cadaceira, 10th Nov., 1810.

In consequence of an extraordinary report* which has been circulated with a good deal of assiduity, it becomes necessary that I should make a written detailed report to your Lordship of the circumstances which preceded and attended the action which took place upon the heights of Busaco on the morning of the 27th September, inasmuch as they relate to myself and the troops I had the honour of commanding on that occasion.

Major-General Lightburne, with the 5th and 83rd regiments, was detached to the left, and did not act under my orders.

On the evening of the 25th, by orders from your Lordship, I occupied that part of the Serra do Busaco which is immediately connected with the pass of St. Antonio de Cantaro with Colonel Mackinnon's brigade, consisting of the 45th, 74th, and 88th regiments, amounting to about 1300 rank and file, and with the 9th and 21st regiments of Portuguese infantry under Colonel de Champelmond: upon the whole about 3000 men.

All the movements of the enemy during the 26th indicating a determination of attacking the position early on the following morning, I made what dispositions I judged necessary for the defence of the post that evening; and there being an unoccupied space of considerably above a mile between my left and the right of Sir Brent Spencer's division, immediately after sunset, when it could not be observed by the enemy, I detached Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace with the 88th regiment to take up an intermediate position

* See "Memoirs of Lieut.-General Sir T. Picton," by H. B. Robinson, Esq. Vol. i., pp. 331—340.

and communicate with the hill of Busaco and the main body of my division at the pass of St. Antonio.

The troops in the immediate neighbourhood of the pass were visited by me on their respective posts before daybreak, and immediately after Colonel Mackinnon returned from visiting the 88th regiment and reported that the enemy was collecting in the ravine opposite the position occupied by that regiment, in consequence of which I immediately detached Major Gwynne, of the 45th regiment, with four companies to reinforce that post.

A few minutes after, when the day began to clear up, a smart firing of musketry was heard on the left, apparently proceeding from the point where the 88th had been stationed; and after a short suspense a violent cannonade opened upon the pass of St. Antonio, and at the same time a heavy column compelled the advanced pickets of the division to fall back, and, pressing forward with great impetuosity, endeavoured to push up the road and force the pass. The light corps of the division, unable to resist such a superiority of numbers in front, was most judiciously thrown in upon the flank of the advancing column by Lieutenant-Colonel Williams; and it was received with so steady and well-directed a fire by the 21st Portuguese regiment of the line and three companies of the 74th that moved up to their support on the left, that after a long struggle and repeated desperate attempts to effect their object (during which they suffered much from the well-directed fire of the Portuguese artillery under Major Arentschildt), they were ultimately under the necessity of desisting, though a severe firing of cannon and musketry still continued.

About this period the fire of musketry on the left appearing to increase and draw nearer, I directed Colonel Mackinnon to take the immediate command of the troops at the pass of St. Antonio, and rode towards the left, with the Assistant Adjutant-General, Major Pakenham, leaving my aide-de-camp, Captain Cuthbert, and the Assistant Quartermaster-General, Captain Anderdon, to bring up as fast as possible one battalion of the 8th Portuguese regiment, and the five remaining companies of the 45th regiment.

On reaching the high rocky point about half-way between the pass of St. Antonio and the hill of Busaco, I found the light companies of the 74th and 88th regiments retiring in disorder, and the head of the enemy's column, already in possession of the strong rocky point, deliberately firing down upon us, and the remainder of a large column pushing up the hill with great rapidity. Whilst endeavouring to rally the light infantry companies with the assistance of Major Pakenham, I was joined by Major Smith of the 45th regiment; and we succeeded in forming them under the immediate fire of the enemy, not more than 60 yards distant. Major Smith most gallantly led them to the charge, and gained possession of the rock, driving the enemy before him; but, I am concerned to say, fell in the moment of victory, for which we were chiefly indebted to his animating example.

The Assistant Quartermaster-General having fortunately brought up a battalion of the 8th Portuguese regiment, commanded by Major Birmingham, at this critical period, I personally led and directed their attack on the flank of the enemy's column; and we completely succeeded in

driving them in great confusion and disorder down the hill and across the ravine.

Not being able to discover any enemy upon the ridge to my left, I immediately returned to the pass of St. Antonio, where the firing of musketry and cannon still continued with little apparent abatement. On my arrival I learned from Colonel Mackinnon that the enemy had not been able to make any impression during my absence.

At this moment Major-General Leith's aide-de-camp came to report the arrival of that General and his division, upon which I rode from the post of St. Antonio to the road of communication, and directed the leading regiment of the brigade to proceed without loss of time to the left, as I had no occasion for assistance. General Leith's brigade in consequence marched on, and arrived in time to join the five companies of the 45th regiment under the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Meade, and the 8th Portuguese regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas, in repulsing the last attempt of the enemy.

Your Lordship was pleased to mention me as directing the gallant charge of the 45th and 88th regiments; but I can claim no merit whatever in the executive part of that brilliant exploit which your Lordship has so highly and so justly extolled. Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace of the 88th, and Major Gwynne, who commanded the four companies of the 45th, and were, therefore, engaged on that occasion, are entitled to the whole of the merit, and I am not disposed to deprive them of any part. I was actively engaged at the time in repelling the attack upon the post with which I was principally charged, though I provided, as far as the means I had at my disposal would allow, for the safety of every part of the position within my reach; and the moment I could, with propriety and safety to the service, quit the principal point of my command, I immediately proceeded to the post where my services were most necessary, and was at all times to be found where His Majesty's service and my own honour required that I should be. I shall not say anything of the conduct of the troops under my command during the whole of the trying service of the day; it was beyond eulogy, and can receive no additional splendour from my feeble praise.

With many apologies for troubling your Lordship with such long details, in which I am necessarily so much concerned,

I have the honour to be, with high respect,
Your Lordship's very faithful humble servant,

THOS. PICTON, Major-General,
Commanding 3rd division.

Major-Gen. Leith to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Camp of Sobral, 10th Nov., 1810.

As your important duty as Commander-in-Chief rendered it impossible that you should have witnessed all the movements made in an extensive line, of which various parts were engaged with the enemy at the same time, and as I apprehend that the principal effort made by my corps in the action of Busaco could not have come under your Lordship's personal

observation, I submit to your consideration a report of the movements of the whole, and of the attack made on the enemy by part of the force under my command on the 27th of September.

The feeling which ought to have made me more delicate in touching on a subject where I happened to be personally concerned has been removed by your Lordship's having done me the honour already to mention my name in your public despatch. I have, therefore, no hesitation in fulfilling the gratifying duty of laying before you a report of the gallant and honourable manner in which those under my immediate command conducted themselves on one of the memorable occasions which mark your Lordship's military life.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your most faithful and obedient servant,

JAMES LEITH, Major-General.

Report of the Position and Movements of Major-General Leith's Corps, particularly of the British Brigade, during the Battle of Busaco, on the 27th of September, 1810.

At daybreak Major-General Leith's corps found itself posted as follows: the British brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Barnes; Royal, consisting of the 3rd batt. Royal, 1st batt. 9th, and 2nd batt. 38th regiments, were behind the ridge where the high roads from Gondolem and Carvalhos meet and cross the Serra do Busaco as one. At this point, and commanding the passage of the Serra, were placed four guns of the 6-pounder brigade of Portuguese artillery. In pursuance of directions received from Lord Wellington on the 26th, Brigadier-General Spry had moved from this point with his Portuguese brigade, consisting of the 3rd regiment, 2 battalions; the 15th, ditto ditto; and the Thomar militia: the 8th Portuguese regiment, 2 battalions, were likewise attached to him. They moved by their left till the leading regiment (the 8th) had nearly formed a junction with the right of Major-General Picton's division, posted to command near the high road leading across the Serra from St. Antonio de Cantaro. The two battalions of the Lusitanian Legion, under Colonel Baron Eben, were posted about half distance between the British brigade and Brigadier-General Spry. Two 6-pounders and 300 of the Lusitanian Legion, under Major Fearon, were posted in the redoubt of the chapel of N. S. de Monte Alto, on the right of the whole line.

The firing, which commenced towards the centre and left soon after daybreak, seemed to indicate a serious attack before 6 A.M.; that nearest on the left appeared principally directed against the position of St. Antonio de Cantaro, occupied by the 3rd division. Lord Wellington had generally directed, on taking up the position, that the divisions should, in case of necessity, mutually support each other: finding there was no attack on his right or front, Major-General Leith immediately put the brigades of his corps in motion by their left, the 6-pounder Portuguese artillery moving with the British brigade. During this movement Major-General Leith received a pencil note from Lord Wellington, which he communicated to Lieutenant-General Hill, directing that he should move to his left, to support Major-General Picton, unless Lieutenant-General Hill's position on his right, or his own front, were attacked; to which the Major-General replied that no attack was made or threatened, and that his corps had already been put in motion by its left for that purpose. Major-General Leith rode on to ascertain the nature of the attack, and arrived at a commanding part of the Serra, where some Portuguese guns were posted on Major-General Picton's right, and were

firing on the road which passes over the Serra from St. Antonio de Cantaro, near which the enemy were endeavouring to ascend. The ammunition of these guns being expended, and it being of much importance to have artillery at that point, Major-General Leith immediately ordered the 6-pounder brigade of his corps to be placed there as soon as possible, which was accordingly done. Brigadier-General Spry's brigade, and one battalion of the 8th Portuguese regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas, were in line in front of the rocky ridge near those guns, on both of which the enemy kept up a heavy cannonade, and succeeded in dismounting two of the guns, and wounding some officers and men. The 9th Portuguese regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sutton (belonging to Major-General Picton's division), was also in line there. The enemy, who was sometimes driven back and sometimes driving our troops, had, in conformity to his usual custom, a succession of columns to support the attack on Major-General Picton's position, and now appeared evidently to gain ground on the face of the Serra to the left of the road of St. Antonio de Cantaro: Major-General Leith accordingly directed a movement of succession, ordering Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas, with the right battalion 8th Portuguese regiment, to move by his left, to support the point attacked; he also ordered the 9th Portuguese regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sutton (belonging to Major-General Picton's division), to move to the support of General Picton's position; and Brigadier-General Spry's brigade was also ordered to move to its left, partly as a reserve and to support the Portuguese artillery under Major Arentschildt, near the road of St. Antonio de Cantaro. The enemy during this movement disengaged part of his leading column, and branched into two, the first continuing to its right, the head of the second pointing towards its left, and threatening the position on the right of the road from St. Antonio de Cantaro, which caused Brigadier-General Spry's brigade to be formed: this column, however, when the first column had succeeded, turned towards its right also, and followed the other, which was gaining the ascent of the Serra; the enemy was still advancing, and had every appearance of succeeding in forcing that part of Major-General Picton's position which is on the left of the road of St. Antonio de Cantaro, where several rocky eminences crown the ridge of the Serra. Major-General Leith, who had directed the British brigade and Lusitanian Legion to move by the road of communication in rear of and nearly parallel to the ridge of the Serra, till it should appear where their support might be most necessary, now ordered the Lusitanian Legion to remain in column behind that part of the ridge which concealed its movements and those of the British brigade from the view of the enemy, with its head resting so as to be ready to support, near the road, the Portuguese artillery under Major Arentschildt, and the 8th and 9th Portuguese regiments, which he had ordered (as before stated) to support the point attacked, and where the enemy were fast gaining ground, while Major-General Leith led the British brigade by the shortest line to where it was evident their support was become essentially necessary. The ground where the British brigade was now moving behind a chain of rocky eminences, where it had appeared clearly the enemy was successfully pushing to establish himself, precluded Major-General Leith from seeing at that moment the progress the enemy was making; but, by the information of staff-officers, stationed on purpose, who communicated his direction and progress, Major-General Leith moved the British brigade so as to endeavour to meet and check the enemy where he had gained the ascendency. At this time a heavy fire of musketry was kept up on the height, the smoke of which prevented a clear view of the state of things: when, however, the rock forming the high part of the Serra, where

Major-General Picton's division was originally, became visible, the enemy appeared in full possession of it, and a French officer was in the act of cheering, with his hat off, while a continued fire was kept up from thence and along the whole face of the slope of the Serra in a diagonal direction towards the bottom by the enemy (ascending rapidly from the successive columns formed for the attack) on a mass of soldiers of the left battalion of the 8th and 9th Portuguese regiments who, having been severely pressed, had given way, and were rapidly retiring in complete confusion and disorder. Major-General Leith, on that occasion, spoke to Major Birmingham (who was on foot, having had his horse killed), who stated that the fugitives were of the 9th as well as of the 8th regiment, and that he had ineffectually tried to check their retreat. Major-General Leith addressed and succeeded in stopping them, and they cheered, when he ordered them to be collected and formed in the rear; they were passing, as they retired, diagonally to the right of the 9th British regiment. The face of affairs in this quarter now wore a different aspect, for the enemy, who had been the assailant, having dispersed or driven everything there opposed to him; was in possession of the rocky eminence of the Serra at this part of Major-General Picton's position, without a shot being then fired at him. Not a moment was to be lost: Major-General Leith accordingly resolved instantly to attack the enemy with the bayonet; he therefore ordered the 9th British regiment, which had been hitherto moving rapidly by its left in column (in order to gain the most advantageous ground for checking the enemy), to form the line, which they did with the greatest promptitude, accuracy, and coolness, under the fire of the enemy, who had just appeared formed on that part of the rocky eminence which overlooks the back of the ridge, and who had then, for the first time, also perceived the British brigade under him. Major-General Leith had intended that the 38th regiment should have moved on in rear and to the left of the 9th regiment, to have turned the enemy beyond the rocky eminence, which was quite inaccessible towards the rear of the Serra, while the 9th should have gained the ridge on the right of the rocky height; the Royal to have been posted, as they were, in reserve; but the enemy, having driven everything before him in that quarter, afforded him the advantage of gaining the top of the rocky ridge, which is accessible in front, before it was possible for the British brigade to reach that position, although not a moment had been lost in marching to support the point attacked, and, for that purpose, it had made a rapid movement of more than two miles without halting, and frequently in double quick time: the 38th regiment were therefore directed to form also and support, when Major-General Leith had the honour to lead the 9th regiment to attack the enemy on the rocky ridge, which they did without firing a shot. That part which looks behind the Serra (as already stated) was inaccessible, and afforded the enemy the advantage of outflanking the 9th on the left as they advanced; but the order, celerity, and coolness with which they attacked, panic-struck the enemy, who immediately gave way on being charged with the bayonet, and the whole were driven down the face of the Serra in confusion and with immense loss, from a destructive fire which the 9th regiment opened on him as he fled with precipitation after the charge. The 38th regiment advanced with great coolness and spirit under a heavy fire to support the 9th while they were ascending to attack the enemy on the top of the rocky ridge, and, after the charge, they moved up on the right of the 9th and joined in the destructive pursuit of the enemy till the whole were ordered back, the action having entirely ceased after this, excepting a cannonade. The steadiness and accuracy with which the 9th regiment altered the direction of march, which, before they were engaged, was continually changing in order to form in the most advantageous manner for the attack of the enemy, the

quickness and precision with which they formed line under a heavy fire, their instantaneous and orderly charge, by which they drove the enemy, so much superior in numbers, from a formidable position, and the promptitude with which they obeyed Major-General Leith's order to cease firing, in his humble opinion was altogether conduct as distinguished as any regiment could have shown, and perhaps not the less worthy of notice that it is well known the attack was made by the flower of Regnier's corps, who had volunteered the service in which the enemy was then ultimately defeated. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnes, commanding the British brigade, with great zeal and gallantry accompanied the 9th regiment, which was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, who, notwithstanding his being extremely ill, exerted himself with the greatest gallantry in front during the charge, when his horse was killed under him; Lieutenant-Colonel Crauford, who had been on duty during the night with the pickets, by a zealous exertion arrived in time also to distinguish himself in front of his regiment. Lieutenant-Colonel Nugent, commanding, Major Loftus, and the 2nd battalion 88th regiment evinced the greatest coolness and spirit while they were engaged with the enemy; the 3rd battalion Royal, commanded by Major Gordon (an excellent officer), although they had not the good fortune to be actively engaged, showed great zeal, coolness, and order in crossing the fire of the enemy's cannon.

Major-General Leith cannot close this report without stating the zeal, activity, and gallantry of Major Berkeley, 35th regiment, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain Gomm, 9th regiment, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General; and Captains Hare, 23rd, and Sutton, 97th, who voluntarily assisted in the Adjutant and Quartermaster General's department, and Lieutenant Leith Hay, 29th regiment, his aide-de-camp: all these officers distinguished themselves on horseback in front of the 9th regiment during the charge; as did also Lieutenant Oliviera of the Lusitanian Legion, who was attached to Major-General Leith's corps.

JAMES LEITH, Major-General.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Isla de Leon, 10th Nov., 1810.

I have received your letters of the 4th,* together with a copy of your most interesting despatch to the Secretary of State, detailing your reasons for not attacking the French army, which appear to me to be quite conclusive.

On the subject of your other letter, you will already have heard from me of the change in the government; and I cannot help thinking that the government is better as it is now constituted than if the Princess of Brazils were at the head of it. Her pretensions, however, were discussed in the Cortes, and she had not more than one or two persons in her favour. I certainly stated my opinions with regard to the inexpediency of appointing her Regent, which I thought were in conformity to yours. I long ago asked for instructions upon this head; but the only intimation I had of the sentiments of the government at home was in a letter from Armstrong, in which he stated that Lord W. was, upon the whole, of opinion that it would be better that she should not be declared Regent, and that we ought to oppose it. This is certainly in conformity to my sentiments; but I doubt much whether my influence in the opposite scale would have been of any advantage to her.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. vi., p. 586.

I still continue to think that there is no democratical feeling in the Assembly; and if you could be present at two or three of their discussions, or could converse with those even who are most suspected of democratical principles, I am persuaded you would be of the same opinion. My only apprehension is that they have the same defects that belong to every institution, and indeed to every individual, I have seen in Spain, viz., that unconquerable habit of delay which ruins all their affairs.

I would advise the Marques de la Romana to acknowledge the Cortes, as I hear there was a motion made this morning to inquire of the Regency whether the Cortes had been recognised by his army.

I am happy to tell you that the fever at Cadiz is abated. There were only nineteen deaths the day before yesterday, and no fresh cases of yellow fever.

Tell Alava I will write to him soon, and hope to send him the news of his promotion.

Ever yours most affectionately,

H. WELLESLEY.

I will send the shawls to Lady Liverpool as soon as I can get them; but there are none here.

No news from O'Donnell or Blake.

[381.] G. O. Pero Negro, 12th Nov., 1810.

2. The Brunswick light infantry are to be attached to the Light division until further orders.

3. This corps is to detach one company to do duty with the light infantry of Colonel Pakenham's brigade, and two companies to do duty with the light infantry of Major-General Dunlop's and Brigadier-General Hay's brigades in the 5th division.

4. The Commander of the Forces refers the General officers commanding divisions and brigades to his orders on the formation and use of light infantry battalions in each brigade, and he desires that they may be strictly adhered to: he again recommends the detached companies of the 5th battalion 60th regt., and those now detached from the Brunswick light infantry, to their care and attention, and desires that these companies, when not in battalions with the light infantry companies of the regiment, in the manner and at the time pointed out in the General Orders, may be kept at the head quarters of the brigade.

5. Brigade-Major Olfermann, attached to Colonel Pakenham, is to be attached to the Light division until further orders.

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Alemquer, 16th Nov., 1810. [382.]

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that when any of the General officers quit their quarters, if only to take a ride, they will leave at home some person to receive, open, and carry into execution any orders that may be sent to them.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests the officers commanding regiments will be very cautious in occupying the quarters in which the French troops may have been quartered; to make their men clean them well out before they sleep in them; and, if possible, to have fires lighted in them; but care must be taken not to burn the houses. These precautions will be found to contribute much to preserve the health of the soldiers.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, London, 19th Nov., 1810.

Your despatches of the 20th and 27th of October, and those of the 3rd of November, have at last all arrived.* The letters of the 3rd instant were received on Friday last, those of the 27th yesterday, and those of the 20th by Sir Wyndham Dalling only this day. May I beg of you to direct duplicates to be regularly made in future of your despatches, as very great inconvenience may result from the arrival and circulation of private letters at a time when no information is received by government. This inconvenience occurred in some degree last week with respect to letters of the 20th and 27th of October, which were brought by the packet, without any despatches from you; the despatches of the same dates having been put on board ships of war. It is certainly very desirable that all despatches of importance should be sent home, if possible, by ships of war; but in those cases we very much wish you would send duplicates of them by the packet, as is uniformly done with respect to all public letters despatched from this country.

I am very much obliged to you for your private letter of the 27th ultimo. I am anxious to assure you that we are most fully and completely satisfied with all that you have done, and all that you are doing. With respect to the expediency of attacking Masséna, no proper judgment can be formed upon such a subject except by those who are near the scene of action. We wish you to be governed on this point entirely by your own discretion, and that you should neither abstain from attack, nor engage in it, in consequence of any opinions which may be supposed to be entertained in this country. If it were even possible (which it is not) to form a just opinion here on such a subject, the change of circumstances and succession of events would be very likely to render that opinion which might

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. vi., pp. 526-528, 543-555, 579-584.

have been good when it was formed, bad when it came to be acted upon. In short, you know our objects to be the defence of Portugal and the support of the cause of the Peninsula, as long as they are practicable; and I trust you feel that you possess the entire confidence of government with respect to the measures which it may be desirable to adopt for these purposes, whether they may be of a cautious or of a more enterprising character.

I have given directions that all the supplies required should be sent out with as little delay as possible. You will, I hope, have received before this time the 4th and 23rd regiments. With respect to the regiments from Sicily, the orders to Sir J. Stuart are *positive* with regard to them; but I am apprehensive that some difficulty may arise as to the means of sending them, in consequence of Admiral Berkeley having detained some of the troop-ships destined for this service in the Tagus: I wish, therefore, you would desire him to send to Sicily the troop-ships for 2500 men, if there is no prospect of their being wanted under the present circumstances at Lisbon. Arrangements are making in this country and in Ireland for a reinforcement of 3000 infantry for your army, in case you should think it necessary to call for them. I apprised you in a former letter that a regiment of dragoons was ready for embarkation, and might be sent now or early in the spring, as you may judge most advisable. If you require them at this time, I wish you would send home a proportion of the cavalry transports actually in the Tagus.

We have intelligence from Cadiz of the 4th instant: at that time there was no appearance of the French army withdrawing from before that place. If such an event should occur, which I confess I do not consider under present circumstances to be very probable, you may direct General Graham to join you with the whole of his force, with the exception of about 1200 or 1500 men. You must in this event endeavour to arrange the question of command between him and Spencer in some way which will be as little unsatisfactory as circumstances will admit to both of them.

You will have heard by the two last mails of the unfortunate indisposition of the King: the reports of all the physicians who attend him are so far favourable that they agree in giving the most confident expectations of his recovery. I trust this event will happen speedily, and before it can be necessary to take any steps for filling up the defect in the Royal authority; for I am thoroughly convinced that if a Regency is once established, the King never will recover. The public feeling on the occasion is as good as possible: the two Houses were most fully attended on Thursday last, and every disposition was manifested to give fair confidence to the government, and to resist any premature investigation into the circumstances of His Majesty's illness. I trust in God I shall be able to make a more satisfactory report to you of the King's situation when I write next week, and that it will not be necessary to meet Parliament on the 29th, except for the purpose of proroguing it.

Believe me to be, with sincere regard,
My dear Lord Wellington,
Very faithfully yours,
LIVERPOOL.

G. O. Cartaxo, 23rd Nov., 1810. [383.]

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the commanding officers of regiments will inform the soldiers that the wine casks are a most valuable property to the people of this country, and he desires that they may not be destroyed.

WELLINGTON.

Col. Torrens to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY LORD, Horse Guards, 24th Nov., 1810.

I am directed by the Commander in Chief to acquaint your Lordship that Colonel Downie, who is about to raise a legion of 3000 men in the province of Estremadura, has been permitted by the Spanish government to have the assistance of some British officers, who are to be employed on the same footing as those who have been allowed to serve in the Portuguese army, *without any additional rank in the British service;* and Sir David Dundas leaves it to your Lordship's discretion to give Colonel Downie the assistance he may require from amongst the officers under your command, who may be spared consistently with the discipline of the battalions to which they belong.

I have, &c.,

H. TORRENS.

G. O. Cartaxo, 26th Nov., 1810. [384.]

2. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers and commanding officers of regiments will take measures to prevent the soldiers from using the doors and windows, and pulling down the timbers of the houses, for firewood.

The consequence will be that the soldiers will be without quarters, besides the serious injury that these practices occasion to the inhabitants of the country.

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Cartaxo, 27th Nov., 1810. [385.]

1. The Commander of the Forces reminds the commanding officers of regiments of the inconvenience which the troops have experienced from the want of salt occasionally during the campaign, and he urges them and the officers commanding companies to make their men take care of the salt which they receive occasionally with their salt meat.

WELLINGTON.

[386.] *To Lieut.-Col. ———.*

DEAR ———, Cartaxo, 29th Nov., 1810.

I have received your letter of yesterday, and I am much concerned to find that you still entertain the same notions as when you left us. I can only repeat what I have frequently told you, that you have allowed the misfortunes of your brother to work upon your mind till it has lost all its energy, and it has received impressions which ought never to have been made upon it. Nothing but a disturbed imagination could induce you to believe that you are suspected of crimes of which it is quite impossible that you should be guilty; and I write the language of truth when I tell you that time must elapse and great attention must be paid to you before you can be restored to that way of thinking which is necessary in those who are to conduct the business of the world. I therefore not only consent but I recommend to you to return to England to your father, where alone you can receive that care and attention which I hope and believe will restore you to a right way of thinking.

As for me, I can assure you that I have no feelings but those of sorrow and regret that I should have been deprived of your assistance at this moment by a calamity which has been occasioned by your suffering your mind to droop and give way upon the misfortunes of your brother.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[387.] *To the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, Cartaxo, 30th Nov., 1810.

It is very desirable that you should have some inquiry made regarding the requisitions which have been made for supplies of different kinds either by me or the heads of departments since the month of April last, and the measures which have been adopted to comply with them, and the state of forwardness in which those measures are at present. The orders go from your office very regularly; but I imagine that either the inferior departments do not attend to the early execution of them, or that measures are not adopted to force the vessels to sail when the supplies are embarked, as a great length of time elapses before

the supplies arrive here after the receipt of the requisition has been acknowledged.

Some articles of provision required by Mr. Kennedy in June last have not yet arrived; and others are still wanting, required by the chief engineer even at a more distant date.

From what I have seen of the service, I am convinced that much benefit would result from tracing the mode of execution of two or three different orders from the moment of their issue from the Secretary of State's office to the period of the arrival of the articles in the Tagus.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Isla de Leon, 2nd Dec., 1810.

This morning I received an official letter from M. de Bardaxi, stating that as troops were much wanted here, the Council of Regency had determined to bring the Marques de la Romana's army from Portugal to Cadiz, and requesting that I would write to you for transports for their conveyance. I immediately went to the Regency and represented the injurious consequences which might ensue from such a measure during the actual state of the armies in Portugal, and I strongly urged the necessity of your being previously consulted. In consequence of this representation I have just received the enclosed letter from M. de Bardaxi, and I have only to advise you to keep the Spanish troops as long as you think they will be of any use to you. If they are of no service in Portugal, it certainly would be very desirable to have them here, if it were only to garrison Cadiz, where I am afraid that no progress will be made in the new levies without the interference of troops, or, at least, unless the inhabitants are kept in order by a strong garrison. There does not appear, however, to be anything like disaffection, but there is certainly a great unwillingness to enlist. I have no news to tell you. My last letters from you are of the 21st November.

Ever yours most affectionately,

H. WELLESLEY.

The sickness at Cadiz continues to abate; indeed I believe that there are scarcely any traces of it remaining.

If you have anything to suggest with regard to the employment of the Marques de la Romana's army, you had better state it in your answer to this letter, as, although you may not be desirous of its continuance in Portugal, it is very possible you may think it would be better employed elsewhere than at Cadiz.

The French continue to threaten an attack.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Don Eusebio de Bardaxi y Ayara to the British Minister.

SIR, Isla de Leon, 2nd Dec., 1810.

The great importance of insuring more and more the defence of the Isla de Leon and Cadiz has suggested to the Council of Regency the resolution of augmenting considerably the number of troops which compose this garrison; and inasmuch as amongst the several armies which Spain at present possesses, there is not one which can be disposed of for the above object with greater utility and less risk than the corps of Spanish troops commanded by the Marques de la Romana in Portugal, His Highness orders me to tell you, Sir, that he has determined to send an order to the said Marques to embark with his division at Lisbon, and remove to this island.

Such a determination appears to be so much the more right and opportune, as the late retreat of General Masséna puts Lord Wellington beyond all risk of being attacked for some time. Notwithstanding, as the corps of the Marques de la Romana is at this time co-operating with the British army, the Council of Regency by no means wishes that this measure should be adopted without the consent of Lord Wellington. On this account I entreat you, Sir, to be so good as to make his Excellency acquainted with this measure, to the end that, being informed of the reasons which induce His Highness to adopt it, and provided that the carrying of it into effect produces no inconvenience to the plan of operations which it may be proposed to follow against the enemy, his Excellency may consent to it, and, moreover, may have the goodness to furnish the vessels necessary for the embarkation of the Marques de la Romana and the division under his command.

I repeat to you, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

EUSEBIO DE BARDAXI Y AYARA.

[388.] *To Charles Stuart, Esq.*

MY DEAR SIR, Cartaxo, 3rd Dec., 1810.

——'s conduct is certainly very extraordinary, and he is quite insane. I hear that when he returned from the packet he said there was a conspiracy against him on board, and burst out crying before all the ladies as they were coming out of church, who dispersed in the greatest alarm. I send you a duplicate of the despatch which he has got, which I request you to send by the first opportunity, as it is not impossible that any alarm may induce him to throw overboard that which he has. Let me know if he has likewise the despatch of the 1st of December.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lieut.-Gen. Viscount Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, London, 4th Dec., 1810.

We received yesterday your despatches of the 21st ultimo, with the intelligence of Masséna's retreat.* This event has given great satisfaction here. At the same time we are anxious to learn what are the precise objects of this measure, whether it has not been principally adopted for the purpose of enabling him to communicate with his reinforcements, and whether it is not his intention to endeavour to establish his winter quarters on the banks of the Zezere. I should hope that the next accounts would give us some further information as to these points. In the mean time, if you feel yourself *quite* secure for the next six months, it would be very desirable to make as large a saving as possible during that period under the head of transports. You are of course aware that our great difficulty is *money*, and it is of the utmost importance that the excess on some branches of service should be provided for by a reduction on those of others.

We had a most disagreeable scene in the two Houses of Parliament on Thursday last; the feelings and temper of the country are, however, as good as possible, and our majorities were respectable. The King has been gradually getting better for the last five days, and we begin, therefore, to hope that measures for a Regency will not be necessary. The conduct of Lord Grenville on this occasion is beyond anything we could have conceived to be possible; Canning was not in the House, and his friends did not vote; Lord Sidmouth and his friends most zealous with us; Castlereagh likewise with us.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

G. O. Cartaxo, 5th Dec., 1810. [389.]

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers and the Commanding officers of regiments will take measures to prevent the troops under their command from cutting the olive and other fruit trees for fire wood.

2. Parties on fatigue from each regiment should be sent out every morning to cut the quantity of wood required for fires; and as there is no want of fire wood in the neighbourhood of all the cantonments, there can be no occasion for cutting the olive trees for that purpose.

WELLINGTON.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. vi., p. 629.

END OF VOL. VI.

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